| 1 |
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE or |
| 2 |
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license |
| 3 |
// <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your |
| 4 |
// option. This file may not be copied, modified, or distributed |
| 5 |
// except according to those terms. |
| 6 |
|
| 7 |
mod common; |
| 8 |
|
| 9 |
use common::assert_dscp; |
| 10 |
use neqo_common::{Datagram, Decoder, Encoder, Role}; |
| 11 |
use neqo_transport::{ |
| 12 |
CloseReason, ConnectionParameters, Error, State, Version, MIN_INITIAL_PACKET_SIZE, |
| 13 |
}; |
| 14 |
use test_fixture::{ |
| 15 |
default_client, default_server, |
| 16 |
header_protection::{ |
| 17 |
apply_header_protection, decode_initial_header, initial_aead_and_hp, |
| 18 |
remove_header_protection, |
| 19 |
}, |
| 20 |
new_client, now, split_datagram, |
| 21 |
}; |
| 22 |
|
| 23 |
#[test] |
| 24 |
fn connect() { |
| 25 |
let (client, server) = test_fixture::connect(); |
| 26 |
assert_dscp(&client.stats()); |
| 27 |
assert_dscp(&server.stats()); |
| 28 |
} |
| 29 |
|
| 30 |
#[test] |
| 31 |
fn truncate_long_packet() { |
| 32 |
let mut client = default_client(); |
| 33 |
let mut server = default_server(); |
| 34 |
|
| 35 |
let out = client.process_output(now()); |
| 36 |
let out2 = client.process_output(now()); |
| 37 |
assert!(out.as_dgram_ref().is_some() && out2.as_dgram_ref().is_some()); |
| 38 |
server.process_input(out.dgram().unwrap(), now()); |
| 39 |
let out = server.process(out2.dgram(), now()); |
| 40 |
assert!(out.as_dgram_ref().is_some()); |
| 41 |
let out = client.process(out.dgram(), now()); |
| 42 |
let out = server.process(out.dgram(), now()); |
| 43 |
|
| 44 |
// This will truncate the Handshake packet from the server. |
| 45 |
let dupe = out.as_dgram_ref().unwrap().clone(); |
| 46 |
// Count the padding in the packet, plus 1. |
| 47 |
let tail = dupe.iter().rev().take_while(|b| **b == 0).count() + 1; |
| 48 |
let truncated = Datagram::new( |
| 49 |
dupe.source(), |
| 50 |
dupe.destination(), |
| 51 |
dupe.tos(), |
| 52 |
&dupe[..(dupe.len() - tail)], |
| 53 |
); |
| 54 |
let hs_probe = client.process(Some(truncated), now()).dgram(); |
| 55 |
assert!(hs_probe.is_some()); |
| 56 |
|
| 57 |
// Now feed in the untruncated packet. |
| 58 |
let out = client.process(out.dgram(), now()); |
| 59 |
assert!(out.as_dgram_ref().is_some()); // Throw this ACK away. |
| 60 |
assert!(test_fixture::maybe_authenticate(&mut client)); |
| 61 |
let out = client.process_output(now()); |
| 62 |
assert!(out.as_dgram_ref().is_some()); |
| 63 |
|
| 64 |
assert!(client.state().connected()); |
| 65 |
let out = server.process(out.dgram(), now()); |
| 66 |
assert!(out.as_dgram_ref().is_some()); |
| 67 |
assert!(server.state().connected()); |
| 68 |
} |
| 69 |
|
| 70 |
/// Test that reordering parts of the server Initial doesn't change things. |
| 71 |
#[test] |
| 72 |
fn reorder_server_initial() { |
| 73 |
// A simple ACK_ECN frame for a single packet with packet number 0 with a single ECT(0) mark. |
| 74 |
const ACK_FRAME: &[u8] = &[0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00]; |
| 75 |
|
| 76 |
// This test needs to decrypt the CI, so turn off MLKEM. |
| 77 |
let mut client = new_client( |
| 78 |
ConnectionParameters::default() |
| 79 |
.versions(Version::Version1, vec![Version::Version1]) |
| 80 |
.mlkem(false), |
| 81 |
); |
| 82 |
let mut server = default_server(); |
| 83 |
|
| 84 |
let client_initial = client.process_output(now()); |
| 85 |
let (_, client_dcid, _, _) = |
| 86 |
decode_initial_header(client_initial.as_dgram_ref().unwrap(), Role::Client).unwrap(); |
| 87 |
let client_dcid = client_dcid.to_owned(); |
| 88 |
|
| 89 |
let server_packet = server.process(client_initial.dgram(), now()).dgram(); |
| 90 |
let (server_initial, server_hs) = split_datagram(server_packet.as_ref().unwrap()); |
| 91 |
let (protected_header, _, _, payload) = |
| 92 |
decode_initial_header(&server_initial, Role::Server).unwrap(); |
| 93 |
|
| 94 |
// Now decrypt the packet. |
| 95 |
let (aead, hp) = initial_aead_and_hp(&client_dcid, Role::Server); |
| 96 |
let (header, pn) = remove_header_protection(&hp, protected_header, payload); |
| 97 |
assert_eq!(pn, 0); |
| 98 |
let pn_len = header.len() - protected_header.len(); |
| 99 |
let mut buf = vec![0; payload.len()]; |
| 100 |
let mut plaintext = aead |
| 101 |
.decrypt(pn, &header, &payload[pn_len..], &mut buf) |
| 102 |
.unwrap() |
| 103 |
.to_owned(); |
| 104 |
|
| 105 |
// Now we need to find the frames. Make some really strong assumptions. |
| 106 |
let mut dec = Decoder::new(&plaintext[..]); |
| 107 |
assert_eq!(dec.decode(ACK_FRAME.len()), Some(ACK_FRAME)); |
| 108 |
assert_eq!(dec.decode_varint(), Some(0x06)); // CRYPTO |
| 109 |
assert_eq!(dec.decode_varint(), Some(0x00)); // offset |
| 110 |
dec.skip_vvec(); // Skip over the payload. |
| 111 |
let end = dec.offset(); |
| 112 |
|
| 113 |
// Move the ACK frame after the CRYPTO frame. |
| 114 |
plaintext[..end].rotate_left(ACK_FRAME.len()); |
| 115 |
|
| 116 |
// And rebuild a packet. |
| 117 |
let mut packet = header.clone(); |
| 118 |
packet.resize(MIN_INITIAL_PACKET_SIZE, 0); |
| 119 |
aead.encrypt(pn, &header, &plaintext, &mut packet[header.len()..]) |
| 120 |
.unwrap(); |
| 121 |
apply_header_protection(&hp, &mut packet, protected_header.len()..header.len()); |
| 122 |
let reordered = Datagram::new( |
| 123 |
server_initial.source(), |
| 124 |
server_initial.destination(), |
| 125 |
server_initial.tos(), |
| 126 |
packet, |
| 127 |
); |
| 128 |
|
| 129 |
// Now a connection can be made successfully. |
| 130 |
// Though we modified the server's Initial packet, we get away with it. |
| 131 |
// TLS only authenticates the content of the CRYPTO frame, which was untouched. |
| 132 |
client.process_input(reordered, now()); |
| 133 |
client.process_input(server_hs.unwrap(), now()); |
| 134 |
assert!(test_fixture::maybe_authenticate(&mut client)); |
| 135 |
let finished = client.process_output(now()); |
| 136 |
assert_eq!(*client.state(), State::Connected); |
| 137 |
|
| 138 |
let done = server.process(finished.dgram(), now()); |
| 139 |
assert_eq!(*server.state(), State::Confirmed); |
| 140 |
|
| 141 |
client.process_input(done.dgram().unwrap(), now()); |
| 142 |
assert_eq!(*client.state(), State::Confirmed); |
| 143 |
} |
| 144 |
|
| 145 |
#[cfg(test)] |
| 146 |
fn set_payload(server_packet: Option<&Datagram>, client_dcid: &[u8], payload: &[u8]) -> Datagram { |
| 147 |
let (server_initial, _server_hs) = split_datagram(server_packet.as_ref().unwrap()); |
| 148 |
let (protected_header, _, _, orig_payload) = |
| 149 |
decode_initial_header(&server_initial, Role::Server).unwrap(); |
| 150 |
|
| 151 |
// Now decrypt the packet. |
| 152 |
let (aead, hp) = initial_aead_and_hp(client_dcid, Role::Server); |
| 153 |
let (mut header, pn) = remove_header_protection(&hp, protected_header, orig_payload); |
| 154 |
assert_eq!(pn, 0); |
| 155 |
// Re-encode the packet number as four bytes, so we have enough material for the header |
| 156 |
// protection sample if payload is empty. |
| 157 |
let pn_pos = header.len() - 2; |
| 158 |
header[pn_pos] = u8::try_from(4 + aead.expansion()).unwrap(); |
| 159 |
header.resize(header.len() + 3, 0); |
| 160 |
header[0] |= 0b0000_0011; // Set the packet number length to 4. |
| 161 |
|
| 162 |
// And build a packet containing the given payload. |
| 163 |
let mut packet = header.clone(); |
| 164 |
packet.resize(header.len() + payload.len() + aead.expansion(), 0); |
| 165 |
aead.encrypt(pn, &header, payload, &mut packet[header.len()..]) |
| 166 |
.unwrap(); |
| 167 |
apply_header_protection(&hp, &mut packet, protected_header.len()..header.len()); |
| 168 |
Datagram::new( |
| 169 |
server_initial.source(), |
| 170 |
server_initial.destination(), |
| 171 |
server_initial.tos(), |
| 172 |
packet, |
| 173 |
) |
| 174 |
} |
| 175 |
|
| 176 |
/// Test that the stack treats a packet without any frames as a protocol violation. |
| 177 |
#[test] |
| 178 |
fn packet_without_frames() { |
| 179 |
let mut client = new_client( |
| 180 |
ConnectionParameters::default().versions(Version::Version1, vec![Version::Version1]), |
| 181 |
); |
| 182 |
let mut server = default_server(); |
| 183 |
|
| 184 |
let client_initial = client.process_output(now()); |
| 185 |
let client_initial_clone = client_initial.as_dgram_ref().unwrap().clone(); |
| 186 |
let (_, client_dcid, _, _) = |
| 187 |
decode_initial_header(&client_initial_clone, Role::Client).unwrap(); |
| 188 |
|
| 189 |
let server_packet = server.process(client_initial.dgram(), now()).dgram(); |
| 190 |
let modified = set_payload(server_packet.as_ref(), client_dcid, &[]); |
| 191 |
client.process_input(modified, now()); |
| 192 |
assert_eq!( |
| 193 |
client.state(), |
| 194 |
&State::Closed(CloseReason::Transport(Error::ProtocolViolation)) |
| 195 |
); |
| 196 |
} |
| 197 |
|
| 198 |
/// Test that the stack permits a packet containing only padding. |
| 199 |
#[test] |
| 200 |
fn packet_with_only_padding() { |
| 201 |
let mut client = new_client( |
| 202 |
ConnectionParameters::default().versions(Version::Version1, vec![Version::Version1]), |
| 203 |
); |
| 204 |
let mut server = default_server(); |
| 205 |
|
| 206 |
let client_initial = client.process_output(now()); |
| 207 |
let client_initial_clone = client_initial.as_dgram_ref().unwrap().clone(); |
| 208 |
let (_, client_dcid, _, _) = |
| 209 |
decode_initial_header(&client_initial_clone, Role::Client).unwrap(); |
| 210 |
|
| 211 |
let server_packet = server.process(client_initial.dgram(), now()).dgram(); |
| 212 |
let modified = set_payload(server_packet.as_ref(), client_dcid, &[0]); |
| 213 |
client.process_input(modified, now()); |
| 214 |
assert_eq!(client.state(), &State::WaitInitial); |
| 215 |
} |
| 216 |
|
| 217 |
/// Overflow the crypto buffer. |
| 218 |
#[expect(clippy::similar_names, reason = "scid simiar to dcic.")] |
| 219 |
#[test] |
| 220 |
fn overflow_crypto() { |
| 221 |
let mut client = new_client( |
| 222 |
ConnectionParameters::default().versions(Version::Version1, vec![Version::Version1]), |
| 223 |
); |
| 224 |
let mut server = default_server(); |
| 225 |
|
| 226 |
let client_initial = client.process_output(now()).dgram(); |
| 227 |
let (_, client_dcid, _, _) = |
| 228 |
decode_initial_header(client_initial.as_ref().unwrap(), Role::Client).unwrap(); |
| 229 |
let client_dcid = client_dcid.to_owned(); |
| 230 |
|
| 231 |
let server_packet = server.process(client_initial, now()).dgram(); |
| 232 |
let (server_initial, _) = split_datagram(server_packet.as_ref().unwrap()); |
| 233 |
|
| 234 |
// Now decrypt the server packet to get AEAD and HP instances. |
| 235 |
// We won't be using the packet, but making new ones. |
| 236 |
let (aead, hp) = initial_aead_and_hp(&client_dcid, Role::Server); |
| 237 |
let (_, server_dcid, server_scid, _) = |
| 238 |
decode_initial_header(&server_initial, Role::Server).unwrap(); |
| 239 |
|
| 240 |
// Send in 100 packets, each with 1000 bytes of crypto frame data each, |
| 241 |
// eventually this will overrun the buffer we keep for crypto data. |
| 242 |
let mut payload = Encoder::with_capacity(1024); |
| 243 |
for pn in 0..100_u64 { |
| 244 |
payload.truncate(0); |
| 245 |
payload |
| 246 |
.encode_varint(0x06_u64) // CRYPTO frame type. |
| 247 |
.encode_varint(pn * 1000 + 1) // offset |
| 248 |
.encode_varint(1000_u64); // length |
| 249 |
let plen = payload.len(); |
| 250 |
payload.pad_to(plen + 1000, 44); |
| 251 |
|
| 252 |
let mut packet = Encoder::with_capacity(MIN_INITIAL_PACKET_SIZE); |
| 253 |
packet |
| 254 |
.encode_byte(0xc1) // Initial with packet number length of 2. |
| 255 |
.encode_uint(4, Version::Version1.wire_version()) |
| 256 |
.encode_vec(1, server_dcid) |
| 257 |
.encode_vec(1, server_scid) |
| 258 |
.encode_vvec(&[]) // token |
| 259 |
.encode_varint(u64::try_from(2 + payload.len() + aead.expansion()).unwrap()); // length |
| 260 |
let pn_offset = packet.len(); |
| 261 |
packet.encode_uint(2, pn); |
| 262 |
|
| 263 |
let mut packet = Vec::from(packet); |
| 264 |
let header = packet.clone(); |
| 265 |
packet.resize(header.len() + payload.len() + aead.expansion(), 0); |
| 266 |
aead.encrypt(pn, &header, payload.as_ref(), &mut packet[header.len()..]) |
| 267 |
.unwrap(); |
| 268 |
apply_header_protection(&hp, &mut packet, pn_offset..(pn_offset + 2)); |
| 269 |
packet.resize(MIN_INITIAL_PACKET_SIZE, 0); // Initial has to be MIN_INITIAL_PACKET_SIZE bytes! |
| 270 |
|
| 271 |
let dgram = Datagram::new( |
| 272 |
server_initial.source(), |
| 273 |
server_initial.destination(), |
| 274 |
server_initial.tos(), |
| 275 |
packet, |
| 276 |
); |
| 277 |
client.process_input(dgram, now()); |
| 278 |
if let State::Closing { error, .. } = client.state() { |
| 279 |
assert!( |
| 280 |
matches!(error, CloseReason::Transport(Error::CryptoBufferExceeded)), |
| 281 |
"the connection need to abort on crypto buffer" |
| 282 |
); |
| 283 |
assert!(pn > 64, "at least 64000 bytes of data is buffered"); |
| 284 |
return; |
| 285 |
} |
| 286 |
} |
| 287 |
panic!("Was not able to overflow the crypto buffer"); |
| 288 |
} |
| 289 |
|
| 290 |
#[test] |
| 291 |
fn handshake_mlkem768x25519() { |
| 292 |
let mut client = default_client(); |
| 293 |
let mut server = default_server(); |
| 294 |
|
| 295 |
client |
| 296 |
.set_groups(&[neqo_crypto::TLS_GRP_KEM_MLKEM768X25519]) |
| 297 |
.unwrap(); |
| 298 |
client.send_additional_key_shares(0).unwrap(); |
| 299 |
|
| 300 |
test_fixture::handshake(&mut client, &mut server); |
| 301 |
assert_eq!(*client.state(), State::Confirmed); |
| 302 |
assert_eq!(*server.state(), State::Confirmed); |
| 303 |
assert_eq!( |
| 304 |
client.tls_info().unwrap().key_exchange(), |
| 305 |
neqo_crypto::TLS_GRP_KEM_MLKEM768X25519 |
| 306 |
); |
| 307 |
assert_eq!( |
| 308 |
server.tls_info().unwrap().key_exchange(), |
| 309 |
neqo_crypto::TLS_GRP_KEM_MLKEM768X25519 |
| 310 |
); |
| 311 |
} |