| 1 |
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 2 |
* |
| 3 |
* user.c |
| 4 |
* Commands for manipulating roles (formerly called users). |
| 5 |
* |
| 6 |
* Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2025, PostgreSQL Global Development Group |
| 7 |
* Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California |
| 8 |
* |
| 9 |
* src/backend/commands/user.c |
| 10 |
* |
| 11 |
*------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 12 |
*/ |
| 13 |
#include "postgres.h" |
| 14 |
|
| 15 |
#include "access/genam.h" |
| 16 |
#include "access/htup_details.h" |
| 17 |
#include "access/table.h" |
| 18 |
#include "access/xact.h" |
| 19 |
#include "catalog/binary_upgrade.h" |
| 20 |
#include "catalog/catalog.h" |
| 21 |
#include "catalog/dependency.h" |
| 22 |
#include "catalog/indexing.h" |
| 23 |
#include "catalog/objectaccess.h" |
| 24 |
#include "catalog/pg_auth_members.h" |
| 25 |
#include "catalog/pg_authid.h" |
| 26 |
#include "catalog/pg_database.h" |
| 27 |
#include "catalog/pg_db_role_setting.h" |
| 28 |
#include "commands/comment.h" |
| 29 |
#include "commands/dbcommands.h" |
| 30 |
#include "commands/defrem.h" |
| 31 |
#include "commands/seclabel.h" |
| 32 |
#include "commands/user.h" |
| 33 |
#include "libpq/crypt.h" |
| 34 |
#include "miscadmin.h" |
| 35 |
#include "storage/lmgr.h" |
| 36 |
#include "utils/acl.h" |
| 37 |
#include "utils/builtins.h" |
| 38 |
#include "utils/catcache.h" |
| 39 |
#include "utils/fmgroids.h" |
| 40 |
#include "utils/syscache.h" |
| 41 |
#include "utils/varlena.h" |
| 42 |
|
| 43 |
/* |
| 44 |
* Removing a role grant - or the admin option on it - might recurse to |
| 45 |
* dependent grants. We use these values to reason about what would need to |
| 46 |
* be done in such cases. |
| 47 |
* |
| 48 |
* RRG_NOOP indicates a grant that would not need to be altered by the |
| 49 |
* operation. |
| 50 |
* |
| 51 |
* RRG_REMOVE_ADMIN_OPTION indicates a grant that would need to have |
| 52 |
* admin_option set to false by the operation. |
| 53 |
* |
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* Similarly, RRG_REMOVE_INHERIT_OPTION and RRG_REMOVE_SET_OPTION indicate |
| 55 |
* grants that would need to have the corresponding options set to false. |
| 56 |
* |
| 57 |
* RRG_DELETE_GRANT indicates a grant that would need to be removed entirely |
| 58 |
* by the operation. |
| 59 |
*/ |
| 60 |
typedef enum |
| 61 |
{ |
| 62 |
RRG_NOOP, |
| 63 |
RRG_REMOVE_ADMIN_OPTION, |
| 64 |
RRG_REMOVE_INHERIT_OPTION, |
| 65 |
RRG_REMOVE_SET_OPTION, |
| 66 |
RRG_DELETE_GRANT, |
| 67 |
} RevokeRoleGrantAction; |
| 68 |
|
| 69 |
/* Potentially set by pg_upgrade_support functions */ |
| 70 |
Oid binary_upgrade_next_pg_authid_oid = InvalidOid; |
| 71 |
|
| 72 |
typedef struct |
| 73 |
{ |
| 74 |
unsigned specified; |
| 75 |
bool admin; |
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bool inherit; |
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bool set; |
| 78 |
} GrantRoleOptions; |
| 79 |
|
| 80 |
#define GRANT_ROLE_SPECIFIED_ADMIN 0x0001 |
| 81 |
#define GRANT_ROLE_SPECIFIED_INHERIT 0x0002 |
| 82 |
#define GRANT_ROLE_SPECIFIED_SET 0x0004 |
| 83 |
|
| 84 |
/* GUC parameters */ |
| 85 |
int Password_encryption = PASSWORD_TYPE_SCRAM_SHA_256; |
| 86 |
char *createrole_self_grant = ""; |
| 87 |
static bool createrole_self_grant_enabled = false; |
| 88 |
static GrantRoleOptions createrole_self_grant_options; |
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|
| 90 |
/* Hook to check passwords in CreateRole() and AlterRole() */ |
| 91 |
check_password_hook_type check_password_hook = NULL; |
| 92 |
|
| 93 |
static void AddRoleMems(Oid currentUserId, const char *rolename, Oid roleid, |
| 94 |
List *memberSpecs, List *memberIds, |
| 95 |
Oid grantorId, GrantRoleOptions *popt); |
| 96 |
static void DelRoleMems(Oid currentUserId, const char *rolename, Oid roleid, |
| 97 |
List *memberSpecs, List *memberIds, |
| 98 |
Oid grantorId, GrantRoleOptions *popt, |
| 99 |
DropBehavior behavior); |
| 100 |
static void check_role_membership_authorization(Oid currentUserId, Oid roleid, |
| 101 |
bool is_grant); |
| 102 |
static Oid check_role_grantor(Oid currentUserId, Oid roleid, Oid grantorId, |
| 103 |
bool is_grant); |
| 104 |
static RevokeRoleGrantAction *initialize_revoke_actions(CatCList *memlist); |
| 105 |
static bool plan_single_revoke(CatCList *memlist, |
| 106 |
RevokeRoleGrantAction *actions, |
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Oid member, Oid grantor, |
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GrantRoleOptions *popt, |
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DropBehavior behavior); |
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static void plan_member_revoke(CatCList *memlist, |
| 111 |
RevokeRoleGrantAction *actions, Oid member); |
| 112 |
static void plan_recursive_revoke(CatCList *memlist, |
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RevokeRoleGrantAction *actions, |
| 114 |
int index, |
| 115 |
bool revoke_admin_option_only, |
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DropBehavior behavior); |
| 117 |
static void InitGrantRoleOptions(GrantRoleOptions *popt); |
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|
| 119 |
|
| 120 |
/* Check if current user has createrole privileges */ |
| 121 |
static bool |
| 122 |
have_createrole_privilege(void) |
| 123 |
{ |
| 124 |
return has_createrole_privilege(GetUserId()); |
| 125 |
} |
| 126 |
|
| 127 |
|
| 128 |
/* |
| 129 |
* CREATE ROLE |
| 130 |
*/ |
| 131 |
Oid |
| 132 |
CreateRole(ParseState *pstate, CreateRoleStmt *stmt) |
| 133 |
{ |
| 134 |
Relation pg_authid_rel; |
| 135 |
TupleDesc pg_authid_dsc; |
| 136 |
HeapTuple tuple; |
| 137 |
Datum new_record[Natts_pg_authid] = {0}; |
| 138 |
bool new_record_nulls[Natts_pg_authid] = {0}; |
| 139 |
Oid currentUserId = GetUserId(); |
| 140 |
Oid roleid; |
| 141 |
ListCell *item; |
| 142 |
ListCell *option; |
| 143 |
char *password = NULL; /* user password */ |
| 144 |
bool issuper = false; /* Make the user a superuser? */ |
| 145 |
bool inherit = true; /* Auto inherit privileges? */ |
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bool createrole = false; /* Can this user create roles? */ |
| 147 |
bool createdb = false; /* Can the user create databases? */ |
| 148 |
bool canlogin = false; /* Can this user login? */ |
| 149 |
bool isreplication = false; /* Is this a replication role? */ |
| 150 |
bool bypassrls = false; /* Is this a row security enabled role? */ |
| 151 |
int connlimit = -1; /* maximum connections allowed */ |
| 152 |
List *addroleto = NIL; /* roles to make this a member of */ |
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List *rolemembers = NIL; /* roles to be members of this role */ |
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List *adminmembers = NIL; /* roles to be admins of this role */ |
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char *validUntil = NULL; /* time the login is valid until */ |
| 156 |
Datum validUntil_datum; /* same, as timestamptz Datum */ |
| 157 |
bool validUntil_null; |
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DefElem *dpassword = NULL; |
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DefElem *dissuper = NULL; |
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DefElem *dinherit = NULL; |
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DefElem *dcreaterole = NULL; |
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DefElem *dcreatedb = NULL; |
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DefElem *dcanlogin = NULL; |
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DefElem *disreplication = NULL; |
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DefElem *dconnlimit = NULL; |
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DefElem *daddroleto = NULL; |
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DefElem *drolemembers = NULL; |
| 168 |
DefElem *dadminmembers = NULL; |
| 169 |
DefElem *dvalidUntil = NULL; |
| 170 |
DefElem *dbypassRLS = NULL; |
| 171 |
GrantRoleOptions popt; |
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|
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/* The defaults can vary depending on the original statement type */ |
| 174 |
switch (stmt->stmt_type) |
| 175 |
{ |
| 176 |
case ROLESTMT_ROLE: |
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break; |
| 178 |
case ROLESTMT_USER: |
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canlogin = true; |
| 180 |
/* may eventually want inherit to default to false here */ |
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break; |
| 182 |
case ROLESTMT_GROUP: |
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break; |
| 184 |
} |
| 185 |
|
| 186 |
/* Extract options from the statement node tree */ |
| 187 |
foreach(option, stmt->options) |
| 188 |
{ |
| 189 |
DefElem *defel = (DefElem *) lfirst(option); |
| 190 |
|
| 191 |
if (strcmp(defel->defname, "password") == 0) |
| 192 |
{ |
| 193 |
if (dpassword) |
| 194 |
errorConflictingDefElem(defel, pstate); |
| 195 |
dpassword = defel; |
| 196 |
} |
| 197 |
else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "sysid") == 0) |
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{ |
| 199 |
ereport(NOTICE, |
| 200 |
(errmsg("SYSID can no longer be specified"))); |
| 201 |
} |
| 202 |
else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "superuser") == 0) |
| 203 |
{ |
| 204 |
if (dissuper) |
| 205 |
errorConflictingDefElem(defel, pstate); |
| 206 |
dissuper = defel; |
| 207 |
} |
| 208 |
else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "inherit") == 0) |
| 209 |
{ |
| 210 |
if (dinherit) |
| 211 |
errorConflictingDefElem(defel, pstate); |
| 212 |
dinherit = defel; |
| 213 |
} |
| 214 |
else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "createrole") == 0) |
| 215 |
{ |
| 216 |
if (dcreaterole) |
| 217 |
errorConflictingDefElem(defel, pstate); |
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dcreaterole = defel; |
| 219 |
} |
| 220 |
else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "createdb") == 0) |
| 221 |
{ |
| 222 |
if (dcreatedb) |
| 223 |
errorConflictingDefElem(defel, pstate); |
| 224 |
dcreatedb = defel; |
| 225 |
} |
| 226 |
else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "canlogin") == 0) |
| 227 |
{ |
| 228 |
if (dcanlogin) |
| 229 |
errorConflictingDefElem(defel, pstate); |
| 230 |
dcanlogin = defel; |
| 231 |
} |
| 232 |
else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "isreplication") == 0) |
| 233 |
{ |
| 234 |
if (disreplication) |
| 235 |
errorConflictingDefElem(defel, pstate); |
| 236 |
disreplication = defel; |
| 237 |
} |
| 238 |
else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "connectionlimit") == 0) |
| 239 |
{ |
| 240 |
if (dconnlimit) |
| 241 |
errorConflictingDefElem(defel, pstate); |
| 242 |
dconnlimit = defel; |
| 243 |
} |
| 244 |
else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "addroleto") == 0) |
| 245 |
{ |
| 246 |
if (daddroleto) |
| 247 |
errorConflictingDefElem(defel, pstate); |
| 248 |
daddroleto = defel; |
| 249 |
} |
| 250 |
else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "rolemembers") == 0) |
| 251 |
{ |
| 252 |
if (drolemembers) |
| 253 |
errorConflictingDefElem(defel, pstate); |
| 254 |
drolemembers = defel; |
| 255 |
} |
| 256 |
else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "adminmembers") == 0) |
| 257 |
{ |
| 258 |
if (dadminmembers) |
| 259 |
errorConflictingDefElem(defel, pstate); |
| 260 |
dadminmembers = defel; |
| 261 |
} |
| 262 |
else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "validUntil") == 0) |
| 263 |
{ |
| 264 |
if (dvalidUntil) |
| 265 |
errorConflictingDefElem(defel, pstate); |
| 266 |
dvalidUntil = defel; |
| 267 |
} |
| 268 |
else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "bypassrls") == 0) |
| 269 |
{ |
| 270 |
if (dbypassRLS) |
| 271 |
errorConflictingDefElem(defel, pstate); |
| 272 |
dbypassRLS = defel; |
| 273 |
} |
| 274 |
else |
| 275 |
elog(ERROR, "option \"%s\" not recognized", |
| 276 |
defel->defname); |
| 277 |
} |
| 278 |
|
| 279 |
if (dpassword && dpassword->arg) |
| 280 |
password = strVal(dpassword->arg); |
| 281 |
if (dissuper) |
| 282 |
issuper = boolVal(dissuper->arg); |
| 283 |
if (dinherit) |
| 284 |
inherit = boolVal(dinherit->arg); |
| 285 |
if (dcreaterole) |
| 286 |
createrole = boolVal(dcreaterole->arg); |
| 287 |
if (dcreatedb) |
| 288 |
createdb = boolVal(dcreatedb->arg); |
| 289 |
if (dcanlogin) |
| 290 |
canlogin = boolVal(dcanlogin->arg); |
| 291 |
if (disreplication) |
| 292 |
isreplication = boolVal(disreplication->arg); |
| 293 |
if (dconnlimit) |
| 294 |
{ |
| 295 |
connlimit = intVal(dconnlimit->arg); |
| 296 |
if (connlimit < -1) |
| 297 |
ereport(ERROR, |
| 298 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE), |
| 299 |
errmsg("invalid connection limit: %d", connlimit))); |
| 300 |
} |
| 301 |
if (daddroleto) |
| 302 |
addroleto = (List *) daddroleto->arg; |
| 303 |
if (drolemembers) |
| 304 |
rolemembers = (List *) drolemembers->arg; |
| 305 |
if (dadminmembers) |
| 306 |
adminmembers = (List *) dadminmembers->arg; |
| 307 |
if (dvalidUntil) |
| 308 |
validUntil = strVal(dvalidUntil->arg); |
| 309 |
if (dbypassRLS) |
| 310 |
bypassrls = boolVal(dbypassRLS->arg); |
| 311 |
|
| 312 |
/* Check some permissions first */ |
| 313 |
if (!superuser_arg(currentUserId)) |
| 314 |
{ |
| 315 |
if (!has_createrole_privilege(currentUserId)) |
| 316 |
ereport(ERROR, |
| 317 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE), |
| 318 |
errmsg("permission denied to create role"), |
| 319 |
errdetail("Only roles with the %s attribute may create roles.", |
| 320 |
"CREATEROLE"))); |
| 321 |
if (issuper) |
| 322 |
ereport(ERROR, |
| 323 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE), |
| 324 |
errmsg("permission denied to create role"), |
| 325 |
errdetail("Only roles with the %s attribute may create roles with the %s attribute.", |
| 326 |
"SUPERUSER", "SUPERUSER"))); |
| 327 |
if (createdb && !have_createdb_privilege()) |
| 328 |
ereport(ERROR, |
| 329 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE), |
| 330 |
errmsg("permission denied to create role"), |
| 331 |
errdetail("Only roles with the %s attribute may create roles with the %s attribute.", |
| 332 |
"CREATEDB", "CREATEDB"))); |
| 333 |
if (isreplication && !has_rolreplication(currentUserId)) |
| 334 |
ereport(ERROR, |
| 335 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE), |
| 336 |
errmsg("permission denied to create role"), |
| 337 |
errdetail("Only roles with the %s attribute may create roles with the %s attribute.", |
| 338 |
"REPLICATION", "REPLICATION"))); |
| 339 |
if (bypassrls && !has_bypassrls_privilege(currentUserId)) |
| 340 |
ereport(ERROR, |
| 341 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE), |
| 342 |
errmsg("permission denied to create role"), |
| 343 |
errdetail("Only roles with the %s attribute may create roles with the %s attribute.", |
| 344 |
"BYPASSRLS", "BYPASSRLS"))); |
| 345 |
} |
| 346 |
|
| 347 |
/* |
| 348 |
* Check that the user is not trying to create a role in the reserved |
| 349 |
* "pg_" namespace. |
| 350 |
*/ |
| 351 |
if (IsReservedName(stmt->role)) |
| 352 |
ereport(ERROR, |
| 353 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_RESERVED_NAME), |
| 354 |
errmsg("role name \"%s\" is reserved", |
| 355 |
stmt->role), |
| 356 |
errdetail("Role names starting with \"pg_\" are reserved."))); |
| 357 |
|
| 358 |
/* |
| 359 |
* If built with appropriate switch, whine when regression-testing |
| 360 |
* conventions for role names are violated. |
| 361 |
*/ |
| 362 |
#ifdef ENFORCE_REGRESSION_TEST_NAME_RESTRICTIONS |
| 363 |
if (strncmp(stmt->role, "regress_", 8) != 0) |
| 364 |
elog(WARNING, "roles created by regression test cases should have names starting with \"regress_\""); |
| 365 |
#endif |
| 366 |
|
| 367 |
/* |
| 368 |
* Check the pg_authid relation to be certain the role doesn't already |
| 369 |
* exist. |
| 370 |
*/ |
| 371 |
pg_authid_rel = table_open(AuthIdRelationId, RowExclusiveLock); |
| 372 |
pg_authid_dsc = RelationGetDescr(pg_authid_rel); |
| 373 |
|
| 374 |
if (OidIsValid(get_role_oid(stmt->role, true))) |
| 375 |
ereport(ERROR, |
| 376 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_DUPLICATE_OBJECT), |
| 377 |
errmsg("role \"%s\" already exists", |
| 378 |
stmt->role))); |
| 379 |
|
| 380 |
/* Convert validuntil to internal form */ |
| 381 |
if (validUntil) |
| 382 |
{ |
| 383 |
validUntil_datum = DirectFunctionCall3(timestamptz_in, |
| 384 |
CStringGetDatum(validUntil), |
| 385 |
ObjectIdGetDatum(InvalidOid), |
| 386 |
Int32GetDatum(-1)); |
| 387 |
validUntil_null = false; |
| 388 |
} |
| 389 |
else |
| 390 |
{ |
| 391 |
validUntil_datum = (Datum) 0; |
| 392 |
validUntil_null = true; |
| 393 |
} |
| 394 |
|
| 395 |
/* |
| 396 |
* Call the password checking hook if there is one defined |
| 397 |
*/ |
| 398 |
if (check_password_hook && password) |
| 399 |
(*check_password_hook) (stmt->role, |
| 400 |
password, |
| 401 |
get_password_type(password), |
| 402 |
validUntil_datum, |
| 403 |
validUntil_null); |
| 404 |
|
| 405 |
/* |
| 406 |
* Build a tuple to insert |
| 407 |
*/ |
| 408 |
new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolname - 1] = |
| 409 |
DirectFunctionCall1(namein, CStringGetDatum(stmt->role)); |
| 410 |
new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolsuper - 1] = BoolGetDatum(issuper); |
| 411 |
new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolinherit - 1] = BoolGetDatum(inherit); |
| 412 |
new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolcreaterole - 1] = BoolGetDatum(createrole); |
| 413 |
new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolcreatedb - 1] = BoolGetDatum(createdb); |
| 414 |
new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolcanlogin - 1] = BoolGetDatum(canlogin); |
| 415 |
new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolreplication - 1] = BoolGetDatum(isreplication); |
| 416 |
new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolconnlimit - 1] = Int32GetDatum(connlimit); |
| 417 |
|
| 418 |
if (password) |
| 419 |
{ |
| 420 |
char *shadow_pass; |
| 421 |
const char *logdetail = NULL; |
| 422 |
|
| 423 |
/* |
| 424 |
* Don't allow an empty password. Libpq treats an empty password the |
| 425 |
* same as no password at all, and won't even try to authenticate. But |
| 426 |
* other clients might, so allowing it would be confusing. By clearing |
| 427 |
* the password when an empty string is specified, the account is |
| 428 |
* consistently locked for all clients. |
| 429 |
* |
| 430 |
* Note that this only covers passwords stored in the database itself. |
| 431 |
* There are also checks in the authentication code, to forbid an |
| 432 |
* empty password from being used with authentication methods that |
| 433 |
* fetch the password from an external system, like LDAP or PAM. |
| 434 |
*/ |
| 435 |
if (password[0] == '\0' || |
| 436 |
plain_crypt_verify(stmt->role, password, "", &logdetail) == STATUS_OK) |
| 437 |
{ |
| 438 |
ereport(NOTICE, |
| 439 |
(errmsg("empty string is not a valid password, clearing password"))); |
| 440 |
new_record_nulls[Anum_pg_authid_rolpassword - 1] = true; |
| 441 |
} |
| 442 |
else |
| 443 |
{ |
| 444 |
/* Encrypt the password to the requested format. */ |
| 445 |
shadow_pass = encrypt_password(Password_encryption, stmt->role, |
| 446 |
password); |
| 447 |
new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolpassword - 1] = |
| 448 |
CStringGetTextDatum(shadow_pass); |
| 449 |
} |
| 450 |
} |
| 451 |
else |
| 452 |
new_record_nulls[Anum_pg_authid_rolpassword - 1] = true; |
| 453 |
|
| 454 |
new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolvaliduntil - 1] = validUntil_datum; |
| 455 |
new_record_nulls[Anum_pg_authid_rolvaliduntil - 1] = validUntil_null; |
| 456 |
|
| 457 |
new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolbypassrls - 1] = BoolGetDatum(bypassrls); |
| 458 |
|
| 459 |
/* |
| 460 |
* pg_largeobject_metadata contains pg_authid.oid's, so we use the |
| 461 |
* binary-upgrade override. |
| 462 |
*/ |
| 463 |
if (IsBinaryUpgrade) |
| 464 |
{ |
| 465 |
if (!OidIsValid(binary_upgrade_next_pg_authid_oid)) |
| 466 |
ereport(ERROR, |
| 467 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE), |
| 468 |
errmsg("pg_authid OID value not set when in binary upgrade mode"))); |
| 469 |
|
| 470 |
roleid = binary_upgrade_next_pg_authid_oid; |
| 471 |
binary_upgrade_next_pg_authid_oid = InvalidOid; |
| 472 |
} |
| 473 |
else |
| 474 |
{ |
| 475 |
roleid = GetNewOidWithIndex(pg_authid_rel, AuthIdOidIndexId, |
| 476 |
Anum_pg_authid_oid); |
| 477 |
} |
| 478 |
|
| 479 |
new_record[Anum_pg_authid_oid - 1] = ObjectIdGetDatum(roleid); |
| 480 |
|
| 481 |
tuple = heap_form_tuple(pg_authid_dsc, new_record, new_record_nulls); |
| 482 |
|
| 483 |
/* |
| 484 |
* Insert new record in the pg_authid table |
| 485 |
*/ |
| 486 |
CatalogTupleInsert(pg_authid_rel, tuple); |
| 487 |
|
| 488 |
/* |
| 489 |
* Advance command counter so we can see new record; else tests in |
| 490 |
* AddRoleMems may fail. |
| 491 |
*/ |
| 492 |
if (addroleto || adminmembers || rolemembers) |
| 493 |
CommandCounterIncrement(); |
| 494 |
|
| 495 |
/* Default grant. */ |
| 496 |
InitGrantRoleOptions(&popt); |
| 497 |
|
| 498 |
/* |
| 499 |
* Add the new role to the specified existing roles. |
| 500 |
*/ |
| 501 |
if (addroleto) |
| 502 |
{ |
| 503 |
RoleSpec *thisrole = makeNode(RoleSpec); |
| 504 |
List *thisrole_list = list_make1(thisrole); |
| 505 |
List *thisrole_oidlist = list_make1_oid(roleid); |
| 506 |
|
| 507 |
thisrole->roletype = ROLESPEC_CSTRING; |
| 508 |
thisrole->rolename = stmt->role; |
| 509 |
thisrole->location = -1; |
| 510 |
|
| 511 |
foreach(item, addroleto) |
| 512 |
{ |
| 513 |
RoleSpec *oldrole = lfirst(item); |
| 514 |
HeapTuple oldroletup = get_rolespec_tuple(oldrole); |
| 515 |
Form_pg_authid oldroleform = (Form_pg_authid) GETSTRUCT(oldroletup); |
| 516 |
Oid oldroleid = oldroleform->oid; |
| 517 |
char *oldrolename = NameStr(oldroleform->rolname); |
| 518 |
|
| 519 |
/* can only add this role to roles for which you have rights */ |
| 520 |
check_role_membership_authorization(currentUserId, oldroleid, true); |
| 521 |
AddRoleMems(currentUserId, oldrolename, oldroleid, |
| 522 |
thisrole_list, |
| 523 |
thisrole_oidlist, |
| 524 |
InvalidOid, &popt); |
| 525 |
|
| 526 |
ReleaseSysCache(oldroletup); |
| 527 |
} |
| 528 |
} |
| 529 |
|
| 530 |
/* |
| 531 |
* If the current user isn't a superuser, make them an admin of the new |
| 532 |
* role so that they can administer the new object they just created. |
| 533 |
* Superusers will be able to do that anyway. |
| 534 |
* |
| 535 |
* The grantor of record for this implicit grant is the bootstrap |
| 536 |
* superuser, which means that the CREATEROLE user cannot revoke the |
| 537 |
* grant. They can however grant the created role back to themselves with |
| 538 |
* different options, since they enjoy ADMIN OPTION on it. |
| 539 |
*/ |
| 540 |
if (!superuser()) |
| 541 |
{ |
| 542 |
RoleSpec *current_role = makeNode(RoleSpec); |
| 543 |
GrantRoleOptions poptself; |
| 544 |
List *memberSpecs; |
| 545 |
List *memberIds = list_make1_oid(currentUserId); |
| 546 |
|
| 547 |
current_role->roletype = ROLESPEC_CURRENT_ROLE; |
| 548 |
current_role->location = -1; |
| 549 |
memberSpecs = list_make1(current_role); |
| 550 |
|
| 551 |
poptself.specified = GRANT_ROLE_SPECIFIED_ADMIN |
| 552 |
| GRANT_ROLE_SPECIFIED_INHERIT |
| 553 |
| GRANT_ROLE_SPECIFIED_SET; |
| 554 |
poptself.admin = true; |
| 555 |
poptself.inherit = false; |
| 556 |
poptself.set = false; |
| 557 |
|
| 558 |
AddRoleMems(BOOTSTRAP_SUPERUSERID, stmt->role, roleid, |
| 559 |
memberSpecs, memberIds, |
| 560 |
BOOTSTRAP_SUPERUSERID, &poptself); |
| 561 |
|
| 562 |
/* |
| 563 |
* We must make the implicit grant visible to the code below, else the |
| 564 |
* additional grants will fail. |
| 565 |
*/ |
| 566 |
CommandCounterIncrement(); |
| 567 |
|
| 568 |
/* |
| 569 |
* Because of the implicit grant above, a CREATEROLE user who creates |
| 570 |
* a role has the ability to grant that role back to themselves with |
| 571 |
* the INHERIT or SET options, if they wish to inherit the role's |
| 572 |
* privileges or be able to SET ROLE to it. The createrole_self_grant |
| 573 |
* GUC can be used to make this happen automatically. This has no |
| 574 |
* security implications since the same user is able to make the same |
| 575 |
* grant using an explicit GRANT statement; it's just convenient. |
| 576 |
*/ |
| 577 |
if (createrole_self_grant_enabled) |
| 578 |
AddRoleMems(currentUserId, stmt->role, roleid, |
| 579 |
memberSpecs, memberIds, |
| 580 |
currentUserId, &createrole_self_grant_options); |
| 581 |
} |
| 582 |
|
| 583 |
/* |
| 584 |
* Add the specified members to this new role. adminmembers get the admin |
| 585 |
* option, rolemembers don't. |
| 586 |
* |
| 587 |
* NB: No permissions check is required here. If you have enough rights to |
| 588 |
* create a role, you can add any members you like. |
| 589 |
*/ |
| 590 |
AddRoleMems(currentUserId, stmt->role, roleid, |
| 591 |
rolemembers, roleSpecsToIds(rolemembers), |
| 592 |
InvalidOid, &popt); |
| 593 |
popt.specified |= GRANT_ROLE_SPECIFIED_ADMIN; |
| 594 |
popt.admin = true; |
| 595 |
AddRoleMems(currentUserId, stmt->role, roleid, |
| 596 |
adminmembers, roleSpecsToIds(adminmembers), |
| 597 |
InvalidOid, &popt); |
| 598 |
|
| 599 |
/* Post creation hook for new role */ |
| 600 |
InvokeObjectPostCreateHook(AuthIdRelationId, roleid, 0); |
| 601 |
|
| 602 |
/* |
| 603 |
* Close pg_authid, but keep lock till commit. |
| 604 |
*/ |
| 605 |
table_close(pg_authid_rel, NoLock); |
| 606 |
|
| 607 |
return roleid; |
| 608 |
} |
| 609 |
|
| 610 |
|
| 611 |
/* |
| 612 |
* ALTER ROLE |
| 613 |
* |
| 614 |
* Note: the rolemembers option accepted here is intended to support the |
| 615 |
* backwards-compatible ALTER GROUP syntax. Although it will work to say |
| 616 |
* "ALTER ROLE role ROLE rolenames", we don't document it. |
| 617 |
*/ |
| 618 |
Oid |
| 619 |
AlterRole(ParseState *pstate, AlterRoleStmt *stmt) |
| 620 |
{ |
| 621 |
Datum new_record[Natts_pg_authid] = {0}; |
| 622 |
bool new_record_nulls[Natts_pg_authid] = {0}; |
| 623 |
bool new_record_repl[Natts_pg_authid] = {0}; |
| 624 |
Relation pg_authid_rel; |
| 625 |
TupleDesc pg_authid_dsc; |
| 626 |
HeapTuple tuple, |
| 627 |
new_tuple; |
| 628 |
Form_pg_authid authform; |
| 629 |
ListCell *option; |
| 630 |
char *rolename; |
| 631 |
char *password = NULL; /* user password */ |
| 632 |
int connlimit = -1; /* maximum connections allowed */ |
| 633 |
char *validUntil = NULL; /* time the login is valid until */ |
| 634 |
Datum validUntil_datum; /* same, as timestamptz Datum */ |
| 635 |
bool validUntil_null; |
| 636 |
DefElem *dpassword = NULL; |
| 637 |
DefElem *dissuper = NULL; |
| 638 |
DefElem *dinherit = NULL; |
| 639 |
DefElem *dcreaterole = NULL; |
| 640 |
DefElem *dcreatedb = NULL; |
| 641 |
DefElem *dcanlogin = NULL; |
| 642 |
DefElem *disreplication = NULL; |
| 643 |
DefElem *dconnlimit = NULL; |
| 644 |
DefElem *drolemembers = NULL; |
| 645 |
DefElem *dvalidUntil = NULL; |
| 646 |
DefElem *dbypassRLS = NULL; |
| 647 |
Oid roleid; |
| 648 |
Oid currentUserId = GetUserId(); |
| 649 |
GrantRoleOptions popt; |
| 650 |
|
| 651 |
check_rolespec_name(stmt->role, |
| 652 |
_("Cannot alter reserved roles.")); |
| 653 |
|
| 654 |
/* Extract options from the statement node tree */ |
| 655 |
foreach(option, stmt->options) |
| 656 |
{ |
| 657 |
DefElem *defel = (DefElem *) lfirst(option); |
| 658 |
|
| 659 |
if (strcmp(defel->defname, "password") == 0) |
| 660 |
{ |
| 661 |
if (dpassword) |
| 662 |
errorConflictingDefElem(defel, pstate); |
| 663 |
dpassword = defel; |
| 664 |
} |
| 665 |
else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "superuser") == 0) |
| 666 |
{ |
| 667 |
if (dissuper) |
| 668 |
errorConflictingDefElem(defel, pstate); |
| 669 |
dissuper = defel; |
| 670 |
} |
| 671 |
else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "inherit") == 0) |
| 672 |
{ |
| 673 |
if (dinherit) |
| 674 |
errorConflictingDefElem(defel, pstate); |
| 675 |
dinherit = defel; |
| 676 |
} |
| 677 |
else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "createrole") == 0) |
| 678 |
{ |
| 679 |
if (dcreaterole) |
| 680 |
errorConflictingDefElem(defel, pstate); |
| 681 |
dcreaterole = defel; |
| 682 |
} |
| 683 |
else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "createdb") == 0) |
| 684 |
{ |
| 685 |
if (dcreatedb) |
| 686 |
errorConflictingDefElem(defel, pstate); |
| 687 |
dcreatedb = defel; |
| 688 |
} |
| 689 |
else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "canlogin") == 0) |
| 690 |
{ |
| 691 |
if (dcanlogin) |
| 692 |
errorConflictingDefElem(defel, pstate); |
| 693 |
dcanlogin = defel; |
| 694 |
} |
| 695 |
else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "isreplication") == 0) |
| 696 |
{ |
| 697 |
if (disreplication) |
| 698 |
errorConflictingDefElem(defel, pstate); |
| 699 |
disreplication = defel; |
| 700 |
} |
| 701 |
else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "connectionlimit") == 0) |
| 702 |
{ |
| 703 |
if (dconnlimit) |
| 704 |
errorConflictingDefElem(defel, pstate); |
| 705 |
dconnlimit = defel; |
| 706 |
} |
| 707 |
else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "rolemembers") == 0 && |
| 708 |
stmt->action != 0) |
| 709 |
{ |
| 710 |
if (drolemembers) |
| 711 |
errorConflictingDefElem(defel, pstate); |
| 712 |
drolemembers = defel; |
| 713 |
} |
| 714 |
else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "validUntil") == 0) |
| 715 |
{ |
| 716 |
if (dvalidUntil) |
| 717 |
errorConflictingDefElem(defel, pstate); |
| 718 |
dvalidUntil = defel; |
| 719 |
} |
| 720 |
else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "bypassrls") == 0) |
| 721 |
{ |
| 722 |
if (dbypassRLS) |
| 723 |
errorConflictingDefElem(defel, pstate); |
| 724 |
dbypassRLS = defel; |
| 725 |
} |
| 726 |
else |
| 727 |
elog(ERROR, "option \"%s\" not recognized", |
| 728 |
defel->defname); |
| 729 |
} |
| 730 |
|
| 731 |
if (dpassword && dpassword->arg) |
| 732 |
password = strVal(dpassword->arg); |
| 733 |
if (dconnlimit) |
| 734 |
{ |
| 735 |
connlimit = intVal(dconnlimit->arg); |
| 736 |
if (connlimit < -1) |
| 737 |
ereport(ERROR, |
| 738 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE), |
| 739 |
errmsg("invalid connection limit: %d", connlimit))); |
| 740 |
} |
| 741 |
if (dvalidUntil) |
| 742 |
validUntil = strVal(dvalidUntil->arg); |
| 743 |
|
| 744 |
/* |
| 745 |
* Scan the pg_authid relation to be certain the user exists. |
| 746 |
*/ |
| 747 |
pg_authid_rel = table_open(AuthIdRelationId, RowExclusiveLock); |
| 748 |
pg_authid_dsc = RelationGetDescr(pg_authid_rel); |
| 749 |
|
| 750 |
tuple = get_rolespec_tuple(stmt->role); |
| 751 |
authform = (Form_pg_authid) GETSTRUCT(tuple); |
| 752 |
rolename = pstrdup(NameStr(authform->rolname)); |
| 753 |
roleid = authform->oid; |
| 754 |
|
| 755 |
/* To mess with a superuser in any way you gotta be superuser. */ |
| 756 |
if (!superuser() && authform->rolsuper) |
| 757 |
ereport(ERROR, |
| 758 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE), |
| 759 |
errmsg("permission denied to alter role"), |
| 760 |
errdetail("Only roles with the %s attribute may alter roles with the %s attribute.", |
| 761 |
"SUPERUSER", "SUPERUSER"))); |
| 762 |
if (!superuser() && dissuper) |
| 763 |
ereport(ERROR, |
| 764 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE), |
| 765 |
errmsg("permission denied to alter role"), |
| 766 |
errdetail("Only roles with the %s attribute may change the %s attribute.", |
| 767 |
"SUPERUSER", "SUPERUSER"))); |
| 768 |
|
| 769 |
/* |
| 770 |
* Most changes to a role require that you both have CREATEROLE privileges |
| 771 |
* and also ADMIN OPTION on the role. |
| 772 |
*/ |
| 773 |
if (!have_createrole_privilege() || |
| 774 |
!is_admin_of_role(GetUserId(), roleid)) |
| 775 |
{ |
| 776 |
/* things an unprivileged user certainly can't do */ |
| 777 |
if (dinherit || dcreaterole || dcreatedb || dcanlogin || dconnlimit || |
| 778 |
dvalidUntil || disreplication || dbypassRLS) |
| 779 |
ereport(ERROR, |
| 780 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE), |
| 781 |
errmsg("permission denied to alter role"), |
| 782 |
errdetail("Only roles with the %s attribute and the %s option on role \"%s\" may alter this role.", |
| 783 |
"CREATEROLE", "ADMIN", rolename))); |
| 784 |
|
| 785 |
/* an unprivileged user can change their own password */ |
| 786 |
if (dpassword && roleid != currentUserId) |
| 787 |
ereport(ERROR, |
| 788 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE), |
| 789 |
errmsg("permission denied to alter role"), |
| 790 |
errdetail("To change another role's password, the current user must have the %s attribute and the %s option on the role.", |
| 791 |
"CREATEROLE", "ADMIN"))); |
| 792 |
} |
| 793 |
else if (!superuser()) |
| 794 |
{ |
| 795 |
/* |
| 796 |
* Even if you have both CREATEROLE and ADMIN OPTION on a role, you |
| 797 |
* can only change the CREATEDB, REPLICATION, or BYPASSRLS attributes |
| 798 |
* if they are set for your own role (or you are the superuser). |
| 799 |
*/ |
| 800 |
if (dcreatedb && !have_createdb_privilege()) |
| 801 |
ereport(ERROR, |
| 802 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE), |
| 803 |
errmsg("permission denied to alter role"), |
| 804 |
errdetail("Only roles with the %s attribute may change the %s attribute.", |
| 805 |
"CREATEDB", "CREATEDB"))); |
| 806 |
if (disreplication && !has_rolreplication(currentUserId)) |
| 807 |
ereport(ERROR, |
| 808 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE), |
| 809 |
errmsg("permission denied to alter role"), |
| 810 |
errdetail("Only roles with the %s attribute may change the %s attribute.", |
| 811 |
"REPLICATION", "REPLICATION"))); |
| 812 |
if (dbypassRLS && !has_bypassrls_privilege(currentUserId)) |
| 813 |
ereport(ERROR, |
| 814 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE), |
| 815 |
errmsg("permission denied to alter role"), |
| 816 |
errdetail("Only roles with the %s attribute may change the %s attribute.", |
| 817 |
"BYPASSRLS", "BYPASSRLS"))); |
| 818 |
} |
| 819 |
|
| 820 |
/* To add or drop members, you need ADMIN OPTION. */ |
| 821 |
if (drolemembers && !is_admin_of_role(currentUserId, roleid)) |
| 822 |
ereport(ERROR, |
| 823 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE), |
| 824 |
errmsg("permission denied to alter role"), |
| 825 |
errdetail("Only roles with the %s option on role \"%s\" may add or drop members.", |
| 826 |
"ADMIN", rolename))); |
| 827 |
|
| 828 |
/* Convert validuntil to internal form */ |
| 829 |
if (dvalidUntil) |
| 830 |
{ |
| 831 |
validUntil_datum = DirectFunctionCall3(timestamptz_in, |
| 832 |
CStringGetDatum(validUntil), |
| 833 |
ObjectIdGetDatum(InvalidOid), |
| 834 |
Int32GetDatum(-1)); |
| 835 |
validUntil_null = false; |
| 836 |
} |
| 837 |
else |
| 838 |
{ |
| 839 |
/* fetch existing setting in case hook needs it */ |
| 840 |
validUntil_datum = SysCacheGetAttr(AUTHNAME, tuple, |
| 841 |
Anum_pg_authid_rolvaliduntil, |
| 842 |
&validUntil_null); |
| 843 |
} |
| 844 |
|
| 845 |
/* |
| 846 |
* Call the password checking hook if there is one defined |
| 847 |
*/ |
| 848 |
if (check_password_hook && password) |
| 849 |
(*check_password_hook) (rolename, |
| 850 |
password, |
| 851 |
get_password_type(password), |
| 852 |
validUntil_datum, |
| 853 |
validUntil_null); |
| 854 |
|
| 855 |
/* |
| 856 |
* Build an updated tuple, perusing the information just obtained |
| 857 |
*/ |
| 858 |
|
| 859 |
/* |
| 860 |
* issuper/createrole/etc |
| 861 |
*/ |
| 862 |
if (dissuper) |
| 863 |
{ |
| 864 |
bool should_be_super = boolVal(dissuper->arg); |
| 865 |
|
| 866 |
if (!should_be_super && roleid == BOOTSTRAP_SUPERUSERID) |
| 867 |
ereport(ERROR, |
| 868 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED), |
| 869 |
errmsg("permission denied to alter role"), |
| 870 |
errdetail("The bootstrap superuser must have the %s attribute.", |
| 871 |
"SUPERUSER"))); |
| 872 |
|
| 873 |
new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolsuper - 1] = BoolGetDatum(should_be_super); |
| 874 |
new_record_repl[Anum_pg_authid_rolsuper - 1] = true; |
| 875 |
} |
| 876 |
|
| 877 |
if (dinherit) |
| 878 |
{ |
| 879 |
new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolinherit - 1] = BoolGetDatum(boolVal(dinherit->arg)); |
| 880 |
new_record_repl[Anum_pg_authid_rolinherit - 1] = true; |
| 881 |
} |
| 882 |
|
| 883 |
if (dcreaterole) |
| 884 |
{ |
| 885 |
new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolcreaterole - 1] = BoolGetDatum(boolVal(dcreaterole->arg)); |
| 886 |
new_record_repl[Anum_pg_authid_rolcreaterole - 1] = true; |
| 887 |
} |
| 888 |
|
| 889 |
if (dcreatedb) |
| 890 |
{ |
| 891 |
new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolcreatedb - 1] = BoolGetDatum(boolVal(dcreatedb->arg)); |
| 892 |
new_record_repl[Anum_pg_authid_rolcreatedb - 1] = true; |
| 893 |
} |
| 894 |
|
| 895 |
if (dcanlogin) |
| 896 |
{ |
| 897 |
new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolcanlogin - 1] = BoolGetDatum(boolVal(dcanlogin->arg)); |
| 898 |
new_record_repl[Anum_pg_authid_rolcanlogin - 1] = true; |
| 899 |
} |
| 900 |
|
| 901 |
if (disreplication) |
| 902 |
{ |
| 903 |
new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolreplication - 1] = BoolGetDatum(boolVal(disreplication->arg)); |
| 904 |
new_record_repl[Anum_pg_authid_rolreplication - 1] = true; |
| 905 |
} |
| 906 |
|
| 907 |
if (dconnlimit) |
| 908 |
{ |
| 909 |
new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolconnlimit - 1] = Int32GetDatum(connlimit); |
| 910 |
new_record_repl[Anum_pg_authid_rolconnlimit - 1] = true; |
| 911 |
} |
| 912 |
|
| 913 |
/* password */ |
| 914 |
if (password) |
| 915 |
{ |
| 916 |
char *shadow_pass; |
| 917 |
const char *logdetail = NULL; |
| 918 |
|
| 919 |
/* Like in CREATE USER, don't allow an empty password. */ |
| 920 |
if (password[0] == '\0' || |
| 921 |
plain_crypt_verify(rolename, password, "", &logdetail) == STATUS_OK) |
| 922 |
{ |
| 923 |
ereport(NOTICE, |
| 924 |
(errmsg("empty string is not a valid password, clearing password"))); |
| 925 |
new_record_nulls[Anum_pg_authid_rolpassword - 1] = true; |
| 926 |
} |
| 927 |
else |
| 928 |
{ |
| 929 |
/* Encrypt the password to the requested format. */ |
| 930 |
shadow_pass = encrypt_password(Password_encryption, rolename, |
| 931 |
password); |
| 932 |
new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolpassword - 1] = |
| 933 |
CStringGetTextDatum(shadow_pass); |
| 934 |
} |
| 935 |
new_record_repl[Anum_pg_authid_rolpassword - 1] = true; |
| 936 |
} |
| 937 |
|
| 938 |
/* unset password */ |
| 939 |
if (dpassword && dpassword->arg == NULL) |
| 940 |
{ |
| 941 |
new_record_repl[Anum_pg_authid_rolpassword - 1] = true; |
| 942 |
new_record_nulls[Anum_pg_authid_rolpassword - 1] = true; |
| 943 |
} |
| 944 |
|
| 945 |
/* valid until */ |
| 946 |
new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolvaliduntil - 1] = validUntil_datum; |
| 947 |
new_record_nulls[Anum_pg_authid_rolvaliduntil - 1] = validUntil_null; |
| 948 |
new_record_repl[Anum_pg_authid_rolvaliduntil - 1] = true; |
| 949 |
|
| 950 |
if (dbypassRLS) |
| 951 |
{ |
| 952 |
new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolbypassrls - 1] = BoolGetDatum(boolVal(dbypassRLS->arg)); |
| 953 |
new_record_repl[Anum_pg_authid_rolbypassrls - 1] = true; |
| 954 |
} |
| 955 |
|
| 956 |
new_tuple = heap_modify_tuple(tuple, pg_authid_dsc, new_record, |
| 957 |
new_record_nulls, new_record_repl); |
| 958 |
CatalogTupleUpdate(pg_authid_rel, &tuple->t_self, new_tuple); |
| 959 |
|
| 960 |
InvokeObjectPostAlterHook(AuthIdRelationId, roleid, 0); |
| 961 |
|
| 962 |
ReleaseSysCache(tuple); |
| 963 |
heap_freetuple(new_tuple); |
| 964 |
|
| 965 |
InitGrantRoleOptions(&popt); |
| 966 |
|
| 967 |
/* |
| 968 |
* Advance command counter so we can see new record; else tests in |
| 969 |
* AddRoleMems may fail. |
| 970 |
*/ |
| 971 |
if (drolemembers) |
| 972 |
{ |
| 973 |
List *rolemembers = (List *) drolemembers->arg; |
| 974 |
|
| 975 |
CommandCounterIncrement(); |
| 976 |
|
| 977 |
if (stmt->action == +1) /* add members to role */ |
| 978 |
AddRoleMems(currentUserId, rolename, roleid, |
| 979 |
rolemembers, roleSpecsToIds(rolemembers), |
| 980 |
InvalidOid, &popt); |
| 981 |
else if (stmt->action == -1) /* drop members from role */ |
| 982 |
DelRoleMems(currentUserId, rolename, roleid, |
| 983 |
rolemembers, roleSpecsToIds(rolemembers), |
| 984 |
InvalidOid, &popt, DROP_RESTRICT); |
| 985 |
} |
| 986 |
|
| 987 |
/* |
| 988 |
* Close pg_authid, but keep lock till commit. |
| 989 |
*/ |
| 990 |
table_close(pg_authid_rel, NoLock); |
| 991 |
|
| 992 |
return roleid; |
| 993 |
} |
| 994 |
|
| 995 |
|
| 996 |
/* |
| 997 |
* ALTER ROLE ... SET |
| 998 |
*/ |
| 999 |
Oid |
| 1000 |
AlterRoleSet(AlterRoleSetStmt *stmt) |
| 1001 |
{ |
| 1002 |
HeapTuple roletuple; |
| 1003 |
Form_pg_authid roleform; |
| 1004 |
Oid databaseid = InvalidOid; |
| 1005 |
Oid roleid = InvalidOid; |
| 1006 |
|
| 1007 |
if (stmt->role) |
| 1008 |
{ |
| 1009 |
check_rolespec_name(stmt->role, |
| 1010 |
_("Cannot alter reserved roles.")); |
| 1011 |
|
| 1012 |
roletuple = get_rolespec_tuple(stmt->role); |
| 1013 |
roleform = (Form_pg_authid) GETSTRUCT(roletuple); |
| 1014 |
roleid = roleform->oid; |
| 1015 |
|
| 1016 |
/* |
| 1017 |
* Obtain a lock on the role and make sure it didn't go away in the |
| 1018 |
* meantime. |
| 1019 |
*/ |
| 1020 |
shdepLockAndCheckObject(AuthIdRelationId, roleid); |
| 1021 |
|
| 1022 |
/* |
| 1023 |
* To mess with a superuser you gotta be superuser; otherwise you need |
| 1024 |
* CREATEROLE plus admin option on the target role; unless you're just |
| 1025 |
* trying to change your own settings |
| 1026 |
*/ |
| 1027 |
if (roleform->rolsuper) |
| 1028 |
{ |
| 1029 |
if (!superuser()) |
| 1030 |
ereport(ERROR, |
| 1031 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE), |
| 1032 |
errmsg("permission denied to alter role"), |
| 1033 |
errdetail("Only roles with the %s attribute may alter roles with the %s attribute.", |
| 1034 |
"SUPERUSER", "SUPERUSER"))); |
| 1035 |
} |
| 1036 |
else |
| 1037 |
{ |
| 1038 |
if ((!have_createrole_privilege() || |
| 1039 |
!is_admin_of_role(GetUserId(), roleid)) |
| 1040 |
&& roleid != GetUserId()) |
| 1041 |
ereport(ERROR, |
| 1042 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE), |
| 1043 |
errmsg("permission denied to alter role"), |
| 1044 |
errdetail("Only roles with the %s attribute and the %s option on role \"%s\" may alter this role.", |
| 1045 |
"CREATEROLE", "ADMIN", NameStr(roleform->rolname)))); |
| 1046 |
} |
| 1047 |
|
| 1048 |
ReleaseSysCache(roletuple); |
| 1049 |
} |
| 1050 |
|
| 1051 |
/* look up and lock the database, if specified */ |
| 1052 |
if (stmt->database != NULL) |
| 1053 |
{ |
| 1054 |
databaseid = get_database_oid(stmt->database, false); |
| 1055 |
shdepLockAndCheckObject(DatabaseRelationId, databaseid); |
| 1056 |
|
| 1057 |
if (!stmt->role) |
| 1058 |
{ |
| 1059 |
/* |
| 1060 |
* If no role is specified, then this is effectively the same as |
| 1061 |
* ALTER DATABASE ... SET, so use the same permission check. |
| 1062 |
*/ |
| 1063 |
if (!object_ownercheck(DatabaseRelationId, databaseid, GetUserId())) |
| 1064 |
aclcheck_error(ACLCHECK_NOT_OWNER, OBJECT_DATABASE, |
| 1065 |
stmt->database); |
| 1066 |
} |
| 1067 |
} |
| 1068 |
|
| 1069 |
if (!stmt->role && !stmt->database) |
| 1070 |
{ |
| 1071 |
/* Must be superuser to alter settings globally. */ |
| 1072 |
if (!superuser()) |
| 1073 |
ereport(ERROR, |
| 1074 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE), |
| 1075 |
errmsg("permission denied to alter setting"), |
| 1076 |
errdetail("Only roles with the %s attribute may alter settings globally.", |
| 1077 |
"SUPERUSER"))); |
| 1078 |
} |
| 1079 |
|
| 1080 |
AlterSetting(databaseid, roleid, stmt->setstmt); |
| 1081 |
|
| 1082 |
return roleid; |
| 1083 |
} |
| 1084 |
|
| 1085 |
|
| 1086 |
/* |
| 1087 |
* DROP ROLE |
| 1088 |
*/ |
| 1089 |
void |
| 1090 |
DropRole(DropRoleStmt *stmt) |
| 1091 |
{ |
| 1092 |
Relation pg_authid_rel, |
| 1093 |
pg_auth_members_rel; |
| 1094 |
ListCell *item; |
| 1095 |
List *role_oids = NIL; |
| 1096 |
|
| 1097 |
if (!have_createrole_privilege()) |
| 1098 |
ereport(ERROR, |
| 1099 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE), |
| 1100 |
errmsg("permission denied to drop role"), |
| 1101 |
errdetail("Only roles with the %s attribute and the %s option on the target roles may drop roles.", |
| 1102 |
"CREATEROLE", "ADMIN"))); |
| 1103 |
|
| 1104 |
/* |
| 1105 |
* Scan the pg_authid relation to find the Oid of the role(s) to be |
| 1106 |
* deleted and perform preliminary permissions and sanity checks. |
| 1107 |
*/ |
| 1108 |
pg_authid_rel = table_open(AuthIdRelationId, RowExclusiveLock); |
| 1109 |
pg_auth_members_rel = table_open(AuthMemRelationId, RowExclusiveLock); |
| 1110 |
|
| 1111 |
foreach(item, stmt->roles) |
| 1112 |
{ |
| 1113 |
RoleSpec *rolspec = lfirst(item); |
| 1114 |
char *role; |
| 1115 |
HeapTuple tuple, |
| 1116 |
tmp_tuple; |
| 1117 |
Form_pg_authid roleform; |
| 1118 |
ScanKeyData scankey; |
| 1119 |
SysScanDesc sscan; |
| 1120 |
Oid roleid; |
| 1121 |
|
| 1122 |
if (rolspec->roletype != ROLESPEC_CSTRING) |
| 1123 |
ereport(ERROR, |
| 1124 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE), |
| 1125 |
errmsg("cannot use special role specifier in DROP ROLE"))); |
| 1126 |
role = rolspec->rolename; |
| 1127 |
|
| 1128 |
tuple = SearchSysCache1(AUTHNAME, PointerGetDatum(role)); |
| 1129 |
if (!HeapTupleIsValid(tuple)) |
| 1130 |
{ |
| 1131 |
if (!stmt->missing_ok) |
| 1132 |
{ |
| 1133 |
ereport(ERROR, |
| 1134 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_UNDEFINED_OBJECT), |
| 1135 |
errmsg("role \"%s\" does not exist", role))); |
| 1136 |
} |
| 1137 |
else |
| 1138 |
{ |
| 1139 |
ereport(NOTICE, |
| 1140 |
(errmsg("role \"%s\" does not exist, skipping", |
| 1141 |
role))); |
| 1142 |
} |
| 1143 |
|
| 1144 |
continue; |
| 1145 |
} |
| 1146 |
|
| 1147 |
roleform = (Form_pg_authid) GETSTRUCT(tuple); |
| 1148 |
roleid = roleform->oid; |
| 1149 |
|
| 1150 |
if (roleid == GetUserId()) |
| 1151 |
ereport(ERROR, |
| 1152 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_OBJECT_IN_USE), |
| 1153 |
errmsg("current user cannot be dropped"))); |
| 1154 |
if (roleid == GetOuterUserId()) |
| 1155 |
ereport(ERROR, |
| 1156 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_OBJECT_IN_USE), |
| 1157 |
errmsg("current user cannot be dropped"))); |
| 1158 |
if (roleid == GetSessionUserId()) |
| 1159 |
ereport(ERROR, |
| 1160 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_OBJECT_IN_USE), |
| 1161 |
errmsg("session user cannot be dropped"))); |
| 1162 |
|
| 1163 |
/* |
| 1164 |
* For safety's sake, we allow createrole holders to drop ordinary |
| 1165 |
* roles but not superuser roles, and only if they also have ADMIN |
| 1166 |
* OPTION. |
| 1167 |
*/ |
| 1168 |
if (roleform->rolsuper && !superuser()) |
| 1169 |
ereport(ERROR, |
| 1170 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE), |
| 1171 |
errmsg("permission denied to drop role"), |
| 1172 |
errdetail("Only roles with the %s attribute may drop roles with the %s attribute.", |
| 1173 |
"SUPERUSER", "SUPERUSER"))); |
| 1174 |
if (!is_admin_of_role(GetUserId(), roleid)) |
| 1175 |
ereport(ERROR, |
| 1176 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE), |
| 1177 |
errmsg("permission denied to drop role"), |
| 1178 |
errdetail("Only roles with the %s attribute and the %s option on role \"%s\" may drop this role.", |
| 1179 |
"CREATEROLE", "ADMIN", NameStr(roleform->rolname)))); |
| 1180 |
|
| 1181 |
/* DROP hook for the role being removed */ |
| 1182 |
InvokeObjectDropHook(AuthIdRelationId, roleid, 0); |
| 1183 |
|
| 1184 |
/* Don't leak the syscache tuple */ |
| 1185 |
ReleaseSysCache(tuple); |
| 1186 |
|
| 1187 |
/* |
| 1188 |
* Lock the role, so nobody can add dependencies to her while we drop |
| 1189 |
* her. We keep the lock until the end of transaction. |
| 1190 |
*/ |
| 1191 |
LockSharedObject(AuthIdRelationId, roleid, 0, AccessExclusiveLock); |
| 1192 |
|
| 1193 |
/* |
| 1194 |
* If there is a pg_auth_members entry that has one of the roles to be |
| 1195 |
* dropped as the roleid or member, it should be silently removed, but |
| 1196 |
* if there is a pg_auth_members entry that has one of the roles to be |
| 1197 |
* dropped as the grantor, the operation should fail. |
| 1198 |
* |
| 1199 |
* It's possible, however, that a single pg_auth_members entry could |
| 1200 |
* fall into multiple categories - e.g. the user could do "GRANT foo |
| 1201 |
* TO bar GRANTED BY baz" and then "DROP ROLE baz, bar". We want such |
| 1202 |
* an operation to succeed regardless of the order in which the |
| 1203 |
* to-be-dropped roles are passed to DROP ROLE. |
| 1204 |
* |
| 1205 |
* To make that work, we remove all pg_auth_members entries that can |
| 1206 |
* be silently removed in this loop, and then below we'll make a |
| 1207 |
* second pass over the list of roles to be removed and check for any |
| 1208 |
* remaining dependencies. |
| 1209 |
*/ |
| 1210 |
ScanKeyInit(&scankey, |
| 1211 |
Anum_pg_auth_members_roleid, |
| 1212 |
BTEqualStrategyNumber, F_OIDEQ, |
| 1213 |
ObjectIdGetDatum(roleid)); |
| 1214 |
|
| 1215 |
sscan = systable_beginscan(pg_auth_members_rel, AuthMemRoleMemIndexId, |
| 1216 |
true, NULL, 1, &scankey); |
| 1217 |
|
| 1218 |
while (HeapTupleIsValid(tmp_tuple = systable_getnext(sscan))) |
| 1219 |
{ |
| 1220 |
Form_pg_auth_members authmem_form; |
| 1221 |
|
| 1222 |
authmem_form = (Form_pg_auth_members) GETSTRUCT(tmp_tuple); |
| 1223 |
deleteSharedDependencyRecordsFor(AuthMemRelationId, |
| 1224 |
authmem_form->oid, 0); |
| 1225 |
CatalogTupleDelete(pg_auth_members_rel, &tmp_tuple->t_self); |
| 1226 |
} |
| 1227 |
|
| 1228 |
systable_endscan(sscan); |
| 1229 |
|
| 1230 |
ScanKeyInit(&scankey, |
| 1231 |
Anum_pg_auth_members_member, |
| 1232 |
BTEqualStrategyNumber, F_OIDEQ, |
| 1233 |
ObjectIdGetDatum(roleid)); |
| 1234 |
|
| 1235 |
sscan = systable_beginscan(pg_auth_members_rel, AuthMemMemRoleIndexId, |
| 1236 |
true, NULL, 1, &scankey); |
| 1237 |
|
| 1238 |
while (HeapTupleIsValid(tmp_tuple = systable_getnext(sscan))) |
| 1239 |
{ |
| 1240 |
Form_pg_auth_members authmem_form; |
| 1241 |
|
| 1242 |
authmem_form = (Form_pg_auth_members) GETSTRUCT(tmp_tuple); |
| 1243 |
deleteSharedDependencyRecordsFor(AuthMemRelationId, |
| 1244 |
authmem_form->oid, 0); |
| 1245 |
CatalogTupleDelete(pg_auth_members_rel, &tmp_tuple->t_self); |
| 1246 |
} |
| 1247 |
|
| 1248 |
systable_endscan(sscan); |
| 1249 |
|
| 1250 |
/* |
| 1251 |
* Advance command counter so that later iterations of this loop will |
| 1252 |
* see the changes already made. This is essential if, for example, |
| 1253 |
* we are trying to drop both a role and one of its direct members --- |
| 1254 |
* we'll get an error if we try to delete the linking pg_auth_members |
| 1255 |
* tuple twice. (We do not need a CCI between the two delete loops |
| 1256 |
* above, because it's not allowed for a role to directly contain |
| 1257 |
* itself.) |
| 1258 |
*/ |
| 1259 |
CommandCounterIncrement(); |
| 1260 |
|
| 1261 |
/* Looks tentatively OK, add it to the list if not there yet. */ |
| 1262 |
role_oids = list_append_unique_oid(role_oids, roleid); |
| 1263 |
} |
| 1264 |
|
| 1265 |
/* |
| 1266 |
* Second pass over the roles to be removed. |
| 1267 |
*/ |
| 1268 |
foreach(item, role_oids) |
| 1269 |
{ |
| 1270 |
Oid roleid = lfirst_oid(item); |
| 1271 |
HeapTuple tuple; |
| 1272 |
Form_pg_authid roleform; |
| 1273 |
char *detail; |
| 1274 |
char *detail_log; |
| 1275 |
|
| 1276 |
/* |
| 1277 |
* Re-find the pg_authid tuple. |
| 1278 |
* |
| 1279 |
* Since we've taken a lock on the role OID, it shouldn't be possible |
| 1280 |
* for the tuple to have been deleted -- or for that matter updated -- |
| 1281 |
* unless the user is manually modifying the system catalogs. |
| 1282 |
*/ |
| 1283 |
tuple = SearchSysCache1(AUTHOID, ObjectIdGetDatum(roleid)); |
| 1284 |
if (!HeapTupleIsValid(tuple)) |
| 1285 |
elog(ERROR, "could not find tuple for role %u", roleid); |
| 1286 |
roleform = (Form_pg_authid) GETSTRUCT(tuple); |
| 1287 |
|
| 1288 |
/* |
| 1289 |
* Check for pg_shdepend entries depending on this role. |
| 1290 |
* |
| 1291 |
* This needs to happen after we've completed removing any |
| 1292 |
* pg_auth_members entries that can be removed silently, in order to |
| 1293 |
* avoid spurious failures. See notes above for more details. |
| 1294 |
*/ |
| 1295 |
if (checkSharedDependencies(AuthIdRelationId, roleid, |
| 1296 |
&detail, &detail_log)) |
| 1297 |
ereport(ERROR, |
| 1298 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_DEPENDENT_OBJECTS_STILL_EXIST), |
| 1299 |
errmsg("role \"%s\" cannot be dropped because some objects depend on it", |
| 1300 |
NameStr(roleform->rolname)), |
| 1301 |
errdetail_internal("%s", detail), |
| 1302 |
errdetail_log("%s", detail_log))); |
| 1303 |
|
| 1304 |
/* |
| 1305 |
* Remove the role from the pg_authid table |
| 1306 |
*/ |
| 1307 |
CatalogTupleDelete(pg_authid_rel, &tuple->t_self); |
| 1308 |
|
| 1309 |
ReleaseSysCache(tuple); |
| 1310 |
|
| 1311 |
/* |
| 1312 |
* Remove any comments or security labels on this role. |
| 1313 |
*/ |
| 1314 |
DeleteSharedComments(roleid, AuthIdRelationId); |
| 1315 |
DeleteSharedSecurityLabel(roleid, AuthIdRelationId); |
| 1316 |
|
| 1317 |
/* |
| 1318 |
* Remove settings for this role. |
| 1319 |
*/ |
| 1320 |
DropSetting(InvalidOid, roleid); |
| 1321 |
} |
| 1322 |
|
| 1323 |
/* |
| 1324 |
* Now we can clean up; but keep locks until commit. |
| 1325 |
*/ |
| 1326 |
table_close(pg_auth_members_rel, NoLock); |
| 1327 |
table_close(pg_authid_rel, NoLock); |
| 1328 |
} |
| 1329 |
|
| 1330 |
/* |
| 1331 |
* Rename role |
| 1332 |
*/ |
| 1333 |
ObjectAddress |
| 1334 |
RenameRole(const char *oldname, const char *newname) |
| 1335 |
{ |
| 1336 |
HeapTuple oldtuple, |
| 1337 |
newtuple; |
| 1338 |
TupleDesc dsc; |
| 1339 |
Relation rel; |
| 1340 |
Datum datum; |
| 1341 |
bool isnull; |
| 1342 |
Datum repl_val[Natts_pg_authid]; |
| 1343 |
bool repl_null[Natts_pg_authid]; |
| 1344 |
bool repl_repl[Natts_pg_authid]; |
| 1345 |
int i; |
| 1346 |
Oid roleid; |
| 1347 |
ObjectAddress address; |
| 1348 |
Form_pg_authid authform; |
| 1349 |
|
| 1350 |
rel = table_open(AuthIdRelationId, RowExclusiveLock); |
| 1351 |
dsc = RelationGetDescr(rel); |
| 1352 |
|
| 1353 |
oldtuple = SearchSysCache1(AUTHNAME, CStringGetDatum(oldname)); |
| 1354 |
if (!HeapTupleIsValid(oldtuple)) |
| 1355 |
ereport(ERROR, |
| 1356 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_UNDEFINED_OBJECT), |
| 1357 |
errmsg("role \"%s\" does not exist", oldname))); |
| 1358 |
|
| 1359 |
/* |
| 1360 |
* XXX Client applications probably store the session user somewhere, so |
| 1361 |
* renaming it could cause confusion. On the other hand, there may not be |
| 1362 |
* an actual problem besides a little confusion, so think about this and |
| 1363 |
* decide. Same for SET ROLE ... we don't restrict renaming the current |
| 1364 |
* effective userid, though. |
| 1365 |
*/ |
| 1366 |
|
| 1367 |
authform = (Form_pg_authid) GETSTRUCT(oldtuple); |
| 1368 |
roleid = authform->oid; |
| 1369 |
|
| 1370 |
if (roleid == GetSessionUserId()) |
| 1371 |
ereport(ERROR, |
| 1372 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED), |
| 1373 |
errmsg("session user cannot be renamed"))); |
| 1374 |
if (roleid == GetOuterUserId()) |
| 1375 |
ereport(ERROR, |
| 1376 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED), |
| 1377 |
errmsg("current user cannot be renamed"))); |
| 1378 |
|
| 1379 |
/* |
| 1380 |
* Check that the user is not trying to rename a system role and not |
| 1381 |
* trying to rename a role into the reserved "pg_" namespace. |
| 1382 |
*/ |
| 1383 |
if (IsReservedName(NameStr(authform->rolname))) |
| 1384 |
ereport(ERROR, |
| 1385 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_RESERVED_NAME), |
| 1386 |
errmsg("role name \"%s\" is reserved", |
| 1387 |
NameStr(authform->rolname)), |
| 1388 |
errdetail("Role names starting with \"pg_\" are reserved."))); |
| 1389 |
|
| 1390 |
if (IsReservedName(newname)) |
| 1391 |
ereport(ERROR, |
| 1392 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_RESERVED_NAME), |
| 1393 |
errmsg("role name \"%s\" is reserved", |
| 1394 |
newname), |
| 1395 |
errdetail("Role names starting with \"pg_\" are reserved."))); |
| 1396 |
|
| 1397 |
/* |
| 1398 |
* If built with appropriate switch, whine when regression-testing |
| 1399 |
* conventions for role names are violated. |
| 1400 |
*/ |
| 1401 |
#ifdef ENFORCE_REGRESSION_TEST_NAME_RESTRICTIONS |
| 1402 |
if (strncmp(newname, "regress_", 8) != 0) |
| 1403 |
elog(WARNING, "roles created by regression test cases should have names starting with \"regress_\""); |
| 1404 |
#endif |
| 1405 |
|
| 1406 |
/* make sure the new name doesn't exist */ |
| 1407 |
if (SearchSysCacheExists1(AUTHNAME, CStringGetDatum(newname))) |
| 1408 |
ereport(ERROR, |
| 1409 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_DUPLICATE_OBJECT), |
| 1410 |
errmsg("role \"%s\" already exists", newname))); |
| 1411 |
|
| 1412 |
/* |
| 1413 |
* Only superusers can mess with superusers. Otherwise, a user with |
| 1414 |
* CREATEROLE can rename a role for which they have ADMIN OPTION. |
| 1415 |
*/ |
| 1416 |
if (authform->rolsuper) |
| 1417 |
{ |
| 1418 |
if (!superuser()) |
| 1419 |
ereport(ERROR, |
| 1420 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE), |
| 1421 |
errmsg("permission denied to rename role"), |
| 1422 |
errdetail("Only roles with the %s attribute may rename roles with the %s attribute.", |
| 1423 |
"SUPERUSER", "SUPERUSER"))); |
| 1424 |
} |
| 1425 |
else |
| 1426 |
{ |
| 1427 |
if (!have_createrole_privilege() || |
| 1428 |
!is_admin_of_role(GetUserId(), roleid)) |
| 1429 |
ereport(ERROR, |
| 1430 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE), |
| 1431 |
errmsg("permission denied to rename role"), |
| 1432 |
errdetail("Only roles with the %s attribute and the %s option on role \"%s\" may rename this role.", |
| 1433 |
"CREATEROLE", "ADMIN", NameStr(authform->rolname)))); |
| 1434 |
} |
| 1435 |
|
| 1436 |
/* OK, construct the modified tuple */ |
| 1437 |
for (i = 0; i < Natts_pg_authid; i++) |
| 1438 |
repl_repl[i] = false; |
| 1439 |
|
| 1440 |
repl_repl[Anum_pg_authid_rolname - 1] = true; |
| 1441 |
repl_val[Anum_pg_authid_rolname - 1] = DirectFunctionCall1(namein, |
| 1442 |
CStringGetDatum(newname)); |
| 1443 |
repl_null[Anum_pg_authid_rolname - 1] = false; |
| 1444 |
|
| 1445 |
datum = heap_getattr(oldtuple, Anum_pg_authid_rolpassword, dsc, &isnull); |
| 1446 |
|
| 1447 |
if (!isnull && get_password_type(TextDatumGetCString(datum)) == PASSWORD_TYPE_MD5) |
| 1448 |
{ |
| 1449 |
/* MD5 uses the username as salt, so just clear it on a rename */ |
| 1450 |
repl_repl[Anum_pg_authid_rolpassword - 1] = true; |
| 1451 |
repl_null[Anum_pg_authid_rolpassword - 1] = true; |
| 1452 |
|
| 1453 |
ereport(NOTICE, |
| 1454 |
(errmsg("MD5 password cleared because of role rename"))); |
| 1455 |
} |
| 1456 |
|
| 1457 |
newtuple = heap_modify_tuple(oldtuple, dsc, repl_val, repl_null, repl_repl); |
| 1458 |
CatalogTupleUpdate(rel, &oldtuple->t_self, newtuple); |
| 1459 |
|
| 1460 |
InvokeObjectPostAlterHook(AuthIdRelationId, roleid, 0); |
| 1461 |
|
| 1462 |
ObjectAddressSet(address, AuthIdRelationId, roleid); |
| 1463 |
|
| 1464 |
ReleaseSysCache(oldtuple); |
| 1465 |
|
| 1466 |
/* |
| 1467 |
* Close pg_authid, but keep lock till commit. |
| 1468 |
*/ |
| 1469 |
table_close(rel, NoLock); |
| 1470 |
|
| 1471 |
return address; |
| 1472 |
} |
| 1473 |
|
| 1474 |
/* |
| 1475 |
* GrantRoleStmt |
| 1476 |
* |
| 1477 |
* Grant/Revoke roles to/from roles |
| 1478 |
*/ |
| 1479 |
void |
| 1480 |
GrantRole(ParseState *pstate, GrantRoleStmt *stmt) |
| 1481 |
{ |
| 1482 |
Relation pg_authid_rel; |
| 1483 |
Oid grantor; |
| 1484 |
List *grantee_ids; |
| 1485 |
ListCell *item; |
| 1486 |
GrantRoleOptions popt; |
| 1487 |
Oid currentUserId = GetUserId(); |
| 1488 |
|
| 1489 |
/* Parse options list. */ |
| 1490 |
InitGrantRoleOptions(&popt); |
| 1491 |
foreach(item, stmt->opt) |
| 1492 |
{ |
| 1493 |
DefElem *opt = (DefElem *) lfirst(item); |
| 1494 |
char *optval = defGetString(opt); |
| 1495 |
|
| 1496 |
if (strcmp(opt->defname, "admin") == 0) |
| 1497 |
{ |
| 1498 |
popt.specified |= GRANT_ROLE_SPECIFIED_ADMIN; |
| 1499 |
|
| 1500 |
if (parse_bool(optval, &popt.admin)) |
| 1501 |
continue; |
| 1502 |
} |
| 1503 |
else if (strcmp(opt->defname, "inherit") == 0) |
| 1504 |
{ |
| 1505 |
popt.specified |= GRANT_ROLE_SPECIFIED_INHERIT; |
| 1506 |
if (parse_bool(optval, &popt.inherit)) |
| 1507 |
continue; |
| 1508 |
} |
| 1509 |
else if (strcmp(opt->defname, "set") == 0) |
| 1510 |
{ |
| 1511 |
popt.specified |= GRANT_ROLE_SPECIFIED_SET; |
| 1512 |
if (parse_bool(optval, &popt.set)) |
| 1513 |
continue; |
| 1514 |
} |
| 1515 |
else |
| 1516 |
ereport(ERROR, |
| 1517 |
errcode(ERRCODE_SYNTAX_ERROR), |
| 1518 |
errmsg("unrecognized role option \"%s\"", opt->defname), |
| 1519 |
parser_errposition(pstate, opt->location)); |
| 1520 |
|
| 1521 |
ereport(ERROR, |
| 1522 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE), |
| 1523 |
errmsg("unrecognized value for role option \"%s\": \"%s\"", |
| 1524 |
opt->defname, optval), |
| 1525 |
parser_errposition(pstate, opt->location))); |
| 1526 |
} |
| 1527 |
|
| 1528 |
/* Lookup OID of grantor, if specified. */ |
| 1529 |
if (stmt->grantor) |
| 1530 |
grantor = get_rolespec_oid(stmt->grantor, false); |
| 1531 |
else |
| 1532 |
grantor = InvalidOid; |
| 1533 |
|
| 1534 |
grantee_ids = roleSpecsToIds(stmt->grantee_roles); |
| 1535 |
|
| 1536 |
/* AccessShareLock is enough since we aren't modifying pg_authid */ |
| 1537 |
pg_authid_rel = table_open(AuthIdRelationId, AccessShareLock); |
| 1538 |
|
| 1539 |
/* |
| 1540 |
* Step through all of the granted roles and add, update, or remove |
| 1541 |
* entries in pg_auth_members as appropriate. If stmt->is_grant is true, |
| 1542 |
* we are adding new grants or, if they already exist, updating options on |
| 1543 |
* those grants. If stmt->is_grant is false, we are revoking grants or |
| 1544 |
* removing options from them. |
| 1545 |
*/ |
| 1546 |
foreach(item, stmt->granted_roles) |
| 1547 |
{ |
| 1548 |
AccessPriv *priv = (AccessPriv *) lfirst(item); |
| 1549 |
char *rolename = priv->priv_name; |
| 1550 |
Oid roleid; |
| 1551 |
|
| 1552 |
/* Must reject priv(columns) and ALL PRIVILEGES(columns) */ |
| 1553 |
if (rolename == NULL || priv->cols != NIL) |
| 1554 |
ereport(ERROR, |
| 1555 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_GRANT_OPERATION), |
| 1556 |
errmsg("column names cannot be included in GRANT/REVOKE ROLE"))); |
| 1557 |
|
| 1558 |
roleid = get_role_oid(rolename, false); |
| 1559 |
check_role_membership_authorization(currentUserId, |
| 1560 |
roleid, stmt->is_grant); |
| 1561 |
if (stmt->is_grant) |
| 1562 |
AddRoleMems(currentUserId, rolename, roleid, |
| 1563 |
stmt->grantee_roles, grantee_ids, |
| 1564 |
grantor, &popt); |
| 1565 |
else |
| 1566 |
DelRoleMems(currentUserId, rolename, roleid, |
| 1567 |
stmt->grantee_roles, grantee_ids, |
| 1568 |
grantor, &popt, stmt->behavior); |
| 1569 |
} |
| 1570 |
|
| 1571 |
/* |
| 1572 |
* Close pg_authid, but keep lock till commit. |
| 1573 |
*/ |
| 1574 |
table_close(pg_authid_rel, NoLock); |
| 1575 |
} |
| 1576 |
|
| 1577 |
/* |
| 1578 |
* DropOwnedObjects |
| 1579 |
* |
| 1580 |
* Drop the objects owned by a given list of roles. |
| 1581 |
*/ |
| 1582 |
void |
| 1583 |
DropOwnedObjects(DropOwnedStmt *stmt) |
| 1584 |
{ |
| 1585 |
List *role_ids = roleSpecsToIds(stmt->roles); |
| 1586 |
ListCell *cell; |
| 1587 |
|
| 1588 |
/* Check privileges */ |
| 1589 |
foreach(cell, role_ids) |
| 1590 |
{ |
| 1591 |
Oid roleid = lfirst_oid(cell); |
| 1592 |
|
| 1593 |
if (!has_privs_of_role(GetUserId(), roleid)) |
| 1594 |
ereport(ERROR, |
| 1595 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE), |
| 1596 |
errmsg("permission denied to drop objects"), |
| 1597 |
errdetail("Only roles with privileges of role \"%s\" may drop objects owned by it.", |
| 1598 |
GetUserNameFromId(roleid, false)))); |
| 1599 |
} |
| 1600 |
|
| 1601 |
/* Ok, do it */ |
| 1602 |
shdepDropOwned(role_ids, stmt->behavior); |
| 1603 |
} |
| 1604 |
|
| 1605 |
/* |
| 1606 |
* ReassignOwnedObjects |
| 1607 |
* |
| 1608 |
* Give the objects owned by a given list of roles away to another user. |
| 1609 |
*/ |
| 1610 |
void |
| 1611 |
ReassignOwnedObjects(ReassignOwnedStmt *stmt) |
| 1612 |
{ |
| 1613 |
List *role_ids = roleSpecsToIds(stmt->roles); |
| 1614 |
ListCell *cell; |
| 1615 |
Oid newrole; |
| 1616 |
|
| 1617 |
/* Check privileges */ |
| 1618 |
foreach(cell, role_ids) |
| 1619 |
{ |
| 1620 |
Oid roleid = lfirst_oid(cell); |
| 1621 |
|
| 1622 |
if (!has_privs_of_role(GetUserId(), roleid)) |
| 1623 |
ereport(ERROR, |
| 1624 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE), |
| 1625 |
errmsg("permission denied to reassign objects"), |
| 1626 |
errdetail("Only roles with privileges of role \"%s\" may reassign objects owned by it.", |
| 1627 |
GetUserNameFromId(roleid, false)))); |
| 1628 |
} |
| 1629 |
|
| 1630 |
/* Must have privileges on the receiving side too */ |
| 1631 |
newrole = get_rolespec_oid(stmt->newrole, false); |
| 1632 |
|
| 1633 |
if (!has_privs_of_role(GetUserId(), newrole)) |
| 1634 |
ereport(ERROR, |
| 1635 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE), |
| 1636 |
errmsg("permission denied to reassign objects"), |
| 1637 |
errdetail("Only roles with privileges of role \"%s\" may reassign objects to it.", |
| 1638 |
GetUserNameFromId(newrole, false)))); |
| 1639 |
|
| 1640 |
/* Ok, do it */ |
| 1641 |
shdepReassignOwned(role_ids, newrole); |
| 1642 |
} |
| 1643 |
|
| 1644 |
/* |
| 1645 |
* roleSpecsToIds |
| 1646 |
* |
| 1647 |
* Given a list of RoleSpecs, generate a list of role OIDs in the same order. |
| 1648 |
* |
| 1649 |
* ROLESPEC_PUBLIC is not allowed. |
| 1650 |
*/ |
| 1651 |
List * |
| 1652 |
roleSpecsToIds(List *memberNames) |
| 1653 |
{ |
| 1654 |
List *result = NIL; |
| 1655 |
ListCell *l; |
| 1656 |
|
| 1657 |
foreach(l, memberNames) |
| 1658 |
{ |
| 1659 |
RoleSpec *rolespec = lfirst_node(RoleSpec, l); |
| 1660 |
Oid roleid; |
| 1661 |
|
| 1662 |
roleid = get_rolespec_oid(rolespec, false); |
| 1663 |
result = lappend_oid(result, roleid); |
| 1664 |
} |
| 1665 |
return result; |
| 1666 |
} |
| 1667 |
|
| 1668 |
/* |
| 1669 |
* AddRoleMems -- Add given members to the specified role |
| 1670 |
* |
| 1671 |
* currentUserId: OID of role performing the operation |
| 1672 |
* rolename: name of role to add to (used only for error messages) |
| 1673 |
* roleid: OID of role to add to |
| 1674 |
* memberSpecs: list of RoleSpec of roles to add (used only for error messages) |
| 1675 |
* memberIds: OIDs of roles to add |
| 1676 |
* grantorId: OID that should be recorded as having granted the membership |
| 1677 |
* (InvalidOid if not set explicitly) |
| 1678 |
* popt: information about grant options |
| 1679 |
*/ |
| 1680 |
static void |
| 1681 |
AddRoleMems(Oid currentUserId, const char *rolename, Oid roleid, |
| 1682 |
List *memberSpecs, List *memberIds, |
| 1683 |
Oid grantorId, GrantRoleOptions *popt) |
| 1684 |
{ |
| 1685 |
Relation pg_authmem_rel; |
| 1686 |
TupleDesc pg_authmem_dsc; |
| 1687 |
ListCell *specitem; |
| 1688 |
ListCell *iditem; |
| 1689 |
|
| 1690 |
Assert(list_length(memberSpecs) == list_length(memberIds)); |
| 1691 |
|
| 1692 |
/* Validate grantor (and resolve implicit grantor if not specified). */ |
| 1693 |
grantorId = check_role_grantor(currentUserId, roleid, grantorId, true); |
| 1694 |
|
| 1695 |
pg_authmem_rel = table_open(AuthMemRelationId, RowExclusiveLock); |
| 1696 |
pg_authmem_dsc = RelationGetDescr(pg_authmem_rel); |
| 1697 |
|
| 1698 |
/* |
| 1699 |
* Only allow changes to this role by one backend at a time, so that we |
| 1700 |
* can check integrity constraints like the lack of circular ADMIN OPTION |
| 1701 |
* grants without fear of race conditions. |
| 1702 |
*/ |
| 1703 |
LockSharedObject(AuthIdRelationId, roleid, 0, |
| 1704 |
ShareUpdateExclusiveLock); |
| 1705 |
|
| 1706 |
/* Preliminary sanity checks. */ |
| 1707 |
forboth(specitem, memberSpecs, iditem, memberIds) |
| 1708 |
{ |
| 1709 |
RoleSpec *memberRole = lfirst_node(RoleSpec, specitem); |
| 1710 |
Oid memberid = lfirst_oid(iditem); |
| 1711 |
|
| 1712 |
/* |
| 1713 |
* pg_database_owner is never a role member. Lifting this restriction |
| 1714 |
* would require a policy decision about membership loops. One could |
| 1715 |
* prevent loops, which would include making "ALTER DATABASE x OWNER |
| 1716 |
* TO proposed_datdba" fail if is_member_of_role(pg_database_owner, |
| 1717 |
* proposed_datdba). Hence, gaining a membership could reduce what a |
| 1718 |
* role could do. Alternately, one could allow these memberships to |
| 1719 |
* complete loops. A role could then have actual WITH ADMIN OPTION on |
| 1720 |
* itself, prompting a decision about is_admin_of_role() treatment of |
| 1721 |
* the case. |
| 1722 |
* |
| 1723 |
* Lifting this restriction also has policy implications for ownership |
| 1724 |
* of shared objects (databases and tablespaces). We allow such |
| 1725 |
* ownership, but we might find cause to ban it in the future. |
| 1726 |
* Designing such a ban would more troublesome if the design had to |
| 1727 |
* address pg_database_owner being a member of role FOO that owns a |
| 1728 |
* shared object. (The effect of such ownership is that any owner of |
| 1729 |
* another database can act as the owner of affected shared objects.) |
| 1730 |
*/ |
| 1731 |
if (memberid == ROLE_PG_DATABASE_OWNER) |
| 1732 |
ereport(ERROR, |
| 1733 |
errcode(ERRCODE_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED), |
| 1734 |
errmsg("role \"%s\" cannot be a member of any role", |
| 1735 |
get_rolespec_name(memberRole))); |
| 1736 |
|
| 1737 |
/* |
| 1738 |
* Refuse creation of membership loops, including the trivial case |
| 1739 |
* where a role is made a member of itself. We do this by checking to |
| 1740 |
* see if the target role is already a member of the proposed member |
| 1741 |
* role. We have to ignore possible superuserness, however, else we |
| 1742 |
* could never grant membership in a superuser-privileged role. |
| 1743 |
*/ |
| 1744 |
if (is_member_of_role_nosuper(roleid, memberid)) |
| 1745 |
ereport(ERROR, |
| 1746 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_GRANT_OPERATION), |
| 1747 |
errmsg("role \"%s\" is a member of role \"%s\"", |
| 1748 |
rolename, get_rolespec_name(memberRole)))); |
| 1749 |
} |
| 1750 |
|
| 1751 |
/* |
| 1752 |
* Disallow attempts to grant ADMIN OPTION back to a user who granted it |
| 1753 |
* to you, similar to what check_circularity does for ACLs. We want the |
| 1754 |
* chains of grants to remain acyclic, so that it's always possible to use |
| 1755 |
* REVOKE .. CASCADE to clean up all grants that depend on the one being |
| 1756 |
* revoked. |
| 1757 |
* |
| 1758 |
* NB: This check might look redundant with the check for membership loops |
| 1759 |
* above, but it isn't. That's checking for role-member loop (e.g. A is a |
| 1760 |
* member of B and B is a member of A) while this is checking for a |
| 1761 |
* member-grantor loop (e.g. A gave ADMIN OPTION on X to B and now B, who |
| 1762 |
* has no other source of ADMIN OPTION on X, tries to give ADMIN OPTION on |
| 1763 |
* X back to A). |
| 1764 |
*/ |
| 1765 |
if (popt->admin && grantorId != BOOTSTRAP_SUPERUSERID) |
| 1766 |
{ |
| 1767 |
CatCList *memlist; |
| 1768 |
RevokeRoleGrantAction *actions; |
| 1769 |
int i; |
| 1770 |
|
| 1771 |
/* Get the list of members for this role. */ |
| 1772 |
memlist = SearchSysCacheList1(AUTHMEMROLEMEM, |
| 1773 |
ObjectIdGetDatum(roleid)); |
| 1774 |
|
| 1775 |
/* |
| 1776 |
* Figure out what would happen if we removed all existing grants to |
| 1777 |
* every role to which we've been asked to make a new grant. |
| 1778 |
*/ |
| 1779 |
actions = initialize_revoke_actions(memlist); |
| 1780 |
foreach(iditem, memberIds) |
| 1781 |
{ |
| 1782 |
Oid memberid = lfirst_oid(iditem); |
| 1783 |
|
| 1784 |
if (memberid == BOOTSTRAP_SUPERUSERID) |
| 1785 |
ereport(ERROR, |
| 1786 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_GRANT_OPERATION), |
| 1787 |
errmsg("%s option cannot be granted back to your own grantor", |
| 1788 |
"ADMIN"))); |
| 1789 |
plan_member_revoke(memlist, actions, memberid); |
| 1790 |
} |
| 1791 |
|
| 1792 |
/* |
| 1793 |
* If the result would be that the grantor role would no longer have |
| 1794 |
* the ability to perform the grant, then the proposed grant would |
| 1795 |
* create a circularity. |
| 1796 |
*/ |
| 1797 |
for (i = 0; i < memlist->n_members; ++i) |
| 1798 |
{ |
| 1799 |
HeapTuple authmem_tuple; |
| 1800 |
Form_pg_auth_members authmem_form; |
| 1801 |
|
| 1802 |
authmem_tuple = &memlist->members[i]->tuple; |
| 1803 |
authmem_form = (Form_pg_auth_members) GETSTRUCT(authmem_tuple); |
| 1804 |
|
| 1805 |
if (actions[i] == RRG_NOOP && |
| 1806 |
authmem_form->member == grantorId && |
| 1807 |
authmem_form->admin_option) |
| 1808 |
break; |
| 1809 |
} |
| 1810 |
if (i >= memlist->n_members) |
| 1811 |
ereport(ERROR, |
| 1812 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_GRANT_OPERATION), |
| 1813 |
errmsg("%s option cannot be granted back to your own grantor", |
| 1814 |
"ADMIN"))); |
| 1815 |
|
| 1816 |
ReleaseSysCacheList(memlist); |
| 1817 |
} |
| 1818 |
|
| 1819 |
/* Now perform the catalog updates. */ |
| 1820 |
forboth(specitem, memberSpecs, iditem, memberIds) |
| 1821 |
{ |
| 1822 |
RoleSpec *memberRole = lfirst_node(RoleSpec, specitem); |
| 1823 |
Oid memberid = lfirst_oid(iditem); |
| 1824 |
HeapTuple authmem_tuple; |
| 1825 |
HeapTuple tuple; |
| 1826 |
Datum new_record[Natts_pg_auth_members] = {0}; |
| 1827 |
bool new_record_nulls[Natts_pg_auth_members] = {0}; |
| 1828 |
bool new_record_repl[Natts_pg_auth_members] = {0}; |
| 1829 |
|
| 1830 |
/* Common initialization for possible insert or update */ |
| 1831 |
new_record[Anum_pg_auth_members_roleid - 1] = |
| 1832 |
ObjectIdGetDatum(roleid); |
| 1833 |
new_record[Anum_pg_auth_members_member - 1] = |
| 1834 |
ObjectIdGetDatum(memberid); |
| 1835 |
new_record[Anum_pg_auth_members_grantor - 1] = |
| 1836 |
ObjectIdGetDatum(grantorId); |
| 1837 |
|
| 1838 |
/* Find any existing tuple */ |
| 1839 |
authmem_tuple = SearchSysCache3(AUTHMEMROLEMEM, |
| 1840 |
ObjectIdGetDatum(roleid), |
| 1841 |
ObjectIdGetDatum(memberid), |
| 1842 |
ObjectIdGetDatum(grantorId)); |
| 1843 |
|
| 1844 |
/* |
| 1845 |
* If we found a tuple, update it with new option values, unless there |
| 1846 |
* are no changes, in which case issue a WARNING. |
| 1847 |
* |
| 1848 |
* If we didn't find a tuple, just insert one. |
| 1849 |
*/ |
| 1850 |
if (HeapTupleIsValid(authmem_tuple)) |
| 1851 |
{ |
| 1852 |
Form_pg_auth_members authmem_form; |
| 1853 |
bool at_least_one_change = false; |
| 1854 |
|
| 1855 |
authmem_form = (Form_pg_auth_members) GETSTRUCT(authmem_tuple); |
| 1856 |
|
| 1857 |
if ((popt->specified & GRANT_ROLE_SPECIFIED_ADMIN) != 0 |
| 1858 |
&& authmem_form->admin_option != popt->admin) |
| 1859 |
{ |
| 1860 |
new_record[Anum_pg_auth_members_admin_option - 1] = |
| 1861 |
BoolGetDatum(popt->admin); |
| 1862 |
new_record_repl[Anum_pg_auth_members_admin_option - 1] = |
| 1863 |
true; |
| 1864 |
at_least_one_change = true; |
| 1865 |
} |
| 1866 |
|
| 1867 |
if ((popt->specified & GRANT_ROLE_SPECIFIED_INHERIT) != 0 |
| 1868 |
&& authmem_form->inherit_option != popt->inherit) |
| 1869 |
{ |
| 1870 |
new_record[Anum_pg_auth_members_inherit_option - 1] = |
| 1871 |
BoolGetDatum(popt->inherit); |
| 1872 |
new_record_repl[Anum_pg_auth_members_inherit_option - 1] = |
| 1873 |
true; |
| 1874 |
at_least_one_change = true; |
| 1875 |
} |
| 1876 |
|
| 1877 |
if ((popt->specified & GRANT_ROLE_SPECIFIED_SET) != 0 |
| 1878 |
&& authmem_form->set_option != popt->set) |
| 1879 |
{ |
| 1880 |
new_record[Anum_pg_auth_members_set_option - 1] = |
| 1881 |
BoolGetDatum(popt->set); |
| 1882 |
new_record_repl[Anum_pg_auth_members_set_option - 1] = |
| 1883 |
true; |
| 1884 |
at_least_one_change = true; |
| 1885 |
} |
| 1886 |
|
| 1887 |
if (!at_least_one_change) |
| 1888 |
{ |
| 1889 |
ereport(NOTICE, |
| 1890 |
(errmsg("role \"%s\" has already been granted membership in role \"%s\" by role \"%s\"", |
| 1891 |
get_rolespec_name(memberRole), rolename, |
| 1892 |
GetUserNameFromId(grantorId, false)))); |
| 1893 |
ReleaseSysCache(authmem_tuple); |
| 1894 |
continue; |
| 1895 |
} |
| 1896 |
|
| 1897 |
tuple = heap_modify_tuple(authmem_tuple, pg_authmem_dsc, |
| 1898 |
new_record, |
| 1899 |
new_record_nulls, new_record_repl); |
| 1900 |
CatalogTupleUpdate(pg_authmem_rel, &tuple->t_self, tuple); |
| 1901 |
|
| 1902 |
ReleaseSysCache(authmem_tuple); |
| 1903 |
} |
| 1904 |
else |
| 1905 |
{ |
| 1906 |
Oid objectId; |
| 1907 |
Oid *newmembers = palloc(sizeof(Oid)); |
| 1908 |
|
| 1909 |
/* |
| 1910 |
* The values for these options can be taken directly from 'popt'. |
| 1911 |
* Either they were specified, or the defaults as set by |
| 1912 |
* InitGrantRoleOptions are correct. |
| 1913 |
*/ |
| 1914 |
new_record[Anum_pg_auth_members_admin_option - 1] = |
| 1915 |
BoolGetDatum(popt->admin); |
| 1916 |
new_record[Anum_pg_auth_members_set_option - 1] = |
| 1917 |
BoolGetDatum(popt->set); |
| 1918 |
|
| 1919 |
/* |
| 1920 |
* If the user specified a value for the inherit option, use |
| 1921 |
* whatever was specified. Otherwise, set the default value based |
| 1922 |
* on the role-level property. |
| 1923 |
*/ |
| 1924 |
if ((popt->specified & GRANT_ROLE_SPECIFIED_INHERIT) != 0) |
| 1925 |
new_record[Anum_pg_auth_members_inherit_option - 1] = |
| 1926 |
popt->inherit; |
| 1927 |
else |
| 1928 |
{ |
| 1929 |
HeapTuple mrtup; |
| 1930 |
Form_pg_authid mrform; |
| 1931 |
|
| 1932 |
mrtup = SearchSysCache1(AUTHOID, ObjectIdGetDatum(memberid)); |
| 1933 |
if (!HeapTupleIsValid(mrtup)) |
| 1934 |
elog(ERROR, "cache lookup failed for role %u", memberid); |
| 1935 |
mrform = (Form_pg_authid) GETSTRUCT(mrtup); |
| 1936 |
new_record[Anum_pg_auth_members_inherit_option - 1] = |
| 1937 |
mrform->rolinherit; |
| 1938 |
ReleaseSysCache(mrtup); |
| 1939 |
} |
| 1940 |
|
| 1941 |
/* get an OID for the new row and insert it */ |
| 1942 |
objectId = GetNewOidWithIndex(pg_authmem_rel, AuthMemOidIndexId, |
| 1943 |
Anum_pg_auth_members_oid); |
| 1944 |
new_record[Anum_pg_auth_members_oid - 1] = objectId; |
| 1945 |
tuple = heap_form_tuple(pg_authmem_dsc, |
| 1946 |
new_record, new_record_nulls); |
| 1947 |
CatalogTupleInsert(pg_authmem_rel, tuple); |
| 1948 |
|
| 1949 |
/* updateAclDependencies wants to pfree array inputs */ |
| 1950 |
newmembers[0] = grantorId; |
| 1951 |
updateAclDependencies(AuthMemRelationId, objectId, |
| 1952 |
0, InvalidOid, |
| 1953 |
0, NULL, |
| 1954 |
1, newmembers); |
| 1955 |
} |
| 1956 |
|
| 1957 |
/* CCI after each change, in case there are duplicates in list */ |
| 1958 |
CommandCounterIncrement(); |
| 1959 |
} |
| 1960 |
|
| 1961 |
/* |
| 1962 |
* Close pg_authmem, but keep lock till commit. |
| 1963 |
*/ |
| 1964 |
table_close(pg_authmem_rel, NoLock); |
| 1965 |
} |
| 1966 |
|
| 1967 |
/* |
| 1968 |
* DelRoleMems -- Remove given members from the specified role |
| 1969 |
* |
| 1970 |
* rolename: name of role to del from (used only for error messages) |
| 1971 |
* roleid: OID of role to del from |
| 1972 |
* memberSpecs: list of RoleSpec of roles to del (used only for error messages) |
| 1973 |
* memberIds: OIDs of roles to del |
| 1974 |
* grantorId: who is revoking the membership |
| 1975 |
* popt: information about grant options |
| 1976 |
* behavior: RESTRICT or CASCADE behavior for recursive removal |
| 1977 |
*/ |
| 1978 |
static void |
| 1979 |
DelRoleMems(Oid currentUserId, const char *rolename, Oid roleid, |
| 1980 |
List *memberSpecs, List *memberIds, |
| 1981 |
Oid grantorId, GrantRoleOptions *popt, DropBehavior behavior) |
| 1982 |
{ |
| 1983 |
Relation pg_authmem_rel; |
| 1984 |
TupleDesc pg_authmem_dsc; |
| 1985 |
ListCell *specitem; |
| 1986 |
ListCell *iditem; |
| 1987 |
CatCList *memlist; |
| 1988 |
RevokeRoleGrantAction *actions; |
| 1989 |
int i; |
| 1990 |
|
| 1991 |
Assert(list_length(memberSpecs) == list_length(memberIds)); |
| 1992 |
|
| 1993 |
/* Validate grantor (and resolve implicit grantor if not specified). */ |
| 1994 |
grantorId = check_role_grantor(currentUserId, roleid, grantorId, false); |
| 1995 |
|
| 1996 |
pg_authmem_rel = table_open(AuthMemRelationId, RowExclusiveLock); |
| 1997 |
pg_authmem_dsc = RelationGetDescr(pg_authmem_rel); |
| 1998 |
|
| 1999 |
/* |
| 2000 |
* Only allow changes to this role by one backend at a time, so that we |
| 2001 |
* can check for things like dependent privileges without fear of race |
| 2002 |
* conditions. |
| 2003 |
*/ |
| 2004 |
LockSharedObject(AuthIdRelationId, roleid, 0, |
| 2005 |
ShareUpdateExclusiveLock); |
| 2006 |
|
| 2007 |
memlist = SearchSysCacheList1(AUTHMEMROLEMEM, ObjectIdGetDatum(roleid)); |
| 2008 |
actions = initialize_revoke_actions(memlist); |
| 2009 |
|
| 2010 |
/* |
| 2011 |
* We may need to recurse to dependent privileges if DROP_CASCADE was |
| 2012 |
* specified, or refuse to perform the operation if dependent privileges |
| 2013 |
* exist and DROP_RESTRICT was specified. plan_single_revoke() will figure |
| 2014 |
* out what to do with each catalog tuple. |
| 2015 |
*/ |
| 2016 |
forboth(specitem, memberSpecs, iditem, memberIds) |
| 2017 |
{ |
| 2018 |
RoleSpec *memberRole = lfirst(specitem); |
| 2019 |
Oid memberid = lfirst_oid(iditem); |
| 2020 |
|
| 2021 |
if (!plan_single_revoke(memlist, actions, memberid, grantorId, |
| 2022 |
popt, behavior)) |
| 2023 |
{ |
| 2024 |
ereport(WARNING, |
| 2025 |
(errmsg("role \"%s\" has not been granted membership in role \"%s\" by role \"%s\"", |
| 2026 |
get_rolespec_name(memberRole), rolename, |
| 2027 |
GetUserNameFromId(grantorId, false)))); |
| 2028 |
continue; |
| 2029 |
} |
| 2030 |
} |
| 2031 |
|
| 2032 |
/* |
| 2033 |
* We now know what to do with each catalog tuple: it should either be |
| 2034 |
* left alone, deleted, or just have the admin_option flag cleared. |
| 2035 |
* Perform the appropriate action in each case. |
| 2036 |
*/ |
| 2037 |
for (i = 0; i < memlist->n_members; ++i) |
| 2038 |
{ |
| 2039 |
HeapTuple authmem_tuple; |
| 2040 |
Form_pg_auth_members authmem_form; |
| 2041 |
|
| 2042 |
if (actions[i] == RRG_NOOP) |
| 2043 |
continue; |
| 2044 |
|
| 2045 |
authmem_tuple = &memlist->members[i]->tuple; |
| 2046 |
authmem_form = (Form_pg_auth_members) GETSTRUCT(authmem_tuple); |
| 2047 |
|
| 2048 |
if (actions[i] == RRG_DELETE_GRANT) |
| 2049 |
{ |
| 2050 |
/* |
| 2051 |
* Remove the entry altogether, after first removing its |
| 2052 |
* dependencies |
| 2053 |
*/ |
| 2054 |
deleteSharedDependencyRecordsFor(AuthMemRelationId, |
| 2055 |
authmem_form->oid, 0); |
| 2056 |
CatalogTupleDelete(pg_authmem_rel, &authmem_tuple->t_self); |
| 2057 |
} |
| 2058 |
else |
| 2059 |
{ |
| 2060 |
/* Just turn off the specified option */ |
| 2061 |
HeapTuple tuple; |
| 2062 |
Datum new_record[Natts_pg_auth_members] = {0}; |
| 2063 |
bool new_record_nulls[Natts_pg_auth_members] = {0}; |
| 2064 |
bool new_record_repl[Natts_pg_auth_members] = {0}; |
| 2065 |
|
| 2066 |
/* Build a tuple to update with */ |
| 2067 |
if (actions[i] == RRG_REMOVE_ADMIN_OPTION) |
| 2068 |
{ |
| 2069 |
new_record[Anum_pg_auth_members_admin_option - 1] = |
| 2070 |
BoolGetDatum(false); |
| 2071 |
new_record_repl[Anum_pg_auth_members_admin_option - 1] = |
| 2072 |
true; |
| 2073 |
} |
| 2074 |
else if (actions[i] == RRG_REMOVE_INHERIT_OPTION) |
| 2075 |
{ |
| 2076 |
new_record[Anum_pg_auth_members_inherit_option - 1] = |
| 2077 |
BoolGetDatum(false); |
| 2078 |
new_record_repl[Anum_pg_auth_members_inherit_option - 1] = |
| 2079 |
true; |
| 2080 |
} |
| 2081 |
else if (actions[i] == RRG_REMOVE_SET_OPTION) |
| 2082 |
{ |
| 2083 |
new_record[Anum_pg_auth_members_set_option - 1] = |
| 2084 |
BoolGetDatum(false); |
| 2085 |
new_record_repl[Anum_pg_auth_members_set_option - 1] = |
| 2086 |
true; |
| 2087 |
} |
| 2088 |
else |
| 2089 |
elog(ERROR, "unknown role revoke action"); |
| 2090 |
|
| 2091 |
tuple = heap_modify_tuple(authmem_tuple, pg_authmem_dsc, |
| 2092 |
new_record, |
| 2093 |
new_record_nulls, new_record_repl); |
| 2094 |
CatalogTupleUpdate(pg_authmem_rel, &tuple->t_self, tuple); |
| 2095 |
} |
| 2096 |
} |
| 2097 |
|
| 2098 |
ReleaseSysCacheList(memlist); |
| 2099 |
|
| 2100 |
/* |
| 2101 |
* Close pg_authmem, but keep lock till commit. |
| 2102 |
*/ |
| 2103 |
table_close(pg_authmem_rel, NoLock); |
| 2104 |
} |
| 2105 |
|
| 2106 |
/* |
| 2107 |
* Check that currentUserId has permission to modify the membership list for |
| 2108 |
* roleid. Throw an error if not. |
| 2109 |
*/ |
| 2110 |
static void |
| 2111 |
check_role_membership_authorization(Oid currentUserId, Oid roleid, |
| 2112 |
bool is_grant) |
| 2113 |
{ |
| 2114 |
/* |
| 2115 |
* The charter of pg_database_owner is to have exactly one, implicit, |
| 2116 |
* situation-dependent member. There's no technical need for this |
| 2117 |
* restriction. (One could lift it and take the further step of making |
| 2118 |
* object_ownercheck(DatabaseRelationId, ...) equivalent to |
| 2119 |
* has_privs_of_role(roleid, ROLE_PG_DATABASE_OWNER), in which case |
| 2120 |
* explicit, situation-independent members could act as the owner of any |
| 2121 |
* database.) |
| 2122 |
*/ |
| 2123 |
if (is_grant && roleid == ROLE_PG_DATABASE_OWNER) |
| 2124 |
ereport(ERROR, |
| 2125 |
errcode(ERRCODE_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED), |
| 2126 |
errmsg("role \"%s\" cannot have explicit members", |
| 2127 |
GetUserNameFromId(roleid, false))); |
| 2128 |
|
| 2129 |
/* To mess with a superuser role, you gotta be superuser. */ |
| 2130 |
if (superuser_arg(roleid)) |
| 2131 |
{ |
| 2132 |
if (!superuser_arg(currentUserId)) |
| 2133 |
{ |
| 2134 |
if (is_grant) |
| 2135 |
ereport(ERROR, |
| 2136 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE), |
| 2137 |
errmsg("permission denied to grant role \"%s\"", |
| 2138 |
GetUserNameFromId(roleid, false)), |
| 2139 |
errdetail("Only roles with the %s attribute may grant roles with the %s attribute.", |
| 2140 |
"SUPERUSER", "SUPERUSER"))); |
| 2141 |
else |
| 2142 |
ereport(ERROR, |
| 2143 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE), |
| 2144 |
errmsg("permission denied to revoke role \"%s\"", |
| 2145 |
GetUserNameFromId(roleid, false)), |
| 2146 |
errdetail("Only roles with the %s attribute may revoke roles with the %s attribute.", |
| 2147 |
"SUPERUSER", "SUPERUSER"))); |
| 2148 |
} |
| 2149 |
} |
| 2150 |
else |
| 2151 |
{ |
| 2152 |
/* |
| 2153 |
* Otherwise, must have admin option on the role to be changed. |
| 2154 |
*/ |
| 2155 |
if (!is_admin_of_role(currentUserId, roleid)) |
| 2156 |
{ |
| 2157 |
if (is_grant) |
| 2158 |
ereport(ERROR, |
| 2159 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE), |
| 2160 |
errmsg("permission denied to grant role \"%s\"", |
| 2161 |
GetUserNameFromId(roleid, false)), |
| 2162 |
errdetail("Only roles with the %s option on role \"%s\" may grant this role.", |
| 2163 |
"ADMIN", GetUserNameFromId(roleid, false)))); |
| 2164 |
else |
| 2165 |
ereport(ERROR, |
| 2166 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE), |
| 2167 |
errmsg("permission denied to revoke role \"%s\"", |
| 2168 |
GetUserNameFromId(roleid, false)), |
| 2169 |
errdetail("Only roles with the %s option on role \"%s\" may revoke this role.", |
| 2170 |
"ADMIN", GetUserNameFromId(roleid, false)))); |
| 2171 |
} |
| 2172 |
} |
| 2173 |
} |
| 2174 |
|
| 2175 |
/* |
| 2176 |
* Sanity-check, or infer, the grantor for a GRANT or REVOKE statement |
| 2177 |
* targeting a role. |
| 2178 |
* |
| 2179 |
* The grantor must always be either a role with ADMIN OPTION on the role in |
| 2180 |
* which membership is being granted, or the bootstrap superuser. This is |
| 2181 |
* similar to the restriction enforced by select_best_grantor, except that |
| 2182 |
* roles don't have owners, so we regard the bootstrap superuser as the |
| 2183 |
* implicit owner. |
| 2184 |
* |
| 2185 |
* If the grantor was not explicitly specified by the user, grantorId should |
| 2186 |
* be passed as InvalidOid, and this function will infer the user to be |
| 2187 |
* recorded as the grantor. In many cases, this will be the current user, but |
| 2188 |
* things get more complicated when the current user doesn't possess ADMIN |
| 2189 |
* OPTION on the role but rather relies on having SUPERUSER privileges, or |
| 2190 |
* on inheriting the privileges of a role which does have ADMIN OPTION. See |
| 2191 |
* below for details. |
| 2192 |
* |
| 2193 |
* If the grantor was specified by the user, then it must be a user that |
| 2194 |
* can legally be recorded as the grantor, as per the rule stated above. |
| 2195 |
* This is an integrity constraint, not a permissions check, and thus even |
| 2196 |
* superusers are subject to this restriction. However, there is also a |
| 2197 |
* permissions check: to specify a role as the grantor, the current user |
| 2198 |
* must possess the privileges of that role. Superusers will always pass |
| 2199 |
* this check, but for non-superusers it may lead to an error. |
| 2200 |
* |
| 2201 |
* The return value is the OID to be regarded as the grantor when executing |
| 2202 |
* the operation. |
| 2203 |
*/ |
| 2204 |
static Oid |
| 2205 |
check_role_grantor(Oid currentUserId, Oid roleid, Oid grantorId, bool is_grant) |
| 2206 |
{ |
| 2207 |
/* If the grantor ID was not specified, pick one to use. */ |
| 2208 |
if (!OidIsValid(grantorId)) |
| 2209 |
{ |
| 2210 |
/* |
| 2211 |
* Grants where the grantor is recorded as the bootstrap superuser do |
| 2212 |
* not depend on any other existing grants, so always default to this |
| 2213 |
* interpretation when possible. |
| 2214 |
*/ |
| 2215 |
if (superuser_arg(currentUserId)) |
| 2216 |
return BOOTSTRAP_SUPERUSERID; |
| 2217 |
|
| 2218 |
/* |
| 2219 |
* Otherwise, the grantor must either have ADMIN OPTION on the role or |
| 2220 |
* inherit the privileges of a role which does. In the former case, |
| 2221 |
* record the grantor as the current user; in the latter, pick one of |
| 2222 |
* the roles that is "most directly" inherited by the current role |
| 2223 |
* (i.e. fewest "hops"). |
| 2224 |
* |
| 2225 |
* (We shouldn't fail to find a best grantor, because we've already |
| 2226 |
* established that the current user has permission to perform the |
| 2227 |
* operation.) |
| 2228 |
*/ |
| 2229 |
grantorId = select_best_admin(currentUserId, roleid); |
| 2230 |
if (!OidIsValid(grantorId)) |
| 2231 |
elog(ERROR, "no possible grantors"); |
| 2232 |
return grantorId; |
| 2233 |
} |
| 2234 |
|
| 2235 |
/* |
| 2236 |
* If an explicit grantor is specified, it must be a role whose privileges |
| 2237 |
* the current user possesses. |
| 2238 |
* |
| 2239 |
* It should also be a role that has ADMIN OPTION on the target role, but |
| 2240 |
* we check this condition only in case of GRANT. For REVOKE, no matching |
| 2241 |
* grant should exist anyway, but if it somehow does, let the user get rid |
| 2242 |
* of it. |
| 2243 |
*/ |
| 2244 |
if (is_grant) |
| 2245 |
{ |
| 2246 |
if (!has_privs_of_role(currentUserId, grantorId)) |
| 2247 |
ereport(ERROR, |
| 2248 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE), |
| 2249 |
errmsg("permission denied to grant privileges as role \"%s\"", |
| 2250 |
GetUserNameFromId(grantorId, false)), |
| 2251 |
errdetail("Only roles with privileges of role \"%s\" may grant privileges as this role.", |
| 2252 |
GetUserNameFromId(grantorId, false)))); |
| 2253 |
|
| 2254 |
if (grantorId != BOOTSTRAP_SUPERUSERID && |
| 2255 |
select_best_admin(grantorId, roleid) != grantorId) |
| 2256 |
ereport(ERROR, |
| 2257 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE), |
| 2258 |
errmsg("permission denied to grant privileges as role \"%s\"", |
| 2259 |
GetUserNameFromId(grantorId, false)), |
| 2260 |
errdetail("The grantor must have the %s option on role \"%s\".", |
| 2261 |
"ADMIN", GetUserNameFromId(roleid, false)))); |
| 2262 |
} |
| 2263 |
else |
| 2264 |
{ |
| 2265 |
if (!has_privs_of_role(currentUserId, grantorId)) |
| 2266 |
ereport(ERROR, |
| 2267 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE), |
| 2268 |
errmsg("permission denied to revoke privileges granted by role \"%s\"", |
| 2269 |
GetUserNameFromId(grantorId, false)), |
| 2270 |
errdetail("Only roles with privileges of role \"%s\" may revoke privileges granted by this role.", |
| 2271 |
GetUserNameFromId(grantorId, false)))); |
| 2272 |
} |
| 2273 |
|
| 2274 |
/* |
| 2275 |
* If a grantor was specified explicitly, always attribute the grant to |
| 2276 |
* that role (unless we error out above). |
| 2277 |
*/ |
| 2278 |
return grantorId; |
| 2279 |
} |
| 2280 |
|
| 2281 |
/* |
| 2282 |
* Initialize an array of RevokeRoleGrantAction objects. |
| 2283 |
* |
| 2284 |
* 'memlist' should be a list of all grants for the target role. |
| 2285 |
* |
| 2286 |
* This constructs an array indicating that no actions are to be performed; |
| 2287 |
* that is, every element is initially RRG_NOOP. |
| 2288 |
*/ |
| 2289 |
static RevokeRoleGrantAction * |
| 2290 |
initialize_revoke_actions(CatCList *memlist) |
| 2291 |
{ |
| 2292 |
RevokeRoleGrantAction *result; |
| 2293 |
int i; |
| 2294 |
|
| 2295 |
if (memlist->n_members == 0) |
| 2296 |
return NULL; |
| 2297 |
|
| 2298 |
result = palloc(sizeof(RevokeRoleGrantAction) * memlist->n_members); |
| 2299 |
for (i = 0; i < memlist->n_members; i++) |
| 2300 |
result[i] = RRG_NOOP; |
| 2301 |
return result; |
| 2302 |
} |
| 2303 |
|
| 2304 |
/* |
| 2305 |
* Figure out what we would need to do in order to revoke a grant, or just the |
| 2306 |
* admin option on a grant, given that there might be dependent privileges. |
| 2307 |
* |
| 2308 |
* 'memlist' should be a list of all grants for the target role. |
| 2309 |
* |
| 2310 |
* Whatever actions prove to be necessary will be signalled by updating |
| 2311 |
* 'actions'. |
| 2312 |
* |
| 2313 |
* If behavior is DROP_RESTRICT, an error will occur if there are dependent |
| 2314 |
* role membership grants; if DROP_CASCADE, those grants will be scheduled |
| 2315 |
* for deletion. |
| 2316 |
* |
| 2317 |
* The return value is true if the matching grant was found in the list, |
| 2318 |
* and false if not. |
| 2319 |
*/ |
| 2320 |
static bool |
| 2321 |
plan_single_revoke(CatCList *memlist, RevokeRoleGrantAction *actions, |
| 2322 |
Oid member, Oid grantor, GrantRoleOptions *popt, |
| 2323 |
DropBehavior behavior) |
| 2324 |
{ |
| 2325 |
int i; |
| 2326 |
|
| 2327 |
/* |
| 2328 |
* If popt.specified == 0, we're revoking the grant entirely; otherwise, |
| 2329 |
* we expect just one bit to be set, and we're revoking the corresponding |
| 2330 |
* option. As of this writing, there's no syntax that would allow for an |
| 2331 |
* attempt to revoke multiple options at once, and the logic below |
| 2332 |
* wouldn't work properly if such syntax were added, so assert that our |
| 2333 |
* caller isn't trying to do that. |
| 2334 |
*/ |
| 2335 |
Assert(pg_popcount32(popt->specified) <= 1); |
| 2336 |
|
| 2337 |
for (i = 0; i < memlist->n_members; ++i) |
| 2338 |
{ |
| 2339 |
HeapTuple authmem_tuple; |
| 2340 |
Form_pg_auth_members authmem_form; |
| 2341 |
|
| 2342 |
authmem_tuple = &memlist->members[i]->tuple; |
| 2343 |
authmem_form = (Form_pg_auth_members) GETSTRUCT(authmem_tuple); |
| 2344 |
|
| 2345 |
if (authmem_form->member == member && |
| 2346 |
authmem_form->grantor == grantor) |
| 2347 |
{ |
| 2348 |
if ((popt->specified & GRANT_ROLE_SPECIFIED_INHERIT) != 0) |
| 2349 |
{ |
| 2350 |
/* |
| 2351 |
* Revoking the INHERIT option doesn't change anything for |
| 2352 |
* dependent privileges, so we don't need to recurse. |
| 2353 |
*/ |
| 2354 |
actions[i] = RRG_REMOVE_INHERIT_OPTION; |
| 2355 |
} |
| 2356 |
else if ((popt->specified & GRANT_ROLE_SPECIFIED_SET) != 0) |
| 2357 |
{ |
| 2358 |
/* Here too, no need to recurse. */ |
| 2359 |
actions[i] = RRG_REMOVE_SET_OPTION; |
| 2360 |
} |
| 2361 |
else |
| 2362 |
{ |
| 2363 |
bool revoke_admin_option_only; |
| 2364 |
|
| 2365 |
/* |
| 2366 |
* Revoking the grant entirely, or ADMIN option on a grant, |
| 2367 |
* implicates dependent privileges, so we may need to recurse. |
| 2368 |
*/ |
| 2369 |
revoke_admin_option_only = |
| 2370 |
(popt->specified & GRANT_ROLE_SPECIFIED_ADMIN) != 0; |
| 2371 |
plan_recursive_revoke(memlist, actions, i, |
| 2372 |
revoke_admin_option_only, behavior); |
| 2373 |
} |
| 2374 |
return true; |
| 2375 |
} |
| 2376 |
} |
| 2377 |
|
| 2378 |
return false; |
| 2379 |
} |
| 2380 |
|
| 2381 |
/* |
| 2382 |
* Figure out what we would need to do in order to revoke all grants to |
| 2383 |
* a given member, given that there might be dependent privileges. |
| 2384 |
* |
| 2385 |
* 'memlist' should be a list of all grants for the target role. |
| 2386 |
* |
| 2387 |
* Whatever actions prove to be necessary will be signalled by updating |
| 2388 |
* 'actions'. |
| 2389 |
*/ |
| 2390 |
static void |
| 2391 |
plan_member_revoke(CatCList *memlist, RevokeRoleGrantAction *actions, |
| 2392 |
Oid member) |
| 2393 |
{ |
| 2394 |
int i; |
| 2395 |
|
| 2396 |
for (i = 0; i < memlist->n_members; ++i) |
| 2397 |
{ |
| 2398 |
HeapTuple authmem_tuple; |
| 2399 |
Form_pg_auth_members authmem_form; |
| 2400 |
|
| 2401 |
authmem_tuple = &memlist->members[i]->tuple; |
| 2402 |
authmem_form = (Form_pg_auth_members) GETSTRUCT(authmem_tuple); |
| 2403 |
|
| 2404 |
if (authmem_form->member == member) |
| 2405 |
plan_recursive_revoke(memlist, actions, i, false, DROP_CASCADE); |
| 2406 |
} |
| 2407 |
} |
| 2408 |
|
| 2409 |
/* |
| 2410 |
* Workhorse for figuring out recursive revocation of role grants. |
| 2411 |
* |
| 2412 |
* This is similar to what recursive_revoke() does for ACLs. |
| 2413 |
*/ |
| 2414 |
static void |
| 2415 |
plan_recursive_revoke(CatCList *memlist, RevokeRoleGrantAction *actions, |
| 2416 |
int index, |
| 2417 |
bool revoke_admin_option_only, DropBehavior behavior) |
| 2418 |
{ |
| 2419 |
bool would_still_have_admin_option = false; |
| 2420 |
HeapTuple authmem_tuple; |
| 2421 |
Form_pg_auth_members authmem_form; |
| 2422 |
int i; |
| 2423 |
|
| 2424 |
/* If it's already been done, we can just return. */ |
| 2425 |
if (actions[index] == RRG_DELETE_GRANT) |
| 2426 |
return; |
| 2427 |
if (actions[index] == RRG_REMOVE_ADMIN_OPTION && |
| 2428 |
revoke_admin_option_only) |
| 2429 |
return; |
| 2430 |
|
| 2431 |
/* Locate tuple data. */ |
| 2432 |
authmem_tuple = &memlist->members[index]->tuple; |
| 2433 |
authmem_form = (Form_pg_auth_members) GETSTRUCT(authmem_tuple); |
| 2434 |
|
| 2435 |
/* |
| 2436 |
* If the existing tuple does not have admin_option set, then we do not |
| 2437 |
* need to recurse. If we're just supposed to clear that bit we don't need |
| 2438 |
* to do anything at all; if we're supposed to remove the grant, we need |
| 2439 |
* to do something, but only to the tuple, and not any others. |
| 2440 |
*/ |
| 2441 |
if (!revoke_admin_option_only) |
| 2442 |
{ |
| 2443 |
actions[index] = RRG_DELETE_GRANT; |
| 2444 |
if (!authmem_form->admin_option) |
| 2445 |
return; |
| 2446 |
} |
| 2447 |
else |
| 2448 |
{ |
| 2449 |
if (!authmem_form->admin_option) |
| 2450 |
return; |
| 2451 |
actions[index] = RRG_REMOVE_ADMIN_OPTION; |
| 2452 |
} |
| 2453 |
|
| 2454 |
/* Determine whether the member would still have ADMIN OPTION. */ |
| 2455 |
for (i = 0; i < memlist->n_members; ++i) |
| 2456 |
{ |
| 2457 |
HeapTuple am_cascade_tuple; |
| 2458 |
Form_pg_auth_members am_cascade_form; |
| 2459 |
|
| 2460 |
am_cascade_tuple = &memlist->members[i]->tuple; |
| 2461 |
am_cascade_form = (Form_pg_auth_members) GETSTRUCT(am_cascade_tuple); |
| 2462 |
|
| 2463 |
if (am_cascade_form->member == authmem_form->member && |
| 2464 |
am_cascade_form->admin_option && actions[i] == RRG_NOOP) |
| 2465 |
{ |
| 2466 |
would_still_have_admin_option = true; |
| 2467 |
break; |
| 2468 |
} |
| 2469 |
} |
| 2470 |
|
| 2471 |
/* If the member would still have ADMIN OPTION, we need not recurse. */ |
| 2472 |
if (would_still_have_admin_option) |
| 2473 |
return; |
| 2474 |
|
| 2475 |
/* |
| 2476 |
* Recurse to grants that are not yet slated for deletion which have this |
| 2477 |
* member as the grantor. |
| 2478 |
*/ |
| 2479 |
for (i = 0; i < memlist->n_members; ++i) |
| 2480 |
{ |
| 2481 |
HeapTuple am_cascade_tuple; |
| 2482 |
Form_pg_auth_members am_cascade_form; |
| 2483 |
|
| 2484 |
am_cascade_tuple = &memlist->members[i]->tuple; |
| 2485 |
am_cascade_form = (Form_pg_auth_members) GETSTRUCT(am_cascade_tuple); |
| 2486 |
|
| 2487 |
if (am_cascade_form->grantor == authmem_form->member && |
| 2488 |
actions[i] != RRG_DELETE_GRANT) |
| 2489 |
{ |
| 2490 |
if (behavior == DROP_RESTRICT) |
| 2491 |
ereport(ERROR, |
| 2492 |
(errcode(ERRCODE_DEPENDENT_OBJECTS_STILL_EXIST), |
| 2493 |
errmsg("dependent privileges exist"), |
| 2494 |
errhint("Use CASCADE to revoke them too."))); |
| 2495 |
|
| 2496 |
plan_recursive_revoke(memlist, actions, i, false, behavior); |
| 2497 |
} |
| 2498 |
} |
| 2499 |
} |
| 2500 |
|
| 2501 |
/* |
| 2502 |
* Initialize a GrantRoleOptions object with default values. |
| 2503 |
*/ |
| 2504 |
static void |
| 2505 |
InitGrantRoleOptions(GrantRoleOptions *popt) |
| 2506 |
{ |
| 2507 |
popt->specified = 0; |
| 2508 |
popt->admin = false; |
| 2509 |
popt->inherit = false; |
| 2510 |
popt->set = true; |
| 2511 |
} |
| 2512 |
|
| 2513 |
/* |
| 2514 |
* GUC check_hook for createrole_self_grant |
| 2515 |
*/ |
| 2516 |
bool |
| 2517 |
check_createrole_self_grant(char **newval, void **extra, GucSource source) |
| 2518 |
{ |
| 2519 |
char *rawstring; |
| 2520 |
List *elemlist; |
| 2521 |
ListCell *l; |
| 2522 |
unsigned options = 0; |
| 2523 |
unsigned *result; |
| 2524 |
|
| 2525 |
/* Need a modifiable copy of string */ |
| 2526 |
rawstring = pstrdup(*newval); |
| 2527 |
|
| 2528 |
if (!SplitIdentifierString(rawstring, ',', &elemlist)) |
| 2529 |
{ |
| 2530 |
/* syntax error in list */ |
| 2531 |
GUC_check_errdetail("List syntax is invalid."); |
| 2532 |
pfree(rawstring); |
| 2533 |
list_free(elemlist); |
| 2534 |
return false; |
| 2535 |
} |
| 2536 |
|
| 2537 |
foreach(l, elemlist) |
| 2538 |
{ |
| 2539 |
char *tok = (char *) lfirst(l); |
| 2540 |
|
| 2541 |
if (pg_strcasecmp(tok, "SET") == 0) |
| 2542 |
options |= GRANT_ROLE_SPECIFIED_SET; |
| 2543 |
else if (pg_strcasecmp(tok, "INHERIT") == 0) |
| 2544 |
options |= GRANT_ROLE_SPECIFIED_INHERIT; |
| 2545 |
else |
| 2546 |
{ |
| 2547 |
GUC_check_errdetail("Unrecognized key word: \"%s\".", tok); |
| 2548 |
pfree(rawstring); |
| 2549 |
list_free(elemlist); |
| 2550 |
return false; |
| 2551 |
} |
| 2552 |
} |
| 2553 |
|
| 2554 |
pfree(rawstring); |
| 2555 |
list_free(elemlist); |
| 2556 |
|
| 2557 |
result = (unsigned *) guc_malloc(LOG, sizeof(unsigned)); |
| 2558 |
if (!result) |
| 2559 |
return false; |
| 2560 |
*result = options; |
| 2561 |
*extra = result; |
| 2562 |
|
| 2563 |
return true; |
| 2564 |
} |
| 2565 |
|
| 2566 |
/* |
| 2567 |
* GUC assign_hook for createrole_self_grant |
| 2568 |
*/ |
| 2569 |
void |
| 2570 |
assign_createrole_self_grant(const char *newval, void *extra) |
| 2571 |
{ |
| 2572 |
unsigned options = *(unsigned *) extra; |
| 2573 |
|
| 2574 |
createrole_self_grant_enabled = (options != 0); |
| 2575 |
createrole_self_grant_options.specified = GRANT_ROLE_SPECIFIED_ADMIN |
| 2576 |
| GRANT_ROLE_SPECIFIED_INHERIT |
| 2577 |
| GRANT_ROLE_SPECIFIED_SET; |
| 2578 |
createrole_self_grant_options.admin = false; |
| 2579 |
createrole_self_grant_options.inherit = |
| 2580 |
(options & GRANT_ROLE_SPECIFIED_INHERIT) != 0; |
| 2581 |
createrole_self_grant_options.set = |
| 2582 |
(options & GRANT_ROLE_SPECIFIED_SET) != 0; |
| 2583 |
} |