| 1 |
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 2 |
* |
| 3 |
* backend_startup.c |
| 4 |
* Backend startup code |
| 5 |
* |
| 6 |
* Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2025, PostgreSQL Global Development Group |
| 7 |
* Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California |
| 8 |
* |
| 9 |
* |
| 10 |
* IDENTIFICATION |
| 11 |
* src/backend/tcop/backend_startup.c |
| 12 |
* |
| 13 |
*------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 14 |
*/ |
| 15 |
|
| 16 |
#include "postgres.h" |
| 17 |
|
| 18 |
#include <unistd.h> |
| 19 |
|
| 20 |
#include "access/xlog.h" |
| 21 |
#include "access/xlogrecovery.h" |
| 22 |
#include "common/ip.h" |
| 23 |
#include "common/string.h" |
| 24 |
#include "libpq/libpq.h" |
| 25 |
#include "libpq/libpq-be.h" |
| 26 |
#include "libpq/pqformat.h" |
| 27 |
#include "libpq/pqsignal.h" |
| 28 |
#include "miscadmin.h" |
| 29 |
#include "postmaster/postmaster.h" |
| 30 |
#include "replication/walsender.h" |
| 31 |
#include "storage/fd.h" |
| 32 |
#include "storage/ipc.h" |
| 33 |
#include "storage/procsignal.h" |
| 34 |
#include "storage/proc.h" |
| 35 |
#include "tcop/backend_startup.h" |
| 36 |
#include "tcop/tcopprot.h" |
| 37 |
#include "utils/builtins.h" |
| 38 |
#include "utils/guc_hooks.h" |
| 39 |
#include "utils/injection_point.h" |
| 40 |
#include "utils/memutils.h" |
| 41 |
#include "utils/ps_status.h" |
| 42 |
#include "utils/timeout.h" |
| 43 |
#include "utils/varlena.h" |
| 44 |
|
| 45 |
/* GUCs */ |
| 46 |
bool Trace_connection_negotiation = false; |
| 47 |
uint32 log_connections = 0; |
| 48 |
char *log_connections_string = NULL; |
| 49 |
|
| 50 |
/* Other globals */ |
| 51 |
|
| 52 |
/* |
| 53 |
* ConnectionTiming stores timestamps of various points in connection |
| 54 |
* establishment and setup. |
| 55 |
* ready_for_use is initialized to a special value here so we can check if |
| 56 |
* we've already set it before doing so in PostgresMain(). |
| 57 |
*/ |
| 58 |
ConnectionTiming conn_timing = {.ready_for_use = TIMESTAMP_MINUS_INFINITY}; |
| 59 |
|
| 60 |
static void BackendInitialize(ClientSocket *client_sock, CAC_state cac); |
| 61 |
static int ProcessSSLStartup(Port *port); |
| 62 |
static int ProcessStartupPacket(Port *port, bool ssl_done, bool gss_done); |
| 63 |
static void ProcessCancelRequestPacket(Port *port, void *pkt, int pktlen); |
| 64 |
static void SendNegotiateProtocolVersion(List *unrecognized_protocol_options); |
| 65 |
static void process_startup_packet_die(SIGNAL_ARGS); |
| 66 |
static void StartupPacketTimeoutHandler(void); |
| 67 |
static bool validate_log_connections_options(List *elemlist, uint32 *flags); |
| 68 |
|
| 69 |
/* |
| 70 |
* Entry point for a new backend process. |
| 71 |
* |
| 72 |
* Initialize the connection, read the startup packet, authenticate the |
| 73 |
* client, and start the main processing loop. |
| 74 |
*/ |
| 75 |
void |
| 76 |
BackendMain(const void *startup_data, size_t startup_data_len) |
| 77 |
{ |
| 78 |
const BackendStartupData *bsdata = startup_data; |
| 79 |
|
| 80 |
Assert(startup_data_len == sizeof(BackendStartupData)); |
| 81 |
Assert(MyClientSocket != NULL); |
| 82 |
|
| 83 |
#ifdef EXEC_BACKEND |
| 84 |
|
| 85 |
/* |
| 86 |
* Need to reinitialize the SSL library in the backend, since the context |
| 87 |
* structures contain function pointers and cannot be passed through the |
| 88 |
* parameter file. |
| 89 |
* |
| 90 |
* If for some reason reload fails (maybe the user installed broken key |
| 91 |
* files), soldier on without SSL; that's better than all connections |
| 92 |
* becoming impossible. |
| 93 |
* |
| 94 |
* XXX should we do this in all child processes? For the moment it's |
| 95 |
* enough to do it in backend children. |
| 96 |
*/ |
| 97 |
#ifdef USE_SSL |
| 98 |
if (EnableSSL) |
| 99 |
{ |
| 100 |
if (secure_initialize(false) == 0) |
| 101 |
LoadedSSL = true; |
| 102 |
else |
| 103 |
ereport(LOG, |
| 104 |
(errmsg("SSL configuration could not be loaded in child process"))); |
| 105 |
} |
| 106 |
#endif |
| 107 |
#endif |
| 108 |
|
| 109 |
/* Perform additional initialization and collect startup packet */ |
| 110 |
BackendInitialize(MyClientSocket, bsdata->canAcceptConnections); |
| 111 |
|
| 112 |
/* |
| 113 |
* Create a per-backend PGPROC struct in shared memory. We must do this |
| 114 |
* before we can use LWLocks or access any shared memory. |
| 115 |
*/ |
| 116 |
InitProcess(); |
| 117 |
|
| 118 |
/* |
| 119 |
* Make sure we aren't in PostmasterContext anymore. (We can't delete it |
| 120 |
* just yet, though, because InitPostgres will need the HBA data.) |
| 121 |
*/ |
| 122 |
MemoryContextSwitchTo(TopMemoryContext); |
| 123 |
|
| 124 |
PostgresMain(MyProcPort->database_name, MyProcPort->user_name); |
| 125 |
} |
| 126 |
|
| 127 |
|
| 128 |
/* |
| 129 |
* BackendInitialize -- initialize an interactive (postmaster-child) |
| 130 |
* backend process, and collect the client's startup packet. |
| 131 |
* |
| 132 |
* returns: nothing. Will not return at all if there's any failure. |
| 133 |
* |
| 134 |
* Note: this code does not depend on having any access to shared memory. |
| 135 |
* Indeed, our approach to SIGTERM/timeout handling *requires* that |
| 136 |
* shared memory not have been touched yet; see comments within. |
| 137 |
* In the EXEC_BACKEND case, we are physically attached to shared memory |
| 138 |
* but have not yet set up most of our local pointers to shmem structures. |
| 139 |
*/ |
| 140 |
static void |
| 141 |
BackendInitialize(ClientSocket *client_sock, CAC_state cac) |
| 142 |
{ |
| 143 |
int status; |
| 144 |
int ret; |
| 145 |
Port *port; |
| 146 |
char remote_host[NI_MAXHOST]; |
| 147 |
char remote_port[NI_MAXSERV]; |
| 148 |
StringInfoData ps_data; |
| 149 |
MemoryContext oldcontext; |
| 150 |
|
| 151 |
/* Tell fd.c about the long-lived FD associated with the client_sock */ |
| 152 |
ReserveExternalFD(); |
| 153 |
|
| 154 |
/* |
| 155 |
* PreAuthDelay is a debugging aid for investigating problems in the |
| 156 |
* authentication cycle: it can be set in postgresql.conf to allow time to |
| 157 |
* attach to the newly-forked backend with a debugger. (See also |
| 158 |
* PostAuthDelay, which we allow clients to pass through PGOPTIONS, but it |
| 159 |
* is not honored until after authentication.) |
| 160 |
*/ |
| 161 |
if (PreAuthDelay > 0) |
| 162 |
pg_usleep(PreAuthDelay * 1000000L); |
| 163 |
|
| 164 |
/* This flag will remain set until InitPostgres finishes authentication */ |
| 165 |
ClientAuthInProgress = true; /* limit visibility of log messages */ |
| 166 |
|
| 167 |
/* |
| 168 |
* Initialize libpq and enable reporting of ereport errors to the client. |
| 169 |
* Must do this now because authentication uses libpq to send messages. |
| 170 |
* |
| 171 |
* The Port structure and all data structures attached to it are allocated |
| 172 |
* in TopMemoryContext, so that they survive into PostgresMain execution. |
| 173 |
* We need not worry about leaking this storage on failure, since we |
| 174 |
* aren't in the postmaster process anymore. |
| 175 |
*/ |
| 176 |
oldcontext = MemoryContextSwitchTo(TopMemoryContext); |
| 177 |
port = MyProcPort = pq_init(client_sock); |
| 178 |
MemoryContextSwitchTo(oldcontext); |
| 179 |
|
| 180 |
whereToSendOutput = DestRemote; /* now safe to ereport to client */ |
| 181 |
|
| 182 |
/* set these to empty in case they are needed before we set them up */ |
| 183 |
port->remote_host = ""; |
| 184 |
port->remote_port = ""; |
| 185 |
|
| 186 |
/* |
| 187 |
* We arrange to do _exit(1) if we receive SIGTERM or timeout while trying |
| 188 |
* to collect the startup packet; while SIGQUIT results in _exit(2). |
| 189 |
* Otherwise the postmaster cannot shutdown the database FAST or IMMED |
| 190 |
* cleanly if a buggy client fails to send the packet promptly. |
| 191 |
* |
| 192 |
* Exiting with _exit(1) is only possible because we have not yet touched |
| 193 |
* shared memory; therefore no outside-the-process state needs to get |
| 194 |
* cleaned up. |
| 195 |
*/ |
| 196 |
pqsignal(SIGTERM, process_startup_packet_die); |
| 197 |
/* SIGQUIT handler was already set up by InitPostmasterChild */ |
| 198 |
InitializeTimeouts(); /* establishes SIGALRM handler */ |
| 199 |
sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &StartupBlockSig, NULL); |
| 200 |
|
| 201 |
/* |
| 202 |
* Get the remote host name and port for logging and status display. |
| 203 |
*/ |
| 204 |
remote_host[0] = '\0'; |
| 205 |
remote_port[0] = '\0'; |
| 206 |
if ((ret = pg_getnameinfo_all(&port->raddr.addr, port->raddr.salen, |
| 207 |
remote_host, sizeof(remote_host), |
| 208 |
remote_port, sizeof(remote_port), |
| 209 |
(log_hostname ? 0 : NI_NUMERICHOST) | NI_NUMERICSERV)) != 0) |
| 210 |
ereport(WARNING, |
| 211 |
(errmsg_internal("pg_getnameinfo_all() failed: %s", |
| 212 |
gai_strerror(ret)))); |
| 213 |
|
| 214 |
/* |
| 215 |
* Save remote_host and remote_port in port structure (after this, they |
| 216 |
* will appear in log_line_prefix data for log messages). |
| 217 |
*/ |
| 218 |
port->remote_host = MemoryContextStrdup(TopMemoryContext, remote_host); |
| 219 |
port->remote_port = MemoryContextStrdup(TopMemoryContext, remote_port); |
| 220 |
|
| 221 |
/* And now we can log that the connection was received, if enabled */ |
| 222 |
if (log_connections & LOG_CONNECTION_RECEIPT) |
| 223 |
{ |
| 224 |
if (remote_port[0]) |
| 225 |
ereport(LOG, |
| 226 |
(errmsg("connection received: host=%s port=%s", |
| 227 |
remote_host, |
| 228 |
remote_port))); |
| 229 |
else |
| 230 |
ereport(LOG, |
| 231 |
(errmsg("connection received: host=%s", |
| 232 |
remote_host))); |
| 233 |
} |
| 234 |
|
| 235 |
/* For testing client error handling */ |
| 236 |
#ifdef USE_INJECTION_POINTS |
| 237 |
INJECTION_POINT("backend-initialize", NULL); |
| 238 |
if (IS_INJECTION_POINT_ATTACHED("backend-initialize-v2-error")) |
| 239 |
{ |
| 240 |
/* |
| 241 |
* This simulates an early error from a pre-v14 server, which used the |
| 242 |
* version 2 protocol for any errors that occurred before processing |
| 243 |
* the startup packet. |
| 244 |
*/ |
| 245 |
FrontendProtocol = PG_PROTOCOL(2, 0); |
| 246 |
elog(FATAL, "protocol version 2 error triggered"); |
| 247 |
} |
| 248 |
#endif |
| 249 |
|
| 250 |
/* |
| 251 |
* If we did a reverse lookup to name, we might as well save the results |
| 252 |
* rather than possibly repeating the lookup during authentication. |
| 253 |
* |
| 254 |
* Note that we don't want to specify NI_NAMEREQD above, because then we'd |
| 255 |
* get nothing useful for a client without an rDNS entry. Therefore, we |
| 256 |
* must check whether we got a numeric IPv4 or IPv6 address, and not save |
| 257 |
* it into remote_hostname if so. (This test is conservative and might |
| 258 |
* sometimes classify a hostname as numeric, but an error in that |
| 259 |
* direction is safe; it only results in a possible extra lookup.) |
| 260 |
*/ |
| 261 |
if (log_hostname && |
| 262 |
ret == 0 && |
| 263 |
strspn(remote_host, "0123456789.") < strlen(remote_host) && |
| 264 |
strspn(remote_host, "0123456789ABCDEFabcdef:") < strlen(remote_host)) |
| 265 |
{ |
| 266 |
port->remote_hostname = MemoryContextStrdup(TopMemoryContext, remote_host); |
| 267 |
} |
| 268 |
|
| 269 |
/* |
| 270 |
* Ready to begin client interaction. We will give up and _exit(1) after |
| 271 |
* a time delay, so that a broken client can't hog a connection |
| 272 |
* indefinitely. PreAuthDelay and any DNS interactions above don't count |
| 273 |
* against the time limit. |
| 274 |
* |
| 275 |
* Note: AuthenticationTimeout is applied here while waiting for the |
| 276 |
* startup packet, and then again in InitPostgres for the duration of any |
| 277 |
* authentication operations. So a hostile client could tie up the |
| 278 |
* process for nearly twice AuthenticationTimeout before we kick him off. |
| 279 |
* |
| 280 |
* Note: because PostgresMain will call InitializeTimeouts again, the |
| 281 |
* registration of STARTUP_PACKET_TIMEOUT will be lost. This is okay |
| 282 |
* since we never use it again after this function. |
| 283 |
*/ |
| 284 |
RegisterTimeout(STARTUP_PACKET_TIMEOUT, StartupPacketTimeoutHandler); |
| 285 |
enable_timeout_after(STARTUP_PACKET_TIMEOUT, AuthenticationTimeout * 1000); |
| 286 |
|
| 287 |
/* Handle direct SSL handshake */ |
| 288 |
status = ProcessSSLStartup(port); |
| 289 |
|
| 290 |
/* |
| 291 |
* Receive the startup packet (which might turn out to be a cancel request |
| 292 |
* packet). |
| 293 |
*/ |
| 294 |
if (status == STATUS_OK) |
| 295 |
status = ProcessStartupPacket(port, false, false); |
| 296 |
|
| 297 |
/* |
| 298 |
* If we're going to reject the connection due to database state, say so |
| 299 |
* now instead of wasting cycles on an authentication exchange. (This also |
| 300 |
* allows a pg_ping utility to be written.) |
| 301 |
*/ |
| 302 |
if (status == STATUS_OK) |
| 303 |
{ |
| 304 |
switch (cac) |
| 305 |
{ |
| 306 |
case CAC_STARTUP: |
| 307 |
ereport(FATAL, |
| 308 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_CANNOT_CONNECT_NOW), |
| 309 |
errmsg("the database system is starting up"))); |
| 310 |
break; |
| 311 |
case CAC_NOTHOTSTANDBY: |
| 312 |
if (!EnableHotStandby) |
| 313 |
ereport(FATAL, |
| 314 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_CANNOT_CONNECT_NOW), |
| 315 |
errmsg("the database system is not accepting connections"), |
| 316 |
errdetail("Hot standby mode is disabled."))); |
| 317 |
else if (reachedConsistency) |
| 318 |
ereport(FATAL, |
| 319 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_CANNOT_CONNECT_NOW), |
| 320 |
errmsg("the database system is not yet accepting connections"), |
| 321 |
errdetail("Recovery snapshot is not yet ready for hot standby."), |
| 322 |
errhint("To enable hot standby, close write transactions with more than %d subtransactions on the primary server.", |
| 323 |
PGPROC_MAX_CACHED_SUBXIDS))); |
| 324 |
else |
| 325 |
ereport(FATAL, |
| 326 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_CANNOT_CONNECT_NOW), |
| 327 |
errmsg("the database system is not yet accepting connections"), |
| 328 |
errdetail("Consistent recovery state has not been yet reached."))); |
| 329 |
break; |
| 330 |
case CAC_SHUTDOWN: |
| 331 |
ereport(FATAL, |
| 332 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_CANNOT_CONNECT_NOW), |
| 333 |
errmsg("the database system is shutting down"))); |
| 334 |
break; |
| 335 |
case CAC_RECOVERY: |
| 336 |
ereport(FATAL, |
| 337 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_CANNOT_CONNECT_NOW), |
| 338 |
errmsg("the database system is in recovery mode"))); |
| 339 |
break; |
| 340 |
case CAC_TOOMANY: |
| 341 |
ereport(FATAL, |
| 342 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_TOO_MANY_CONNECTIONS), |
| 343 |
errmsg("sorry, too many clients already"))); |
| 344 |
break; |
| 345 |
case CAC_OK: |
| 346 |
break; |
| 347 |
} |
| 348 |
} |
| 349 |
|
| 350 |
/* |
| 351 |
* Disable the timeout, and prevent SIGTERM again. |
| 352 |
*/ |
| 353 |
disable_timeout(STARTUP_PACKET_TIMEOUT, false); |
| 354 |
sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &BlockSig, NULL); |
| 355 |
|
| 356 |
/* |
| 357 |
* As a safety check that nothing in startup has yet performed |
| 358 |
* shared-memory modifications that would need to be undone if we had |
| 359 |
* exited through SIGTERM or timeout above, check that no on_shmem_exit |
| 360 |
* handlers have been registered yet. (This isn't terribly bulletproof, |
| 361 |
* since someone might misuse an on_proc_exit handler for shmem cleanup, |
| 362 |
* but it's a cheap and helpful check. We cannot disallow on_proc_exit |
| 363 |
* handlers unfortunately, since pq_init() already registered one.) |
| 364 |
*/ |
| 365 |
check_on_shmem_exit_lists_are_empty(); |
| 366 |
|
| 367 |
/* |
| 368 |
* Stop here if it was bad or a cancel packet. ProcessStartupPacket |
| 369 |
* already did any appropriate error reporting. |
| 370 |
*/ |
| 371 |
if (status != STATUS_OK) |
| 372 |
proc_exit(0); |
| 373 |
|
| 374 |
/* |
| 375 |
* Now that we have the user and database name, we can set the process |
| 376 |
* title for ps. It's good to do this as early as possible in startup. |
| 377 |
*/ |
| 378 |
initStringInfo(&ps_data); |
| 379 |
if (am_walsender) |
| 380 |
appendStringInfo(&ps_data, "%s ", GetBackendTypeDesc(B_WAL_SENDER)); |
| 381 |
appendStringInfo(&ps_data, "%s ", port->user_name); |
| 382 |
if (port->database_name[0] != '\0') |
| 383 |
appendStringInfo(&ps_data, "%s ", port->database_name); |
| 384 |
appendStringInfoString(&ps_data, port->remote_host); |
| 385 |
if (port->remote_port[0] != '\0') |
| 386 |
appendStringInfo(&ps_data, "(%s)", port->remote_port); |
| 387 |
|
| 388 |
init_ps_display(ps_data.data); |
| 389 |
pfree(ps_data.data); |
| 390 |
|
| 391 |
set_ps_display("initializing"); |
| 392 |
} |
| 393 |
|
| 394 |
/* |
| 395 |
* Check for a direct SSL connection. |
| 396 |
* |
| 397 |
* This happens before the startup packet so we are careful not to actually |
| 398 |
* read any bytes from the stream if it's not a direct SSL connection. |
| 399 |
*/ |
| 400 |
static int |
| 401 |
ProcessSSLStartup(Port *port) |
| 402 |
{ |
| 403 |
int firstbyte; |
| 404 |
|
| 405 |
Assert(!port->ssl_in_use); |
| 406 |
|
| 407 |
pq_startmsgread(); |
| 408 |
firstbyte = pq_peekbyte(); |
| 409 |
pq_endmsgread(); |
| 410 |
if (firstbyte == EOF) |
| 411 |
{ |
| 412 |
/* |
| 413 |
* Like in ProcessStartupPacket, if we get no data at all, don't |
| 414 |
* clutter the log with a complaint. |
| 415 |
*/ |
| 416 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 417 |
} |
| 418 |
|
| 419 |
if (firstbyte != 0x16) |
| 420 |
{ |
| 421 |
/* Not an SSL handshake message */ |
| 422 |
return STATUS_OK; |
| 423 |
} |
| 424 |
|
| 425 |
/* |
| 426 |
* First byte indicates standard SSL handshake message |
| 427 |
* |
| 428 |
* (It can't be a Postgres startup length because in network byte order |
| 429 |
* that would be a startup packet hundreds of megabytes long) |
| 430 |
*/ |
| 431 |
|
| 432 |
#ifdef USE_SSL |
| 433 |
if (!LoadedSSL || port->laddr.addr.ss_family == AF_UNIX) |
| 434 |
{ |
| 435 |
/* SSL not supported */ |
| 436 |
goto reject; |
| 437 |
} |
| 438 |
|
| 439 |
if (secure_open_server(port) == -1) |
| 440 |
{ |
| 441 |
/* |
| 442 |
* we assume secure_open_server() sent an appropriate TLS alert |
| 443 |
* already |
| 444 |
*/ |
| 445 |
goto reject; |
| 446 |
} |
| 447 |
Assert(port->ssl_in_use); |
| 448 |
|
| 449 |
if (!port->alpn_used) |
| 450 |
{ |
| 451 |
ereport(COMMERROR, |
| 452 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION), |
| 453 |
errmsg("received direct SSL connection request without ALPN protocol negotiation extension"))); |
| 454 |
goto reject; |
| 455 |
} |
| 456 |
|
| 457 |
if (Trace_connection_negotiation) |
| 458 |
ereport(LOG, |
| 459 |
(errmsg("direct SSL connection accepted"))); |
| 460 |
return STATUS_OK; |
| 461 |
#else |
| 462 |
/* SSL not supported by this build */ |
| 463 |
goto reject; |
| 464 |
#endif |
| 465 |
|
| 466 |
reject: |
| 467 |
if (Trace_connection_negotiation) |
| 468 |
ereport(LOG, |
| 469 |
(errmsg("direct SSL connection rejected"))); |
| 470 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 471 |
} |
| 472 |
|
| 473 |
/* |
| 474 |
* Read a client's startup packet and do something according to it. |
| 475 |
* |
| 476 |
* Returns STATUS_OK or STATUS_ERROR, or might call ereport(FATAL) and |
| 477 |
* not return at all. |
| 478 |
* |
| 479 |
* (Note that ereport(FATAL) stuff is sent to the client, so only use it |
| 480 |
* if that's what you want. Return STATUS_ERROR if you don't want to |
| 481 |
* send anything to the client, which would typically be appropriate |
| 482 |
* if we detect a communications failure.) |
| 483 |
* |
| 484 |
* Set ssl_done and/or gss_done when negotiation of an encrypted layer |
| 485 |
* (currently, TLS or GSSAPI) is completed. A successful negotiation of either |
| 486 |
* encryption layer sets both flags, but a rejected negotiation sets only the |
| 487 |
* flag for that layer, since the client may wish to try the other one. We |
| 488 |
* should make no assumption here about the order in which the client may make |
| 489 |
* requests. |
| 490 |
*/ |
| 491 |
static int |
| 492 |
ProcessStartupPacket(Port *port, bool ssl_done, bool gss_done) |
| 493 |
{ |
| 494 |
int32 len; |
| 495 |
char *buf; |
| 496 |
ProtocolVersion proto; |
| 497 |
MemoryContext oldcontext; |
| 498 |
|
| 499 |
retry: |
| 500 |
pq_startmsgread(); |
| 501 |
|
| 502 |
/* |
| 503 |
* Grab the first byte of the length word separately, so that we can tell |
| 504 |
* whether we have no data at all or an incomplete packet. (This might |
| 505 |
* sound inefficient, but it's not really, because of buffering in |
| 506 |
* pqcomm.c.) |
| 507 |
*/ |
| 508 |
if (pq_getbytes(&len, 1) == EOF) |
| 509 |
{ |
| 510 |
/* |
| 511 |
* If we get no data at all, don't clutter the log with a complaint; |
| 512 |
* such cases often occur for legitimate reasons. An example is that |
| 513 |
* we might be here after responding to NEGOTIATE_SSL_CODE, and if the |
| 514 |
* client didn't like our response, it'll probably just drop the |
| 515 |
* connection. Service-monitoring software also often just opens and |
| 516 |
* closes a connection without sending anything. (So do port |
| 517 |
* scanners, which may be less benign, but it's not really our job to |
| 518 |
* notice those.) |
| 519 |
*/ |
| 520 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 521 |
} |
| 522 |
|
| 523 |
if (pq_getbytes(((char *) &len) + 1, 3) == EOF) |
| 524 |
{ |
| 525 |
/* Got a partial length word, so bleat about that */ |
| 526 |
if (!ssl_done && !gss_done) |
| 527 |
ereport(COMMERROR, |
| 528 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION), |
| 529 |
errmsg("incomplete startup packet"))); |
| 530 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 531 |
} |
| 532 |
|
| 533 |
len = pg_ntoh32(len); |
| 534 |
len -= 4; |
| 535 |
|
| 536 |
if (len < (int32) sizeof(ProtocolVersion) || |
| 537 |
len > MAX_STARTUP_PACKET_LENGTH) |
| 538 |
{ |
| 539 |
ereport(COMMERROR, |
| 540 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION), |
| 541 |
errmsg("invalid length of startup packet"))); |
| 542 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 543 |
} |
| 544 |
|
| 545 |
/* |
| 546 |
* Allocate space to hold the startup packet, plus one extra byte that's |
| 547 |
* initialized to be zero. This ensures we will have null termination of |
| 548 |
* all strings inside the packet. |
| 549 |
*/ |
| 550 |
buf = palloc(len + 1); |
| 551 |
buf[len] = '\0'; |
| 552 |
|
| 553 |
if (pq_getbytes(buf, len) == EOF) |
| 554 |
{ |
| 555 |
ereport(COMMERROR, |
| 556 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION), |
| 557 |
errmsg("incomplete startup packet"))); |
| 558 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 559 |
} |
| 560 |
pq_endmsgread(); |
| 561 |
|
| 562 |
/* |
| 563 |
* The first field is either a protocol version number or a special |
| 564 |
* request code. |
| 565 |
*/ |
| 566 |
port->proto = proto = pg_ntoh32(*((ProtocolVersion *) buf)); |
| 567 |
|
| 568 |
if (proto == CANCEL_REQUEST_CODE) |
| 569 |
{ |
| 570 |
ProcessCancelRequestPacket(port, buf, len); |
| 571 |
/* Not really an error, but we don't want to proceed further */ |
| 572 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 573 |
} |
| 574 |
|
| 575 |
if (proto == NEGOTIATE_SSL_CODE && !ssl_done) |
| 576 |
{ |
| 577 |
char SSLok; |
| 578 |
|
| 579 |
#ifdef USE_SSL |
| 580 |
|
| 581 |
/* |
| 582 |
* No SSL when disabled or on Unix sockets. |
| 583 |
* |
| 584 |
* Also no SSL negotiation if we already have a direct SSL connection |
| 585 |
*/ |
| 586 |
if (!LoadedSSL || port->laddr.addr.ss_family == AF_UNIX || port->ssl_in_use) |
| 587 |
SSLok = 'N'; |
| 588 |
else |
| 589 |
SSLok = 'S'; /* Support for SSL */ |
| 590 |
#else |
| 591 |
SSLok = 'N'; /* No support for SSL */ |
| 592 |
#endif |
| 593 |
|
| 594 |
if (Trace_connection_negotiation) |
| 595 |
{ |
| 596 |
if (SSLok == 'S') |
| 597 |
ereport(LOG, |
| 598 |
(errmsg("SSLRequest accepted"))); |
| 599 |
else |
| 600 |
ereport(LOG, |
| 601 |
(errmsg("SSLRequest rejected"))); |
| 602 |
} |
| 603 |
|
| 604 |
while (secure_write(port, &SSLok, 1) != 1) |
| 605 |
{ |
| 606 |
if (errno == EINTR) |
| 607 |
continue; /* if interrupted, just retry */ |
| 608 |
ereport(COMMERROR, |
| 609 |
(errcode_for_socket_access(), |
| 610 |
errmsg("failed to send SSL negotiation response: %m"))); |
| 611 |
return STATUS_ERROR; /* close the connection */ |
| 612 |
} |
| 613 |
|
| 614 |
#ifdef USE_SSL |
| 615 |
if (SSLok == 'S' && secure_open_server(port) == -1) |
| 616 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 617 |
#endif |
| 618 |
|
| 619 |
/* |
| 620 |
* At this point we should have no data already buffered. If we do, |
| 621 |
* it was received before we performed the SSL handshake, so it wasn't |
| 622 |
* encrypted and indeed may have been injected by a man-in-the-middle. |
| 623 |
* We report this case to the client. |
| 624 |
*/ |
| 625 |
if (pq_buffer_remaining_data() > 0) |
| 626 |
ereport(FATAL, |
| 627 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION), |
| 628 |
errmsg("received unencrypted data after SSL request"), |
| 629 |
errdetail("This could be either a client-software bug or evidence of an attempted man-in-the-middle attack."))); |
| 630 |
|
| 631 |
/* |
| 632 |
* regular startup packet, cancel, etc packet should follow, but not |
| 633 |
* another SSL negotiation request, and a GSS request should only |
| 634 |
* follow if SSL was rejected (client may negotiate in either order) |
| 635 |
*/ |
| 636 |
ssl_done = true; |
| 637 |
if (SSLok == 'S') |
| 638 |
{ |
| 639 |
/* |
| 640 |
* We are done with SSL and negotiated correctly, so consider the |
| 641 |
* same for GSS. |
| 642 |
*/ |
| 643 |
gss_done = true; |
| 644 |
} |
| 645 |
goto retry; |
| 646 |
} |
| 647 |
else if (proto == NEGOTIATE_GSS_CODE && !gss_done) |
| 648 |
{ |
| 649 |
char GSSok = 'N'; |
| 650 |
|
| 651 |
#ifdef ENABLE_GSS |
| 652 |
|
| 653 |
/* |
| 654 |
* No GSSAPI encryption when on Unix socket. |
| 655 |
* |
| 656 |
* Also no GSS negotiation if we already have a direct SSL connection. |
| 657 |
*/ |
| 658 |
if (port->laddr.addr.ss_family != AF_UNIX && !port->ssl_in_use) |
| 659 |
GSSok = 'G'; |
| 660 |
#endif |
| 661 |
|
| 662 |
if (Trace_connection_negotiation) |
| 663 |
{ |
| 664 |
if (GSSok == 'G') |
| 665 |
ereport(LOG, |
| 666 |
(errmsg("GSSENCRequest accepted"))); |
| 667 |
else |
| 668 |
ereport(LOG, |
| 669 |
(errmsg("GSSENCRequest rejected"))); |
| 670 |
} |
| 671 |
|
| 672 |
while (secure_write(port, &GSSok, 1) != 1) |
| 673 |
{ |
| 674 |
if (errno == EINTR) |
| 675 |
continue; |
| 676 |
ereport(COMMERROR, |
| 677 |
(errcode_for_socket_access(), |
| 678 |
errmsg("failed to send GSSAPI negotiation response: %m"))); |
| 679 |
return STATUS_ERROR; /* close the connection */ |
| 680 |
} |
| 681 |
|
| 682 |
#ifdef ENABLE_GSS |
| 683 |
if (GSSok == 'G' && secure_open_gssapi(port) == -1) |
| 684 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 685 |
#endif |
| 686 |
|
| 687 |
/* |
| 688 |
* At this point we should have no data already buffered. If we do, |
| 689 |
* it was received before we performed the GSS handshake, so it wasn't |
| 690 |
* encrypted and indeed may have been injected by a man-in-the-middle. |
| 691 |
* We report this case to the client. |
| 692 |
*/ |
| 693 |
if (pq_buffer_remaining_data() > 0) |
| 694 |
ereport(FATAL, |
| 695 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION), |
| 696 |
errmsg("received unencrypted data after GSSAPI encryption request"), |
| 697 |
errdetail("This could be either a client-software bug or evidence of an attempted man-in-the-middle attack."))); |
| 698 |
|
| 699 |
/* |
| 700 |
* regular startup packet, cancel, etc packet should follow, but not |
| 701 |
* another GSS negotiation request, and an SSL request should only |
| 702 |
* follow if GSS was rejected (client may negotiate in either order) |
| 703 |
*/ |
| 704 |
gss_done = true; |
| 705 |
if (GSSok == 'G') |
| 706 |
{ |
| 707 |
/* |
| 708 |
* We are done with GSS and negotiated correctly, so consider the |
| 709 |
* same for SSL. |
| 710 |
*/ |
| 711 |
ssl_done = true; |
| 712 |
} |
| 713 |
goto retry; |
| 714 |
} |
| 715 |
|
| 716 |
/* Could add additional special packet types here */ |
| 717 |
|
| 718 |
/* |
| 719 |
* Set FrontendProtocol now so that ereport() knows what format to send if |
| 720 |
* we fail during startup. We use the protocol version requested by the |
| 721 |
* client unless it's higher than the latest version we support. It's |
| 722 |
* possible that error message fields might look different in newer |
| 723 |
* protocol versions, but that's something those new clients should be |
| 724 |
* able to deal with. |
| 725 |
*/ |
| 726 |
FrontendProtocol = Min(proto, PG_PROTOCOL_LATEST); |
| 727 |
|
| 728 |
/* Check that the major protocol version is in range. */ |
| 729 |
if (PG_PROTOCOL_MAJOR(proto) < PG_PROTOCOL_MAJOR(PG_PROTOCOL_EARLIEST) || |
| 730 |
PG_PROTOCOL_MAJOR(proto) > PG_PROTOCOL_MAJOR(PG_PROTOCOL_LATEST)) |
| 731 |
ereport(FATAL, |
| 732 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED), |
| 733 |
errmsg("unsupported frontend protocol %u.%u: server supports %u.0 to %u.%u", |
| 734 |
PG_PROTOCOL_MAJOR(proto), PG_PROTOCOL_MINOR(proto), |
| 735 |
PG_PROTOCOL_MAJOR(PG_PROTOCOL_EARLIEST), |
| 736 |
PG_PROTOCOL_MAJOR(PG_PROTOCOL_LATEST), |
| 737 |
PG_PROTOCOL_MINOR(PG_PROTOCOL_LATEST)))); |
| 738 |
|
| 739 |
/* |
| 740 |
* Now fetch parameters out of startup packet and save them into the Port |
| 741 |
* structure. |
| 742 |
*/ |
| 743 |
oldcontext = MemoryContextSwitchTo(TopMemoryContext); |
| 744 |
|
| 745 |
/* Handle protocol version 3 startup packet */ |
| 746 |
{ |
| 747 |
int32 offset = sizeof(ProtocolVersion); |
| 748 |
List *unrecognized_protocol_options = NIL; |
| 749 |
|
| 750 |
/* |
| 751 |
* Scan packet body for name/option pairs. We can assume any string |
| 752 |
* beginning within the packet body is null-terminated, thanks to |
| 753 |
* zeroing extra byte above. |
| 754 |
*/ |
| 755 |
port->guc_options = NIL; |
| 756 |
|
| 757 |
while (offset < len) |
| 758 |
{ |
| 759 |
char *nameptr = buf + offset; |
| 760 |
int32 valoffset; |
| 761 |
char *valptr; |
| 762 |
|
| 763 |
if (*nameptr == '\0') |
| 764 |
break; /* found packet terminator */ |
| 765 |
valoffset = offset + strlen(nameptr) + 1; |
| 766 |
if (valoffset >= len) |
| 767 |
break; /* missing value, will complain below */ |
| 768 |
valptr = buf + valoffset; |
| 769 |
|
| 770 |
if (strcmp(nameptr, "database") == 0) |
| 771 |
port->database_name = pstrdup(valptr); |
| 772 |
else if (strcmp(nameptr, "user") == 0) |
| 773 |
port->user_name = pstrdup(valptr); |
| 774 |
else if (strcmp(nameptr, "options") == 0) |
| 775 |
port->cmdline_options = pstrdup(valptr); |
| 776 |
else if (strcmp(nameptr, "replication") == 0) |
| 777 |
{ |
| 778 |
/* |
| 779 |
* Due to backward compatibility concerns the replication |
| 780 |
* parameter is a hybrid beast which allows the value to be |
| 781 |
* either boolean or the string 'database'. The latter |
| 782 |
* connects to a specific database which is e.g. required for |
| 783 |
* logical decoding while. |
| 784 |
*/ |
| 785 |
if (strcmp(valptr, "database") == 0) |
| 786 |
{ |
| 787 |
am_walsender = true; |
| 788 |
am_db_walsender = true; |
| 789 |
} |
| 790 |
else if (!parse_bool(valptr, &am_walsender)) |
| 791 |
ereport(FATAL, |
| 792 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE), |
| 793 |
errmsg("invalid value for parameter \"%s\": \"%s\"", |
| 794 |
"replication", |
| 795 |
valptr), |
| 796 |
errhint("Valid values are: \"false\", 0, \"true\", 1, \"database\"."))); |
| 797 |
} |
| 798 |
else if (strncmp(nameptr, "_pq_.", 5) == 0) |
| 799 |
{ |
| 800 |
/* |
| 801 |
* Any option beginning with _pq_. is reserved for use as a |
| 802 |
* protocol-level option, but at present no such options are |
| 803 |
* defined. |
| 804 |
*/ |
| 805 |
unrecognized_protocol_options = |
| 806 |
lappend(unrecognized_protocol_options, pstrdup(nameptr)); |
| 807 |
} |
| 808 |
else |
| 809 |
{ |
| 810 |
/* Assume it's a generic GUC option */ |
| 811 |
port->guc_options = lappend(port->guc_options, |
| 812 |
pstrdup(nameptr)); |
| 813 |
port->guc_options = lappend(port->guc_options, |
| 814 |
pstrdup(valptr)); |
| 815 |
|
| 816 |
/* |
| 817 |
* Copy application_name to port if we come across it. This |
| 818 |
* is done so we can log the application_name in the |
| 819 |
* connection authorization message. Note that the GUC would |
| 820 |
* be used but we haven't gone through GUC setup yet. |
| 821 |
*/ |
| 822 |
if (strcmp(nameptr, "application_name") == 0) |
| 823 |
{ |
| 824 |
port->application_name = pg_clean_ascii(valptr, 0); |
| 825 |
} |
| 826 |
} |
| 827 |
offset = valoffset + strlen(valptr) + 1; |
| 828 |
} |
| 829 |
|
| 830 |
/* |
| 831 |
* If we didn't find a packet terminator exactly at the end of the |
| 832 |
* given packet length, complain. |
| 833 |
*/ |
| 834 |
if (offset != len - 1) |
| 835 |
ereport(FATAL, |
| 836 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION), |
| 837 |
errmsg("invalid startup packet layout: expected terminator as last byte"))); |
| 838 |
|
| 839 |
/* |
| 840 |
* If the client requested a newer protocol version or if the client |
| 841 |
* requested any protocol options we didn't recognize, let them know |
| 842 |
* the newest minor protocol version we do support and the names of |
| 843 |
* any unrecognized options. |
| 844 |
*/ |
| 845 |
if (PG_PROTOCOL_MINOR(proto) > PG_PROTOCOL_MINOR(PG_PROTOCOL_LATEST) || |
| 846 |
unrecognized_protocol_options != NIL) |
| 847 |
SendNegotiateProtocolVersion(unrecognized_protocol_options); |
| 848 |
} |
| 849 |
|
| 850 |
/* Check a user name was given. */ |
| 851 |
if (port->user_name == NULL || port->user_name[0] == '\0') |
| 852 |
ereport(FATAL, |
| 853 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION), |
| 854 |
errmsg("no PostgreSQL user name specified in startup packet"))); |
| 855 |
|
| 856 |
/* The database defaults to the user name. */ |
| 857 |
if (port->database_name == NULL || port->database_name[0] == '\0') |
| 858 |
port->database_name = pstrdup(port->user_name); |
| 859 |
|
| 860 |
/* |
| 861 |
* Truncate given database and user names to length of a Postgres name. |
| 862 |
* This avoids lookup failures when overlength names are given. |
| 863 |
*/ |
| 864 |
if (strlen(port->database_name) >= NAMEDATALEN) |
| 865 |
port->database_name[NAMEDATALEN - 1] = '\0'; |
| 866 |
if (strlen(port->user_name) >= NAMEDATALEN) |
| 867 |
port->user_name[NAMEDATALEN - 1] = '\0'; |
| 868 |
|
| 869 |
if (am_walsender) |
| 870 |
MyBackendType = B_WAL_SENDER; |
| 871 |
else |
| 872 |
MyBackendType = B_BACKEND; |
| 873 |
|
| 874 |
/* |
| 875 |
* Normal walsender backends, e.g. for streaming replication, are not |
| 876 |
* connected to a particular database. But walsenders used for logical |
| 877 |
* replication need to connect to a specific database. We allow streaming |
| 878 |
* replication commands to be issued even if connected to a database as it |
| 879 |
* can make sense to first make a basebackup and then stream changes |
| 880 |
* starting from that. |
| 881 |
*/ |
| 882 |
if (am_walsender && !am_db_walsender) |
| 883 |
port->database_name[0] = '\0'; |
| 884 |
|
| 885 |
/* |
| 886 |
* Done filling the Port structure |
| 887 |
*/ |
| 888 |
MemoryContextSwitchTo(oldcontext); |
| 889 |
|
| 890 |
return STATUS_OK; |
| 891 |
} |
| 892 |
|
| 893 |
/* |
| 894 |
* The client has sent a cancel request packet, not a normal |
| 895 |
* start-a-new-connection packet. Perform the necessary processing. Nothing |
| 896 |
* is sent back to the client. |
| 897 |
*/ |
| 898 |
static void |
| 899 |
ProcessCancelRequestPacket(Port *port, void *pkt, int pktlen) |
| 900 |
{ |
| 901 |
CancelRequestPacket *canc; |
| 902 |
int len; |
| 903 |
|
| 904 |
if (pktlen < offsetof(CancelRequestPacket, cancelAuthCode)) |
| 905 |
{ |
| 906 |
ereport(COMMERROR, |
| 907 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION), |
| 908 |
errmsg("invalid length of cancel request packet"))); |
| 909 |
return; |
| 910 |
} |
| 911 |
len = pktlen - offsetof(CancelRequestPacket, cancelAuthCode); |
| 912 |
if (len == 0 || len > 256) |
| 913 |
{ |
| 914 |
ereport(COMMERROR, |
| 915 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION), |
| 916 |
errmsg("invalid length of cancel key in cancel request packet"))); |
| 917 |
return; |
| 918 |
} |
| 919 |
|
| 920 |
canc = (CancelRequestPacket *) pkt; |
| 921 |
SendCancelRequest(pg_ntoh32(canc->backendPID), canc->cancelAuthCode, len); |
| 922 |
} |
| 923 |
|
| 924 |
/* |
| 925 |
* Send a NegotiateProtocolVersion to the client. This lets the client know |
| 926 |
* that they have either requested a newer minor protocol version than we are |
| 927 |
* able to speak, or at least one protocol option that we don't understand, or |
| 928 |
* possibly both. FrontendProtocol has already been set to the version |
| 929 |
* requested by the client or the highest version we know how to speak, |
| 930 |
* whichever is older. If the highest version that we know how to speak is too |
| 931 |
* old for the client, it can abandon the connection. |
| 932 |
* |
| 933 |
* We also include in the response a list of protocol options we didn't |
| 934 |
* understand. This allows clients to include optional parameters that might |
| 935 |
* be present either in newer protocol versions or third-party protocol |
| 936 |
* extensions without fear of having to reconnect if those options are not |
| 937 |
* understood, while at the same time making certain that the client is aware |
| 938 |
* of which options were actually accepted. |
| 939 |
*/ |
| 940 |
static void |
| 941 |
SendNegotiateProtocolVersion(List *unrecognized_protocol_options) |
| 942 |
{ |
| 943 |
StringInfoData buf; |
| 944 |
ListCell *lc; |
| 945 |
|
| 946 |
pq_beginmessage(&buf, PqMsg_NegotiateProtocolVersion); |
| 947 |
pq_sendint32(&buf, FrontendProtocol); |
| 948 |
pq_sendint32(&buf, list_length(unrecognized_protocol_options)); |
| 949 |
foreach(lc, unrecognized_protocol_options) |
| 950 |
pq_sendstring(&buf, lfirst(lc)); |
| 951 |
pq_endmessage(&buf); |
| 952 |
|
| 953 |
/* no need to flush, some other message will follow */ |
| 954 |
} |
| 955 |
|
| 956 |
|
| 957 |
/* |
| 958 |
* SIGTERM while processing startup packet. |
| 959 |
* |
| 960 |
* Running proc_exit() from a signal handler would be quite unsafe. |
| 961 |
* However, since we have not yet touched shared memory, we can just |
| 962 |
* pull the plug and exit without running any atexit handlers. |
| 963 |
* |
| 964 |
* One might be tempted to try to send a message, or log one, indicating |
| 965 |
* why we are disconnecting. However, that would be quite unsafe in itself. |
| 966 |
* Also, it seems undesirable to provide clues about the database's state |
| 967 |
* to a client that has not yet completed authentication, or even sent us |
| 968 |
* a startup packet. |
| 969 |
*/ |
| 970 |
static void |
| 971 |
process_startup_packet_die(SIGNAL_ARGS) |
| 972 |
{ |
| 973 |
_exit(1); |
| 974 |
} |
| 975 |
|
| 976 |
/* |
| 977 |
* Timeout while processing startup packet. |
| 978 |
* As for process_startup_packet_die(), we exit via _exit(1). |
| 979 |
*/ |
| 980 |
static void |
| 981 |
StartupPacketTimeoutHandler(void) |
| 982 |
{ |
| 983 |
_exit(1); |
| 984 |
} |
| 985 |
|
| 986 |
/* |
| 987 |
* Helper for the log_connections GUC check hook. |
| 988 |
* |
| 989 |
* `elemlist` is a listified version of the string input passed to the |
| 990 |
* log_connections GUC check hook, check_log_connections(). |
| 991 |
* check_log_connections() is responsible for cleaning up `elemlist`. |
| 992 |
* |
| 993 |
* validate_log_connections_options() returns false if an error was |
| 994 |
* encountered and the GUC input could not be validated and true otherwise. |
| 995 |
* |
| 996 |
* `flags` returns the flags that should be stored in the log_connections GUC |
| 997 |
* by its assign hook. |
| 998 |
*/ |
| 999 |
static bool |
| 1000 |
validate_log_connections_options(List *elemlist, uint32 *flags) |
| 1001 |
{ |
| 1002 |
ListCell *l; |
| 1003 |
char *item; |
| 1004 |
|
| 1005 |
/* |
| 1006 |
* For backwards compatibility, we accept these tokens by themselves. |
| 1007 |
* |
| 1008 |
* Prior to PostgreSQL 18, log_connections was a boolean GUC that accepted |
| 1009 |
* any unambiguous substring of 'true', 'false', 'yes', 'no', 'on', and |
| 1010 |
* 'off'. Since log_connections became a list of strings in 18, we only |
| 1011 |
* accept complete option strings. |
| 1012 |
*/ |
| 1013 |
static const struct config_enum_entry compat_options[] = { |
| 1014 |
{"off", 0}, |
| 1015 |
{"false", 0}, |
| 1016 |
{"no", 0}, |
| 1017 |
{"0", 0}, |
| 1018 |
{"on", LOG_CONNECTION_ON}, |
| 1019 |
{"true", LOG_CONNECTION_ON}, |
| 1020 |
{"yes", LOG_CONNECTION_ON}, |
| 1021 |
{"1", LOG_CONNECTION_ON}, |
| 1022 |
}; |
| 1023 |
|
| 1024 |
*flags = 0; |
| 1025 |
|
| 1026 |
/* If an empty string was passed, we're done */ |
| 1027 |
if (list_length(elemlist) == 0) |
| 1028 |
return true; |
| 1029 |
|
| 1030 |
/* |
| 1031 |
* Now check for the backwards compatibility options. They must always be |
| 1032 |
* specified on their own, so we error out if the first option is a |
| 1033 |
* backwards compatibility option and other options are also specified. |
| 1034 |
*/ |
| 1035 |
item = linitial(elemlist); |
| 1036 |
|
| 1037 |
for (size_t i = 0; i < lengthof(compat_options); i++) |
| 1038 |
{ |
| 1039 |
struct config_enum_entry option = compat_options[i]; |
| 1040 |
|
| 1041 |
if (pg_strcasecmp(item, option.name) != 0) |
| 1042 |
continue; |
| 1043 |
|
| 1044 |
if (list_length(elemlist) > 1) |
| 1045 |
{ |
| 1046 |
GUC_check_errdetail("Cannot specify log_connections option \"%s\" in a list with other options.", |
| 1047 |
item); |
| 1048 |
return false; |
| 1049 |
} |
| 1050 |
|
| 1051 |
*flags = option.val; |
| 1052 |
return true; |
| 1053 |
} |
| 1054 |
|
| 1055 |
/* Now check the aspect options. The empty string was already handled */ |
| 1056 |
foreach(l, elemlist) |
| 1057 |
{ |
| 1058 |
static const struct config_enum_entry options[] = { |
| 1059 |
{"receipt", LOG_CONNECTION_RECEIPT}, |
| 1060 |
{"authentication", LOG_CONNECTION_AUTHENTICATION}, |
| 1061 |
{"authorization", LOG_CONNECTION_AUTHORIZATION}, |
| 1062 |
{"setup_durations", LOG_CONNECTION_SETUP_DURATIONS}, |
| 1063 |
{"all", LOG_CONNECTION_ALL}, |
| 1064 |
}; |
| 1065 |
|
| 1066 |
item = lfirst(l); |
| 1067 |
for (size_t i = 0; i < lengthof(options); i++) |
| 1068 |
{ |
| 1069 |
struct config_enum_entry option = options[i]; |
| 1070 |
|
| 1071 |
if (pg_strcasecmp(item, option.name) == 0) |
| 1072 |
{ |
| 1073 |
*flags |= option.val; |
| 1074 |
goto next; |
| 1075 |
} |
| 1076 |
} |
| 1077 |
|
| 1078 |
GUC_check_errdetail("Invalid option \"%s\".", item); |
| 1079 |
return false; |
| 1080 |
|
| 1081 |
next: ; |
| 1082 |
} |
| 1083 |
|
| 1084 |
return true; |
| 1085 |
} |
| 1086 |
|
| 1087 |
|
| 1088 |
/* |
| 1089 |
* GUC check hook for log_connections |
| 1090 |
*/ |
| 1091 |
bool |
| 1092 |
check_log_connections(char **newval, void **extra, GucSource source) |
| 1093 |
{ |
| 1094 |
uint32 flags; |
| 1095 |
char *rawstring; |
| 1096 |
List *elemlist; |
| 1097 |
bool success; |
| 1098 |
|
| 1099 |
/* Need a modifiable copy of string */ |
| 1100 |
rawstring = pstrdup(*newval); |
| 1101 |
|
| 1102 |
if (!SplitIdentifierString(rawstring, ',', &elemlist)) |
| 1103 |
{ |
| 1104 |
GUC_check_errdetail("Invalid list syntax in parameter \"%s\".", "log_connections"); |
| 1105 |
pfree(rawstring); |
| 1106 |
list_free(elemlist); |
| 1107 |
return false; |
| 1108 |
} |
| 1109 |
|
| 1110 |
/* Validation logic is all in the helper */ |
| 1111 |
success = validate_log_connections_options(elemlist, &flags); |
| 1112 |
|
| 1113 |
/* Time for cleanup */ |
| 1114 |
pfree(rawstring); |
| 1115 |
list_free(elemlist); |
| 1116 |
|
| 1117 |
if (!success) |
| 1118 |
return false; |
| 1119 |
|
| 1120 |
/* |
| 1121 |
* We succeeded, so allocate `extra` and save the flags there for use by |
| 1122 |
* assign_log_connections(). |
| 1123 |
*/ |
| 1124 |
*extra = guc_malloc(LOG, sizeof(int)); |
| 1125 |
if (!*extra) |
| 1126 |
return false; |
| 1127 |
*((int *) *extra) = flags; |
| 1128 |
|
| 1129 |
return true; |
| 1130 |
} |
| 1131 |
|
| 1132 |
/* |
| 1133 |
* GUC assign hook for log_connections |
| 1134 |
*/ |
| 1135 |
void |
| 1136 |
assign_log_connections(const char *newval, void *extra) |
| 1137 |
{ |
| 1138 |
log_connections = *((int *) extra); |
| 1139 |
} |