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/*------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
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* |
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* usercontext.c |
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* Convenience functions for running code as a different database user. |
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* |
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* Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2025, PostgreSQL Global Development Group |
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* Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California |
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* |
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* |
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* IDENTIFICATION |
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* src/backend/utils/init/usercontext.c |
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* |
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*------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
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*/ |
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#include "postgres.h" |
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|
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#include "miscadmin.h" |
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#include "utils/acl.h" |
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#include "utils/guc.h" |
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#include "utils/usercontext.h" |
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|
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/* |
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* Temporarily switch to a new user ID. |
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* |
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* If the current user doesn't have permission to SET ROLE to the new user, |
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* an ERROR occurs. |
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* |
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* If the new user doesn't have permission to SET ROLE to the current user, |
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* SECURITY_RESTRICTED_OPERATION is imposed and a new GUC nest level is |
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* created so that any settings changes can be rolled back. |
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*/ |
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void |
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SwitchToUntrustedUser(Oid userid, UserContext *context) |
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{ |
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/* Get the current user ID and security context. */ |
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GetUserIdAndSecContext(&context->save_userid, |
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&context->save_sec_context); |
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|
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/* Check that we have sufficient privileges to assume the target role. */ |
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if (!member_can_set_role(context->save_userid, userid)) |
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ereport(ERROR, |
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(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE), |
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errmsg("role \"%s\" cannot SET ROLE to \"%s\"", |
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GetUserNameFromId(context->save_userid, false), |
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GetUserNameFromId(userid, false)))); |
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|
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/* |
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* Try to prevent the user to which we're switching from assuming the |
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* privileges of the current user, unless they can SET ROLE to that user |
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* anyway. |
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*/ |
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if (member_can_set_role(userid, context->save_userid)) |
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{ |
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/* |
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* Each user can SET ROLE to the other, so there's no point in |
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* imposing any security restrictions. Just let the user do whatever |
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* they want. |
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*/ |
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SetUserIdAndSecContext(userid, context->save_sec_context); |
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context->save_nestlevel = -1; |
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} |
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else |
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{ |
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int sec_context = context->save_sec_context; |
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|
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/* |
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* This user can SET ROLE to the target user, but not the other way |
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* around, so protect ourselves against the target user by setting |
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* SECURITY_RESTRICTED_OPERATION to prevent certain changes to the |
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* session state. Also set up a new GUC nest level, so that we can |
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* roll back any GUC changes that may be made by code running as the |
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* target user, inasmuch as they could be malicious. |
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* |
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* Unlike most use of SECURITY_RESTRICTED_OPERATION, this opts not to |
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* use RestrictSearchPath(). Calling it would just stop the current |
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* user from attacking "userid", but we've already established that |
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* the current user could just SET ROLE to "userid". Calling it would |
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* be a compatibility break. |
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*/ |
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sec_context |= SECURITY_RESTRICTED_OPERATION; |
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SetUserIdAndSecContext(userid, sec_context); |
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context->save_nestlevel = NewGUCNestLevel(); |
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} |
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} |
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|
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/* |
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* Switch back to the original user ID. |
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* |
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* If we created a new GUC nest level, also roll back any changes that were |
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* made within it. |
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*/ |
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void |
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RestoreUserContext(UserContext *context) |
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{ |
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if (context->save_nestlevel != -1) |
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AtEOXact_GUC(false, context->save_nestlevel); |
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SetUserIdAndSecContext(context->save_userid, context->save_sec_context); |
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} |