| 1 |
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 2 |
* |
| 3 |
* auth.c |
| 4 |
* Routines to handle network authentication |
| 5 |
* |
| 6 |
* Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2025, PostgreSQL Global Development Group |
| 7 |
* Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California |
| 8 |
* |
| 9 |
* |
| 10 |
* IDENTIFICATION |
| 11 |
* src/backend/libpq/auth.c |
| 12 |
* |
| 13 |
*------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 14 |
*/ |
| 15 |
|
| 16 |
#include "postgres.h" |
| 17 |
|
| 18 |
#include <sys/param.h> |
| 19 |
#include <sys/select.h> |
| 20 |
#include <sys/socket.h> |
| 21 |
#include <netinet/in.h> |
| 22 |
#include <netdb.h> |
| 23 |
#include <pwd.h> |
| 24 |
#include <unistd.h> |
| 25 |
|
| 26 |
#include "commands/user.h" |
| 27 |
#include "common/ip.h" |
| 28 |
#include "common/md5.h" |
| 29 |
#include "libpq/auth.h" |
| 30 |
#include "libpq/crypt.h" |
| 31 |
#include "libpq/libpq.h" |
| 32 |
#include "libpq/oauth.h" |
| 33 |
#include "libpq/pqformat.h" |
| 34 |
#include "libpq/sasl.h" |
| 35 |
#include "libpq/scram.h" |
| 36 |
#include "miscadmin.h" |
| 37 |
#include "port/pg_bswap.h" |
| 38 |
#include "postmaster/postmaster.h" |
| 39 |
#include "replication/walsender.h" |
| 40 |
#include "storage/ipc.h" |
| 41 |
#include "tcop/backend_startup.h" |
| 42 |
#include "utils/memutils.h" |
| 43 |
|
| 44 |
/*---------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 45 |
* Global authentication functions |
| 46 |
*---------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 47 |
*/ |
| 48 |
static void auth_failed(Port *port, int status, const char *logdetail); |
| 49 |
static char *recv_password_packet(Port *port); |
| 50 |
|
| 51 |
|
| 52 |
/*---------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 53 |
* Password-based authentication methods (password, md5, and scram-sha-256) |
| 54 |
*---------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 55 |
*/ |
| 56 |
static int CheckPasswordAuth(Port *port, const char **logdetail); |
| 57 |
static int CheckPWChallengeAuth(Port *port, const char **logdetail); |
| 58 |
|
| 59 |
static int CheckMD5Auth(Port *port, char *shadow_pass, |
| 60 |
const char **logdetail); |
| 61 |
|
| 62 |
|
| 63 |
/*---------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 64 |
* Ident authentication |
| 65 |
*---------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 66 |
*/ |
| 67 |
/* Max size of username ident server can return (per RFC 1413) */ |
| 68 |
#define IDENT_USERNAME_MAX 512 |
| 69 |
|
| 70 |
/* Standard TCP port number for Ident service. Assigned by IANA */ |
| 71 |
#define IDENT_PORT 113 |
| 72 |
|
| 73 |
static int ident_inet(hbaPort *port); |
| 74 |
|
| 75 |
|
| 76 |
/*---------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 77 |
* Peer authentication |
| 78 |
*---------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 79 |
*/ |
| 80 |
static int auth_peer(hbaPort *port); |
| 81 |
|
| 82 |
|
| 83 |
/*---------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 84 |
* PAM authentication |
| 85 |
*---------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 86 |
*/ |
| 87 |
#ifdef USE_PAM |
| 88 |
#ifdef HAVE_PAM_PAM_APPL_H |
| 89 |
#include <pam/pam_appl.h> |
| 90 |
#endif |
| 91 |
#ifdef HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_APPL_H |
| 92 |
#include <security/pam_appl.h> |
| 93 |
#endif |
| 94 |
|
| 95 |
#define PGSQL_PAM_SERVICE "postgresql" /* Service name passed to PAM */ |
| 96 |
|
| 97 |
/* Work around original Solaris' lack of "const" in the conv_proc signature */ |
| 98 |
#ifdef _PAM_LEGACY_NONCONST |
| 99 |
#define PG_PAM_CONST |
| 100 |
#else |
| 101 |
#define PG_PAM_CONST const |
| 102 |
#endif |
| 103 |
|
| 104 |
static int CheckPAMAuth(Port *port, const char *user, const char *password); |
| 105 |
static int pam_passwd_conv_proc(int num_msg, |
| 106 |
PG_PAM_CONST struct pam_message **msg, |
| 107 |
struct pam_response **resp, void *appdata_ptr); |
| 108 |
|
| 109 |
static struct pam_conv pam_passw_conv = { |
| 110 |
&pam_passwd_conv_proc, |
| 111 |
NULL |
| 112 |
}; |
| 113 |
|
| 114 |
static const char *pam_passwd = NULL; /* Workaround for Solaris 2.6 |
| 115 |
* brokenness */ |
| 116 |
static Port *pam_port_cludge; /* Workaround for passing "Port *port" into |
| 117 |
* pam_passwd_conv_proc */ |
| 118 |
static bool pam_no_password; /* For detecting no-password-given */ |
| 119 |
#endif /* USE_PAM */ |
| 120 |
|
| 121 |
|
| 122 |
/*---------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 123 |
* BSD authentication |
| 124 |
*---------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 125 |
*/ |
| 126 |
#ifdef USE_BSD_AUTH |
| 127 |
#include <bsd_auth.h> |
| 128 |
|
| 129 |
static int CheckBSDAuth(Port *port, char *user); |
| 130 |
#endif /* USE_BSD_AUTH */ |
| 131 |
|
| 132 |
|
| 133 |
/*---------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 134 |
* LDAP authentication |
| 135 |
*---------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 136 |
*/ |
| 137 |
#ifdef USE_LDAP |
| 138 |
#ifndef WIN32 |
| 139 |
/* We use a deprecated function to keep the codepath the same as win32. */ |
| 140 |
#define LDAP_DEPRECATED 1 |
| 141 |
#include <ldap.h> |
| 142 |
#else |
| 143 |
#include <winldap.h> |
| 144 |
|
| 145 |
#endif |
| 146 |
|
| 147 |
static int CheckLDAPAuth(Port *port); |
| 148 |
|
| 149 |
/* LDAP_OPT_DIAGNOSTIC_MESSAGE is the newer spelling */ |
| 150 |
#ifndef LDAP_OPT_DIAGNOSTIC_MESSAGE |
| 151 |
#define LDAP_OPT_DIAGNOSTIC_MESSAGE LDAP_OPT_ERROR_STRING |
| 152 |
#endif |
| 153 |
|
| 154 |
/* Default LDAP password mutator hook, can be overridden by a shared library */ |
| 155 |
static char *dummy_ldap_password_mutator(char *input); |
| 156 |
auth_password_hook_typ ldap_password_hook = dummy_ldap_password_mutator; |
| 157 |
|
| 158 |
#endif /* USE_LDAP */ |
| 159 |
|
| 160 |
/*---------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 161 |
* Cert authentication |
| 162 |
*---------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 163 |
*/ |
| 164 |
#ifdef USE_SSL |
| 165 |
static int CheckCertAuth(Port *port); |
| 166 |
#endif |
| 167 |
|
| 168 |
|
| 169 |
/*---------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 170 |
* Kerberos and GSSAPI GUCs |
| 171 |
*---------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 172 |
*/ |
| 173 |
char *pg_krb_server_keyfile; |
| 174 |
bool pg_krb_caseins_users; |
| 175 |
bool pg_gss_accept_delegation; |
| 176 |
|
| 177 |
|
| 178 |
/*---------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 179 |
* GSSAPI Authentication |
| 180 |
*---------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 181 |
*/ |
| 182 |
#ifdef ENABLE_GSS |
| 183 |
#include "libpq/be-gssapi-common.h" |
| 184 |
|
| 185 |
static int pg_GSS_checkauth(Port *port); |
| 186 |
static int pg_GSS_recvauth(Port *port); |
| 187 |
#endif /* ENABLE_GSS */ |
| 188 |
|
| 189 |
|
| 190 |
/*---------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 191 |
* SSPI Authentication |
| 192 |
*---------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 193 |
*/ |
| 194 |
#ifdef ENABLE_SSPI |
| 195 |
typedef SECURITY_STATUS |
| 196 |
(WINAPI * QUERY_SECURITY_CONTEXT_TOKEN_FN) (PCtxtHandle, void **); |
| 197 |
static int pg_SSPI_recvauth(Port *port); |
| 198 |
static int pg_SSPI_make_upn(char *accountname, |
| 199 |
size_t accountnamesize, |
| 200 |
char *domainname, |
| 201 |
size_t domainnamesize, |
| 202 |
bool update_accountname); |
| 203 |
#endif |
| 204 |
|
| 205 |
/*---------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 206 |
* RADIUS Authentication |
| 207 |
*---------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 208 |
*/ |
| 209 |
static int CheckRADIUSAuth(Port *port); |
| 210 |
static int PerformRadiusTransaction(const char *server, const char *secret, const char *portstr, const char *identifier, const char *user_name, const char *passwd); |
| 211 |
|
| 212 |
|
| 213 |
/*---------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 214 |
* Global authentication functions |
| 215 |
*---------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 216 |
*/ |
| 217 |
|
| 218 |
/* |
| 219 |
* This hook allows plugins to get control following client authentication, |
| 220 |
* but before the user has been informed about the results. It could be used |
| 221 |
* to record login events, insert a delay after failed authentication, etc. |
| 222 |
*/ |
| 223 |
ClientAuthentication_hook_type ClientAuthentication_hook = NULL; |
| 224 |
|
| 225 |
/* |
| 226 |
* Tell the user the authentication failed, but not (much about) why. |
| 227 |
* |
| 228 |
* There is a tradeoff here between security concerns and making life |
| 229 |
* unnecessarily difficult for legitimate users. We would not, for example, |
| 230 |
* want to report the password we were expecting to receive... |
| 231 |
* But it seems useful to report the username and authorization method |
| 232 |
* in use, and these are items that must be presumed known to an attacker |
| 233 |
* anyway. |
| 234 |
* Note that many sorts of failure report additional information in the |
| 235 |
* postmaster log, which we hope is only readable by good guys. In |
| 236 |
* particular, if logdetail isn't NULL, we send that string to the log. |
| 237 |
*/ |
| 238 |
static void |
| 239 |
auth_failed(Port *port, int status, const char *logdetail) |
| 240 |
{ |
| 241 |
const char *errstr; |
| 242 |
char *cdetail; |
| 243 |
int errcode_return = ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION; |
| 244 |
|
| 245 |
/* |
| 246 |
* If we failed due to EOF from client, just quit; there's no point in |
| 247 |
* trying to send a message to the client, and not much point in logging |
| 248 |
* the failure in the postmaster log. (Logging the failure might be |
| 249 |
* desirable, were it not for the fact that libpq closes the connection |
| 250 |
* unceremoniously if challenged for a password when it hasn't got one to |
| 251 |
* send. We'll get a useless log entry for every psql connection under |
| 252 |
* password auth, even if it's perfectly successful, if we log STATUS_EOF |
| 253 |
* events.) |
| 254 |
*/ |
| 255 |
if (status == STATUS_EOF) |
| 256 |
proc_exit(0); |
| 257 |
|
| 258 |
switch (port->hba->auth_method) |
| 259 |
{ |
| 260 |
case uaReject: |
| 261 |
case uaImplicitReject: |
| 262 |
errstr = gettext_noop("authentication failed for user \"%s\": host rejected"); |
| 263 |
break; |
| 264 |
case uaTrust: |
| 265 |
errstr = gettext_noop("\"trust\" authentication failed for user \"%s\""); |
| 266 |
break; |
| 267 |
case uaIdent: |
| 268 |
errstr = gettext_noop("Ident authentication failed for user \"%s\""); |
| 269 |
break; |
| 270 |
case uaPeer: |
| 271 |
errstr = gettext_noop("Peer authentication failed for user \"%s\""); |
| 272 |
break; |
| 273 |
case uaPassword: |
| 274 |
case uaMD5: |
| 275 |
case uaSCRAM: |
| 276 |
errstr = gettext_noop("password authentication failed for user \"%s\""); |
| 277 |
/* We use it to indicate if a .pgpass password failed. */ |
| 278 |
errcode_return = ERRCODE_INVALID_PASSWORD; |
| 279 |
break; |
| 280 |
case uaGSS: |
| 281 |
errstr = gettext_noop("GSSAPI authentication failed for user \"%s\""); |
| 282 |
break; |
| 283 |
case uaSSPI: |
| 284 |
errstr = gettext_noop("SSPI authentication failed for user \"%s\""); |
| 285 |
break; |
| 286 |
case uaPAM: |
| 287 |
errstr = gettext_noop("PAM authentication failed for user \"%s\""); |
| 288 |
break; |
| 289 |
case uaBSD: |
| 290 |
errstr = gettext_noop("BSD authentication failed for user \"%s\""); |
| 291 |
break; |
| 292 |
case uaLDAP: |
| 293 |
errstr = gettext_noop("LDAP authentication failed for user \"%s\""); |
| 294 |
break; |
| 295 |
case uaCert: |
| 296 |
errstr = gettext_noop("certificate authentication failed for user \"%s\""); |
| 297 |
break; |
| 298 |
case uaRADIUS: |
| 299 |
errstr = gettext_noop("RADIUS authentication failed for user \"%s\""); |
| 300 |
break; |
| 301 |
case uaOAuth: |
| 302 |
errstr = gettext_noop("OAuth bearer authentication failed for user \"%s\""); |
| 303 |
break; |
| 304 |
default: |
| 305 |
errstr = gettext_noop("authentication failed for user \"%s\": invalid authentication method"); |
| 306 |
break; |
| 307 |
} |
| 308 |
|
| 309 |
cdetail = psprintf(_("Connection matched file \"%s\" line %d: \"%s\""), |
| 310 |
port->hba->sourcefile, port->hba->linenumber, |
| 311 |
port->hba->rawline); |
| 312 |
if (logdetail) |
| 313 |
logdetail = psprintf("%s\n%s", logdetail, cdetail); |
| 314 |
else |
| 315 |
logdetail = cdetail; |
| 316 |
|
| 317 |
ereport(FATAL, |
| 318 |
(errcode(errcode_return), |
| 319 |
errmsg(errstr, port->user_name), |
| 320 |
logdetail ? errdetail_log("%s", logdetail) : 0)); |
| 321 |
|
| 322 |
/* doesn't return */ |
| 323 |
} |
| 324 |
|
| 325 |
|
| 326 |
/* |
| 327 |
* Sets the authenticated identity for the current user. The provided string |
| 328 |
* will be stored into MyClientConnectionInfo, alongside the current HBA |
| 329 |
* method in use. The ID will be logged if log_connections has the |
| 330 |
* 'authentication' option specified. |
| 331 |
* |
| 332 |
* Auth methods should call this routine exactly once, as soon as the user is |
| 333 |
* successfully authenticated, even if they have reasons to know that |
| 334 |
* authorization will fail later. |
| 335 |
* |
| 336 |
* The provided string will be copied into TopMemoryContext, to match the |
| 337 |
* lifetime of MyClientConnectionInfo, so it is safe to pass a string that is |
| 338 |
* managed by an external library. |
| 339 |
*/ |
| 340 |
void |
| 341 |
set_authn_id(Port *port, const char *id) |
| 342 |
{ |
| 343 |
Assert(id); |
| 344 |
|
| 345 |
if (MyClientConnectionInfo.authn_id) |
| 346 |
{ |
| 347 |
/* |
| 348 |
* An existing authn_id should never be overwritten; that means two |
| 349 |
* authentication providers are fighting (or one is fighting itself). |
| 350 |
* Don't leak any authn details to the client, but don't let the |
| 351 |
* connection continue, either. |
| 352 |
*/ |
| 353 |
ereport(FATAL, |
| 354 |
(errmsg("authentication identifier set more than once"), |
| 355 |
errdetail_log("previous identifier: \"%s\"; new identifier: \"%s\"", |
| 356 |
MyClientConnectionInfo.authn_id, id))); |
| 357 |
} |
| 358 |
|
| 359 |
MyClientConnectionInfo.authn_id = MemoryContextStrdup(TopMemoryContext, id); |
| 360 |
MyClientConnectionInfo.auth_method = port->hba->auth_method; |
| 361 |
|
| 362 |
if (log_connections & LOG_CONNECTION_AUTHENTICATION) |
| 363 |
{ |
| 364 |
ereport(LOG, |
| 365 |
errmsg("connection authenticated: identity=\"%s\" method=%s " |
| 366 |
"(%s:%d)", |
| 367 |
MyClientConnectionInfo.authn_id, |
| 368 |
hba_authname(MyClientConnectionInfo.auth_method), |
| 369 |
port->hba->sourcefile, port->hba->linenumber)); |
| 370 |
} |
| 371 |
} |
| 372 |
|
| 373 |
|
| 374 |
/* |
| 375 |
* Client authentication starts here. If there is an error, this |
| 376 |
* function does not return and the backend process is terminated. |
| 377 |
*/ |
| 378 |
void |
| 379 |
ClientAuthentication(Port *port) |
| 380 |
{ |
| 381 |
int status = STATUS_ERROR; |
| 382 |
const char *logdetail = NULL; |
| 383 |
|
| 384 |
/* |
| 385 |
* Get the authentication method to use for this frontend/database |
| 386 |
* combination. Note: we do not parse the file at this point; this has |
| 387 |
* already been done elsewhere. hba.c dropped an error message into the |
| 388 |
* server logfile if parsing the hba config file failed. |
| 389 |
*/ |
| 390 |
hba_getauthmethod(port); |
| 391 |
|
| 392 |
CHECK_FOR_INTERRUPTS(); |
| 393 |
|
| 394 |
/* |
| 395 |
* This is the first point where we have access to the hba record for the |
| 396 |
* current connection, so perform any verifications based on the hba |
| 397 |
* options field that should be done *before* the authentication here. |
| 398 |
*/ |
| 399 |
if (port->hba->clientcert != clientCertOff) |
| 400 |
{ |
| 401 |
/* If we haven't loaded a root certificate store, fail */ |
| 402 |
if (!secure_loaded_verify_locations()) |
| 403 |
ereport(FATAL, |
| 404 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR), |
| 405 |
errmsg("client certificates can only be checked if a root certificate store is available"))); |
| 406 |
|
| 407 |
/* |
| 408 |
* If we loaded a root certificate store, and if a certificate is |
| 409 |
* present on the client, then it has been verified against our root |
| 410 |
* certificate store, and the connection would have been aborted |
| 411 |
* already if it didn't verify ok. |
| 412 |
*/ |
| 413 |
if (!port->peer_cert_valid) |
| 414 |
ereport(FATAL, |
| 415 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION), |
| 416 |
errmsg("connection requires a valid client certificate"))); |
| 417 |
} |
| 418 |
|
| 419 |
/* |
| 420 |
* Now proceed to do the actual authentication check |
| 421 |
*/ |
| 422 |
switch (port->hba->auth_method) |
| 423 |
{ |
| 424 |
case uaReject: |
| 425 |
|
| 426 |
/* |
| 427 |
* An explicit "reject" entry in pg_hba.conf. This report exposes |
| 428 |
* the fact that there's an explicit reject entry, which is |
| 429 |
* perhaps not so desirable from a security standpoint; but the |
| 430 |
* message for an implicit reject could confuse the DBA a lot when |
| 431 |
* the true situation is a match to an explicit reject. And we |
| 432 |
* don't want to change the message for an implicit reject. As |
| 433 |
* noted below, the additional information shown here doesn't |
| 434 |
* expose anything not known to an attacker. |
| 435 |
*/ |
| 436 |
{ |
| 437 |
char hostinfo[NI_MAXHOST]; |
| 438 |
const char *encryption_state; |
| 439 |
|
| 440 |
pg_getnameinfo_all(&port->raddr.addr, port->raddr.salen, |
| 441 |
hostinfo, sizeof(hostinfo), |
| 442 |
NULL, 0, |
| 443 |
NI_NUMERICHOST); |
| 444 |
|
| 445 |
encryption_state = |
| 446 |
#ifdef ENABLE_GSS |
| 447 |
(port->gss && port->gss->enc) ? _("GSS encryption") : |
| 448 |
#endif |
| 449 |
#ifdef USE_SSL |
| 450 |
port->ssl_in_use ? _("SSL encryption") : |
| 451 |
#endif |
| 452 |
_("no encryption"); |
| 453 |
|
| 454 |
if (am_walsender && !am_db_walsender) |
| 455 |
ereport(FATAL, |
| 456 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION), |
| 457 |
/* translator: last %s describes encryption state */ |
| 458 |
errmsg("pg_hba.conf rejects replication connection for host \"%s\", user \"%s\", %s", |
| 459 |
hostinfo, port->user_name, |
| 460 |
encryption_state))); |
| 461 |
else |
| 462 |
ereport(FATAL, |
| 463 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION), |
| 464 |
/* translator: last %s describes encryption state */ |
| 465 |
errmsg("pg_hba.conf rejects connection for host \"%s\", user \"%s\", database \"%s\", %s", |
| 466 |
hostinfo, port->user_name, |
| 467 |
port->database_name, |
| 468 |
encryption_state))); |
| 469 |
break; |
| 470 |
} |
| 471 |
|
| 472 |
case uaImplicitReject: |
| 473 |
|
| 474 |
/* |
| 475 |
* No matching entry, so tell the user we fell through. |
| 476 |
* |
| 477 |
* NOTE: the extra info reported here is not a security breach, |
| 478 |
* because all that info is known at the frontend and must be |
| 479 |
* assumed known to bad guys. We're merely helping out the less |
| 480 |
* clueful good guys. |
| 481 |
*/ |
| 482 |
{ |
| 483 |
char hostinfo[NI_MAXHOST]; |
| 484 |
const char *encryption_state; |
| 485 |
|
| 486 |
pg_getnameinfo_all(&port->raddr.addr, port->raddr.salen, |
| 487 |
hostinfo, sizeof(hostinfo), |
| 488 |
NULL, 0, |
| 489 |
NI_NUMERICHOST); |
| 490 |
|
| 491 |
encryption_state = |
| 492 |
#ifdef ENABLE_GSS |
| 493 |
(port->gss && port->gss->enc) ? _("GSS encryption") : |
| 494 |
#endif |
| 495 |
#ifdef USE_SSL |
| 496 |
port->ssl_in_use ? _("SSL encryption") : |
| 497 |
#endif |
| 498 |
_("no encryption"); |
| 499 |
|
| 500 |
#define HOSTNAME_LOOKUP_DETAIL(port) \ |
| 501 |
(port->remote_hostname ? \ |
| 502 |
(port->remote_hostname_resolv == +1 ? \ |
| 503 |
errdetail_log("Client IP address resolved to \"%s\", forward lookup matches.", \ |
| 504 |
port->remote_hostname) : \ |
| 505 |
port->remote_hostname_resolv == 0 ? \ |
| 506 |
errdetail_log("Client IP address resolved to \"%s\", forward lookup not checked.", \ |
| 507 |
port->remote_hostname) : \ |
| 508 |
port->remote_hostname_resolv == -1 ? \ |
| 509 |
errdetail_log("Client IP address resolved to \"%s\", forward lookup does not match.", \ |
| 510 |
port->remote_hostname) : \ |
| 511 |
port->remote_hostname_resolv == -2 ? \ |
| 512 |
errdetail_log("Could not translate client host name \"%s\" to IP address: %s.", \ |
| 513 |
port->remote_hostname, \ |
| 514 |
gai_strerror(port->remote_hostname_errcode)) : \ |
| 515 |
0) \ |
| 516 |
: (port->remote_hostname_resolv == -2 ? \ |
| 517 |
errdetail_log("Could not resolve client IP address to a host name: %s.", \ |
| 518 |
gai_strerror(port->remote_hostname_errcode)) : \ |
| 519 |
0)) |
| 520 |
|
| 521 |
if (am_walsender && !am_db_walsender) |
| 522 |
ereport(FATAL, |
| 523 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION), |
| 524 |
/* translator: last %s describes encryption state */ |
| 525 |
errmsg("no pg_hba.conf entry for replication connection from host \"%s\", user \"%s\", %s", |
| 526 |
hostinfo, port->user_name, |
| 527 |
encryption_state), |
| 528 |
HOSTNAME_LOOKUP_DETAIL(port))); |
| 529 |
else |
| 530 |
ereport(FATAL, |
| 531 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION), |
| 532 |
/* translator: last %s describes encryption state */ |
| 533 |
errmsg("no pg_hba.conf entry for host \"%s\", user \"%s\", database \"%s\", %s", |
| 534 |
hostinfo, port->user_name, |
| 535 |
port->database_name, |
| 536 |
encryption_state), |
| 537 |
HOSTNAME_LOOKUP_DETAIL(port))); |
| 538 |
break; |
| 539 |
} |
| 540 |
|
| 541 |
case uaGSS: |
| 542 |
#ifdef ENABLE_GSS |
| 543 |
/* We might or might not have the gss workspace already */ |
| 544 |
if (port->gss == NULL) |
| 545 |
port->gss = (pg_gssinfo *) |
| 546 |
MemoryContextAllocZero(TopMemoryContext, |
| 547 |
sizeof(pg_gssinfo)); |
| 548 |
port->gss->auth = true; |
| 549 |
|
| 550 |
/* |
| 551 |
* If GSS state was set up while enabling encryption, we can just |
| 552 |
* check the client's principal. Otherwise, ask for it. |
| 553 |
*/ |
| 554 |
if (port->gss->enc) |
| 555 |
status = pg_GSS_checkauth(port); |
| 556 |
else |
| 557 |
{ |
| 558 |
sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_GSS, NULL, 0); |
| 559 |
status = pg_GSS_recvauth(port); |
| 560 |
} |
| 561 |
#else |
| 562 |
Assert(false); |
| 563 |
#endif |
| 564 |
break; |
| 565 |
|
| 566 |
case uaSSPI: |
| 567 |
#ifdef ENABLE_SSPI |
| 568 |
if (port->gss == NULL) |
| 569 |
port->gss = (pg_gssinfo *) |
| 570 |
MemoryContextAllocZero(TopMemoryContext, |
| 571 |
sizeof(pg_gssinfo)); |
| 572 |
sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_SSPI, NULL, 0); |
| 573 |
status = pg_SSPI_recvauth(port); |
| 574 |
#else |
| 575 |
Assert(false); |
| 576 |
#endif |
| 577 |
break; |
| 578 |
|
| 579 |
case uaPeer: |
| 580 |
status = auth_peer(port); |
| 581 |
break; |
| 582 |
|
| 583 |
case uaIdent: |
| 584 |
status = ident_inet(port); |
| 585 |
break; |
| 586 |
|
| 587 |
case uaMD5: |
| 588 |
case uaSCRAM: |
| 589 |
status = CheckPWChallengeAuth(port, &logdetail); |
| 590 |
break; |
| 591 |
|
| 592 |
case uaPassword: |
| 593 |
status = CheckPasswordAuth(port, &logdetail); |
| 594 |
break; |
| 595 |
|
| 596 |
case uaPAM: |
| 597 |
#ifdef USE_PAM |
| 598 |
status = CheckPAMAuth(port, port->user_name, ""); |
| 599 |
#else |
| 600 |
Assert(false); |
| 601 |
#endif /* USE_PAM */ |
| 602 |
break; |
| 603 |
|
| 604 |
case uaBSD: |
| 605 |
#ifdef USE_BSD_AUTH |
| 606 |
status = CheckBSDAuth(port, port->user_name); |
| 607 |
#else |
| 608 |
Assert(false); |
| 609 |
#endif /* USE_BSD_AUTH */ |
| 610 |
break; |
| 611 |
|
| 612 |
case uaLDAP: |
| 613 |
#ifdef USE_LDAP |
| 614 |
status = CheckLDAPAuth(port); |
| 615 |
#else |
| 616 |
Assert(false); |
| 617 |
#endif |
| 618 |
break; |
| 619 |
case uaRADIUS: |
| 620 |
status = CheckRADIUSAuth(port); |
| 621 |
break; |
| 622 |
case uaCert: |
| 623 |
/* uaCert will be treated as if clientcert=verify-full (uaTrust) */ |
| 624 |
case uaTrust: |
| 625 |
status = STATUS_OK; |
| 626 |
break; |
| 627 |
case uaOAuth: |
| 628 |
status = CheckSASLAuth(&pg_be_oauth_mech, port, NULL, NULL); |
| 629 |
break; |
| 630 |
} |
| 631 |
|
| 632 |
if ((status == STATUS_OK && port->hba->clientcert == clientCertFull) |
| 633 |
|| port->hba->auth_method == uaCert) |
| 634 |
{ |
| 635 |
/* |
| 636 |
* Make sure we only check the certificate if we use the cert method |
| 637 |
* or verify-full option. |
| 638 |
*/ |
| 639 |
#ifdef USE_SSL |
| 640 |
status = CheckCertAuth(port); |
| 641 |
#else |
| 642 |
Assert(false); |
| 643 |
#endif |
| 644 |
} |
| 645 |
|
| 646 |
if ((log_connections & LOG_CONNECTION_AUTHENTICATION) && |
| 647 |
status == STATUS_OK && |
| 648 |
!MyClientConnectionInfo.authn_id) |
| 649 |
{ |
| 650 |
/* |
| 651 |
* Normally, if log_connections is set, the call to set_authn_id() |
| 652 |
* will log the connection. However, if that function is never |
| 653 |
* called, perhaps because the trust method is in use, then we handle |
| 654 |
* the logging here instead. |
| 655 |
*/ |
| 656 |
ereport(LOG, |
| 657 |
errmsg("connection authenticated: user=\"%s\" method=%s " |
| 658 |
"(%s:%d)", |
| 659 |
port->user_name, hba_authname(port->hba->auth_method), |
| 660 |
port->hba->sourcefile, port->hba->linenumber)); |
| 661 |
} |
| 662 |
|
| 663 |
if (ClientAuthentication_hook) |
| 664 |
(*ClientAuthentication_hook) (port, status); |
| 665 |
|
| 666 |
if (status == STATUS_OK) |
| 667 |
sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_OK, NULL, 0); |
| 668 |
else |
| 669 |
auth_failed(port, status, logdetail); |
| 670 |
} |
| 671 |
|
| 672 |
|
| 673 |
/* |
| 674 |
* Send an authentication request packet to the frontend. |
| 675 |
*/ |
| 676 |
void |
| 677 |
sendAuthRequest(Port *port, AuthRequest areq, const void *extradata, int extralen) |
| 678 |
{ |
| 679 |
StringInfoData buf; |
| 680 |
|
| 681 |
CHECK_FOR_INTERRUPTS(); |
| 682 |
|
| 683 |
pq_beginmessage(&buf, PqMsg_AuthenticationRequest); |
| 684 |
pq_sendint32(&buf, (int32) areq); |
| 685 |
if (extralen > 0) |
| 686 |
pq_sendbytes(&buf, extradata, extralen); |
| 687 |
|
| 688 |
pq_endmessage(&buf); |
| 689 |
|
| 690 |
/* |
| 691 |
* Flush message so client will see it, except for AUTH_REQ_OK and |
| 692 |
* AUTH_REQ_SASL_FIN, which need not be sent until we are ready for |
| 693 |
* queries. |
| 694 |
*/ |
| 695 |
if (areq != AUTH_REQ_OK && areq != AUTH_REQ_SASL_FIN) |
| 696 |
pq_flush(); |
| 697 |
|
| 698 |
CHECK_FOR_INTERRUPTS(); |
| 699 |
} |
| 700 |
|
| 701 |
/* |
| 702 |
* Collect password response packet from frontend. |
| 703 |
* |
| 704 |
* Returns NULL if couldn't get password, else palloc'd string. |
| 705 |
*/ |
| 706 |
static char * |
| 707 |
recv_password_packet(Port *port) |
| 708 |
{ |
| 709 |
StringInfoData buf; |
| 710 |
int mtype; |
| 711 |
|
| 712 |
pq_startmsgread(); |
| 713 |
|
| 714 |
/* Expect 'p' message type */ |
| 715 |
mtype = pq_getbyte(); |
| 716 |
if (mtype != PqMsg_PasswordMessage) |
| 717 |
{ |
| 718 |
/* |
| 719 |
* If the client just disconnects without offering a password, don't |
| 720 |
* make a log entry. This is legal per protocol spec and in fact |
| 721 |
* commonly done by psql, so complaining just clutters the log. |
| 722 |
*/ |
| 723 |
if (mtype != EOF) |
| 724 |
ereport(ERROR, |
| 725 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION), |
| 726 |
errmsg("expected password response, got message type %d", |
| 727 |
mtype))); |
| 728 |
return NULL; /* EOF or bad message type */ |
| 729 |
} |
| 730 |
|
| 731 |
initStringInfo(&buf); |
| 732 |
if (pq_getmessage(&buf, PG_MAX_AUTH_TOKEN_LENGTH)) /* receive password */ |
| 733 |
{ |
| 734 |
/* EOF - pq_getmessage already logged a suitable message */ |
| 735 |
pfree(buf.data); |
| 736 |
return NULL; |
| 737 |
} |
| 738 |
|
| 739 |
/* |
| 740 |
* Apply sanity check: password packet length should agree with length of |
| 741 |
* contained string. Note it is safe to use strlen here because |
| 742 |
* StringInfo is guaranteed to have an appended '\0'. |
| 743 |
*/ |
| 744 |
if (strlen(buf.data) + 1 != buf.len) |
| 745 |
ereport(ERROR, |
| 746 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION), |
| 747 |
errmsg("invalid password packet size"))); |
| 748 |
|
| 749 |
/* |
| 750 |
* Don't allow an empty password. Libpq treats an empty password the same |
| 751 |
* as no password at all, and won't even try to authenticate. But other |
| 752 |
* clients might, so allowing it would be confusing. |
| 753 |
* |
| 754 |
* Note that this only catches an empty password sent by the client in |
| 755 |
* plaintext. There's also a check in CREATE/ALTER USER that prevents an |
| 756 |
* empty string from being stored as a user's password in the first place. |
| 757 |
* We rely on that for MD5 and SCRAM authentication, but we still need |
| 758 |
* this check here, to prevent an empty password from being used with |
| 759 |
* authentication methods that check the password against an external |
| 760 |
* system, like PAM, LDAP and RADIUS. |
| 761 |
*/ |
| 762 |
if (buf.len == 1) |
| 763 |
ereport(ERROR, |
| 764 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PASSWORD), |
| 765 |
errmsg("empty password returned by client"))); |
| 766 |
|
| 767 |
/* Do not echo password to logs, for security. */ |
| 768 |
elog(DEBUG5, "received password packet"); |
| 769 |
|
| 770 |
/* |
| 771 |
* Return the received string. Note we do not attempt to do any |
| 772 |
* character-set conversion on it; since we don't yet know the client's |
| 773 |
* encoding, there wouldn't be much point. |
| 774 |
*/ |
| 775 |
return buf.data; |
| 776 |
} |
| 777 |
|
| 778 |
|
| 779 |
/*---------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 780 |
* Password-based authentication mechanisms |
| 781 |
*---------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 782 |
*/ |
| 783 |
|
| 784 |
/* |
| 785 |
* Plaintext password authentication. |
| 786 |
*/ |
| 787 |
static int |
| 788 |
CheckPasswordAuth(Port *port, const char **logdetail) |
| 789 |
{ |
| 790 |
char *passwd; |
| 791 |
int result; |
| 792 |
char *shadow_pass; |
| 793 |
|
| 794 |
sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_PASSWORD, NULL, 0); |
| 795 |
|
| 796 |
passwd = recv_password_packet(port); |
| 797 |
if (passwd == NULL) |
| 798 |
return STATUS_EOF; /* client wouldn't send password */ |
| 799 |
|
| 800 |
shadow_pass = get_role_password(port->user_name, logdetail); |
| 801 |
if (shadow_pass) |
| 802 |
{ |
| 803 |
result = plain_crypt_verify(port->user_name, shadow_pass, passwd, |
| 804 |
logdetail); |
| 805 |
} |
| 806 |
else |
| 807 |
result = STATUS_ERROR; |
| 808 |
|
| 809 |
if (shadow_pass) |
| 810 |
pfree(shadow_pass); |
| 811 |
pfree(passwd); |
| 812 |
|
| 813 |
if (result == STATUS_OK) |
| 814 |
set_authn_id(port, port->user_name); |
| 815 |
|
| 816 |
return result; |
| 817 |
} |
| 818 |
|
| 819 |
/* |
| 820 |
* MD5 and SCRAM authentication. |
| 821 |
*/ |
| 822 |
static int |
| 823 |
CheckPWChallengeAuth(Port *port, const char **logdetail) |
| 824 |
{ |
| 825 |
int auth_result; |
| 826 |
char *shadow_pass; |
| 827 |
PasswordType pwtype; |
| 828 |
|
| 829 |
Assert(port->hba->auth_method == uaSCRAM || |
| 830 |
port->hba->auth_method == uaMD5); |
| 831 |
|
| 832 |
/* First look up the user's password. */ |
| 833 |
shadow_pass = get_role_password(port->user_name, logdetail); |
| 834 |
|
| 835 |
/* |
| 836 |
* If the user does not exist, or has no password or it's expired, we |
| 837 |
* still go through the motions of authentication, to avoid revealing to |
| 838 |
* the client that the user didn't exist. If 'md5' is allowed, we choose |
| 839 |
* whether to use 'md5' or 'scram-sha-256' authentication based on current |
| 840 |
* password_encryption setting. The idea is that most genuine users |
| 841 |
* probably have a password of that type, and if we pretend that this user |
| 842 |
* had a password of that type, too, it "blends in" best. |
| 843 |
*/ |
| 844 |
if (!shadow_pass) |
| 845 |
pwtype = Password_encryption; |
| 846 |
else |
| 847 |
pwtype = get_password_type(shadow_pass); |
| 848 |
|
| 849 |
/* |
| 850 |
* If 'md5' authentication is allowed, decide whether to perform 'md5' or |
| 851 |
* 'scram-sha-256' authentication based on the type of password the user |
| 852 |
* has. If it's an MD5 hash, we must do MD5 authentication, and if it's a |
| 853 |
* SCRAM secret, we must do SCRAM authentication. |
| 854 |
* |
| 855 |
* If MD5 authentication is not allowed, always use SCRAM. If the user |
| 856 |
* had an MD5 password, CheckSASLAuth() with the SCRAM mechanism will |
| 857 |
* fail. |
| 858 |
*/ |
| 859 |
if (port->hba->auth_method == uaMD5 && pwtype == PASSWORD_TYPE_MD5) |
| 860 |
auth_result = CheckMD5Auth(port, shadow_pass, logdetail); |
| 861 |
else |
| 862 |
auth_result = CheckSASLAuth(&pg_be_scram_mech, port, shadow_pass, |
| 863 |
logdetail); |
| 864 |
|
| 865 |
if (shadow_pass) |
| 866 |
pfree(shadow_pass); |
| 867 |
else |
| 868 |
{ |
| 869 |
/* |
| 870 |
* If get_role_password() returned error, authentication better not |
| 871 |
* have succeeded. |
| 872 |
*/ |
| 873 |
Assert(auth_result != STATUS_OK); |
| 874 |
} |
| 875 |
|
| 876 |
if (auth_result == STATUS_OK) |
| 877 |
set_authn_id(port, port->user_name); |
| 878 |
|
| 879 |
return auth_result; |
| 880 |
} |
| 881 |
|
| 882 |
static int |
| 883 |
CheckMD5Auth(Port *port, char *shadow_pass, const char **logdetail) |
| 884 |
{ |
| 885 |
uint8 md5Salt[4]; /* Password salt */ |
| 886 |
char *passwd; |
| 887 |
int result; |
| 888 |
|
| 889 |
/* include the salt to use for computing the response */ |
| 890 |
if (!pg_strong_random(md5Salt, 4)) |
| 891 |
{ |
| 892 |
ereport(LOG, |
| 893 |
(errmsg("could not generate random MD5 salt"))); |
| 894 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 895 |
} |
| 896 |
|
| 897 |
sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_MD5, md5Salt, 4); |
| 898 |
|
| 899 |
passwd = recv_password_packet(port); |
| 900 |
if (passwd == NULL) |
| 901 |
return STATUS_EOF; /* client wouldn't send password */ |
| 902 |
|
| 903 |
if (shadow_pass) |
| 904 |
result = md5_crypt_verify(port->user_name, shadow_pass, passwd, |
| 905 |
md5Salt, 4, logdetail); |
| 906 |
else |
| 907 |
result = STATUS_ERROR; |
| 908 |
|
| 909 |
pfree(passwd); |
| 910 |
|
| 911 |
return result; |
| 912 |
} |
| 913 |
|
| 914 |
|
| 915 |
/*---------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 916 |
* GSSAPI authentication system |
| 917 |
*---------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 918 |
*/ |
| 919 |
#ifdef ENABLE_GSS |
| 920 |
static int |
| 921 |
pg_GSS_recvauth(Port *port) |
| 922 |
{ |
| 923 |
OM_uint32 maj_stat, |
| 924 |
min_stat, |
| 925 |
lmin_s, |
| 926 |
gflags; |
| 927 |
int mtype; |
| 928 |
StringInfoData buf; |
| 929 |
gss_buffer_desc gbuf; |
| 930 |
gss_cred_id_t delegated_creds; |
| 931 |
|
| 932 |
/* |
| 933 |
* Use the configured keytab, if there is one. As we now require MIT |
| 934 |
* Kerberos, we might consider using the credential store extensions in |
| 935 |
* the future instead of the environment variable. |
| 936 |
*/ |
| 937 |
if (pg_krb_server_keyfile != NULL && pg_krb_server_keyfile[0] != '\0') |
| 938 |
{ |
| 939 |
if (setenv("KRB5_KTNAME", pg_krb_server_keyfile, 1) != 0) |
| 940 |
{ |
| 941 |
/* The only likely failure cause is OOM, so use that errcode */ |
| 942 |
ereport(FATAL, |
| 943 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_OUT_OF_MEMORY), |
| 944 |
errmsg("could not set environment: %m"))); |
| 945 |
} |
| 946 |
} |
| 947 |
|
| 948 |
/* |
| 949 |
* We accept any service principal that's present in our keytab. This |
| 950 |
* increases interoperability between kerberos implementations that see |
| 951 |
* for example case sensitivity differently, while not really opening up |
| 952 |
* any vector of attack. |
| 953 |
*/ |
| 954 |
port->gss->cred = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL; |
| 955 |
|
| 956 |
/* |
| 957 |
* Initialize sequence with an empty context |
| 958 |
*/ |
| 959 |
port->gss->ctx = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT; |
| 960 |
|
| 961 |
delegated_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL; |
| 962 |
port->gss->delegated_creds = false; |
| 963 |
|
| 964 |
/* |
| 965 |
* Loop through GSSAPI message exchange. This exchange can consist of |
| 966 |
* multiple messages sent in both directions. First message is always from |
| 967 |
* the client. All messages from client to server are password packets |
| 968 |
* (type 'p'). |
| 969 |
*/ |
| 970 |
do |
| 971 |
{ |
| 972 |
pq_startmsgread(); |
| 973 |
|
| 974 |
CHECK_FOR_INTERRUPTS(); |
| 975 |
|
| 976 |
mtype = pq_getbyte(); |
| 977 |
if (mtype != PqMsg_GSSResponse) |
| 978 |
{ |
| 979 |
/* Only log error if client didn't disconnect. */ |
| 980 |
if (mtype != EOF) |
| 981 |
ereport(ERROR, |
| 982 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION), |
| 983 |
errmsg("expected GSS response, got message type %d", |
| 984 |
mtype))); |
| 985 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 986 |
} |
| 987 |
|
| 988 |
/* Get the actual GSS token */ |
| 989 |
initStringInfo(&buf); |
| 990 |
if (pq_getmessage(&buf, PG_MAX_AUTH_TOKEN_LENGTH)) |
| 991 |
{ |
| 992 |
/* EOF - pq_getmessage already logged error */ |
| 993 |
pfree(buf.data); |
| 994 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 995 |
} |
| 996 |
|
| 997 |
/* Map to GSSAPI style buffer */ |
| 998 |
gbuf.length = buf.len; |
| 999 |
gbuf.value = buf.data; |
| 1000 |
|
| 1001 |
elog(DEBUG4, "processing received GSS token of length %u", |
| 1002 |
(unsigned int) gbuf.length); |
| 1003 |
|
| 1004 |
maj_stat = gss_accept_sec_context(&min_stat, |
| 1005 |
&port->gss->ctx, |
| 1006 |
port->gss->cred, |
| 1007 |
&gbuf, |
| 1008 |
GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS, |
| 1009 |
&port->gss->name, |
| 1010 |
NULL, |
| 1011 |
&port->gss->outbuf, |
| 1012 |
&gflags, |
| 1013 |
NULL, |
| 1014 |
pg_gss_accept_delegation ? &delegated_creds : NULL); |
| 1015 |
|
| 1016 |
/* gbuf no longer used */ |
| 1017 |
pfree(buf.data); |
| 1018 |
|
| 1019 |
elog(DEBUG5, "gss_accept_sec_context major: %u, " |
| 1020 |
"minor: %u, outlen: %u, outflags: %x", |
| 1021 |
maj_stat, min_stat, |
| 1022 |
(unsigned int) port->gss->outbuf.length, gflags); |
| 1023 |
|
| 1024 |
CHECK_FOR_INTERRUPTS(); |
| 1025 |
|
| 1026 |
if (delegated_creds != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL && gflags & GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG) |
| 1027 |
{ |
| 1028 |
pg_store_delegated_credential(delegated_creds); |
| 1029 |
port->gss->delegated_creds = true; |
| 1030 |
} |
| 1031 |
|
| 1032 |
if (port->gss->outbuf.length != 0) |
| 1033 |
{ |
| 1034 |
/* |
| 1035 |
* Negotiation generated data to be sent to the client. |
| 1036 |
*/ |
| 1037 |
elog(DEBUG4, "sending GSS response token of length %u", |
| 1038 |
(unsigned int) port->gss->outbuf.length); |
| 1039 |
|
| 1040 |
sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_GSS_CONT, |
| 1041 |
port->gss->outbuf.value, port->gss->outbuf.length); |
| 1042 |
|
| 1043 |
gss_release_buffer(&lmin_s, &port->gss->outbuf); |
| 1044 |
} |
| 1045 |
|
| 1046 |
if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE && maj_stat != GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) |
| 1047 |
{ |
| 1048 |
gss_delete_sec_context(&lmin_s, &port->gss->ctx, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER); |
| 1049 |
pg_GSS_error(_("accepting GSS security context failed"), |
| 1050 |
maj_stat, min_stat); |
| 1051 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 1052 |
} |
| 1053 |
|
| 1054 |
if (maj_stat == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) |
| 1055 |
elog(DEBUG4, "GSS continue needed"); |
| 1056 |
|
| 1057 |
} while (maj_stat == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED); |
| 1058 |
|
| 1059 |
if (port->gss->cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) |
| 1060 |
{ |
| 1061 |
/* |
| 1062 |
* Release service principal credentials |
| 1063 |
*/ |
| 1064 |
gss_release_cred(&min_stat, &port->gss->cred); |
| 1065 |
} |
| 1066 |
return pg_GSS_checkauth(port); |
| 1067 |
} |
| 1068 |
|
| 1069 |
/* |
| 1070 |
* Check whether the GSSAPI-authenticated user is allowed to connect as the |
| 1071 |
* claimed username. |
| 1072 |
*/ |
| 1073 |
static int |
| 1074 |
pg_GSS_checkauth(Port *port) |
| 1075 |
{ |
| 1076 |
int ret; |
| 1077 |
OM_uint32 maj_stat, |
| 1078 |
min_stat, |
| 1079 |
lmin_s; |
| 1080 |
gss_buffer_desc gbuf; |
| 1081 |
char *princ; |
| 1082 |
|
| 1083 |
/* |
| 1084 |
* Get the name of the user that authenticated, and compare it to the pg |
| 1085 |
* username that was specified for the connection. |
| 1086 |
*/ |
| 1087 |
maj_stat = gss_display_name(&min_stat, port->gss->name, &gbuf, NULL); |
| 1088 |
if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) |
| 1089 |
{ |
| 1090 |
pg_GSS_error(_("retrieving GSS user name failed"), |
| 1091 |
maj_stat, min_stat); |
| 1092 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 1093 |
} |
| 1094 |
|
| 1095 |
/* |
| 1096 |
* gbuf.value might not be null-terminated, so turn it into a regular |
| 1097 |
* null-terminated string. |
| 1098 |
*/ |
| 1099 |
princ = palloc(gbuf.length + 1); |
| 1100 |
memcpy(princ, gbuf.value, gbuf.length); |
| 1101 |
princ[gbuf.length] = '\0'; |
| 1102 |
gss_release_buffer(&lmin_s, &gbuf); |
| 1103 |
|
| 1104 |
/* |
| 1105 |
* Copy the original name of the authenticated principal into our backend |
| 1106 |
* memory for display later. |
| 1107 |
* |
| 1108 |
* This is also our authenticated identity. Set it now, rather than |
| 1109 |
* waiting for the usermap check below, because authentication has already |
| 1110 |
* succeeded and we want the log file to reflect that. |
| 1111 |
*/ |
| 1112 |
port->gss->princ = MemoryContextStrdup(TopMemoryContext, princ); |
| 1113 |
set_authn_id(port, princ); |
| 1114 |
|
| 1115 |
/* |
| 1116 |
* Split the username at the realm separator |
| 1117 |
*/ |
| 1118 |
if (strchr(princ, '@')) |
| 1119 |
{ |
| 1120 |
char *cp = strchr(princ, '@'); |
| 1121 |
|
| 1122 |
/* |
| 1123 |
* If we are not going to include the realm in the username that is |
| 1124 |
* passed to the ident map, destructively modify it here to remove the |
| 1125 |
* realm. Then advance past the separator to check the realm. |
| 1126 |
*/ |
| 1127 |
if (!port->hba->include_realm) |
| 1128 |
*cp = '\0'; |
| 1129 |
cp++; |
| 1130 |
|
| 1131 |
if (port->hba->krb_realm != NULL && strlen(port->hba->krb_realm)) |
| 1132 |
{ |
| 1133 |
/* |
| 1134 |
* Match the realm part of the name first |
| 1135 |
*/ |
| 1136 |
if (pg_krb_caseins_users) |
| 1137 |
ret = pg_strcasecmp(port->hba->krb_realm, cp); |
| 1138 |
else |
| 1139 |
ret = strcmp(port->hba->krb_realm, cp); |
| 1140 |
|
| 1141 |
if (ret) |
| 1142 |
{ |
| 1143 |
/* GSS realm does not match */ |
| 1144 |
elog(DEBUG2, |
| 1145 |
"GSSAPI realm (%s) and configured realm (%s) don't match", |
| 1146 |
cp, port->hba->krb_realm); |
| 1147 |
pfree(princ); |
| 1148 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 1149 |
} |
| 1150 |
} |
| 1151 |
} |
| 1152 |
else if (port->hba->krb_realm && strlen(port->hba->krb_realm)) |
| 1153 |
{ |
| 1154 |
elog(DEBUG2, |
| 1155 |
"GSSAPI did not return realm but realm matching was requested"); |
| 1156 |
pfree(princ); |
| 1157 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 1158 |
} |
| 1159 |
|
| 1160 |
ret = check_usermap(port->hba->usermap, port->user_name, princ, |
| 1161 |
pg_krb_caseins_users); |
| 1162 |
|
| 1163 |
pfree(princ); |
| 1164 |
|
| 1165 |
return ret; |
| 1166 |
} |
| 1167 |
#endif /* ENABLE_GSS */ |
| 1168 |
|
| 1169 |
|
| 1170 |
/*---------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 1171 |
* SSPI authentication system |
| 1172 |
*---------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 1173 |
*/ |
| 1174 |
#ifdef ENABLE_SSPI |
| 1175 |
|
| 1176 |
/* |
| 1177 |
* Generate an error for SSPI authentication. The caller should apply |
| 1178 |
* _() to errmsg to make it translatable. |
| 1179 |
*/ |
| 1180 |
static void |
| 1181 |
pg_SSPI_error(int severity, const char *errmsg, SECURITY_STATUS r) |
| 1182 |
{ |
| 1183 |
char sysmsg[256]; |
| 1184 |
|
| 1185 |
if (FormatMessage(FORMAT_MESSAGE_IGNORE_INSERTS | |
| 1186 |
FORMAT_MESSAGE_FROM_SYSTEM, |
| 1187 |
NULL, r, 0, |
| 1188 |
sysmsg, sizeof(sysmsg), NULL) == 0) |
| 1189 |
ereport(severity, |
| 1190 |
(errmsg_internal("%s", errmsg), |
| 1191 |
errdetail_internal("SSPI error %x", (unsigned int) r))); |
| 1192 |
else |
| 1193 |
ereport(severity, |
| 1194 |
(errmsg_internal("%s", errmsg), |
| 1195 |
errdetail_internal("%s (%x)", sysmsg, (unsigned int) r))); |
| 1196 |
} |
| 1197 |
|
| 1198 |
static int |
| 1199 |
pg_SSPI_recvauth(Port *port) |
| 1200 |
{ |
| 1201 |
int mtype; |
| 1202 |
StringInfoData buf; |
| 1203 |
SECURITY_STATUS r; |
| 1204 |
CredHandle sspicred; |
| 1205 |
CtxtHandle *sspictx = NULL, |
| 1206 |
newctx; |
| 1207 |
TimeStamp expiry; |
| 1208 |
ULONG contextattr; |
| 1209 |
SecBufferDesc inbuf; |
| 1210 |
SecBufferDesc outbuf; |
| 1211 |
SecBuffer OutBuffers[1]; |
| 1212 |
SecBuffer InBuffers[1]; |
| 1213 |
HANDLE token; |
| 1214 |
TOKEN_USER *tokenuser; |
| 1215 |
DWORD retlen; |
| 1216 |
char accountname[MAXPGPATH]; |
| 1217 |
char domainname[MAXPGPATH]; |
| 1218 |
DWORD accountnamesize = sizeof(accountname); |
| 1219 |
DWORD domainnamesize = sizeof(domainname); |
| 1220 |
SID_NAME_USE accountnameuse; |
| 1221 |
char *authn_id; |
| 1222 |
|
| 1223 |
/* |
| 1224 |
* Acquire a handle to the server credentials. |
| 1225 |
*/ |
| 1226 |
r = AcquireCredentialsHandle(NULL, |
| 1227 |
"negotiate", |
| 1228 |
SECPKG_CRED_INBOUND, |
| 1229 |
NULL, |
| 1230 |
NULL, |
| 1231 |
NULL, |
| 1232 |
NULL, |
| 1233 |
&sspicred, |
| 1234 |
&expiry); |
| 1235 |
if (r != SEC_E_OK) |
| 1236 |
pg_SSPI_error(ERROR, _("could not acquire SSPI credentials"), r); |
| 1237 |
|
| 1238 |
/* |
| 1239 |
* Loop through SSPI message exchange. This exchange can consist of |
| 1240 |
* multiple messages sent in both directions. First message is always from |
| 1241 |
* the client. All messages from client to server are password packets |
| 1242 |
* (type 'p'). |
| 1243 |
*/ |
| 1244 |
do |
| 1245 |
{ |
| 1246 |
pq_startmsgread(); |
| 1247 |
mtype = pq_getbyte(); |
| 1248 |
if (mtype != PqMsg_GSSResponse) |
| 1249 |
{ |
| 1250 |
if (sspictx != NULL) |
| 1251 |
{ |
| 1252 |
DeleteSecurityContext(sspictx); |
| 1253 |
free(sspictx); |
| 1254 |
} |
| 1255 |
FreeCredentialsHandle(&sspicred); |
| 1256 |
|
| 1257 |
/* Only log error if client didn't disconnect. */ |
| 1258 |
if (mtype != EOF) |
| 1259 |
ereport(ERROR, |
| 1260 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION), |
| 1261 |
errmsg("expected SSPI response, got message type %d", |
| 1262 |
mtype))); |
| 1263 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 1264 |
} |
| 1265 |
|
| 1266 |
/* Get the actual SSPI token */ |
| 1267 |
initStringInfo(&buf); |
| 1268 |
if (pq_getmessage(&buf, PG_MAX_AUTH_TOKEN_LENGTH)) |
| 1269 |
{ |
| 1270 |
/* EOF - pq_getmessage already logged error */ |
| 1271 |
pfree(buf.data); |
| 1272 |
if (sspictx != NULL) |
| 1273 |
{ |
| 1274 |
DeleteSecurityContext(sspictx); |
| 1275 |
free(sspictx); |
| 1276 |
} |
| 1277 |
FreeCredentialsHandle(&sspicred); |
| 1278 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 1279 |
} |
| 1280 |
|
| 1281 |
/* Map to SSPI style buffer */ |
| 1282 |
inbuf.ulVersion = SECBUFFER_VERSION; |
| 1283 |
inbuf.cBuffers = 1; |
| 1284 |
inbuf.pBuffers = InBuffers; |
| 1285 |
InBuffers[0].pvBuffer = buf.data; |
| 1286 |
InBuffers[0].cbBuffer = buf.len; |
| 1287 |
InBuffers[0].BufferType = SECBUFFER_TOKEN; |
| 1288 |
|
| 1289 |
/* Prepare output buffer */ |
| 1290 |
OutBuffers[0].pvBuffer = NULL; |
| 1291 |
OutBuffers[0].BufferType = SECBUFFER_TOKEN; |
| 1292 |
OutBuffers[0].cbBuffer = 0; |
| 1293 |
outbuf.cBuffers = 1; |
| 1294 |
outbuf.pBuffers = OutBuffers; |
| 1295 |
outbuf.ulVersion = SECBUFFER_VERSION; |
| 1296 |
|
| 1297 |
elog(DEBUG4, "processing received SSPI token of length %u", |
| 1298 |
(unsigned int) buf.len); |
| 1299 |
|
| 1300 |
r = AcceptSecurityContext(&sspicred, |
| 1301 |
sspictx, |
| 1302 |
&inbuf, |
| 1303 |
ASC_REQ_ALLOCATE_MEMORY, |
| 1304 |
SECURITY_NETWORK_DREP, |
| 1305 |
&newctx, |
| 1306 |
&outbuf, |
| 1307 |
&contextattr, |
| 1308 |
NULL); |
| 1309 |
|
| 1310 |
/* input buffer no longer used */ |
| 1311 |
pfree(buf.data); |
| 1312 |
|
| 1313 |
if (outbuf.cBuffers > 0 && outbuf.pBuffers[0].cbBuffer > 0) |
| 1314 |
{ |
| 1315 |
/* |
| 1316 |
* Negotiation generated data to be sent to the client. |
| 1317 |
*/ |
| 1318 |
elog(DEBUG4, "sending SSPI response token of length %u", |
| 1319 |
(unsigned int) outbuf.pBuffers[0].cbBuffer); |
| 1320 |
|
| 1321 |
port->gss->outbuf.length = outbuf.pBuffers[0].cbBuffer; |
| 1322 |
port->gss->outbuf.value = outbuf.pBuffers[0].pvBuffer; |
| 1323 |
|
| 1324 |
sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_GSS_CONT, |
| 1325 |
port->gss->outbuf.value, port->gss->outbuf.length); |
| 1326 |
|
| 1327 |
FreeContextBuffer(outbuf.pBuffers[0].pvBuffer); |
| 1328 |
} |
| 1329 |
|
| 1330 |
if (r != SEC_E_OK && r != SEC_I_CONTINUE_NEEDED) |
| 1331 |
{ |
| 1332 |
if (sspictx != NULL) |
| 1333 |
{ |
| 1334 |
DeleteSecurityContext(sspictx); |
| 1335 |
free(sspictx); |
| 1336 |
} |
| 1337 |
FreeCredentialsHandle(&sspicred); |
| 1338 |
pg_SSPI_error(ERROR, |
| 1339 |
_("could not accept SSPI security context"), r); |
| 1340 |
} |
| 1341 |
|
| 1342 |
/* |
| 1343 |
* Overwrite the current context with the one we just received. If |
| 1344 |
* sspictx is NULL it was the first loop and we need to allocate a |
| 1345 |
* buffer for it. On subsequent runs, we can just overwrite the buffer |
| 1346 |
* contents since the size does not change. |
| 1347 |
*/ |
| 1348 |
if (sspictx == NULL) |
| 1349 |
{ |
| 1350 |
sspictx = malloc(sizeof(CtxtHandle)); |
| 1351 |
if (sspictx == NULL) |
| 1352 |
ereport(ERROR, |
| 1353 |
(errmsg("out of memory"))); |
| 1354 |
} |
| 1355 |
|
| 1356 |
memcpy(sspictx, &newctx, sizeof(CtxtHandle)); |
| 1357 |
|
| 1358 |
if (r == SEC_I_CONTINUE_NEEDED) |
| 1359 |
elog(DEBUG4, "SSPI continue needed"); |
| 1360 |
|
| 1361 |
} while (r == SEC_I_CONTINUE_NEEDED); |
| 1362 |
|
| 1363 |
|
| 1364 |
/* |
| 1365 |
* Release service principal credentials |
| 1366 |
*/ |
| 1367 |
FreeCredentialsHandle(&sspicred); |
| 1368 |
|
| 1369 |
|
| 1370 |
/* |
| 1371 |
* SEC_E_OK indicates that authentication is now complete. |
| 1372 |
* |
| 1373 |
* Get the name of the user that authenticated, and compare it to the pg |
| 1374 |
* username that was specified for the connection. |
| 1375 |
*/ |
| 1376 |
|
| 1377 |
r = QuerySecurityContextToken(sspictx, &token); |
| 1378 |
if (r != SEC_E_OK) |
| 1379 |
pg_SSPI_error(ERROR, |
| 1380 |
_("could not get token from SSPI security context"), r); |
| 1381 |
|
| 1382 |
/* |
| 1383 |
* No longer need the security context, everything from here on uses the |
| 1384 |
* token instead. |
| 1385 |
*/ |
| 1386 |
DeleteSecurityContext(sspictx); |
| 1387 |
free(sspictx); |
| 1388 |
|
| 1389 |
if (!GetTokenInformation(token, TokenUser, NULL, 0, &retlen) && GetLastError() != 122) |
| 1390 |
ereport(ERROR, |
| 1391 |
(errmsg_internal("could not get token information buffer size: error code %lu", |
| 1392 |
GetLastError()))); |
| 1393 |
|
| 1394 |
tokenuser = malloc(retlen); |
| 1395 |
if (tokenuser == NULL) |
| 1396 |
ereport(ERROR, |
| 1397 |
(errmsg("out of memory"))); |
| 1398 |
|
| 1399 |
if (!GetTokenInformation(token, TokenUser, tokenuser, retlen, &retlen)) |
| 1400 |
ereport(ERROR, |
| 1401 |
(errmsg_internal("could not get token information: error code %lu", |
| 1402 |
GetLastError()))); |
| 1403 |
|
| 1404 |
CloseHandle(token); |
| 1405 |
|
| 1406 |
if (!LookupAccountSid(NULL, tokenuser->User.Sid, accountname, &accountnamesize, |
| 1407 |
domainname, &domainnamesize, &accountnameuse)) |
| 1408 |
ereport(ERROR, |
| 1409 |
(errmsg_internal("could not look up account SID: error code %lu", |
| 1410 |
GetLastError()))); |
| 1411 |
|
| 1412 |
free(tokenuser); |
| 1413 |
|
| 1414 |
if (!port->hba->compat_realm) |
| 1415 |
{ |
| 1416 |
int status = pg_SSPI_make_upn(accountname, sizeof(accountname), |
| 1417 |
domainname, sizeof(domainname), |
| 1418 |
port->hba->upn_username); |
| 1419 |
|
| 1420 |
if (status != STATUS_OK) |
| 1421 |
/* Error already reported from pg_SSPI_make_upn */ |
| 1422 |
return status; |
| 1423 |
} |
| 1424 |
|
| 1425 |
/* |
| 1426 |
* We have all of the information necessary to construct the authenticated |
| 1427 |
* identity. Set it now, rather than waiting for check_usermap below, |
| 1428 |
* because authentication has already succeeded and we want the log file |
| 1429 |
* to reflect that. |
| 1430 |
*/ |
| 1431 |
if (port->hba->compat_realm) |
| 1432 |
{ |
| 1433 |
/* SAM-compatible format. */ |
| 1434 |
authn_id = psprintf("%s\\%s", domainname, accountname); |
| 1435 |
} |
| 1436 |
else |
| 1437 |
{ |
| 1438 |
/* Kerberos principal format. */ |
| 1439 |
authn_id = psprintf("%s@%s", accountname, domainname); |
| 1440 |
} |
| 1441 |
|
| 1442 |
set_authn_id(port, authn_id); |
| 1443 |
pfree(authn_id); |
| 1444 |
|
| 1445 |
/* |
| 1446 |
* Compare realm/domain if requested. In SSPI, always compare case |
| 1447 |
* insensitive. |
| 1448 |
*/ |
| 1449 |
if (port->hba->krb_realm && strlen(port->hba->krb_realm)) |
| 1450 |
{ |
| 1451 |
if (pg_strcasecmp(port->hba->krb_realm, domainname) != 0) |
| 1452 |
{ |
| 1453 |
elog(DEBUG2, |
| 1454 |
"SSPI domain (%s) and configured domain (%s) don't match", |
| 1455 |
domainname, port->hba->krb_realm); |
| 1456 |
|
| 1457 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 1458 |
} |
| 1459 |
} |
| 1460 |
|
| 1461 |
/* |
| 1462 |
* We have the username (without domain/realm) in accountname, compare to |
| 1463 |
* the supplied value. In SSPI, always compare case insensitive. |
| 1464 |
* |
| 1465 |
* If set to include realm, append it in <username>@<realm> format. |
| 1466 |
*/ |
| 1467 |
if (port->hba->include_realm) |
| 1468 |
{ |
| 1469 |
char *namebuf; |
| 1470 |
int retval; |
| 1471 |
|
| 1472 |
namebuf = psprintf("%s@%s", accountname, domainname); |
| 1473 |
retval = check_usermap(port->hba->usermap, port->user_name, namebuf, true); |
| 1474 |
pfree(namebuf); |
| 1475 |
return retval; |
| 1476 |
} |
| 1477 |
else |
| 1478 |
return check_usermap(port->hba->usermap, port->user_name, accountname, true); |
| 1479 |
} |
| 1480 |
|
| 1481 |
/* |
| 1482 |
* Replaces the domainname with the Kerberos realm name, |
| 1483 |
* and optionally the accountname with the Kerberos user name. |
| 1484 |
*/ |
| 1485 |
static int |
| 1486 |
pg_SSPI_make_upn(char *accountname, |
| 1487 |
size_t accountnamesize, |
| 1488 |
char *domainname, |
| 1489 |
size_t domainnamesize, |
| 1490 |
bool update_accountname) |
| 1491 |
{ |
| 1492 |
char *samname; |
| 1493 |
char *upname = NULL; |
| 1494 |
char *p = NULL; |
| 1495 |
ULONG upnamesize = 0; |
| 1496 |
size_t upnamerealmsize; |
| 1497 |
BOOLEAN res; |
| 1498 |
|
| 1499 |
/* |
| 1500 |
* Build SAM name (DOMAIN\user), then translate to UPN |
| 1501 |
* ([email protected]). The realm name is returned in lower case, but |
| 1502 |
* that is fine because in SSPI auth, string comparisons are always |
| 1503 |
* case-insensitive. |
| 1504 |
*/ |
| 1505 |
|
| 1506 |
samname = psprintf("%s\\%s", domainname, accountname); |
| 1507 |
res = TranslateName(samname, NameSamCompatible, NameUserPrincipal, |
| 1508 |
NULL, &upnamesize); |
| 1509 |
|
| 1510 |
if ((!res && GetLastError() != ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_BUFFER) |
| 1511 |
|| upnamesize == 0) |
| 1512 |
{ |
| 1513 |
pfree(samname); |
| 1514 |
ereport(LOG, |
| 1515 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_ROLE_SPECIFICATION), |
| 1516 |
errmsg("could not translate name"))); |
| 1517 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 1518 |
} |
| 1519 |
|
| 1520 |
/* upnamesize includes the terminating NUL. */ |
| 1521 |
upname = palloc(upnamesize); |
| 1522 |
|
| 1523 |
res = TranslateName(samname, NameSamCompatible, NameUserPrincipal, |
| 1524 |
upname, &upnamesize); |
| 1525 |
|
| 1526 |
pfree(samname); |
| 1527 |
if (res) |
| 1528 |
p = strchr(upname, '@'); |
| 1529 |
|
| 1530 |
if (!res || p == NULL) |
| 1531 |
{ |
| 1532 |
pfree(upname); |
| 1533 |
ereport(LOG, |
| 1534 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_ROLE_SPECIFICATION), |
| 1535 |
errmsg("could not translate name"))); |
| 1536 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 1537 |
} |
| 1538 |
|
| 1539 |
/* Length of realm name after the '@', including the NUL. */ |
| 1540 |
upnamerealmsize = upnamesize - (p - upname + 1); |
| 1541 |
|
| 1542 |
/* Replace domainname with realm name. */ |
| 1543 |
if (upnamerealmsize > domainnamesize) |
| 1544 |
{ |
| 1545 |
pfree(upname); |
| 1546 |
ereport(LOG, |
| 1547 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_ROLE_SPECIFICATION), |
| 1548 |
errmsg("realm name too long"))); |
| 1549 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 1550 |
} |
| 1551 |
|
| 1552 |
/* Length is now safe. */ |
| 1553 |
strcpy(domainname, p + 1); |
| 1554 |
|
| 1555 |
/* Replace account name as well (in case UPN != SAM)? */ |
| 1556 |
if (update_accountname) |
| 1557 |
{ |
| 1558 |
if ((p - upname + 1) > accountnamesize) |
| 1559 |
{ |
| 1560 |
pfree(upname); |
| 1561 |
ereport(LOG, |
| 1562 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_ROLE_SPECIFICATION), |
| 1563 |
errmsg("translated account name too long"))); |
| 1564 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 1565 |
} |
| 1566 |
|
| 1567 |
*p = 0; |
| 1568 |
strcpy(accountname, upname); |
| 1569 |
} |
| 1570 |
|
| 1571 |
pfree(upname); |
| 1572 |
return STATUS_OK; |
| 1573 |
} |
| 1574 |
#endif /* ENABLE_SSPI */ |
| 1575 |
|
| 1576 |
|
| 1577 |
|
| 1578 |
/*---------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 1579 |
* Ident authentication system |
| 1580 |
*---------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 1581 |
*/ |
| 1582 |
|
| 1583 |
/* |
| 1584 |
* Parse the string "*ident_response" as a response from a query to an Ident |
| 1585 |
* server. If it's a normal response indicating a user name, return true |
| 1586 |
* and store the user name at *ident_user. If it's anything else, |
| 1587 |
* return false. |
| 1588 |
*/ |
| 1589 |
static bool |
| 1590 |
interpret_ident_response(const char *ident_response, |
| 1591 |
char *ident_user) |
| 1592 |
{ |
| 1593 |
const char *cursor = ident_response; /* Cursor into *ident_response */ |
| 1594 |
|
| 1595 |
/* |
| 1596 |
* Ident's response, in the telnet tradition, should end in crlf (\r\n). |
| 1597 |
*/ |
| 1598 |
if (strlen(ident_response) < 2) |
| 1599 |
return false; |
| 1600 |
else if (ident_response[strlen(ident_response) - 2] != '\r') |
| 1601 |
return false; |
| 1602 |
else |
| 1603 |
{ |
| 1604 |
while (*cursor != ':' && *cursor != '\r') |
| 1605 |
cursor++; /* skip port field */ |
| 1606 |
|
| 1607 |
if (*cursor != ':') |
| 1608 |
return false; |
| 1609 |
else |
| 1610 |
{ |
| 1611 |
/* We're positioned to colon before response type field */ |
| 1612 |
char response_type[80]; |
| 1613 |
int i; /* Index into *response_type */ |
| 1614 |
|
| 1615 |
cursor++; /* Go over colon */ |
| 1616 |
while (pg_isblank(*cursor)) |
| 1617 |
cursor++; /* skip blanks */ |
| 1618 |
i = 0; |
| 1619 |
while (*cursor != ':' && *cursor != '\r' && !pg_isblank(*cursor) && |
| 1620 |
i < (int) (sizeof(response_type) - 1)) |
| 1621 |
response_type[i++] = *cursor++; |
| 1622 |
response_type[i] = '\0'; |
| 1623 |
while (pg_isblank(*cursor)) |
| 1624 |
cursor++; /* skip blanks */ |
| 1625 |
if (strcmp(response_type, "USERID") != 0) |
| 1626 |
return false; |
| 1627 |
else |
| 1628 |
{ |
| 1629 |
/* |
| 1630 |
* It's a USERID response. Good. "cursor" should be pointing |
| 1631 |
* to the colon that precedes the operating system type. |
| 1632 |
*/ |
| 1633 |
if (*cursor != ':') |
| 1634 |
return false; |
| 1635 |
else |
| 1636 |
{ |
| 1637 |
cursor++; /* Go over colon */ |
| 1638 |
/* Skip over operating system field. */ |
| 1639 |
while (*cursor != ':' && *cursor != '\r') |
| 1640 |
cursor++; |
| 1641 |
if (*cursor != ':') |
| 1642 |
return false; |
| 1643 |
else |
| 1644 |
{ |
| 1645 |
cursor++; /* Go over colon */ |
| 1646 |
while (pg_isblank(*cursor)) |
| 1647 |
cursor++; /* skip blanks */ |
| 1648 |
/* Rest of line is user name. Copy it over. */ |
| 1649 |
i = 0; |
| 1650 |
while (*cursor != '\r' && i < IDENT_USERNAME_MAX) |
| 1651 |
ident_user[i++] = *cursor++; |
| 1652 |
ident_user[i] = '\0'; |
| 1653 |
return true; |
| 1654 |
} |
| 1655 |
} |
| 1656 |
} |
| 1657 |
} |
| 1658 |
} |
| 1659 |
} |
| 1660 |
|
| 1661 |
|
| 1662 |
/* |
| 1663 |
* Talk to the ident server on "remote_addr" and find out who |
| 1664 |
* owns the tcp connection to "local_addr" |
| 1665 |
* If the username is successfully retrieved, check the usermap. |
| 1666 |
* |
| 1667 |
* XXX: Using WaitLatchOrSocket() and doing a CHECK_FOR_INTERRUPTS() if the |
| 1668 |
* latch was set would improve the responsiveness to timeouts/cancellations. |
| 1669 |
*/ |
| 1670 |
static int |
| 1671 |
ident_inet(hbaPort *port) |
| 1672 |
{ |
| 1673 |
const SockAddr remote_addr = port->raddr; |
| 1674 |
const SockAddr local_addr = port->laddr; |
| 1675 |
char ident_user[IDENT_USERNAME_MAX + 1]; |
| 1676 |
pgsocket sock_fd = PGINVALID_SOCKET; /* for talking to Ident server */ |
| 1677 |
int rc; /* Return code from a locally called function */ |
| 1678 |
bool ident_return; |
| 1679 |
char remote_addr_s[NI_MAXHOST]; |
| 1680 |
char remote_port[NI_MAXSERV]; |
| 1681 |
char local_addr_s[NI_MAXHOST]; |
| 1682 |
char local_port[NI_MAXSERV]; |
| 1683 |
char ident_port[NI_MAXSERV]; |
| 1684 |
char ident_query[80]; |
| 1685 |
char ident_response[80 + IDENT_USERNAME_MAX]; |
| 1686 |
struct addrinfo *ident_serv = NULL, |
| 1687 |
*la = NULL, |
| 1688 |
hints; |
| 1689 |
|
| 1690 |
/* |
| 1691 |
* Might look a little weird to first convert it to text and then back to |
| 1692 |
* sockaddr, but it's protocol independent. |
| 1693 |
*/ |
| 1694 |
pg_getnameinfo_all(&remote_addr.addr, remote_addr.salen, |
| 1695 |
remote_addr_s, sizeof(remote_addr_s), |
| 1696 |
remote_port, sizeof(remote_port), |
| 1697 |
NI_NUMERICHOST | NI_NUMERICSERV); |
| 1698 |
pg_getnameinfo_all(&local_addr.addr, local_addr.salen, |
| 1699 |
local_addr_s, sizeof(local_addr_s), |
| 1700 |
local_port, sizeof(local_port), |
| 1701 |
NI_NUMERICHOST | NI_NUMERICSERV); |
| 1702 |
|
| 1703 |
snprintf(ident_port, sizeof(ident_port), "%d", IDENT_PORT); |
| 1704 |
hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST; |
| 1705 |
hints.ai_family = remote_addr.addr.ss_family; |
| 1706 |
hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; |
| 1707 |
hints.ai_protocol = 0; |
| 1708 |
hints.ai_addrlen = 0; |
| 1709 |
hints.ai_canonname = NULL; |
| 1710 |
hints.ai_addr = NULL; |
| 1711 |
hints.ai_next = NULL; |
| 1712 |
rc = pg_getaddrinfo_all(remote_addr_s, ident_port, &hints, &ident_serv); |
| 1713 |
if (rc || !ident_serv) |
| 1714 |
{ |
| 1715 |
/* we don't expect this to happen */ |
| 1716 |
ident_return = false; |
| 1717 |
goto ident_inet_done; |
| 1718 |
} |
| 1719 |
|
| 1720 |
hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST; |
| 1721 |
hints.ai_family = local_addr.addr.ss_family; |
| 1722 |
hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; |
| 1723 |
hints.ai_protocol = 0; |
| 1724 |
hints.ai_addrlen = 0; |
| 1725 |
hints.ai_canonname = NULL; |
| 1726 |
hints.ai_addr = NULL; |
| 1727 |
hints.ai_next = NULL; |
| 1728 |
rc = pg_getaddrinfo_all(local_addr_s, NULL, &hints, &la); |
| 1729 |
if (rc || !la) |
| 1730 |
{ |
| 1731 |
/* we don't expect this to happen */ |
| 1732 |
ident_return = false; |
| 1733 |
goto ident_inet_done; |
| 1734 |
} |
| 1735 |
|
| 1736 |
sock_fd = socket(ident_serv->ai_family, ident_serv->ai_socktype, |
| 1737 |
ident_serv->ai_protocol); |
| 1738 |
if (sock_fd == PGINVALID_SOCKET) |
| 1739 |
{ |
| 1740 |
ereport(LOG, |
| 1741 |
(errcode_for_socket_access(), |
| 1742 |
errmsg("could not create socket for Ident connection: %m"))); |
| 1743 |
ident_return = false; |
| 1744 |
goto ident_inet_done; |
| 1745 |
} |
| 1746 |
|
| 1747 |
/* |
| 1748 |
* Bind to the address which the client originally contacted, otherwise |
| 1749 |
* the ident server won't be able to match up the right connection. This |
| 1750 |
* is necessary if the PostgreSQL server is running on an IP alias. |
| 1751 |
*/ |
| 1752 |
rc = bind(sock_fd, la->ai_addr, la->ai_addrlen); |
| 1753 |
if (rc != 0) |
| 1754 |
{ |
| 1755 |
ereport(LOG, |
| 1756 |
(errcode_for_socket_access(), |
| 1757 |
errmsg("could not bind to local address \"%s\": %m", |
| 1758 |
local_addr_s))); |
| 1759 |
ident_return = false; |
| 1760 |
goto ident_inet_done; |
| 1761 |
} |
| 1762 |
|
| 1763 |
rc = connect(sock_fd, ident_serv->ai_addr, |
| 1764 |
ident_serv->ai_addrlen); |
| 1765 |
if (rc != 0) |
| 1766 |
{ |
| 1767 |
ereport(LOG, |
| 1768 |
(errcode_for_socket_access(), |
| 1769 |
errmsg("could not connect to Ident server at address \"%s\", port %s: %m", |
| 1770 |
remote_addr_s, ident_port))); |
| 1771 |
ident_return = false; |
| 1772 |
goto ident_inet_done; |
| 1773 |
} |
| 1774 |
|
| 1775 |
/* The query we send to the Ident server */ |
| 1776 |
snprintf(ident_query, sizeof(ident_query), "%s,%s\r\n", |
| 1777 |
remote_port, local_port); |
| 1778 |
|
| 1779 |
/* loop in case send is interrupted */ |
| 1780 |
do |
| 1781 |
{ |
| 1782 |
CHECK_FOR_INTERRUPTS(); |
| 1783 |
|
| 1784 |
rc = send(sock_fd, ident_query, strlen(ident_query), 0); |
| 1785 |
} while (rc < 0 && errno == EINTR); |
| 1786 |
|
| 1787 |
if (rc < 0) |
| 1788 |
{ |
| 1789 |
ereport(LOG, |
| 1790 |
(errcode_for_socket_access(), |
| 1791 |
errmsg("could not send query to Ident server at address \"%s\", port %s: %m", |
| 1792 |
remote_addr_s, ident_port))); |
| 1793 |
ident_return = false; |
| 1794 |
goto ident_inet_done; |
| 1795 |
} |
| 1796 |
|
| 1797 |
do |
| 1798 |
{ |
| 1799 |
CHECK_FOR_INTERRUPTS(); |
| 1800 |
|
| 1801 |
rc = recv(sock_fd, ident_response, sizeof(ident_response) - 1, 0); |
| 1802 |
} while (rc < 0 && errno == EINTR); |
| 1803 |
|
| 1804 |
if (rc < 0) |
| 1805 |
{ |
| 1806 |
ereport(LOG, |
| 1807 |
(errcode_for_socket_access(), |
| 1808 |
errmsg("could not receive response from Ident server at address \"%s\", port %s: %m", |
| 1809 |
remote_addr_s, ident_port))); |
| 1810 |
ident_return = false; |
| 1811 |
goto ident_inet_done; |
| 1812 |
} |
| 1813 |
|
| 1814 |
ident_response[rc] = '\0'; |
| 1815 |
ident_return = interpret_ident_response(ident_response, ident_user); |
| 1816 |
if (!ident_return) |
| 1817 |
ereport(LOG, |
| 1818 |
(errmsg("invalidly formatted response from Ident server: \"%s\"", |
| 1819 |
ident_response))); |
| 1820 |
|
| 1821 |
ident_inet_done: |
| 1822 |
if (sock_fd != PGINVALID_SOCKET) |
| 1823 |
closesocket(sock_fd); |
| 1824 |
if (ident_serv) |
| 1825 |
pg_freeaddrinfo_all(remote_addr.addr.ss_family, ident_serv); |
| 1826 |
if (la) |
| 1827 |
pg_freeaddrinfo_all(local_addr.addr.ss_family, la); |
| 1828 |
|
| 1829 |
if (ident_return) |
| 1830 |
{ |
| 1831 |
/* |
| 1832 |
* Success! Store the identity, then check the usermap. Note that |
| 1833 |
* setting the authenticated identity is done before checking the |
| 1834 |
* usermap, because at this point authentication has succeeded. |
| 1835 |
*/ |
| 1836 |
set_authn_id(port, ident_user); |
| 1837 |
return check_usermap(port->hba->usermap, port->user_name, ident_user, false); |
| 1838 |
} |
| 1839 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 1840 |
} |
| 1841 |
|
| 1842 |
|
| 1843 |
/*---------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 1844 |
* Peer authentication system |
| 1845 |
*---------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 1846 |
*/ |
| 1847 |
|
| 1848 |
/* |
| 1849 |
* Ask kernel about the credentials of the connecting process, |
| 1850 |
* determine the symbolic name of the corresponding user, and check |
| 1851 |
* if valid per the usermap. |
| 1852 |
* |
| 1853 |
* Iff authorized, return STATUS_OK, otherwise return STATUS_ERROR. |
| 1854 |
*/ |
| 1855 |
static int |
| 1856 |
auth_peer(hbaPort *port) |
| 1857 |
{ |
| 1858 |
uid_t uid; |
| 1859 |
gid_t gid; |
| 1860 |
#ifndef WIN32 |
| 1861 |
struct passwd pwbuf; |
| 1862 |
struct passwd *pw; |
| 1863 |
char buf[1024]; |
| 1864 |
int rc; |
| 1865 |
int ret; |
| 1866 |
#endif |
| 1867 |
|
| 1868 |
if (getpeereid(port->sock, &uid, &gid) != 0) |
| 1869 |
{ |
| 1870 |
/* Provide special error message if getpeereid is a stub */ |
| 1871 |
if (errno == ENOSYS) |
| 1872 |
ereport(LOG, |
| 1873 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED), |
| 1874 |
errmsg("peer authentication is not supported on this platform"))); |
| 1875 |
else |
| 1876 |
ereport(LOG, |
| 1877 |
(errcode_for_socket_access(), |
| 1878 |
errmsg("could not get peer credentials: %m"))); |
| 1879 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 1880 |
} |
| 1881 |
|
| 1882 |
#ifndef WIN32 |
| 1883 |
rc = getpwuid_r(uid, &pwbuf, buf, sizeof buf, &pw); |
| 1884 |
if (rc != 0) |
| 1885 |
{ |
| 1886 |
errno = rc; |
| 1887 |
ereport(LOG, |
| 1888 |
errmsg("could not look up local user ID %ld: %m", (long) uid)); |
| 1889 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 1890 |
} |
| 1891 |
else if (!pw) |
| 1892 |
{ |
| 1893 |
ereport(LOG, |
| 1894 |
errmsg("local user with ID %ld does not exist", (long) uid)); |
| 1895 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 1896 |
} |
| 1897 |
|
| 1898 |
/* |
| 1899 |
* Make a copy of static getpw*() result area; this is our authenticated |
| 1900 |
* identity. Set it before calling check_usermap, because authentication |
| 1901 |
* has already succeeded and we want the log file to reflect that. |
| 1902 |
*/ |
| 1903 |
set_authn_id(port, pw->pw_name); |
| 1904 |
|
| 1905 |
ret = check_usermap(port->hba->usermap, port->user_name, |
| 1906 |
MyClientConnectionInfo.authn_id, false); |
| 1907 |
|
| 1908 |
return ret; |
| 1909 |
#else |
| 1910 |
/* should have failed with ENOSYS above */ |
| 1911 |
Assert(false); |
| 1912 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 1913 |
#endif |
| 1914 |
} |
| 1915 |
|
| 1916 |
|
| 1917 |
/*---------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 1918 |
* PAM authentication system |
| 1919 |
*---------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 1920 |
*/ |
| 1921 |
#ifdef USE_PAM |
| 1922 |
|
| 1923 |
/* |
| 1924 |
* PAM conversation function |
| 1925 |
*/ |
| 1926 |
|
| 1927 |
static int |
| 1928 |
pam_passwd_conv_proc(int num_msg, PG_PAM_CONST struct pam_message **msg, |
| 1929 |
struct pam_response **resp, void *appdata_ptr) |
| 1930 |
{ |
| 1931 |
const char *passwd; |
| 1932 |
struct pam_response *reply; |
| 1933 |
int i; |
| 1934 |
|
| 1935 |
if (appdata_ptr) |
| 1936 |
passwd = (char *) appdata_ptr; |
| 1937 |
else |
| 1938 |
{ |
| 1939 |
/* |
| 1940 |
* Workaround for Solaris 2.6 where the PAM library is broken and does |
| 1941 |
* not pass appdata_ptr to the conversation routine |
| 1942 |
*/ |
| 1943 |
passwd = pam_passwd; |
| 1944 |
} |
| 1945 |
|
| 1946 |
*resp = NULL; /* in case of error exit */ |
| 1947 |
|
| 1948 |
if (num_msg <= 0 || num_msg > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG) |
| 1949 |
return PAM_CONV_ERR; |
| 1950 |
|
| 1951 |
/* |
| 1952 |
* Explicitly not using palloc here - PAM will free this memory in |
| 1953 |
* pam_end() |
| 1954 |
*/ |
| 1955 |
if ((reply = calloc(num_msg, sizeof(struct pam_response))) == NULL) |
| 1956 |
{ |
| 1957 |
ereport(LOG, |
| 1958 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_OUT_OF_MEMORY), |
| 1959 |
errmsg("out of memory"))); |
| 1960 |
return PAM_CONV_ERR; |
| 1961 |
} |
| 1962 |
|
| 1963 |
for (i = 0; i < num_msg; i++) |
| 1964 |
{ |
| 1965 |
switch (msg[i]->msg_style) |
| 1966 |
{ |
| 1967 |
case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF: |
| 1968 |
if (strlen(passwd) == 0) |
| 1969 |
{ |
| 1970 |
/* |
| 1971 |
* Password wasn't passed to PAM the first time around - |
| 1972 |
* let's go ask the client to send a password, which we |
| 1973 |
* then stuff into PAM. |
| 1974 |
*/ |
| 1975 |
sendAuthRequest(pam_port_cludge, AUTH_REQ_PASSWORD, NULL, 0); |
| 1976 |
passwd = recv_password_packet(pam_port_cludge); |
| 1977 |
if (passwd == NULL) |
| 1978 |
{ |
| 1979 |
/* |
| 1980 |
* Client didn't want to send password. We |
| 1981 |
* intentionally do not log anything about this, |
| 1982 |
* either here or at higher levels. |
| 1983 |
*/ |
| 1984 |
pam_no_password = true; |
| 1985 |
goto fail; |
| 1986 |
} |
| 1987 |
} |
| 1988 |
if ((reply[i].resp = strdup(passwd)) == NULL) |
| 1989 |
goto fail; |
| 1990 |
reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS; |
| 1991 |
break; |
| 1992 |
case PAM_ERROR_MSG: |
| 1993 |
ereport(LOG, |
| 1994 |
(errmsg("error from underlying PAM layer: %s", |
| 1995 |
msg[i]->msg))); |
| 1996 |
/* FALL THROUGH */ |
| 1997 |
case PAM_TEXT_INFO: |
| 1998 |
/* we don't bother to log TEXT_INFO messages */ |
| 1999 |
if ((reply[i].resp = strdup("")) == NULL) |
| 2000 |
goto fail; |
| 2001 |
reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS; |
| 2002 |
break; |
| 2003 |
default: |
| 2004 |
ereport(LOG, |
| 2005 |
(errmsg("unsupported PAM conversation %d/\"%s\"", |
| 2006 |
msg[i]->msg_style, |
| 2007 |
msg[i]->msg ? msg[i]->msg : "(none)"))); |
| 2008 |
goto fail; |
| 2009 |
} |
| 2010 |
} |
| 2011 |
|
| 2012 |
*resp = reply; |
| 2013 |
return PAM_SUCCESS; |
| 2014 |
|
| 2015 |
fail: |
| 2016 |
/* free up whatever we allocated */ |
| 2017 |
for (i = 0; i < num_msg; i++) |
| 2018 |
free(reply[i].resp); |
| 2019 |
free(reply); |
| 2020 |
|
| 2021 |
return PAM_CONV_ERR; |
| 2022 |
} |
| 2023 |
|
| 2024 |
|
| 2025 |
/* |
| 2026 |
* Check authentication against PAM. |
| 2027 |
*/ |
| 2028 |
static int |
| 2029 |
CheckPAMAuth(Port *port, const char *user, const char *password) |
| 2030 |
{ |
| 2031 |
int retval; |
| 2032 |
pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL; |
| 2033 |
|
| 2034 |
/* |
| 2035 |
* We can't entirely rely on PAM to pass through appdata --- it appears |
| 2036 |
* not to work on at least Solaris 2.6. So use these ugly static |
| 2037 |
* variables instead. |
| 2038 |
*/ |
| 2039 |
pam_passwd = password; |
| 2040 |
pam_port_cludge = port; |
| 2041 |
pam_no_password = false; |
| 2042 |
|
| 2043 |
/* |
| 2044 |
* Set the application data portion of the conversation struct. This is |
| 2045 |
* later used inside the PAM conversation to pass the password to the |
| 2046 |
* authentication module. |
| 2047 |
*/ |
| 2048 |
pam_passw_conv.appdata_ptr = unconstify(char *, password); /* from password above, |
| 2049 |
* not allocated */ |
| 2050 |
|
| 2051 |
/* Optionally, one can set the service name in pg_hba.conf */ |
| 2052 |
if (port->hba->pamservice && port->hba->pamservice[0] != '\0') |
| 2053 |
retval = pam_start(port->hba->pamservice, "pgsql@", |
| 2054 |
&pam_passw_conv, &pamh); |
| 2055 |
else |
| 2056 |
retval = pam_start(PGSQL_PAM_SERVICE, "pgsql@", |
| 2057 |
&pam_passw_conv, &pamh); |
| 2058 |
|
| 2059 |
if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) |
| 2060 |
{ |
| 2061 |
ereport(LOG, |
| 2062 |
(errmsg("could not create PAM authenticator: %s", |
| 2063 |
pam_strerror(pamh, retval)))); |
| 2064 |
pam_passwd = NULL; /* Unset pam_passwd */ |
| 2065 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 2066 |
} |
| 2067 |
|
| 2068 |
retval = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_USER, user); |
| 2069 |
|
| 2070 |
if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) |
| 2071 |
{ |
| 2072 |
ereport(LOG, |
| 2073 |
(errmsg("pam_set_item(PAM_USER) failed: %s", |
| 2074 |
pam_strerror(pamh, retval)))); |
| 2075 |
pam_passwd = NULL; /* Unset pam_passwd */ |
| 2076 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 2077 |
} |
| 2078 |
|
| 2079 |
if (port->hba->conntype != ctLocal) |
| 2080 |
{ |
| 2081 |
char hostinfo[NI_MAXHOST]; |
| 2082 |
int flags; |
| 2083 |
|
| 2084 |
if (port->hba->pam_use_hostname) |
| 2085 |
flags = 0; |
| 2086 |
else |
| 2087 |
flags = NI_NUMERICHOST | NI_NUMERICSERV; |
| 2088 |
|
| 2089 |
retval = pg_getnameinfo_all(&port->raddr.addr, port->raddr.salen, |
| 2090 |
hostinfo, sizeof(hostinfo), NULL, 0, |
| 2091 |
flags); |
| 2092 |
if (retval != 0) |
| 2093 |
{ |
| 2094 |
ereport(WARNING, |
| 2095 |
(errmsg_internal("pg_getnameinfo_all() failed: %s", |
| 2096 |
gai_strerror(retval)))); |
| 2097 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 2098 |
} |
| 2099 |
|
| 2100 |
retval = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_RHOST, hostinfo); |
| 2101 |
|
| 2102 |
if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) |
| 2103 |
{ |
| 2104 |
ereport(LOG, |
| 2105 |
(errmsg("pam_set_item(PAM_RHOST) failed: %s", |
| 2106 |
pam_strerror(pamh, retval)))); |
| 2107 |
pam_passwd = NULL; |
| 2108 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 2109 |
} |
| 2110 |
} |
| 2111 |
|
| 2112 |
retval = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_CONV, &pam_passw_conv); |
| 2113 |
|
| 2114 |
if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) |
| 2115 |
{ |
| 2116 |
ereport(LOG, |
| 2117 |
(errmsg("pam_set_item(PAM_CONV) failed: %s", |
| 2118 |
pam_strerror(pamh, retval)))); |
| 2119 |
pam_passwd = NULL; /* Unset pam_passwd */ |
| 2120 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 2121 |
} |
| 2122 |
|
| 2123 |
retval = pam_authenticate(pamh, 0); |
| 2124 |
|
| 2125 |
if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) |
| 2126 |
{ |
| 2127 |
/* If pam_passwd_conv_proc saw EOF, don't log anything */ |
| 2128 |
if (!pam_no_password) |
| 2129 |
ereport(LOG, |
| 2130 |
(errmsg("pam_authenticate failed: %s", |
| 2131 |
pam_strerror(pamh, retval)))); |
| 2132 |
pam_passwd = NULL; /* Unset pam_passwd */ |
| 2133 |
return pam_no_password ? STATUS_EOF : STATUS_ERROR; |
| 2134 |
} |
| 2135 |
|
| 2136 |
retval = pam_acct_mgmt(pamh, 0); |
| 2137 |
|
| 2138 |
if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) |
| 2139 |
{ |
| 2140 |
/* If pam_passwd_conv_proc saw EOF, don't log anything */ |
| 2141 |
if (!pam_no_password) |
| 2142 |
ereport(LOG, |
| 2143 |
(errmsg("pam_acct_mgmt failed: %s", |
| 2144 |
pam_strerror(pamh, retval)))); |
| 2145 |
pam_passwd = NULL; /* Unset pam_passwd */ |
| 2146 |
return pam_no_password ? STATUS_EOF : STATUS_ERROR; |
| 2147 |
} |
| 2148 |
|
| 2149 |
retval = pam_end(pamh, retval); |
| 2150 |
|
| 2151 |
if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) |
| 2152 |
{ |
| 2153 |
ereport(LOG, |
| 2154 |
(errmsg("could not release PAM authenticator: %s", |
| 2155 |
pam_strerror(pamh, retval)))); |
| 2156 |
} |
| 2157 |
|
| 2158 |
pam_passwd = NULL; /* Unset pam_passwd */ |
| 2159 |
|
| 2160 |
if (retval == PAM_SUCCESS) |
| 2161 |
set_authn_id(port, user); |
| 2162 |
|
| 2163 |
return (retval == PAM_SUCCESS ? STATUS_OK : STATUS_ERROR); |
| 2164 |
} |
| 2165 |
#endif /* USE_PAM */ |
| 2166 |
|
| 2167 |
|
| 2168 |
/*---------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 2169 |
* BSD authentication system |
| 2170 |
*---------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 2171 |
*/ |
| 2172 |
#ifdef USE_BSD_AUTH |
| 2173 |
static int |
| 2174 |
CheckBSDAuth(Port *port, char *user) |
| 2175 |
{ |
| 2176 |
char *passwd; |
| 2177 |
int retval; |
| 2178 |
|
| 2179 |
/* Send regular password request to client, and get the response */ |
| 2180 |
sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_PASSWORD, NULL, 0); |
| 2181 |
|
| 2182 |
passwd = recv_password_packet(port); |
| 2183 |
if (passwd == NULL) |
| 2184 |
return STATUS_EOF; |
| 2185 |
|
| 2186 |
/* |
| 2187 |
* Ask the BSD auth system to verify password. Note that auth_userokay |
| 2188 |
* will overwrite the password string with zeroes, but it's just a |
| 2189 |
* temporary string so we don't care. |
| 2190 |
*/ |
| 2191 |
retval = auth_userokay(user, NULL, "auth-postgresql", passwd); |
| 2192 |
|
| 2193 |
pfree(passwd); |
| 2194 |
|
| 2195 |
if (!retval) |
| 2196 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 2197 |
|
| 2198 |
set_authn_id(port, user); |
| 2199 |
return STATUS_OK; |
| 2200 |
} |
| 2201 |
#endif /* USE_BSD_AUTH */ |
| 2202 |
|
| 2203 |
|
| 2204 |
/*---------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 2205 |
* LDAP authentication system |
| 2206 |
*---------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 2207 |
*/ |
| 2208 |
#ifdef USE_LDAP |
| 2209 |
|
| 2210 |
static int errdetail_for_ldap(LDAP *ldap); |
| 2211 |
|
| 2212 |
/* |
| 2213 |
* Initialize a connection to the LDAP server, including setting up |
| 2214 |
* TLS if requested. |
| 2215 |
*/ |
| 2216 |
static int |
| 2217 |
InitializeLDAPConnection(Port *port, LDAP **ldap) |
| 2218 |
{ |
| 2219 |
const char *scheme; |
| 2220 |
int ldapversion = LDAP_VERSION3; |
| 2221 |
int r; |
| 2222 |
|
| 2223 |
scheme = port->hba->ldapscheme; |
| 2224 |
if (scheme == NULL) |
| 2225 |
scheme = "ldap"; |
| 2226 |
#ifdef WIN32 |
| 2227 |
if (strcmp(scheme, "ldaps") == 0) |
| 2228 |
*ldap = ldap_sslinit(port->hba->ldapserver, port->hba->ldapport, 1); |
| 2229 |
else |
| 2230 |
*ldap = ldap_init(port->hba->ldapserver, port->hba->ldapport); |
| 2231 |
if (!*ldap) |
| 2232 |
{ |
| 2233 |
ereport(LOG, |
| 2234 |
(errmsg("could not initialize LDAP: error code %d", |
| 2235 |
(int) LdapGetLastError()))); |
| 2236 |
|
| 2237 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 2238 |
} |
| 2239 |
#else |
| 2240 |
#ifdef HAVE_LDAP_INITIALIZE |
| 2241 |
|
| 2242 |
/* |
| 2243 |
* OpenLDAP provides a non-standard extension ldap_initialize() that takes |
| 2244 |
* a list of URIs, allowing us to request "ldaps" instead of "ldap". It |
| 2245 |
* also provides ldap_domain2hostlist() to find LDAP servers automatically |
| 2246 |
* using DNS SRV. They were introduced in the same version, so for now we |
| 2247 |
* don't have an extra configure check for the latter. |
| 2248 |
*/ |
| 2249 |
{ |
| 2250 |
StringInfoData uris; |
| 2251 |
char *hostlist = NULL; |
| 2252 |
char *p; |
| 2253 |
bool append_port; |
| 2254 |
|
| 2255 |
/* We'll build a space-separated scheme://hostname:port list here */ |
| 2256 |
initStringInfo(&uris); |
| 2257 |
|
| 2258 |
/* |
| 2259 |
* If pg_hba.conf provided no hostnames, we can ask OpenLDAP to try to |
| 2260 |
* find some by extracting a domain name from the base DN and looking |
| 2261 |
* up DSN SRV records for _ldap._tcp.<domain>. |
| 2262 |
*/ |
| 2263 |
if (!port->hba->ldapserver || port->hba->ldapserver[0] == '\0') |
| 2264 |
{ |
| 2265 |
char *domain; |
| 2266 |
|
| 2267 |
/* ou=blah,dc=foo,dc=bar -> foo.bar */ |
| 2268 |
if (ldap_dn2domain(port->hba->ldapbasedn, &domain)) |
| 2269 |
{ |
| 2270 |
ereport(LOG, |
| 2271 |
(errmsg("could not extract domain name from ldapbasedn"))); |
| 2272 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 2273 |
} |
| 2274 |
|
| 2275 |
/* Look up a list of LDAP server hosts and port numbers */ |
| 2276 |
if (ldap_domain2hostlist(domain, &hostlist)) |
| 2277 |
{ |
| 2278 |
ereport(LOG, |
| 2279 |
(errmsg("LDAP authentication could not find DNS SRV records for \"%s\"", |
| 2280 |
domain), |
| 2281 |
(errhint("Set an LDAP server name explicitly.")))); |
| 2282 |
ldap_memfree(domain); |
| 2283 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 2284 |
} |
| 2285 |
ldap_memfree(domain); |
| 2286 |
|
| 2287 |
/* We have a space-separated list of host:port entries */ |
| 2288 |
p = hostlist; |
| 2289 |
append_port = false; |
| 2290 |
} |
| 2291 |
else |
| 2292 |
{ |
| 2293 |
/* We have a space-separated list of hosts from pg_hba.conf */ |
| 2294 |
p = port->hba->ldapserver; |
| 2295 |
append_port = true; |
| 2296 |
} |
| 2297 |
|
| 2298 |
/* Convert the list of host[:port] entries to full URIs */ |
| 2299 |
do |
| 2300 |
{ |
| 2301 |
size_t size; |
| 2302 |
|
| 2303 |
/* Find the span of the next entry */ |
| 2304 |
size = strcspn(p, " "); |
| 2305 |
|
| 2306 |
/* Append a space separator if this isn't the first URI */ |
| 2307 |
if (uris.len > 0) |
| 2308 |
appendStringInfoChar(&uris, ' '); |
| 2309 |
|
| 2310 |
/* Append scheme://host:port */ |
| 2311 |
appendStringInfoString(&uris, scheme); |
| 2312 |
appendStringInfoString(&uris, "://"); |
| 2313 |
appendBinaryStringInfo(&uris, p, size); |
| 2314 |
if (append_port) |
| 2315 |
appendStringInfo(&uris, ":%d", port->hba->ldapport); |
| 2316 |
|
| 2317 |
/* Step over this entry and any number of trailing spaces */ |
| 2318 |
p += size; |
| 2319 |
while (*p == ' ') |
| 2320 |
++p; |
| 2321 |
} while (*p); |
| 2322 |
|
| 2323 |
/* Free memory from OpenLDAP if we looked up SRV records */ |
| 2324 |
if (hostlist) |
| 2325 |
ldap_memfree(hostlist); |
| 2326 |
|
| 2327 |
/* Finally, try to connect using the URI list */ |
| 2328 |
r = ldap_initialize(ldap, uris.data); |
| 2329 |
pfree(uris.data); |
| 2330 |
if (r != LDAP_SUCCESS) |
| 2331 |
{ |
| 2332 |
ereport(LOG, |
| 2333 |
(errmsg("could not initialize LDAP: %s", |
| 2334 |
ldap_err2string(r)))); |
| 2335 |
|
| 2336 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 2337 |
} |
| 2338 |
} |
| 2339 |
#else |
| 2340 |
if (strcmp(scheme, "ldaps") == 0) |
| 2341 |
{ |
| 2342 |
ereport(LOG, |
| 2343 |
(errmsg("ldaps not supported with this LDAP library"))); |
| 2344 |
|
| 2345 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 2346 |
} |
| 2347 |
*ldap = ldap_init(port->hba->ldapserver, port->hba->ldapport); |
| 2348 |
if (!*ldap) |
| 2349 |
{ |
| 2350 |
ereport(LOG, |
| 2351 |
(errmsg("could not initialize LDAP: %m"))); |
| 2352 |
|
| 2353 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 2354 |
} |
| 2355 |
#endif |
| 2356 |
#endif |
| 2357 |
|
| 2358 |
if ((r = ldap_set_option(*ldap, LDAP_OPT_PROTOCOL_VERSION, &ldapversion)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) |
| 2359 |
{ |
| 2360 |
ereport(LOG, |
| 2361 |
(errmsg("could not set LDAP protocol version: %s", |
| 2362 |
ldap_err2string(r)), |
| 2363 |
errdetail_for_ldap(*ldap))); |
| 2364 |
ldap_unbind(*ldap); |
| 2365 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 2366 |
} |
| 2367 |
|
| 2368 |
if (port->hba->ldaptls) |
| 2369 |
{ |
| 2370 |
#ifndef WIN32 |
| 2371 |
if ((r = ldap_start_tls_s(*ldap, NULL, NULL)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) |
| 2372 |
#else |
| 2373 |
if ((r = ldap_start_tls_s(*ldap, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)) != LDAP_SUCCESS) |
| 2374 |
#endif |
| 2375 |
{ |
| 2376 |
ereport(LOG, |
| 2377 |
(errmsg("could not start LDAP TLS session: %s", |
| 2378 |
ldap_err2string(r)), |
| 2379 |
errdetail_for_ldap(*ldap))); |
| 2380 |
ldap_unbind(*ldap); |
| 2381 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 2382 |
} |
| 2383 |
} |
| 2384 |
|
| 2385 |
return STATUS_OK; |
| 2386 |
} |
| 2387 |
|
| 2388 |
/* Placeholders recognized by FormatSearchFilter. For now just one. */ |
| 2389 |
#define LPH_USERNAME "$username" |
| 2390 |
#define LPH_USERNAME_LEN (sizeof(LPH_USERNAME) - 1) |
| 2391 |
|
| 2392 |
/* Not all LDAP implementations define this. */ |
| 2393 |
#ifndef LDAP_NO_ATTRS |
| 2394 |
#define LDAP_NO_ATTRS "1.1" |
| 2395 |
#endif |
| 2396 |
|
| 2397 |
/* Not all LDAP implementations define this. */ |
| 2398 |
#ifndef LDAPS_PORT |
| 2399 |
#define LDAPS_PORT 636 |
| 2400 |
#endif |
| 2401 |
|
| 2402 |
static char * |
| 2403 |
dummy_ldap_password_mutator(char *input) |
| 2404 |
{ |
| 2405 |
return input; |
| 2406 |
} |
| 2407 |
|
| 2408 |
/* |
| 2409 |
* Return a newly allocated C string copied from "pattern" with all |
| 2410 |
* occurrences of the placeholder "$username" replaced with "user_name". |
| 2411 |
*/ |
| 2412 |
static char * |
| 2413 |
FormatSearchFilter(const char *pattern, const char *user_name) |
| 2414 |
{ |
| 2415 |
StringInfoData output; |
| 2416 |
|
| 2417 |
initStringInfo(&output); |
| 2418 |
while (*pattern != '\0') |
| 2419 |
{ |
| 2420 |
if (strncmp(pattern, LPH_USERNAME, LPH_USERNAME_LEN) == 0) |
| 2421 |
{ |
| 2422 |
appendStringInfoString(&output, user_name); |
| 2423 |
pattern += LPH_USERNAME_LEN; |
| 2424 |
} |
| 2425 |
else |
| 2426 |
appendStringInfoChar(&output, *pattern++); |
| 2427 |
} |
| 2428 |
|
| 2429 |
return output.data; |
| 2430 |
} |
| 2431 |
|
| 2432 |
/* |
| 2433 |
* Perform LDAP authentication |
| 2434 |
*/ |
| 2435 |
static int |
| 2436 |
CheckLDAPAuth(Port *port) |
| 2437 |
{ |
| 2438 |
char *passwd; |
| 2439 |
LDAP *ldap; |
| 2440 |
int r; |
| 2441 |
char *fulluser; |
| 2442 |
const char *server_name; |
| 2443 |
|
| 2444 |
#ifdef HAVE_LDAP_INITIALIZE |
| 2445 |
|
| 2446 |
/* |
| 2447 |
* For OpenLDAP, allow empty hostname if we have a basedn. We'll look for |
| 2448 |
* servers with DNS SRV records via OpenLDAP library facilities. |
| 2449 |
*/ |
| 2450 |
if ((!port->hba->ldapserver || port->hba->ldapserver[0] == '\0') && |
| 2451 |
(!port->hba->ldapbasedn || port->hba->ldapbasedn[0] == '\0')) |
| 2452 |
{ |
| 2453 |
ereport(LOG, |
| 2454 |
(errmsg("LDAP server not specified, and no ldapbasedn"))); |
| 2455 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 2456 |
} |
| 2457 |
#else |
| 2458 |
if (!port->hba->ldapserver || port->hba->ldapserver[0] == '\0') |
| 2459 |
{ |
| 2460 |
ereport(LOG, |
| 2461 |
(errmsg("LDAP server not specified"))); |
| 2462 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 2463 |
} |
| 2464 |
#endif |
| 2465 |
|
| 2466 |
/* |
| 2467 |
* If we're using SRV records, we don't have a server name so we'll just |
| 2468 |
* show an empty string in error messages. |
| 2469 |
*/ |
| 2470 |
server_name = port->hba->ldapserver ? port->hba->ldapserver : ""; |
| 2471 |
|
| 2472 |
if (port->hba->ldapport == 0) |
| 2473 |
{ |
| 2474 |
if (port->hba->ldapscheme != NULL && |
| 2475 |
strcmp(port->hba->ldapscheme, "ldaps") == 0) |
| 2476 |
port->hba->ldapport = LDAPS_PORT; |
| 2477 |
else |
| 2478 |
port->hba->ldapport = LDAP_PORT; |
| 2479 |
} |
| 2480 |
|
| 2481 |
sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_PASSWORD, NULL, 0); |
| 2482 |
|
| 2483 |
passwd = recv_password_packet(port); |
| 2484 |
if (passwd == NULL) |
| 2485 |
return STATUS_EOF; /* client wouldn't send password */ |
| 2486 |
|
| 2487 |
if (InitializeLDAPConnection(port, &ldap) == STATUS_ERROR) |
| 2488 |
{ |
| 2489 |
/* Error message already sent */ |
| 2490 |
pfree(passwd); |
| 2491 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 2492 |
} |
| 2493 |
|
| 2494 |
if (port->hba->ldapbasedn) |
| 2495 |
{ |
| 2496 |
/* |
| 2497 |
* First perform an LDAP search to find the DN for the user we are |
| 2498 |
* trying to log in as. |
| 2499 |
*/ |
| 2500 |
char *filter; |
| 2501 |
LDAPMessage *search_message; |
| 2502 |
LDAPMessage *entry; |
| 2503 |
char *attributes[] = {LDAP_NO_ATTRS, NULL}; |
| 2504 |
char *dn; |
| 2505 |
char *c; |
| 2506 |
int count; |
| 2507 |
|
| 2508 |
/* |
| 2509 |
* Disallow any characters that we would otherwise need to escape, |
| 2510 |
* since they aren't really reasonable in a username anyway. Allowing |
| 2511 |
* them would make it possible to inject any kind of custom filters in |
| 2512 |
* the LDAP filter. |
| 2513 |
*/ |
| 2514 |
for (c = port->user_name; *c; c++) |
| 2515 |
{ |
| 2516 |
if (*c == '*' || |
| 2517 |
*c == '(' || |
| 2518 |
*c == ')' || |
| 2519 |
*c == '\\' || |
| 2520 |
*c == '/') |
| 2521 |
{ |
| 2522 |
ereport(LOG, |
| 2523 |
(errmsg("invalid character in user name for LDAP authentication"))); |
| 2524 |
ldap_unbind(ldap); |
| 2525 |
pfree(passwd); |
| 2526 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 2527 |
} |
| 2528 |
} |
| 2529 |
|
| 2530 |
/* |
| 2531 |
* Bind with a pre-defined username/password (if available) for |
| 2532 |
* searching. If none is specified, this turns into an anonymous bind. |
| 2533 |
*/ |
| 2534 |
r = ldap_simple_bind_s(ldap, |
| 2535 |
port->hba->ldapbinddn ? port->hba->ldapbinddn : "", |
| 2536 |
port->hba->ldapbindpasswd ? ldap_password_hook(port->hba->ldapbindpasswd) : ""); |
| 2537 |
if (r != LDAP_SUCCESS) |
| 2538 |
{ |
| 2539 |
ereport(LOG, |
| 2540 |
(errmsg("could not perform initial LDAP bind for ldapbinddn \"%s\" on server \"%s\": %s", |
| 2541 |
port->hba->ldapbinddn ? port->hba->ldapbinddn : "", |
| 2542 |
server_name, |
| 2543 |
ldap_err2string(r)), |
| 2544 |
errdetail_for_ldap(ldap))); |
| 2545 |
ldap_unbind(ldap); |
| 2546 |
pfree(passwd); |
| 2547 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 2548 |
} |
| 2549 |
|
| 2550 |
/* Build a custom filter or a single attribute filter? */ |
| 2551 |
if (port->hba->ldapsearchfilter) |
| 2552 |
filter = FormatSearchFilter(port->hba->ldapsearchfilter, port->user_name); |
| 2553 |
else if (port->hba->ldapsearchattribute) |
| 2554 |
filter = psprintf("(%s=%s)", port->hba->ldapsearchattribute, port->user_name); |
| 2555 |
else |
| 2556 |
filter = psprintf("(uid=%s)", port->user_name); |
| 2557 |
|
| 2558 |
search_message = NULL; |
| 2559 |
r = ldap_search_s(ldap, |
| 2560 |
port->hba->ldapbasedn, |
| 2561 |
port->hba->ldapscope, |
| 2562 |
filter, |
| 2563 |
attributes, |
| 2564 |
0, |
| 2565 |
&search_message); |
| 2566 |
|
| 2567 |
if (r != LDAP_SUCCESS) |
| 2568 |
{ |
| 2569 |
ereport(LOG, |
| 2570 |
(errmsg("could not search LDAP for filter \"%s\" on server \"%s\": %s", |
| 2571 |
filter, server_name, ldap_err2string(r)), |
| 2572 |
errdetail_for_ldap(ldap))); |
| 2573 |
if (search_message != NULL) |
| 2574 |
ldap_msgfree(search_message); |
| 2575 |
ldap_unbind(ldap); |
| 2576 |
pfree(passwd); |
| 2577 |
pfree(filter); |
| 2578 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 2579 |
} |
| 2580 |
|
| 2581 |
count = ldap_count_entries(ldap, search_message); |
| 2582 |
if (count != 1) |
| 2583 |
{ |
| 2584 |
if (count == 0) |
| 2585 |
ereport(LOG, |
| 2586 |
(errmsg("LDAP user \"%s\" does not exist", port->user_name), |
| 2587 |
errdetail("LDAP search for filter \"%s\" on server \"%s\" returned no entries.", |
| 2588 |
filter, server_name))); |
| 2589 |
else |
| 2590 |
ereport(LOG, |
| 2591 |
(errmsg("LDAP user \"%s\" is not unique", port->user_name), |
| 2592 |
errdetail_plural("LDAP search for filter \"%s\" on server \"%s\" returned %d entry.", |
| 2593 |
"LDAP search for filter \"%s\" on server \"%s\" returned %d entries.", |
| 2594 |
count, |
| 2595 |
filter, server_name, count))); |
| 2596 |
|
| 2597 |
ldap_unbind(ldap); |
| 2598 |
pfree(passwd); |
| 2599 |
pfree(filter); |
| 2600 |
ldap_msgfree(search_message); |
| 2601 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 2602 |
} |
| 2603 |
|
| 2604 |
entry = ldap_first_entry(ldap, search_message); |
| 2605 |
dn = ldap_get_dn(ldap, entry); |
| 2606 |
if (dn == NULL) |
| 2607 |
{ |
| 2608 |
int error; |
| 2609 |
|
| 2610 |
(void) ldap_get_option(ldap, LDAP_OPT_ERROR_NUMBER, &error); |
| 2611 |
ereport(LOG, |
| 2612 |
(errmsg("could not get dn for the first entry matching \"%s\" on server \"%s\": %s", |
| 2613 |
filter, server_name, |
| 2614 |
ldap_err2string(error)), |
| 2615 |
errdetail_for_ldap(ldap))); |
| 2616 |
ldap_unbind(ldap); |
| 2617 |
pfree(passwd); |
| 2618 |
pfree(filter); |
| 2619 |
ldap_msgfree(search_message); |
| 2620 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 2621 |
} |
| 2622 |
fulluser = pstrdup(dn); |
| 2623 |
|
| 2624 |
pfree(filter); |
| 2625 |
ldap_memfree(dn); |
| 2626 |
ldap_msgfree(search_message); |
| 2627 |
} |
| 2628 |
else |
| 2629 |
fulluser = psprintf("%s%s%s", |
| 2630 |
port->hba->ldapprefix ? port->hba->ldapprefix : "", |
| 2631 |
port->user_name, |
| 2632 |
port->hba->ldapsuffix ? port->hba->ldapsuffix : ""); |
| 2633 |
|
| 2634 |
r = ldap_simple_bind_s(ldap, fulluser, passwd); |
| 2635 |
|
| 2636 |
if (r != LDAP_SUCCESS) |
| 2637 |
{ |
| 2638 |
ereport(LOG, |
| 2639 |
(errmsg("LDAP login failed for user \"%s\" on server \"%s\": %s", |
| 2640 |
fulluser, server_name, ldap_err2string(r)), |
| 2641 |
errdetail_for_ldap(ldap))); |
| 2642 |
ldap_unbind(ldap); |
| 2643 |
pfree(passwd); |
| 2644 |
pfree(fulluser); |
| 2645 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 2646 |
} |
| 2647 |
|
| 2648 |
/* Save the original bind DN as the authenticated identity. */ |
| 2649 |
set_authn_id(port, fulluser); |
| 2650 |
|
| 2651 |
ldap_unbind(ldap); |
| 2652 |
pfree(passwd); |
| 2653 |
pfree(fulluser); |
| 2654 |
|
| 2655 |
return STATUS_OK; |
| 2656 |
} |
| 2657 |
|
| 2658 |
/* |
| 2659 |
* Add a detail error message text to the current error if one can be |
| 2660 |
* constructed from the LDAP 'diagnostic message'. |
| 2661 |
*/ |
| 2662 |
static int |
| 2663 |
errdetail_for_ldap(LDAP *ldap) |
| 2664 |
{ |
| 2665 |
char *message; |
| 2666 |
int rc; |
| 2667 |
|
| 2668 |
rc = ldap_get_option(ldap, LDAP_OPT_DIAGNOSTIC_MESSAGE, &message); |
| 2669 |
if (rc == LDAP_SUCCESS && message != NULL) |
| 2670 |
{ |
| 2671 |
errdetail("LDAP diagnostics: %s", message); |
| 2672 |
ldap_memfree(message); |
| 2673 |
} |
| 2674 |
|
| 2675 |
return 0; |
| 2676 |
} |
| 2677 |
|
| 2678 |
#endif /* USE_LDAP */ |
| 2679 |
|
| 2680 |
|
| 2681 |
/*---------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 2682 |
* SSL client certificate authentication |
| 2683 |
*---------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 2684 |
*/ |
| 2685 |
#ifdef USE_SSL |
| 2686 |
static int |
| 2687 |
CheckCertAuth(Port *port) |
| 2688 |
{ |
| 2689 |
int status_check_usermap = STATUS_ERROR; |
| 2690 |
char *peer_username = NULL; |
| 2691 |
|
| 2692 |
Assert(port->ssl); |
| 2693 |
|
| 2694 |
/* select the correct field to compare */ |
| 2695 |
switch (port->hba->clientcertname) |
| 2696 |
{ |
| 2697 |
case clientCertDN: |
| 2698 |
peer_username = port->peer_dn; |
| 2699 |
break; |
| 2700 |
case clientCertCN: |
| 2701 |
peer_username = port->peer_cn; |
| 2702 |
} |
| 2703 |
|
| 2704 |
/* Make sure we have received a username in the certificate */ |
| 2705 |
if (peer_username == NULL || |
| 2706 |
strlen(peer_username) <= 0) |
| 2707 |
{ |
| 2708 |
ereport(LOG, |
| 2709 |
(errmsg("certificate authentication failed for user \"%s\": client certificate contains no user name", |
| 2710 |
port->user_name))); |
| 2711 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 2712 |
} |
| 2713 |
|
| 2714 |
if (port->hba->auth_method == uaCert) |
| 2715 |
{ |
| 2716 |
/* |
| 2717 |
* For cert auth, the client's Subject DN is always our authenticated |
| 2718 |
* identity, even if we're only using its CN for authorization. Set |
| 2719 |
* it now, rather than waiting for check_usermap() below, because |
| 2720 |
* authentication has already succeeded and we want the log file to |
| 2721 |
* reflect that. |
| 2722 |
*/ |
| 2723 |
if (!port->peer_dn) |
| 2724 |
{ |
| 2725 |
/* |
| 2726 |
* This should not happen as both peer_dn and peer_cn should be |
| 2727 |
* set in this context. |
| 2728 |
*/ |
| 2729 |
ereport(LOG, |
| 2730 |
(errmsg("certificate authentication failed for user \"%s\": unable to retrieve subject DN", |
| 2731 |
port->user_name))); |
| 2732 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 2733 |
} |
| 2734 |
|
| 2735 |
set_authn_id(port, port->peer_dn); |
| 2736 |
} |
| 2737 |
|
| 2738 |
/* Just pass the certificate cn/dn to the usermap check */ |
| 2739 |
status_check_usermap = check_usermap(port->hba->usermap, port->user_name, peer_username, false); |
| 2740 |
if (status_check_usermap != STATUS_OK) |
| 2741 |
{ |
| 2742 |
/* |
| 2743 |
* If clientcert=verify-full was specified and the authentication |
| 2744 |
* method is other than uaCert, log the reason for rejecting the |
| 2745 |
* authentication. |
| 2746 |
*/ |
| 2747 |
if (port->hba->clientcert == clientCertFull && port->hba->auth_method != uaCert) |
| 2748 |
{ |
| 2749 |
switch (port->hba->clientcertname) |
| 2750 |
{ |
| 2751 |
case clientCertDN: |
| 2752 |
ereport(LOG, |
| 2753 |
(errmsg("certificate validation (clientcert=verify-full) failed for user \"%s\": DN mismatch", |
| 2754 |
port->user_name))); |
| 2755 |
break; |
| 2756 |
case clientCertCN: |
| 2757 |
ereport(LOG, |
| 2758 |
(errmsg("certificate validation (clientcert=verify-full) failed for user \"%s\": CN mismatch", |
| 2759 |
port->user_name))); |
| 2760 |
} |
| 2761 |
} |
| 2762 |
} |
| 2763 |
return status_check_usermap; |
| 2764 |
} |
| 2765 |
#endif |
| 2766 |
|
| 2767 |
|
| 2768 |
/*---------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 2769 |
* RADIUS authentication |
| 2770 |
*---------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 2771 |
*/ |
| 2772 |
|
| 2773 |
/* |
| 2774 |
* RADIUS authentication is described in RFC2865 (and several others). |
| 2775 |
*/ |
| 2776 |
|
| 2777 |
#define RADIUS_VECTOR_LENGTH 16 |
| 2778 |
#define RADIUS_HEADER_LENGTH 20 |
| 2779 |
#define RADIUS_MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH 128 |
| 2780 |
|
| 2781 |
/* Maximum size of a RADIUS packet we will create or accept */ |
| 2782 |
#define RADIUS_BUFFER_SIZE 1024 |
| 2783 |
|
| 2784 |
typedef struct |
| 2785 |
{ |
| 2786 |
uint8 attribute; |
| 2787 |
uint8 length; |
| 2788 |
uint8 data[FLEXIBLE_ARRAY_MEMBER]; |
| 2789 |
} radius_attribute; |
| 2790 |
|
| 2791 |
typedef struct |
| 2792 |
{ |
| 2793 |
uint8 code; |
| 2794 |
uint8 id; |
| 2795 |
uint16 length; |
| 2796 |
uint8 vector[RADIUS_VECTOR_LENGTH]; |
| 2797 |
/* this is a bit longer than strictly necessary: */ |
| 2798 |
char pad[RADIUS_BUFFER_SIZE - RADIUS_VECTOR_LENGTH]; |
| 2799 |
} radius_packet; |
| 2800 |
|
| 2801 |
/* RADIUS packet types */ |
| 2802 |
#define RADIUS_ACCESS_REQUEST 1 |
| 2803 |
#define RADIUS_ACCESS_ACCEPT 2 |
| 2804 |
#define RADIUS_ACCESS_REJECT 3 |
| 2805 |
|
| 2806 |
/* RADIUS attributes */ |
| 2807 |
#define RADIUS_USER_NAME 1 |
| 2808 |
#define RADIUS_PASSWORD 2 |
| 2809 |
#define RADIUS_SERVICE_TYPE 6 |
| 2810 |
#define RADIUS_NAS_IDENTIFIER 32 |
| 2811 |
|
| 2812 |
/* RADIUS service types */ |
| 2813 |
#define RADIUS_AUTHENTICATE_ONLY 8 |
| 2814 |
|
| 2815 |
/* Seconds to wait - XXX: should be in a config variable! */ |
| 2816 |
#define RADIUS_TIMEOUT 3 |
| 2817 |
|
| 2818 |
static void |
| 2819 |
radius_add_attribute(radius_packet *packet, uint8 type, const unsigned char *data, int len) |
| 2820 |
{ |
| 2821 |
radius_attribute *attr; |
| 2822 |
|
| 2823 |
if (packet->length + len > RADIUS_BUFFER_SIZE) |
| 2824 |
{ |
| 2825 |
/* |
| 2826 |
* With remotely realistic data, this can never happen. But catch it |
| 2827 |
* just to make sure we don't overrun a buffer. We'll just skip adding |
| 2828 |
* the broken attribute, which will in the end cause authentication to |
| 2829 |
* fail. |
| 2830 |
*/ |
| 2831 |
elog(WARNING, |
| 2832 |
"adding attribute code %d with length %d to radius packet would create oversize packet, ignoring", |
| 2833 |
type, len); |
| 2834 |
return; |
| 2835 |
} |
| 2836 |
|
| 2837 |
attr = (radius_attribute *) ((unsigned char *) packet + packet->length); |
| 2838 |
attr->attribute = type; |
| 2839 |
attr->length = len + 2; /* total size includes type and length */ |
| 2840 |
memcpy(attr->data, data, len); |
| 2841 |
packet->length += attr->length; |
| 2842 |
} |
| 2843 |
|
| 2844 |
static int |
| 2845 |
CheckRADIUSAuth(Port *port) |
| 2846 |
{ |
| 2847 |
char *passwd; |
| 2848 |
ListCell *server, |
| 2849 |
*secrets, |
| 2850 |
*radiusports, |
| 2851 |
*identifiers; |
| 2852 |
|
| 2853 |
/* Make sure struct alignment is correct */ |
| 2854 |
Assert(offsetof(radius_packet, vector) == 4); |
| 2855 |
|
| 2856 |
/* Verify parameters */ |
| 2857 |
if (port->hba->radiusservers == NIL) |
| 2858 |
{ |
| 2859 |
ereport(LOG, |
| 2860 |
(errmsg("RADIUS server not specified"))); |
| 2861 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 2862 |
} |
| 2863 |
|
| 2864 |
if (port->hba->radiussecrets == NIL) |
| 2865 |
{ |
| 2866 |
ereport(LOG, |
| 2867 |
(errmsg("RADIUS secret not specified"))); |
| 2868 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 2869 |
} |
| 2870 |
|
| 2871 |
/* Send regular password request to client, and get the response */ |
| 2872 |
sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_PASSWORD, NULL, 0); |
| 2873 |
|
| 2874 |
passwd = recv_password_packet(port); |
| 2875 |
if (passwd == NULL) |
| 2876 |
return STATUS_EOF; /* client wouldn't send password */ |
| 2877 |
|
| 2878 |
if (strlen(passwd) > RADIUS_MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH) |
| 2879 |
{ |
| 2880 |
ereport(LOG, |
| 2881 |
(errmsg("RADIUS authentication does not support passwords longer than %d characters", RADIUS_MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH))); |
| 2882 |
pfree(passwd); |
| 2883 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 2884 |
} |
| 2885 |
|
| 2886 |
/* |
| 2887 |
* Loop over and try each server in order. |
| 2888 |
*/ |
| 2889 |
secrets = list_head(port->hba->radiussecrets); |
| 2890 |
radiusports = list_head(port->hba->radiusports); |
| 2891 |
identifiers = list_head(port->hba->radiusidentifiers); |
| 2892 |
foreach(server, port->hba->radiusservers) |
| 2893 |
{ |
| 2894 |
int ret = PerformRadiusTransaction(lfirst(server), |
| 2895 |
lfirst(secrets), |
| 2896 |
radiusports ? lfirst(radiusports) : NULL, |
| 2897 |
identifiers ? lfirst(identifiers) : NULL, |
| 2898 |
port->user_name, |
| 2899 |
passwd); |
| 2900 |
|
| 2901 |
/*------ |
| 2902 |
* STATUS_OK = Login OK |
| 2903 |
* STATUS_ERROR = Login not OK, but try next server |
| 2904 |
* STATUS_EOF = Login not OK, and don't try next server |
| 2905 |
*------ |
| 2906 |
*/ |
| 2907 |
if (ret == STATUS_OK) |
| 2908 |
{ |
| 2909 |
set_authn_id(port, port->user_name); |
| 2910 |
|
| 2911 |
pfree(passwd); |
| 2912 |
return STATUS_OK; |
| 2913 |
} |
| 2914 |
else if (ret == STATUS_EOF) |
| 2915 |
{ |
| 2916 |
pfree(passwd); |
| 2917 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 2918 |
} |
| 2919 |
|
| 2920 |
/* |
| 2921 |
* secret, port and identifiers either have length 0 (use default), |
| 2922 |
* length 1 (use the same everywhere) or the same length as servers. |
| 2923 |
* So if the length is >1, we advance one step. In other cases, we |
| 2924 |
* don't and will then reuse the correct value. |
| 2925 |
*/ |
| 2926 |
if (list_length(port->hba->radiussecrets) > 1) |
| 2927 |
secrets = lnext(port->hba->radiussecrets, secrets); |
| 2928 |
if (list_length(port->hba->radiusports) > 1) |
| 2929 |
radiusports = lnext(port->hba->radiusports, radiusports); |
| 2930 |
if (list_length(port->hba->radiusidentifiers) > 1) |
| 2931 |
identifiers = lnext(port->hba->radiusidentifiers, identifiers); |
| 2932 |
} |
| 2933 |
|
| 2934 |
/* No servers left to try, so give up */ |
| 2935 |
pfree(passwd); |
| 2936 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 2937 |
} |
| 2938 |
|
| 2939 |
static int |
| 2940 |
PerformRadiusTransaction(const char *server, const char *secret, const char *portstr, const char *identifier, const char *user_name, const char *passwd) |
| 2941 |
{ |
| 2942 |
radius_packet radius_send_pack; |
| 2943 |
radius_packet radius_recv_pack; |
| 2944 |
radius_packet *packet = &radius_send_pack; |
| 2945 |
radius_packet *receivepacket = &radius_recv_pack; |
| 2946 |
void *radius_buffer = &radius_send_pack; |
| 2947 |
void *receive_buffer = &radius_recv_pack; |
| 2948 |
int32 service = pg_hton32(RADIUS_AUTHENTICATE_ONLY); |
| 2949 |
uint8 *cryptvector; |
| 2950 |
int encryptedpasswordlen; |
| 2951 |
uint8 encryptedpassword[RADIUS_MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH]; |
| 2952 |
uint8 *md5trailer; |
| 2953 |
int packetlength; |
| 2954 |
pgsocket sock; |
| 2955 |
|
| 2956 |
struct sockaddr_in6 localaddr; |
| 2957 |
struct sockaddr_in6 remoteaddr; |
| 2958 |
struct addrinfo hint; |
| 2959 |
struct addrinfo *serveraddrs; |
| 2960 |
int port; |
| 2961 |
socklen_t addrsize; |
| 2962 |
fd_set fdset; |
| 2963 |
struct timeval endtime; |
| 2964 |
int i, |
| 2965 |
j, |
| 2966 |
r; |
| 2967 |
|
| 2968 |
/* Assign default values */ |
| 2969 |
if (portstr == NULL) |
| 2970 |
portstr = "1812"; |
| 2971 |
if (identifier == NULL) |
| 2972 |
identifier = "postgresql"; |
| 2973 |
|
| 2974 |
MemSet(&hint, 0, sizeof(hint)); |
| 2975 |
hint.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM; |
| 2976 |
hint.ai_family = AF_UNSPEC; |
| 2977 |
port = atoi(portstr); |
| 2978 |
|
| 2979 |
r = pg_getaddrinfo_all(server, portstr, &hint, &serveraddrs); |
| 2980 |
if (r || !serveraddrs) |
| 2981 |
{ |
| 2982 |
ereport(LOG, |
| 2983 |
(errmsg("could not translate RADIUS server name \"%s\" to address: %s", |
| 2984 |
server, gai_strerror(r)))); |
| 2985 |
if (serveraddrs) |
| 2986 |
pg_freeaddrinfo_all(hint.ai_family, serveraddrs); |
| 2987 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 2988 |
} |
| 2989 |
/* XXX: add support for multiple returned addresses? */ |
| 2990 |
|
| 2991 |
/* Construct RADIUS packet */ |
| 2992 |
packet->code = RADIUS_ACCESS_REQUEST; |
| 2993 |
packet->length = RADIUS_HEADER_LENGTH; |
| 2994 |
if (!pg_strong_random(packet->vector, RADIUS_VECTOR_LENGTH)) |
| 2995 |
{ |
| 2996 |
ereport(LOG, |
| 2997 |
(errmsg("could not generate random encryption vector"))); |
| 2998 |
pg_freeaddrinfo_all(hint.ai_family, serveraddrs); |
| 2999 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 3000 |
} |
| 3001 |
packet->id = packet->vector[0]; |
| 3002 |
radius_add_attribute(packet, RADIUS_SERVICE_TYPE, (const unsigned char *) &service, sizeof(service)); |
| 3003 |
radius_add_attribute(packet, RADIUS_USER_NAME, (const unsigned char *) user_name, strlen(user_name)); |
| 3004 |
radius_add_attribute(packet, RADIUS_NAS_IDENTIFIER, (const unsigned char *) identifier, strlen(identifier)); |
| 3005 |
|
| 3006 |
/* |
| 3007 |
* RADIUS password attributes are calculated as: e[0] = p[0] XOR |
| 3008 |
* MD5(secret + Request Authenticator) for the first group of 16 octets, |
| 3009 |
* and then: e[i] = p[i] XOR MD5(secret + e[i-1]) for the following ones |
| 3010 |
* (if necessary) |
| 3011 |
*/ |
| 3012 |
encryptedpasswordlen = ((strlen(passwd) + RADIUS_VECTOR_LENGTH - 1) / RADIUS_VECTOR_LENGTH) * RADIUS_VECTOR_LENGTH; |
| 3013 |
cryptvector = palloc(strlen(secret) + RADIUS_VECTOR_LENGTH); |
| 3014 |
memcpy(cryptvector, secret, strlen(secret)); |
| 3015 |
|
| 3016 |
/* for the first iteration, we use the Request Authenticator vector */ |
| 3017 |
md5trailer = packet->vector; |
| 3018 |
for (i = 0; i < encryptedpasswordlen; i += RADIUS_VECTOR_LENGTH) |
| 3019 |
{ |
| 3020 |
const char *errstr = NULL; |
| 3021 |
|
| 3022 |
memcpy(cryptvector + strlen(secret), md5trailer, RADIUS_VECTOR_LENGTH); |
| 3023 |
|
| 3024 |
/* |
| 3025 |
* .. and for subsequent iterations the result of the previous XOR |
| 3026 |
* (calculated below) |
| 3027 |
*/ |
| 3028 |
md5trailer = encryptedpassword + i; |
| 3029 |
|
| 3030 |
if (!pg_md5_binary(cryptvector, strlen(secret) + RADIUS_VECTOR_LENGTH, |
| 3031 |
encryptedpassword + i, &errstr)) |
| 3032 |
{ |
| 3033 |
ereport(LOG, |
| 3034 |
(errmsg("could not perform MD5 encryption of password: %s", |
| 3035 |
errstr))); |
| 3036 |
pfree(cryptvector); |
| 3037 |
pg_freeaddrinfo_all(hint.ai_family, serveraddrs); |
| 3038 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 3039 |
} |
| 3040 |
|
| 3041 |
for (j = i; j < i + RADIUS_VECTOR_LENGTH; j++) |
| 3042 |
{ |
| 3043 |
if (j < strlen(passwd)) |
| 3044 |
encryptedpassword[j] = passwd[j] ^ encryptedpassword[j]; |
| 3045 |
else |
| 3046 |
encryptedpassword[j] = '\0' ^ encryptedpassword[j]; |
| 3047 |
} |
| 3048 |
} |
| 3049 |
pfree(cryptvector); |
| 3050 |
|
| 3051 |
radius_add_attribute(packet, RADIUS_PASSWORD, encryptedpassword, encryptedpasswordlen); |
| 3052 |
|
| 3053 |
/* Length needs to be in network order on the wire */ |
| 3054 |
packetlength = packet->length; |
| 3055 |
packet->length = pg_hton16(packet->length); |
| 3056 |
|
| 3057 |
sock = socket(serveraddrs[0].ai_family, SOCK_DGRAM, 0); |
| 3058 |
if (sock == PGINVALID_SOCKET) |
| 3059 |
{ |
| 3060 |
ereport(LOG, |
| 3061 |
(errmsg("could not create RADIUS socket: %m"))); |
| 3062 |
pg_freeaddrinfo_all(hint.ai_family, serveraddrs); |
| 3063 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 3064 |
} |
| 3065 |
|
| 3066 |
memset(&localaddr, 0, sizeof(localaddr)); |
| 3067 |
localaddr.sin6_family = serveraddrs[0].ai_family; |
| 3068 |
localaddr.sin6_addr = in6addr_any; |
| 3069 |
if (localaddr.sin6_family == AF_INET6) |
| 3070 |
addrsize = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); |
| 3071 |
else |
| 3072 |
addrsize = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in); |
| 3073 |
|
| 3074 |
if (bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *) &localaddr, addrsize)) |
| 3075 |
{ |
| 3076 |
ereport(LOG, |
| 3077 |
(errmsg("could not bind local RADIUS socket: %m"))); |
| 3078 |
closesocket(sock); |
| 3079 |
pg_freeaddrinfo_all(hint.ai_family, serveraddrs); |
| 3080 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 3081 |
} |
| 3082 |
|
| 3083 |
if (sendto(sock, radius_buffer, packetlength, 0, |
| 3084 |
serveraddrs[0].ai_addr, serveraddrs[0].ai_addrlen) < 0) |
| 3085 |
{ |
| 3086 |
ereport(LOG, |
| 3087 |
(errmsg("could not send RADIUS packet: %m"))); |
| 3088 |
closesocket(sock); |
| 3089 |
pg_freeaddrinfo_all(hint.ai_family, serveraddrs); |
| 3090 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 3091 |
} |
| 3092 |
|
| 3093 |
/* Don't need the server address anymore */ |
| 3094 |
pg_freeaddrinfo_all(hint.ai_family, serveraddrs); |
| 3095 |
|
| 3096 |
/* |
| 3097 |
* Figure out at what time we should time out. We can't just use a single |
| 3098 |
* call to select() with a timeout, since somebody can be sending invalid |
| 3099 |
* packets to our port thus causing us to retry in a loop and never time |
| 3100 |
* out. |
| 3101 |
* |
| 3102 |
* XXX: Using WaitLatchOrSocket() and doing a CHECK_FOR_INTERRUPTS() if |
| 3103 |
* the latch was set would improve the responsiveness to |
| 3104 |
* timeouts/cancellations. |
| 3105 |
*/ |
| 3106 |
gettimeofday(&endtime, NULL); |
| 3107 |
endtime.tv_sec += RADIUS_TIMEOUT; |
| 3108 |
|
| 3109 |
while (true) |
| 3110 |
{ |
| 3111 |
struct timeval timeout; |
| 3112 |
struct timeval now; |
| 3113 |
int64 timeoutval; |
| 3114 |
const char *errstr = NULL; |
| 3115 |
|
| 3116 |
gettimeofday(&now, NULL); |
| 3117 |
timeoutval = (endtime.tv_sec * 1000000 + endtime.tv_usec) - (now.tv_sec * 1000000 + now.tv_usec); |
| 3118 |
if (timeoutval <= 0) |
| 3119 |
{ |
| 3120 |
ereport(LOG, |
| 3121 |
(errmsg("timeout waiting for RADIUS response from %s", |
| 3122 |
server))); |
| 3123 |
closesocket(sock); |
| 3124 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 3125 |
} |
| 3126 |
timeout.tv_sec = timeoutval / 1000000; |
| 3127 |
timeout.tv_usec = timeoutval % 1000000; |
| 3128 |
|
| 3129 |
FD_ZERO(&fdset); |
| 3130 |
FD_SET(sock, &fdset); |
| 3131 |
|
| 3132 |
r = select(sock + 1, &fdset, NULL, NULL, &timeout); |
| 3133 |
if (r < 0) |
| 3134 |
{ |
| 3135 |
if (errno == EINTR) |
| 3136 |
continue; |
| 3137 |
|
| 3138 |
/* Anything else is an actual error */ |
| 3139 |
ereport(LOG, |
| 3140 |
(errmsg("could not check status on RADIUS socket: %m"))); |
| 3141 |
closesocket(sock); |
| 3142 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 3143 |
} |
| 3144 |
if (r == 0) |
| 3145 |
{ |
| 3146 |
ereport(LOG, |
| 3147 |
(errmsg("timeout waiting for RADIUS response from %s", |
| 3148 |
server))); |
| 3149 |
closesocket(sock); |
| 3150 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 3151 |
} |
| 3152 |
|
| 3153 |
/* |
| 3154 |
* Attempt to read the response packet, and verify the contents. |
| 3155 |
* |
| 3156 |
* Any packet that's not actually a RADIUS packet, or otherwise does |
| 3157 |
* not validate as an explicit reject, is just ignored and we retry |
| 3158 |
* for another packet (until we reach the timeout). This is to avoid |
| 3159 |
* the possibility to denial-of-service the login by flooding the |
| 3160 |
* server with invalid packets on the port that we're expecting the |
| 3161 |
* RADIUS response on. |
| 3162 |
*/ |
| 3163 |
|
| 3164 |
addrsize = sizeof(remoteaddr); |
| 3165 |
packetlength = recvfrom(sock, receive_buffer, RADIUS_BUFFER_SIZE, 0, |
| 3166 |
(struct sockaddr *) &remoteaddr, &addrsize); |
| 3167 |
if (packetlength < 0) |
| 3168 |
{ |
| 3169 |
ereport(LOG, |
| 3170 |
(errmsg("could not read RADIUS response: %m"))); |
| 3171 |
closesocket(sock); |
| 3172 |
return STATUS_ERROR; |
| 3173 |
} |
| 3174 |
|
| 3175 |
if (remoteaddr.sin6_port != pg_hton16(port)) |
| 3176 |
{ |
| 3177 |
ereport(LOG, |
| 3178 |
(errmsg("RADIUS response from %s was sent from incorrect port: %d", |
| 3179 |
server, pg_ntoh16(remoteaddr.sin6_port)))); |
| 3180 |
continue; |
| 3181 |
} |
| 3182 |
|
| 3183 |
if (packetlength < RADIUS_HEADER_LENGTH) |
| 3184 |
{ |
| 3185 |
ereport(LOG, |
| 3186 |
(errmsg("RADIUS response from %s too short: %d", server, packetlength))); |
| 3187 |
continue; |
| 3188 |
} |
| 3189 |
|
| 3190 |
if (packetlength != pg_ntoh16(receivepacket->length)) |
| 3191 |
{ |
| 3192 |
ereport(LOG, |
| 3193 |
(errmsg("RADIUS response from %s has corrupt length: %d (actual length %d)", |
| 3194 |
server, pg_ntoh16(receivepacket->length), packetlength))); |
| 3195 |
continue; |
| 3196 |
} |
| 3197 |
|
| 3198 |
if (packet->id != receivepacket->id) |
| 3199 |
{ |
| 3200 |
ereport(LOG, |
| 3201 |
(errmsg("RADIUS response from %s is to a different request: %d (should be %d)", |
| 3202 |
server, receivepacket->id, packet->id))); |
| 3203 |
continue; |
| 3204 |
} |
| 3205 |
|
| 3206 |
/* |
| 3207 |
* Verify the response authenticator, which is calculated as |
| 3208 |
* MD5(Code+ID+Length+RequestAuthenticator+Attributes+Secret) |
| 3209 |
*/ |
| 3210 |
cryptvector = palloc(packetlength + strlen(secret)); |
| 3211 |
|
| 3212 |
memcpy(cryptvector, receivepacket, 4); /* code+id+length */ |
| 3213 |
memcpy(cryptvector + 4, packet->vector, RADIUS_VECTOR_LENGTH); /* request |
| 3214 |
* authenticator, from |
| 3215 |
* original packet */ |
| 3216 |
if (packetlength > RADIUS_HEADER_LENGTH) /* there may be no |
| 3217 |
* attributes at all */ |
| 3218 |
memcpy(cryptvector + RADIUS_HEADER_LENGTH, |
| 3219 |
(char *) receive_buffer + RADIUS_HEADER_LENGTH, |
| 3220 |
packetlength - RADIUS_HEADER_LENGTH); |
| 3221 |
memcpy(cryptvector + packetlength, secret, strlen(secret)); |
| 3222 |
|
| 3223 |
if (!pg_md5_binary(cryptvector, |
| 3224 |
packetlength + strlen(secret), |
| 3225 |
encryptedpassword, &errstr)) |
| 3226 |
{ |
| 3227 |
ereport(LOG, |
| 3228 |
(errmsg("could not perform MD5 encryption of received packet: %s", |
| 3229 |
errstr))); |
| 3230 |
pfree(cryptvector); |
| 3231 |
continue; |
| 3232 |
} |
| 3233 |
pfree(cryptvector); |
| 3234 |
|
| 3235 |
if (timingsafe_bcmp(receivepacket->vector, encryptedpassword, RADIUS_VECTOR_LENGTH) != 0) |
| 3236 |
{ |
| 3237 |
ereport(LOG, |
| 3238 |
(errmsg("RADIUS response from %s has incorrect MD5 signature", |
| 3239 |
server))); |
| 3240 |
continue; |
| 3241 |
} |
| 3242 |
|
| 3243 |
if (receivepacket->code == RADIUS_ACCESS_ACCEPT) |
| 3244 |
{ |
| 3245 |
closesocket(sock); |
| 3246 |
return STATUS_OK; |
| 3247 |
} |
| 3248 |
else if (receivepacket->code == RADIUS_ACCESS_REJECT) |
| 3249 |
{ |
| 3250 |
closesocket(sock); |
| 3251 |
return STATUS_EOF; |
| 3252 |
} |
| 3253 |
else |
| 3254 |
{ |
| 3255 |
ereport(LOG, |
| 3256 |
(errmsg("RADIUS response from %s has invalid code (%d) for user \"%s\"", |
| 3257 |
server, receivepacket->code, user_name))); |
| 3258 |
continue; |
| 3259 |
} |
| 3260 |
} /* while (true) */ |
| 3261 |
} |