| 1 |
/* |
| 2 |
* Copyright (C) 2008 Red Hat, Inc. |
| 3 |
* |
| 4 |
* This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or |
| 5 |
* modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public |
| 6 |
* License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either |
| 7 |
* version 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. |
| 8 |
* |
| 9 |
* This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, |
| 10 |
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of |
| 11 |
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU |
| 12 |
* Lesser General Public License for more details. |
| 13 |
* |
| 14 |
* You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General |
| 15 |
* Public License along with this library; if not, write to the |
| 16 |
* Free Software Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, |
| 17 |
* Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA. |
| 18 |
* |
| 19 |
* Author: David Zeuthen <[email protected]> |
| 20 |
*/ |
| 21 |
|
| 22 |
#include <string.h> |
| 23 |
#include <stdlib.h> |
| 24 |
#include <sys/types.h> |
| 25 |
#include <sys/stat.h> |
| 26 |
#include <unistd.h> |
| 27 |
#include <fcntl.h> |
| 28 |
#include <grp.h> |
| 29 |
#include <pwd.h> |
| 30 |
#include <errno.h> |
| 31 |
|
| 32 |
#ifdef __linux__ |
| 33 |
#include <sys/prctl.h> |
| 34 |
#endif |
| 35 |
|
| 36 |
#ifdef __FreeBSD__ |
| 37 |
#include <signal.h> |
| 38 |
#include <sys/procctl.h> |
| 39 |
#endif |
| 40 |
|
| 41 |
#include <glib/gi18n.h> |
| 42 |
#include <glib-unix.h> |
| 43 |
|
| 44 |
#ifdef POLKIT_AUTHFW_PAM |
| 45 |
#include <security/pam_appl.h> |
| 46 |
#endif /* POLKIT_AUTHFW_PAM */ |
| 47 |
|
| 48 |
#include <syslog.h> |
| 49 |
#include <stdarg.h> |
| 50 |
|
| 51 |
#include <polkit/polkit.h> |
| 52 |
#define POLKIT_AGENT_I_KNOW_API_IS_SUBJECT_TO_CHANGE |
| 53 |
#include <polkitagent/polkitagent.h> |
| 54 |
|
| 55 |
static gchar *original_user_name = NULL; |
| 56 |
static gchar *original_cwd; |
| 57 |
static gchar *command_line = NULL; |
| 58 |
static gchar *cmdline_short = NULL; |
| 59 |
static struct passwd *pw; |
| 60 |
|
| 61 |
#ifndef HAVE_CLEARENV |
| 62 |
extern char **environ; |
| 63 |
|
| 64 |
static int |
| 65 |
clearenv (void) |
| 66 |
{ |
| 67 |
if (environ != NULL) |
| 68 |
environ[0] = NULL; |
| 69 |
return 0; |
| 70 |
} |
| 71 |
#endif |
| 72 |
|
| 73 |
static void |
| 74 |
usage (int argc, char *argv[]) |
| 75 |
{ |
| 76 |
g_printerr ("pkexec --version |\n" |
| 77 |
" --help |\n" |
| 78 |
" --disable-internal-agent |\n" |
| 79 |
" [--keep-cwd] [--user username] [PROGRAM] [ARGUMENTS...]\n" |
| 80 |
"\n" |
| 81 |
"See the pkexec manual page for more details.\n" |
| 82 |
"\n" |
| 83 |
"Report bugs to: %s\n" |
| 84 |
"%s home page: <%s>\n", PACKAGE_BUGREPORT, PACKAGE_NAME, |
| 85 |
PACKAGE_URL); |
| 86 |
} |
| 87 |
|
| 88 |
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- */ |
| 89 |
|
| 90 |
G_GNUC_PRINTF(3, 4) |
| 91 |
static void |
| 92 |
log_message (gint level, |
| 93 |
gboolean print_to_stderr, |
| 94 |
const gchar *format, |
| 95 |
...) |
| 96 |
{ |
| 97 |
static gboolean is_log_open = FALSE; |
| 98 |
va_list var_args; |
| 99 |
gchar *s; |
| 100 |
const gchar *tty; |
| 101 |
|
| 102 |
if (!is_log_open) |
| 103 |
{ |
| 104 |
openlog ("pkexec", |
| 105 |
LOG_PID, |
| 106 |
LOG_AUTHPRIV); /* security/authorization messages (private) */ |
| 107 |
is_log_open = TRUE; |
| 108 |
} |
| 109 |
|
| 110 |
va_start (var_args, format); |
| 111 |
s = g_strdup_vprintf (format, var_args); |
| 112 |
va_end (var_args); |
| 113 |
|
| 114 |
tty = ttyname (0); |
| 115 |
if (tty == NULL) |
| 116 |
tty = "unknown"; |
| 117 |
|
| 118 |
/* first complain to syslog */ |
| 119 |
syslog (level, |
| 120 |
"%s: %s [USER=%s] [TTY=%s] [CWD=%s] [COMMAND=%s]", |
| 121 |
original_user_name, |
| 122 |
s, |
| 123 |
pw->pw_name, |
| 124 |
tty, |
| 125 |
original_cwd, |
| 126 |
command_line); |
| 127 |
|
| 128 |
/* and then on stderr */ |
| 129 |
if (print_to_stderr) |
| 130 |
g_printerr ("%s\n", s); |
| 131 |
|
| 132 |
g_free (s); |
| 133 |
} |
| 134 |
|
| 135 |
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- */ |
| 136 |
|
| 137 |
#ifdef POLKIT_AUTHFW_PAM |
| 138 |
static int |
| 139 |
pam_conversation_function (int n, |
| 140 |
const struct pam_message **msg, |
| 141 |
struct pam_response **resp, |
| 142 |
void *data) |
| 143 |
{ |
| 144 |
g_assert_not_reached (); |
| 145 |
return PAM_CONV_ERR; |
| 146 |
} |
| 147 |
|
| 148 |
/* A work around for: |
| 149 |
* https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=753882 |
| 150 |
*/ |
| 151 |
static gboolean |
| 152 |
xdg_runtime_dir_is_owned_by (const char *path, |
| 153 |
uid_t target_uid) |
| 154 |
{ |
| 155 |
struct stat stbuf; |
| 156 |
|
| 157 |
return stat (path, &stbuf) == 0 && |
| 158 |
stbuf.st_uid == target_uid; |
| 159 |
} |
| 160 |
|
| 161 |
static gboolean |
| 162 |
open_session (const gchar *user_to_auth, |
| 163 |
uid_t target_uid) |
| 164 |
{ |
| 165 |
gboolean ret; |
| 166 |
gint rc; |
| 167 |
pam_handle_t *pam_h; |
| 168 |
char **envlist; |
| 169 |
struct pam_conv conversation; |
| 170 |
|
| 171 |
ret = FALSE; |
| 172 |
|
| 173 |
pam_h = NULL; |
| 174 |
|
| 175 |
conversation.conv = pam_conversation_function; |
| 176 |
conversation.appdata_ptr = NULL; |
| 177 |
|
| 178 |
/* start the pam stack */ |
| 179 |
rc = pam_start ("polkit-1", |
| 180 |
user_to_auth, |
| 181 |
&conversation, |
| 182 |
&pam_h); |
| 183 |
if (rc != PAM_SUCCESS) |
| 184 |
{ |
| 185 |
g_printerr ("pam_start() failed: %s\n", pam_strerror (pam_h, rc)); |
| 186 |
goto out; |
| 187 |
} |
| 188 |
|
| 189 |
/* open a session */ |
| 190 |
rc = pam_open_session (pam_h, |
| 191 |
0); /* flags */ |
| 192 |
if (rc != PAM_SUCCESS) |
| 193 |
{ |
| 194 |
g_printerr ("pam_open_session() failed: %s\n", pam_strerror (pam_h, rc)); |
| 195 |
goto out; |
| 196 |
} |
| 197 |
|
| 198 |
ret = TRUE; |
| 199 |
|
| 200 |
envlist = pam_getenvlist (pam_h); |
| 201 |
if (envlist != NULL) |
| 202 |
{ |
| 203 |
guint n; |
| 204 |
for (n = 0; envlist[n]; n++) |
| 205 |
{ |
| 206 |
const char *envitem = envlist[n]; |
| 207 |
|
| 208 |
if (g_str_has_prefix (envitem, "XDG_RUNTIME_DIR=")) |
| 209 |
{ |
| 210 |
const char *eq = strchr (envitem, '='); |
| 211 |
g_assert (eq); |
| 212 |
if (!xdg_runtime_dir_is_owned_by (eq + 1, target_uid)) |
| 213 |
continue; |
| 214 |
} |
| 215 |
|
| 216 |
putenv (envlist[n]); |
| 217 |
} |
| 218 |
free (envlist); |
| 219 |
} |
| 220 |
|
| 221 |
out: |
| 222 |
if (pam_h != NULL) |
| 223 |
pam_end (pam_h, rc); |
| 224 |
return ret; |
| 225 |
} |
| 226 |
#endif /* POLKIT_AUTHFW_PAM */ |
| 227 |
|
| 228 |
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- */ |
| 229 |
|
| 230 |
static gboolean |
| 231 |
fdwalk_close_on_exec (guint fd_bottom) |
| 232 |
{ |
| 233 |
/* On Linux we might have a very high FD limit, instead of blindly iterating |
| 234 |
* try g_fdwalk_set_cloexec() first, then fallback to close_range() second, |
| 235 |
* and if that also is not available or doesn't work, look at /proc/self/fd/ |
| 236 |
* and iterate over the actual open FDs instead */ |
| 237 |
#if GLIB_CHECK_VERSION (2, 80, 0) |
| 238 |
/* This is newer than baseline so a warning is raised, but it's used with a |
| 239 |
* compile time check so it's ok */ |
| 240 |
#pragma GCC diagnostic push |
| 241 |
#pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wdeprecated-declarations" |
| 242 |
return g_fdwalk_set_cloexec (fd_bottom) == 0; |
| 243 |
#pragma GCC diagnostic pop |
| 244 |
#else |
| 245 |
/* TODO: drop these fallbacks once the glib baseline is at least 2.80.0 */ |
| 246 |
|
| 247 |
#if defined(CLOSE_RANGE_CLOEXEC) |
| 248 |
if (close_range (fd_bottom, G_MAXINT, CLOSE_RANGE_CLOEXEC) == 0) |
| 249 |
return TRUE; |
| 250 |
#endif |
| 251 |
|
| 252 |
#ifdef __linux__ |
| 253 |
GDir *dir; |
| 254 |
const gchar *file; |
| 255 |
GError *error; |
| 256 |
|
| 257 |
dir = g_dir_open ("/proc/self/fd/", 0, &error); |
| 258 |
if (dir != NULL) |
| 259 |
{ |
| 260 |
while ((file = g_dir_read_name (dir)) != NULL) |
| 261 |
{ |
| 262 |
gchar *endptr; |
| 263 |
guint64 fd; |
| 264 |
|
| 265 |
fd = g_ascii_strtoull (file, &endptr, 10); |
| 266 |
if (*endptr != '\0' || fd > G_MAXINT) |
| 267 |
{ |
| 268 |
g_printerr ("Invalid file descriptor, ignoring: %s\n", file); |
| 269 |
continue; |
| 270 |
} |
| 271 |
|
| 272 |
if (fd < fd_bottom) |
| 273 |
continue; |
| 274 |
|
| 275 |
if (fcntl (fd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) != 0 && errno != EBADF) |
| 276 |
{ |
| 277 |
g_dir_close (dir); |
| 278 |
return FALSE; |
| 279 |
} |
| 280 |
} |
| 281 |
|
| 282 |
g_dir_close (dir); |
| 283 |
return TRUE; |
| 284 |
} |
| 285 |
/* If we can't open procfs for any reason fallback to the old method */ |
| 286 |
#endif /* __linux__ */ |
| 287 |
|
| 288 |
gint max_fd = sysconf (_SC_OPEN_MAX); |
| 289 |
|
| 290 |
for (gint fd = fd_bottom; fd < max_fd; fd++) |
| 291 |
{ |
| 292 |
if (fcntl (fd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) != 0 && errno != EBADF) |
| 293 |
return FALSE; |
| 294 |
} |
| 295 |
|
| 296 |
return TRUE; |
| 297 |
#endif /* g_fdwalk_set_cloexec () */ |
| 298 |
} |
| 299 |
|
| 300 |
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- */ |
| 301 |
|
| 302 |
static gchar * |
| 303 |
find_action_for_path (PolkitAuthority *authority, |
| 304 |
const gchar *path, |
| 305 |
const gchar *argv1, |
| 306 |
gboolean *allow_gui) |
| 307 |
{ |
| 308 |
GList *l; |
| 309 |
GList *actions; |
| 310 |
gchar *action_id; |
| 311 |
GError *error; |
| 312 |
|
| 313 |
actions = NULL; |
| 314 |
action_id = NULL; |
| 315 |
error = NULL; |
| 316 |
*allow_gui = FALSE; |
| 317 |
|
| 318 |
actions = polkit_authority_enumerate_actions_sync (authority, |
| 319 |
NULL, |
| 320 |
&error); |
| 321 |
if (actions == NULL) |
| 322 |
{ |
| 323 |
g_warning ("Error enumerating actions: %s", error->message); |
| 324 |
g_error_free (error); |
| 325 |
goto out; |
| 326 |
} |
| 327 |
|
| 328 |
for (l = actions; l != NULL; l = l->next) |
| 329 |
{ |
| 330 |
PolkitActionDescription *action_desc = POLKIT_ACTION_DESCRIPTION (l->data); |
| 331 |
const gchar *argv1_for_action; |
| 332 |
const gchar *path_for_action; |
| 333 |
const gchar *allow_gui_annotation; |
| 334 |
|
| 335 |
path_for_action = polkit_action_description_get_annotation (action_desc, "org.freedesktop.policykit.exec.path"); |
| 336 |
if (path_for_action == NULL) |
| 337 |
continue; |
| 338 |
|
| 339 |
argv1_for_action = polkit_action_description_get_annotation (action_desc, "org.freedesktop.policykit.exec.argv1"); |
| 340 |
|
| 341 |
if (g_strcmp0 (path_for_action, path) == 0) |
| 342 |
{ |
| 343 |
/* check against org.freedesktop.policykit.exec.argv1 but only if set */ |
| 344 |
if (argv1_for_action != NULL) |
| 345 |
{ |
| 346 |
if (g_strcmp0 (argv1, argv1_for_action) != 0) |
| 347 |
continue; |
| 348 |
} |
| 349 |
|
| 350 |
action_id = g_strdup (polkit_action_description_get_action_id (action_desc)); |
| 351 |
|
| 352 |
allow_gui_annotation = polkit_action_description_get_annotation (action_desc, "org.freedesktop.policykit.exec.allow_gui"); |
| 353 |
|
| 354 |
if (allow_gui_annotation != NULL && strlen (allow_gui_annotation) > 0) |
| 355 |
*allow_gui = TRUE; |
| 356 |
|
| 357 |
goto out; |
| 358 |
} |
| 359 |
} |
| 360 |
|
| 361 |
out: |
| 362 |
g_list_foreach (actions, (GFunc) g_object_unref, NULL); |
| 363 |
g_list_free (actions); |
| 364 |
|
| 365 |
/* Fall back to org.freedesktop.policykit.exec */ |
| 366 |
|
| 367 |
if (action_id == NULL) |
| 368 |
action_id = g_strdup ("org.freedesktop.policykit.exec"); |
| 369 |
|
| 370 |
return action_id; |
| 371 |
} |
| 372 |
|
| 373 |
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- */ |
| 374 |
|
| 375 |
static gboolean |
| 376 |
is_valid_shell (const gchar *shell) |
| 377 |
{ |
| 378 |
gboolean ret; |
| 379 |
gchar *contents; |
| 380 |
gchar **shells; |
| 381 |
GError *error; |
| 382 |
guint n; |
| 383 |
|
| 384 |
ret = FALSE; |
| 385 |
|
| 386 |
contents = NULL; |
| 387 |
shells = NULL; |
| 388 |
|
| 389 |
error = NULL; |
| 390 |
if (!g_file_get_contents ("/etc/shells", |
| 391 |
&contents, |
| 392 |
NULL, /* gsize *length */ |
| 393 |
&error)) |
| 394 |
{ |
| 395 |
g_printerr ("Error getting contents of /etc/shells: %s\n", error->message); |
| 396 |
g_error_free (error); |
| 397 |
goto out; |
| 398 |
} |
| 399 |
|
| 400 |
shells = g_strsplit (contents, "\n", 0); |
| 401 |
for (n = 0; shells != NULL && shells[n] != NULL; n++) |
| 402 |
{ |
| 403 |
if (shells[n][0] == '/' && g_strcmp0 (shell, shells[n]) == 0) |
| 404 |
{ |
| 405 |
ret = TRUE; |
| 406 |
goto out; |
| 407 |
} |
| 408 |
} |
| 409 |
|
| 410 |
out: |
| 411 |
g_free (contents); |
| 412 |
g_strfreev (shells); |
| 413 |
return ret; |
| 414 |
} |
| 415 |
|
| 416 |
static gboolean |
| 417 |
validate_environment_variable (const gchar *key, |
| 418 |
const gchar *value) |
| 419 |
{ |
| 420 |
gboolean ret; |
| 421 |
|
| 422 |
/* Generally we bail if any environment variable value contains |
| 423 |
* |
| 424 |
* - '/' characters |
| 425 |
* - '%' characters |
| 426 |
* - '..' substrings |
| 427 |
*/ |
| 428 |
|
| 429 |
g_return_val_if_fail (key != NULL, FALSE); |
| 430 |
g_return_val_if_fail (value != NULL, FALSE); |
| 431 |
|
| 432 |
ret = FALSE; |
| 433 |
|
| 434 |
/* special case $SHELL */ |
| 435 |
if (g_strcmp0 (key, "SHELL") == 0) |
| 436 |
{ |
| 437 |
/* check if it's in /etc/shells */ |
| 438 |
if (!is_valid_shell (value)) |
| 439 |
{ |
| 440 |
log_message (LOG_CRIT, TRUE, |
| 441 |
"The value for the SHELL variable was not found in the /etc/shells file"); |
| 442 |
g_printerr ("\n" |
| 443 |
"This incident has been reported.\n"); |
| 444 |
goto out; |
| 445 |
} |
| 446 |
} |
| 447 |
else if ((g_strcmp0 (key, "XAUTHORITY") != 0 && strstr (value, "/") != NULL) || |
| 448 |
strstr (value, "%") != NULL || |
| 449 |
strstr (value, "..") != NULL) |
| 450 |
{ |
| 451 |
log_message (LOG_CRIT, TRUE, |
| 452 |
"The value for environment variable %s contains suspicious content", |
| 453 |
key); |
| 454 |
g_printerr ("\n" |
| 455 |
"This incident has been reported.\n"); |
| 456 |
goto out; |
| 457 |
} |
| 458 |
|
| 459 |
ret = TRUE; |
| 460 |
|
| 461 |
out: |
| 462 |
return ret; |
| 463 |
} |
| 464 |
|
| 465 |
|
| 466 |
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- */ |
| 467 |
|
| 468 |
int |
| 469 |
main (int argc, char *argv[]) |
| 470 |
{ |
| 471 |
guint n; |
| 472 |
guint ret; |
| 473 |
gint rc; |
| 474 |
gboolean opt_show_help; |
| 475 |
gboolean opt_show_version; |
| 476 |
gboolean opt_disable_internal_agent; |
| 477 |
gboolean opt_keep_cwd; |
| 478 |
PolkitAuthority *authority; |
| 479 |
PolkitAuthorizationResult *result; |
| 480 |
PolkitSubject *subject; |
| 481 |
PolkitDetails *details; |
| 482 |
GError *error; |
| 483 |
gchar *action_id; |
| 484 |
gboolean allow_gui; |
| 485 |
gchar **exec_argv; |
| 486 |
gchar *path_abs; |
| 487 |
gchar *path; |
| 488 |
struct passwd pwstruct; |
| 489 |
gchar pwbuf[8192]; |
| 490 |
gchar *s; |
| 491 |
const gchar *environment_variables_to_save[] = { |
| 492 |
"SHELL", |
| 493 |
"LANG", |
| 494 |
"LINGUAS", |
| 495 |
"LANGUAGE", |
| 496 |
"LC_COLLATE", |
| 497 |
"LC_CTYPE", |
| 498 |
"LC_MESSAGES", |
| 499 |
"LC_MONETARY", |
| 500 |
"LC_NUMERIC", |
| 501 |
"LC_TIME", |
| 502 |
"LC_ALL", |
| 503 |
"TERM", |
| 504 |
"COLORTERM", |
| 505 |
|
| 506 |
/* By default we don't allow running X11 apps, as it does not work in the |
| 507 |
* general case. See |
| 508 |
* |
| 509 |
* https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=17970#c26 |
| 510 |
* |
| 511 |
* and surrounding comments for a lot of discussion about this. |
| 512 |
* |
| 513 |
* However, it can be enabled for some selected and tested legacy programs |
| 514 |
* which previously used e. g. gksu, by setting the |
| 515 |
* org.freedesktop.policykit.exec.allow_gui annotation to a nonempty value. |
| 516 |
* See https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=38769 for details. |
| 517 |
*/ |
| 518 |
"DISPLAY", |
| 519 |
"XAUTHORITY", |
| 520 |
NULL |
| 521 |
}; |
| 522 |
GPtrArray *saved_env; |
| 523 |
gchar *opt_user; |
| 524 |
pid_t pid_of_caller; |
| 525 |
gpointer local_agent_handle; |
| 526 |
|
| 527 |
|
| 528 |
/* |
| 529 |
* If 'pkexec' is called THIS wrong, someone's probably evil-doing. Don't be nice, just bail out. |
| 530 |
*/ |
| 531 |
if (argc<1) |
| 532 |
{ |
| 533 |
exit(127); |
| 534 |
} |
| 535 |
|
| 536 |
ret = 127; |
| 537 |
authority = NULL; |
| 538 |
subject = NULL; |
| 539 |
details = NULL; |
| 540 |
result = NULL; |
| 541 |
action_id = NULL; |
| 542 |
saved_env = NULL; |
| 543 |
path_abs = NULL; |
| 544 |
path = NULL; |
| 545 |
exec_argv = NULL; |
| 546 |
command_line = NULL; |
| 547 |
cmdline_short = NULL; |
| 548 |
opt_user = NULL; |
| 549 |
local_agent_handle = NULL; |
| 550 |
|
| 551 |
/* Disable remote file access from GIO. */ |
| 552 |
setenv ("GIO_USE_VFS", "local", 1); |
| 553 |
|
| 554 |
/* First process options and find the command-line to invoke. Avoid using fancy library routines |
| 555 |
* that depend on environment variables since we haven't cleared the environment just yet. |
| 556 |
*/ |
| 557 |
opt_show_help = FALSE; |
| 558 |
opt_show_version = FALSE; |
| 559 |
opt_disable_internal_agent = FALSE; |
| 560 |
opt_keep_cwd = FALSE; |
| 561 |
for (n = 1; n < (guint) argc; n++) |
| 562 |
{ |
| 563 |
if (strcmp (argv[n], "--help") == 0) |
| 564 |
{ |
| 565 |
opt_show_help = TRUE; |
| 566 |
} |
| 567 |
else if (strcmp (argv[n], "--version") == 0) |
| 568 |
{ |
| 569 |
opt_show_version = TRUE; |
| 570 |
} |
| 571 |
else if (strcmp (argv[n], "--user") == 0 || strcmp (argv[n], "-u") == 0) |
| 572 |
{ |
| 573 |
n++; |
| 574 |
if (n >= (guint) argc) |
| 575 |
{ |
| 576 |
usage (argc, argv); |
| 577 |
goto out; |
| 578 |
} |
| 579 |
|
| 580 |
if (opt_user != NULL) |
| 581 |
{ |
| 582 |
g_printerr ("--user specified twice\n"); |
| 583 |
goto out; |
| 584 |
} |
| 585 |
opt_user = g_strdup (argv[n]); |
| 586 |
} |
| 587 |
else if (strcmp (argv[n], "--disable-internal-agent") == 0) |
| 588 |
{ |
| 589 |
opt_disable_internal_agent = TRUE; |
| 590 |
} |
| 591 |
else if (strcmp (argv[n], "--keep-cwd") == 0) |
| 592 |
{ |
| 593 |
opt_keep_cwd = TRUE; |
| 594 |
} |
| 595 |
else |
| 596 |
{ |
| 597 |
break; |
| 598 |
} |
| 599 |
} |
| 600 |
|
| 601 |
if (opt_show_help) |
| 602 |
{ |
| 603 |
usage (argc, argv); |
| 604 |
ret = 0; |
| 605 |
goto out; |
| 606 |
} |
| 607 |
else if (opt_show_version) |
| 608 |
{ |
| 609 |
g_print ("pkexec version %s\n", PACKAGE_VERSION); |
| 610 |
ret = 0; |
| 611 |
goto out; |
| 612 |
} |
| 613 |
|
| 614 |
/* check for correct invocation */ |
| 615 |
if (geteuid () != 0) |
| 616 |
{ |
| 617 |
g_printerr ("pkexec must be setuid root\n"); |
| 618 |
goto out; |
| 619 |
} |
| 620 |
|
| 621 |
original_user_name = g_strdup (g_get_user_name ()); |
| 622 |
if (original_user_name == NULL) |
| 623 |
{ |
| 624 |
g_printerr ("Error getting user name.\n"); |
| 625 |
goto out; |
| 626 |
} |
| 627 |
|
| 628 |
if ((original_cwd = g_get_current_dir ()) == NULL) |
| 629 |
{ |
| 630 |
g_printerr ("Error getting cwd: %s\n", |
| 631 |
g_strerror (errno)); |
| 632 |
goto out; |
| 633 |
} |
| 634 |
|
| 635 |
if (opt_user == NULL) |
| 636 |
opt_user = g_strdup ("root"); |
| 637 |
|
| 638 |
/* Look up information about the user we care about - yes, the return |
| 639 |
* value of this function is a bit funky |
| 640 |
*/ |
| 641 |
rc = getpwnam_r (opt_user, &pwstruct, pwbuf, sizeof pwbuf, &pw); |
| 642 |
if (rc == 0 && pw == NULL) |
| 643 |
{ |
| 644 |
g_printerr ("User `%s' does not exist.\n", opt_user); |
| 645 |
goto out; |
| 646 |
} |
| 647 |
else if (pw == NULL) |
| 648 |
{ |
| 649 |
g_printerr ("Error getting information for user `%s': %s\n", opt_user, g_strerror (rc)); |
| 650 |
goto out; |
| 651 |
} |
| 652 |
|
| 653 |
/* Now figure out the command-line to run - argv is guaranteed to be NULL-terminated, see |
| 654 |
* |
| 655 |
* http://lkml.indiana.edu/hypermail/linux/kernel/0409.2/0287.html |
| 656 |
* |
| 657 |
* but do check this is the case. |
| 658 |
* |
| 659 |
* We also try to locate the program in the path if a non-absolute path is given. |
| 660 |
* |
| 661 |
* And then we resolve the real path of the program. |
| 662 |
*/ |
| 663 |
g_assert (argv[argc] == NULL); |
| 664 |
path = g_strdup (argv[n]); |
| 665 |
if (path == NULL) |
| 666 |
{ |
| 667 |
GPtrArray *shell_argv; |
| 668 |
|
| 669 |
path = g_strdup (pwstruct.pw_shell); |
| 670 |
if (!path) |
| 671 |
{ |
| 672 |
g_printerr ("No shell configured or error retrieving pw_shell\n"); |
| 673 |
goto out; |
| 674 |
} |
| 675 |
/* If you change this, be sure to change the if (!command_line) |
| 676 |
case below too */ |
| 677 |
command_line = g_strdup (path); |
| 678 |
shell_argv = g_ptr_array_new (); |
| 679 |
g_ptr_array_add (shell_argv, path); |
| 680 |
g_ptr_array_add (shell_argv, NULL); |
| 681 |
exec_argv = (char**)g_ptr_array_free (shell_argv, FALSE); |
| 682 |
} |
| 683 |
if (path[0] != '/') |
| 684 |
{ |
| 685 |
/* g_find_program_in_path() is not susceptible to attacks via the environment */ |
| 686 |
s = g_find_program_in_path (path); |
| 687 |
if (s == NULL) |
| 688 |
{ |
| 689 |
g_printerr ("Cannot run program %s: %s\n", path, strerror (ENOENT)); |
| 690 |
goto out; |
| 691 |
} |
| 692 |
g_free (path); |
| 693 |
path = s; |
| 694 |
|
| 695 |
/* argc<2 and pkexec runs just shell, argv is guaranteed to be null-terminated. |
| 696 |
* /-less shell shouldn't happen, but let's be defensive and don't write to null-termination |
| 697 |
*/ |
| 698 |
if (argv[n] != NULL) |
| 699 |
{ |
| 700 |
/* Must copy because we might replace path later on. */ |
| 701 |
path_abs = g_strdup(path); |
| 702 |
/* argv[n:] is used as argv arguments to execv(). The called program |
| 703 |
* sees the original called path, but we make sure it's absolute. */ |
| 704 |
if (path_abs != NULL) |
| 705 |
argv[n] = path_abs; |
| 706 |
} |
| 707 |
} |
| 708 |
|
| 709 |
s = realpath(path, NULL); |
| 710 |
if (s != NULL) |
| 711 |
{ |
| 712 |
/* The called program resolved to the canonical location. We don't update |
| 713 |
* argv[n] this time. The called program still sees the original |
| 714 |
* called path. This is very important for multi-call binaries like |
| 715 |
* busybox. */ |
| 716 |
g_free (path); |
| 717 |
path = s; |
| 718 |
} |
| 719 |
if (access (path, F_OK) != 0) |
| 720 |
{ |
| 721 |
g_printerr ("Error accessing %s: %s\n", path, g_strerror (errno)); |
| 722 |
goto out; |
| 723 |
} |
| 724 |
|
| 725 |
if (!command_line) |
| 726 |
{ |
| 727 |
/* If you change this, be sure to change the path == NULL case |
| 728 |
above too */ |
| 729 |
command_line = g_strjoinv (" ", argv + n); |
| 730 |
exec_argv = argv + n; |
| 731 |
} |
| 732 |
|
| 733 |
/* now save the environment variables we care about */ |
| 734 |
saved_env = g_ptr_array_new (); |
| 735 |
for (n = 0; environment_variables_to_save[n] != NULL; n++) |
| 736 |
{ |
| 737 |
const gchar *key = environment_variables_to_save[n]; |
| 738 |
const gchar *value; |
| 739 |
|
| 740 |
value = g_getenv (key); |
| 741 |
if (value == NULL) |
| 742 |
continue; |
| 743 |
|
| 744 |
/* To qualify for the paranoia goldstar - we validate the value of each |
| 745 |
* environment variable passed through - this is to attempt to avoid |
| 746 |
* exploits in (potentially broken) programs launched via pkexec(1). |
| 747 |
*/ |
| 748 |
if (!validate_environment_variable (key, value)) |
| 749 |
goto out; |
| 750 |
|
| 751 |
g_ptr_array_add (saved_env, g_strdup (key)); |
| 752 |
g_ptr_array_add (saved_env, g_strdup (value)); |
| 753 |
} |
| 754 |
|
| 755 |
/* $XAUTHORITY is "special" - if unset, we need to set it to ~/.Xauthority. Yes, |
| 756 |
* this is broken but it's unfortunately how things work (see fdo #51623 for |
| 757 |
* details) |
| 758 |
*/ |
| 759 |
if (g_getenv ("XAUTHORITY") == NULL) |
| 760 |
{ |
| 761 |
const gchar *home; |
| 762 |
|
| 763 |
/* pre-2.36 GLib does not examine $HOME (it always looks in /etc/passwd) and |
| 764 |
* this is not what we want |
| 765 |
*/ |
| 766 |
home = g_getenv ("HOME"); |
| 767 |
if (home == NULL) |
| 768 |
home = g_get_home_dir (); |
| 769 |
|
| 770 |
if (home != NULL) |
| 771 |
{ |
| 772 |
g_ptr_array_add (saved_env, g_strdup ("XAUTHORITY")); |
| 773 |
g_ptr_array_add (saved_env, g_build_filename (home, ".Xauthority", NULL)); |
| 774 |
} |
| 775 |
} |
| 776 |
|
| 777 |
/* Nuke the environment to get a well-known and sanitized environment to avoid attacks |
| 778 |
* via e.g. the DBUS_SYSTEM_BUS_ADDRESS environment variable and similar. |
| 779 |
*/ |
| 780 |
if (clearenv () != 0) |
| 781 |
{ |
| 782 |
g_printerr ("Error clearing environment: %s\n", g_strerror (errno)); |
| 783 |
goto out; |
| 784 |
} |
| 785 |
|
| 786 |
/* make sure we are nuked if the parent process dies */ |
| 787 |
#if defined(__linux__) |
| 788 |
if (prctl (PR_SET_PDEATHSIG, SIGTERM) != 0) |
| 789 |
{ |
| 790 |
g_printerr ("prctl(PR_SET_PDEATHSIG, SIGTERM) failed: %s\n", g_strerror (errno)); |
| 791 |
goto out; |
| 792 |
} |
| 793 |
#elif defined(__FreeBSD__) |
| 794 |
int _sig = SIGTERM; |
| 795 |
if (procctl (P_PID, 0, PROC_PDEATHSIG_CTL, &_sig) != 0) |
| 796 |
{ |
| 797 |
g_printerr ("procctl(2) failed: %s\n", g_strerror (errno)); |
| 798 |
goto out; |
| 799 |
} |
| 800 |
#else |
| 801 |
#warning "Please add OS specific code to catch when the parent dies" |
| 802 |
#endif |
| 803 |
|
| 804 |
/* Figure out the parent process */ |
| 805 |
pid_of_caller = getppid (); |
| 806 |
if (pid_of_caller == 1) |
| 807 |
{ |
| 808 |
/* getppid() can return 1 if the parent died (meaning that we are reaped |
| 809 |
* by /sbin/init); In that case we simpy bail. |
| 810 |
*/ |
| 811 |
g_printerr ("Refusing to render service to dead parents.\n"); |
| 812 |
goto out; |
| 813 |
} |
| 814 |
|
| 815 |
/* This process we want to check an authorization for is the process |
| 816 |
* that launched us - our parent process. |
| 817 |
* |
| 818 |
* At the time the parent process fork()'ed and exec()'ed us, the |
| 819 |
* process had the same real-uid that we have now. So we use this |
| 820 |
* real-uid instead of of looking it up to avoid TOCTTOU issues |
| 821 |
* (consider the parent process exec()'ing a setuid helper). |
| 822 |
* |
| 823 |
* On the other hand, the monotonic process start-time is guaranteed |
| 824 |
* to never change so it's safe to look that up given only the PID |
| 825 |
* since we are guaranteed to be nuked if the parent goes away |
| 826 |
* (cf. the prctl(2) call above). |
| 827 |
*/ |
| 828 |
subject = polkit_unix_process_new_for_owner (pid_of_caller, |
| 829 |
0, /* 0 means "look up start-time in /proc" */ |
| 830 |
getuid ()); |
| 831 |
/* really double-check the invariants guaranteed by the PolkitUnixProcess class */ |
| 832 |
g_assert (subject != NULL); |
| 833 |
g_assert (polkit_unix_process_get_pid (POLKIT_UNIX_PROCESS (subject)) == pid_of_caller); |
| 834 |
g_assert (polkit_unix_process_get_uid (POLKIT_UNIX_PROCESS (subject)) >= 0); |
| 835 |
g_assert (polkit_unix_process_get_start_time (POLKIT_UNIX_PROCESS (subject)) > 0); |
| 836 |
|
| 837 |
error = NULL; |
| 838 |
authority = polkit_authority_get_sync (NULL /* GCancellable* */, &error); |
| 839 |
if (authority == NULL) |
| 840 |
{ |
| 841 |
g_printerr ("Error getting authority: %s\n", error->message); |
| 842 |
g_error_free (error); |
| 843 |
goto out; |
| 844 |
} |
| 845 |
|
| 846 |
g_assert (path != NULL); |
| 847 |
g_assert (exec_argv != NULL); |
| 848 |
action_id = find_action_for_path (authority, |
| 849 |
path, |
| 850 |
exec_argv[1], |
| 851 |
&allow_gui); |
| 852 |
g_assert (action_id != NULL); |
| 853 |
|
| 854 |
details = polkit_details_new (); |
| 855 |
polkit_details_insert (details, "user", pw->pw_name); |
| 856 |
if (pw->pw_gecos != NULL) |
| 857 |
polkit_details_insert (details, "user.gecos", pw->pw_gecos); |
| 858 |
if (pw->pw_gecos != NULL && strlen (pw->pw_gecos) > 0) |
| 859 |
s = g_strdup_printf ("%s (%s)", pw->pw_gecos, pw->pw_name); |
| 860 |
else |
| 861 |
s = g_strdup_printf ("%s", pw->pw_name); |
| 862 |
polkit_details_insert (details, "user.display", s); |
| 863 |
g_free (s); |
| 864 |
polkit_details_insert (details, "program", path); |
| 865 |
polkit_details_insert (details, "command_line", command_line); |
| 866 |
|
| 867 |
cmdline_short = g_strdup(command_line); |
| 868 |
if (cmdline_short == NULL) |
| 869 |
{ |
| 870 |
g_printerr ("Failed to allocate memory for shortened command line.\n"); |
| 871 |
goto out; |
| 872 |
} |
| 873 |
if (strlen(command_line) > 80) |
| 874 |
g_stpcpy(g_stpcpy( cmdline_short + 38, " ... " ), |
| 875 |
command_line + strlen(command_line) - 37 ); |
| 876 |
polkit_details_insert (details, "cmdline_short", cmdline_short); |
| 877 |
|
| 878 |
if (g_strcmp0 (action_id, "org.freedesktop.policykit.exec") == 0) |
| 879 |
{ |
| 880 |
if (pw->pw_uid == 0) |
| 881 |
{ |
| 882 |
polkit_details_insert (details, "polkit.message", |
| 883 |
/* Translators: message shown when trying to run a program as root. Do not |
| 884 |
* translate the $(program) fragment - it will be expanded to the path |
| 885 |
* of the program e.g. /bin/bash. |
| 886 |
*/ |
| 887 |
N_("Authentication is needed to run `$(cmdline_short)' as the super user")); |
| 888 |
} |
| 889 |
else |
| 890 |
{ |
| 891 |
polkit_details_insert (details, "polkit.message", |
| 892 |
/* Translators: message shown when trying to run a program as another user. |
| 893 |
* Do not translate the $(program) or $(user) fragments - the former will |
| 894 |
* be expanded to the path of the program e.g. "/bin/bash" and the latter |
| 895 |
* to the user e.g. "John Doe (johndoe)" or "johndoe". |
| 896 |
*/ |
| 897 |
N_("Authentication is needed to run `$(cmdline_short)' as user $(user.display)")); |
| 898 |
} |
| 899 |
} |
| 900 |
polkit_details_insert (details, "polkit.gettext_domain", GETTEXT_PACKAGE); |
| 901 |
|
| 902 |
try_again: |
| 903 |
error = NULL; |
| 904 |
result = polkit_authority_check_authorization_sync (authority, |
| 905 |
subject, |
| 906 |
action_id, |
| 907 |
details, |
| 908 |
POLKIT_CHECK_AUTHORIZATION_FLAGS_ALLOW_USER_INTERACTION, |
| 909 |
NULL, |
| 910 |
&error); |
| 911 |
if (result == NULL) |
| 912 |
{ |
| 913 |
g_printerr ("Error checking for authorization %s: %s\n", |
| 914 |
action_id, |
| 915 |
error ? error->message : "Could not verify; error object not present."); |
| 916 |
goto out; |
| 917 |
} |
| 918 |
|
| 919 |
if (polkit_authorization_result_get_is_authorized (result)) |
| 920 |
{ |
| 921 |
/* do nothing */ |
| 922 |
} |
| 923 |
else if (polkit_authorization_result_get_is_challenge (result)) |
| 924 |
{ |
| 925 |
if (local_agent_handle == NULL && !opt_disable_internal_agent) |
| 926 |
{ |
| 927 |
PolkitAgentListener *listener; |
| 928 |
error = NULL; |
| 929 |
/* this will fail if we can't find a controlling terminal */ |
| 930 |
listener = polkit_agent_text_listener_new (NULL, &error); |
| 931 |
if (listener == NULL) |
| 932 |
{ |
| 933 |
g_printerr ("Error creating textual authentication agent: %s\n", error->message); |
| 934 |
g_error_free (error); |
| 935 |
goto out; |
| 936 |
} |
| 937 |
local_agent_handle = polkit_agent_listener_register (listener, |
| 938 |
POLKIT_AGENT_REGISTER_FLAGS_RUN_IN_THREAD, |
| 939 |
subject, |
| 940 |
NULL, /* object_path */ |
| 941 |
NULL, /* GCancellable */ |
| 942 |
&error); |
| 943 |
g_object_unref (listener); |
| 944 |
if (local_agent_handle == NULL) |
| 945 |
{ |
| 946 |
g_printerr ("Error registering local authentication agent: %s\n", error->message); |
| 947 |
g_error_free (error); |
| 948 |
goto out; |
| 949 |
} |
| 950 |
g_object_unref (result); |
| 951 |
result = NULL; |
| 952 |
goto try_again; |
| 953 |
} |
| 954 |
else |
| 955 |
{ |
| 956 |
g_printerr ("Error executing command as another user: No authentication agent found.\n"); |
| 957 |
goto out; |
| 958 |
} |
| 959 |
} |
| 960 |
else |
| 961 |
{ |
| 962 |
if (polkit_authorization_result_get_dismissed (result)) |
| 963 |
{ |
| 964 |
log_message (LOG_WARNING, TRUE, |
| 965 |
"Error executing command as another user: Request dismissed"); |
| 966 |
ret = 126; |
| 967 |
} |
| 968 |
else |
| 969 |
{ |
| 970 |
log_message (LOG_WARNING, TRUE, |
| 971 |
"Error executing command as another user: Not authorized"); |
| 972 |
g_printerr ("\n" |
| 973 |
"This incident has been reported.\n"); |
| 974 |
} |
| 975 |
goto out; |
| 976 |
} |
| 977 |
|
| 978 |
/* Set PATH to a safe list */ |
| 979 |
g_ptr_array_add (saved_env, g_strdup ("PATH")); |
| 980 |
if (pw->pw_uid != 0) |
| 981 |
s = g_strdup_printf ("/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin:%s/bin", pw->pw_dir); |
| 982 |
else |
| 983 |
s = g_strdup_printf ("/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin:%s/bin", pw->pw_dir); |
| 984 |
g_ptr_array_add (saved_env, s); |
| 985 |
g_ptr_array_add (saved_env, g_strdup ("LOGNAME")); |
| 986 |
g_ptr_array_add (saved_env, g_strdup (pw->pw_name)); |
| 987 |
g_ptr_array_add (saved_env, g_strdup ("USER")); |
| 988 |
g_ptr_array_add (saved_env, g_strdup (pw->pw_name)); |
| 989 |
g_ptr_array_add (saved_env, g_strdup ("HOME")); |
| 990 |
g_ptr_array_add (saved_env, g_strdup (pw->pw_dir)); |
| 991 |
|
| 992 |
s = g_strdup_printf ("%d", getuid ()); |
| 993 |
g_ptr_array_add (saved_env, g_strdup ("PKEXEC_UID")); |
| 994 |
g_ptr_array_add (saved_env, g_strdup (s)); |
| 995 |
g_ptr_array_add (saved_env, g_strdup ("SUDO_UID")); /* compat with sudo */ |
| 996 |
g_ptr_array_add (saved_env, s); |
| 997 |
|
| 998 |
s = g_strdup_printf ("%d", getgid ()); |
| 999 |
g_ptr_array_add (saved_env, g_strdup ("SUDO_GID")); /* compat with sudo */ |
| 1000 |
g_ptr_array_add (saved_env, s); |
| 1001 |
|
| 1002 |
/* set the environment */ |
| 1003 |
for (n = 0; n < saved_env->len - 1; n += 2) |
| 1004 |
{ |
| 1005 |
const gchar *key = saved_env->pdata[n]; |
| 1006 |
const gchar *value = saved_env->pdata[n + 1]; |
| 1007 |
|
| 1008 |
/* Only set $DISPLAY and $XAUTHORITY when explicitly allowed in the .policy */ |
| 1009 |
if (!allow_gui && |
| 1010 |
(strcmp (key, "DISPLAY") == 0 || strcmp (key, "XAUTHORITY") == 0)) |
| 1011 |
continue; |
| 1012 |
|
| 1013 |
if (!g_setenv (key, value, TRUE)) |
| 1014 |
{ |
| 1015 |
g_printerr ("Error setting environment variable %s to '%s': %s\n", |
| 1016 |
key, |
| 1017 |
value, |
| 1018 |
g_strerror (errno)); |
| 1019 |
goto out; |
| 1020 |
} |
| 1021 |
} |
| 1022 |
|
| 1023 |
/* set close_on_exec on all file descriptors except stdin, stdout, stderr */ |
| 1024 |
if (!fdwalk_close_on_exec (3)) |
| 1025 |
{ |
| 1026 |
g_printerr ("Error setting close-on-exec for file descriptors\n"); |
| 1027 |
goto out; |
| 1028 |
} |
| 1029 |
|
| 1030 |
/* if not changing to uid 0, become uid 0 before changing to the user */ |
| 1031 |
if (pw->pw_uid != 0) |
| 1032 |
{ |
| 1033 |
(void) setreuid (0, 0); |
| 1034 |
if ((geteuid () != 0) || (getuid () != 0)) |
| 1035 |
{ |
| 1036 |
g_printerr ("Error becoming uid 0: %s\n", g_strerror (errno)); |
| 1037 |
goto out; |
| 1038 |
} |
| 1039 |
} |
| 1040 |
|
| 1041 |
/* open session - with PAM enabled, this runs the open_session() part of the PAM |
| 1042 |
* stack - this includes applying limits via pam_limits.so but also other things |
| 1043 |
* requested via the current PAM configuration. |
| 1044 |
* |
| 1045 |
* NOTE NOTE NOTE: pam_limits.so doesn't seem to clear existing limits - e.g. |
| 1046 |
* |
| 1047 |
* $ ulimit -t |
| 1048 |
* unlimited |
| 1049 |
* |
| 1050 |
* $ su - |
| 1051 |
* Password: |
| 1052 |
* # ulimit -t |
| 1053 |
* unlimited |
| 1054 |
* # logout |
| 1055 |
* |
| 1056 |
* $ ulimit -t 1000 |
| 1057 |
* $ ulimit -t |
| 1058 |
* 1000 |
| 1059 |
* $ su - |
| 1060 |
* Password: |
| 1061 |
* # ulimit -t |
| 1062 |
* 1000 |
| 1063 |
* |
| 1064 |
* TODO: The question here is whether we should clear the limits before applying them? |
| 1065 |
* As evident above, neither su(1) (and, for that matter, nor sudo(8)) does this. |
| 1066 |
*/ |
| 1067 |
#ifdef POLKIT_AUTHFW_PAM |
| 1068 |
if (!open_session (pw->pw_name, |
| 1069 |
pw->pw_uid)) |
| 1070 |
{ |
| 1071 |
goto out; |
| 1072 |
} |
| 1073 |
#endif /* POLKIT_AUTHFW_PAM */ |
| 1074 |
|
| 1075 |
/* become the user */ |
| 1076 |
if (setgroups (0, NULL) != 0) |
| 1077 |
{ |
| 1078 |
g_printerr ("Error setting groups: %s\n", g_strerror (errno)); |
| 1079 |
goto out; |
| 1080 |
} |
| 1081 |
if (initgroups (pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) != 0) |
| 1082 |
{ |
| 1083 |
g_printerr ("Error initializing groups for %s: %s\n", pw->pw_name, g_strerror (errno)); |
| 1084 |
goto out; |
| 1085 |
} |
| 1086 |
(void) setregid (pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid); |
| 1087 |
(void) setreuid (pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid); |
| 1088 |
if ((geteuid () != pw->pw_uid) || (getuid () != pw->pw_uid) || |
| 1089 |
(getegid () != pw->pw_gid) || (getgid () != pw->pw_gid)) |
| 1090 |
{ |
| 1091 |
g_printerr ("Error becoming real+effective uid %d and gid %d: %s\n", pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_gid, g_strerror (errno)); |
| 1092 |
goto out; |
| 1093 |
} |
| 1094 |
|
| 1095 |
/* change to home directory */ |
| 1096 |
if (!opt_keep_cwd) |
| 1097 |
{ |
| 1098 |
if (chdir (pw->pw_dir) != 0) |
| 1099 |
{ |
| 1100 |
g_printerr ("Error changing to home directory %s: %s\n", pw->pw_dir, g_strerror (errno)); |
| 1101 |
goto out; |
| 1102 |
} |
| 1103 |
} |
| 1104 |
|
| 1105 |
/* Log the fact that we're executing a command */ |
| 1106 |
log_message (LOG_NOTICE, FALSE, "Executing command"); |
| 1107 |
|
| 1108 |
/* exec the program */ |
| 1109 |
if (execv (path, exec_argv) != 0) |
| 1110 |
{ |
| 1111 |
g_printerr ("Error executing %s: %s\n", path, g_strerror (errno)); |
| 1112 |
goto out; |
| 1113 |
} |
| 1114 |
|
| 1115 |
/* if exec doesn't fail, it never returns... */ |
| 1116 |
g_assert_not_reached (); |
| 1117 |
|
| 1118 |
out: |
| 1119 |
/* if applicable, nuke the local authentication agent */ |
| 1120 |
if (local_agent_handle != NULL) |
| 1121 |
polkit_agent_listener_unregister (local_agent_handle); |
| 1122 |
|
| 1123 |
if (result != NULL) |
| 1124 |
g_object_unref (result); |
| 1125 |
|
| 1126 |
g_free (action_id); |
| 1127 |
|
| 1128 |
if (details != NULL) |
| 1129 |
g_object_unref (details); |
| 1130 |
|
| 1131 |
if (subject != NULL) |
| 1132 |
g_object_unref (subject); |
| 1133 |
|
| 1134 |
if (authority != NULL) |
| 1135 |
g_object_unref (authority); |
| 1136 |
|
| 1137 |
if (saved_env != NULL) |
| 1138 |
{ |
| 1139 |
g_ptr_array_foreach (saved_env, (GFunc) g_free, NULL); |
| 1140 |
g_ptr_array_free (saved_env, TRUE); |
| 1141 |
} |
| 1142 |
|
| 1143 |
g_free (original_cwd); |
| 1144 |
g_free (path_abs); |
| 1145 |
g_free (path); |
| 1146 |
g_free (command_line); |
| 1147 |
g_free (cmdline_short); |
| 1148 |
g_free (opt_user); |
| 1149 |
g_free (original_user_name); |
| 1150 |
|
| 1151 |
return ret; |
| 1152 |
} |
| 1153 |
|