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// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE or |
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// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license |
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// <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your |
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// option. This file may not be copied, modified, or distributed |
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// except according to those terms. |
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|
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use std::{ |
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cell::RefCell, |
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cmp::{max, min}, |
| 10 |
fmt::{self, Display, Formatter}, |
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mem, |
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ops::{Index, IndexMut, Range}, |
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rc::Rc, |
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time::Instant, |
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}; |
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|
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use enum_map::EnumMap; |
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use neqo_common::{hex, hex_snip_middle, qdebug, qinfo, qtrace, Encoder, Role}; |
| 19 |
pub use neqo_crypto::Epoch; |
| 20 |
use neqo_crypto::{ |
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hkdf, hp::HpKey, Aead, Agent, AntiReplay, Cipher, Error as CryptoError, HandshakeState, |
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PrivateKey, PublicKey, Record, RecordList, ResumptionToken, SymKey, ZeroRttChecker, |
| 23 |
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, TLS_CT_HANDSHAKE, |
| 24 |
TLS_GRP_EC_SECP256R1, TLS_GRP_EC_SECP384R1, TLS_GRP_EC_SECP521R1, TLS_GRP_EC_X25519, |
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TLS_GRP_KEM_MLKEM768X25519, TLS_VERSION_1_3, |
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}; |
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|
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use crate::{ |
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cid::ConnectionIdRef, |
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frame::FrameType, |
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packet::{PacketBuilder, PacketNumber}, |
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recovery::RecoveryToken, |
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recv_stream::RxStreamOrderer, |
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send_stream::TxBuffer, |
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sni::find_sni, |
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stats::FrameStats, |
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tparams::{TpZeroRttChecker, TransportParameters, TransportParametersHandler}, |
| 38 |
tracking::PacketNumberSpace, |
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version::Version, |
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ConnectionParameters, Error, Res, |
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}; |
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|
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/// The number of invocations remaining on a write cipher before we try |
| 44 |
/// to update keys. This has to be much smaller than the number returned |
| 45 |
/// by `CryptoDxState::limit` or updates will happen too often. As we don't |
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/// need to ask permission to update, this can be quite small. |
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pub const UPDATE_WRITE_KEYS_AT: PacketNumber = 100; |
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|
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// This is a testing kludge that allows for overwriting the number of |
| 50 |
// invocations of the next cipher to operate. With this, it is possible |
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// to test what happens when the number of invocations reaches 0, or |
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// when it hits `UPDATE_WRITE_KEYS_AT` and an automatic update should occur. |
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// This is a little crude, but it saves a lot of plumbing. |
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#[cfg(test)] |
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thread_local!(pub static OVERWRITE_INVOCATIONS: RefCell<Option<PacketNumber>> = RefCell::default()); |
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|
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#[derive(Debug)] |
| 58 |
pub struct Crypto { |
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version: Version, |
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protocols: Vec<String>, |
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tls: Agent, |
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streams: CryptoStreams, |
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states: CryptoStates, |
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} |
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|
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type TpHandler = Rc<RefCell<TransportParametersHandler>>; |
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|
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impl Crypto { |
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pub fn new( |
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version: Version, |
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conn_params: &ConnectionParameters, |
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mut agent: Agent, |
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protocols: Vec<String>, |
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tphandler: TpHandler, |
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) -> Res<Self> { |
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agent.set_version_range(TLS_VERSION_1_3, TLS_VERSION_1_3)?; |
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agent.set_ciphers(&[ |
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TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, |
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TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, |
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TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, |
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])?; |
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agent.set_groups(if conn_params.mlkem_enabled() { |
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&[ |
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TLS_GRP_KEM_MLKEM768X25519, |
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TLS_GRP_EC_X25519, |
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TLS_GRP_EC_SECP256R1, |
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TLS_GRP_EC_SECP384R1, |
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TLS_GRP_EC_SECP521R1, |
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] |
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} else { |
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&[ |
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TLS_GRP_EC_X25519, |
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TLS_GRP_EC_SECP256R1, |
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TLS_GRP_EC_SECP384R1, |
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TLS_GRP_EC_SECP521R1, |
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] |
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})?; |
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if let Agent::Client(c) = &mut agent { |
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// Configure clients to send additional key shares to reduce the rate of HRRs |
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// when enabling MLKEM. |
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c.send_additional_key_shares(usize::from(conn_params.mlkem_enabled()))?; |
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|
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// Always enable 0-RTT on the client, but the server needs |
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// more configuration passed to server_enable_0rtt. |
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c.enable_0rtt()?; |
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} |
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agent.set_alpn(&protocols)?; |
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agent.disable_end_of_early_data()?; |
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let extension = match version { |
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Version::Version2 | Version::Version1 => 0x39, |
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#[cfg(feature = "draft-29")] |
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Version::Draft29 => 0xffa5, |
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}; |
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agent.extension_handler(extension, tphandler)?; |
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Ok(Self { |
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version, |
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protocols, |
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tls: agent, |
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streams: CryptoStreams::default(), |
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states: CryptoStates::default(), |
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}) |
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} |
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|
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/// Get the name of the server. (Only works for the client currently). |
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pub fn server_name(&self) -> Option<&str> { |
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if let Agent::Client(c) = &self.tls { |
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Some(c.server_name()) |
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} else { |
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None |
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} |
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} |
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|
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/// Get the set of enabled protocols. |
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pub fn protocols(&self) -> &[String] { |
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&self.protocols |
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} |
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|
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pub fn server_enable_0rtt( |
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&mut self, |
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tphandler: TpHandler, |
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anti_replay: &AntiReplay, |
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zero_rtt_checker: impl ZeroRttChecker + 'static, |
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) -> Res<()> { |
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if let Agent::Server(s) = &mut self.tls { |
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Ok(s.enable_0rtt( |
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anti_replay, |
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0xffff_ffff, |
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TpZeroRttChecker::wrap(tphandler, zero_rtt_checker), |
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)?) |
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} else { |
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panic!("not a server"); |
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} |
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} |
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|
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pub fn server_enable_ech( |
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&mut self, |
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config: u8, |
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public_name: &str, |
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sk: &PrivateKey, |
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pk: &PublicKey, |
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) -> Res<()> { |
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if let Agent::Server(s) = &mut self.tls { |
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s.enable_ech(config, public_name, sk, pk)?; |
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Ok(()) |
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} else { |
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panic!("not a client"); |
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} |
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} |
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|
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pub fn client_enable_ech(&mut self, ech_config_list: impl AsRef<[u8]>) -> Res<()> { |
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if let Agent::Client(c) = &mut self.tls { |
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c.enable_ech(ech_config_list)?; |
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Ok(()) |
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} else { |
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panic!("not a client"); |
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} |
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} |
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|
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/// Get the active ECH configuration, which is empty if ECH is disabled. |
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pub fn ech_config(&self) -> &[u8] { |
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self.tls.ech_config() |
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} |
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|
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pub fn handshake( |
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&mut self, |
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now: Instant, |
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space: PacketNumberSpace, |
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data: Option<&[u8]>, |
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) -> Res<&HandshakeState> { |
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let input = data.map(|d| { |
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qtrace!("Handshake record received {d:0x?} "); |
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Record { |
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ct: TLS_CT_HANDSHAKE, |
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epoch: space.into(), |
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data: d.to_vec(), |
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} |
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}); |
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|
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match self.tls.handshake_raw(now, input) { |
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Ok(output) => { |
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self.buffer_records(output)?; |
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Ok(self.tls.state()) |
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} |
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Err(CryptoError::EchRetry(v)) => Err(Error::EchRetry(v)), |
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Err(e) => { |
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qinfo!("Handshake failed {e:?}"); |
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Err(self |
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.tls |
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.alert() |
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.map_or(Error::CryptoError(e), |a| Error::CryptoAlert(*a))) |
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} |
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} |
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} |
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|
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/// Enable 0-RTT and return `true` if it is enabled successfully. |
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pub fn enable_0rtt(&mut self, version: Version, role: Role) -> Res<bool> { |
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let info = self.tls.preinfo()?; |
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// `info.early_data()` returns false for a server, |
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// so use `early_data_cipher()` to tell if 0-RTT is enabled. |
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let cipher = info.early_data_cipher(); |
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if cipher.is_none() { |
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return Ok(false); |
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} |
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let (dir, secret) = match role { |
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Role::Client => ( |
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CryptoDxDirection::Write, |
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self.tls.write_secret(Epoch::ZeroRtt), |
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), |
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Role::Server => ( |
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CryptoDxDirection::Read, |
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self.tls.read_secret(Epoch::ZeroRtt), |
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), |
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}; |
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let secret = secret.ok_or(Error::InternalError)?; |
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self.states |
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.set_0rtt_keys(version, dir, &secret, cipher.ok_or(Error::InternalError)?)?; |
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Ok(true) |
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} |
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|
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/// Lock in a compatible upgrade. |
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pub fn confirm_version(&mut self, confirmed: Version) -> Res<()> { |
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self.states.confirm_version(self.version, confirmed)?; |
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self.version = confirmed; |
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Ok(()) |
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} |
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|
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/// Returns true if new handshake keys were installed. |
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pub fn install_keys(&mut self, role: Role) -> Res<bool> { |
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if self.tls.state().is_final() { |
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Ok(false) |
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} else { |
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let installed_hs = self.install_handshake_keys()?; |
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if role == Role::Server { |
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self.maybe_install_application_write_key(self.version)?; |
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} |
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Ok(installed_hs) |
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} |
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} |
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|
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fn install_handshake_keys(&mut self) -> Res<bool> { |
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qtrace!("[{self}] Attempt to install handshake keys"); |
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let Some(write_secret) = self.tls.write_secret(Epoch::Handshake) else { |
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// No keys is fine. |
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return Ok(false); |
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}; |
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let read_secret = self |
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.tls |
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.read_secret(Epoch::Handshake) |
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.ok_or(Error::InternalError)?; |
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let cipher = match self.tls.info() { |
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None => self.tls.preinfo()?.cipher_suite(), |
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Some(info) => Some(info.cipher_suite()), |
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} |
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.ok_or(Error::InternalError)?; |
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self.states |
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.set_handshake_keys(self.version, &write_secret, &read_secret, cipher)?; |
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qdebug!("[{self}] Handshake keys installed"); |
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Ok(true) |
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} |
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|
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fn maybe_install_application_write_key(&mut self, version: Version) -> Res<()> { |
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qtrace!("[{self}] Attempt to install application write key"); |
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if let Some(secret) = self.tls.write_secret(Epoch::ApplicationData) { |
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self.states.set_application_write_key(version, &secret)?; |
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qdebug!("[{self}] Application write key installed"); |
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} |
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Ok(()) |
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} |
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|
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pub fn install_application_keys(&mut self, version: Version, expire_0rtt: Instant) -> Res<()> { |
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self.maybe_install_application_write_key(version)?; |
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// The write key might have been installed earlier, but it should |
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// always be installed now. |
| 294 |
debug_assert!(self.states.app_write.is_some()); |
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let read_secret = self |
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.tls |
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.read_secret(Epoch::ApplicationData) |
| 298 |
.ok_or(Error::InternalError)?; |
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self.states |
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.set_application_read_key(version, &read_secret, expire_0rtt)?; |
| 301 |
qdebug!("[{self}] application read keys installed"); |
| 302 |
Ok(()) |
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} |
| 304 |
|
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/// Buffer crypto records for sending. |
| 306 |
pub fn buffer_records(&mut self, records: RecordList) -> Res<()> { |
| 307 |
for r in records { |
| 308 |
if r.ct != TLS_CT_HANDSHAKE { |
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return Err(Error::ProtocolViolation); |
| 310 |
} |
| 311 |
qtrace!("[{self}] Adding CRYPTO data {r:?}"); |
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self.streams.send(r.epoch.into(), &r.data)?; |
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} |
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Ok(()) |
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} |
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|
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pub fn write_frame( |
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&mut self, |
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space: PacketNumberSpace, |
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sni_slicing: bool, |
| 321 |
builder: &mut PacketBuilder, |
| 322 |
tokens: &mut Vec<RecoveryToken>, |
| 323 |
stats: &mut FrameStats, |
| 324 |
) { |
| 325 |
self.streams |
| 326 |
.write_frame(space, sni_slicing, builder, tokens, stats); |
| 327 |
} |
| 328 |
|
| 329 |
pub fn acked(&mut self, token: &CryptoRecoveryToken) { |
| 330 |
qdebug!( |
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"Acked crypto frame space={} offset={} length={}", |
| 332 |
token.space, |
| 333 |
token.offset, |
| 334 |
token.length |
| 335 |
); |
| 336 |
self.streams.acked(token); |
| 337 |
} |
| 338 |
|
| 339 |
pub fn lost(&mut self, token: &CryptoRecoveryToken) { |
| 340 |
qinfo!( |
| 341 |
"Lost crypto frame space={} offset={} length={}", |
| 342 |
token.space, |
| 343 |
token.offset, |
| 344 |
token.length |
| 345 |
); |
| 346 |
self.streams.lost(token); |
| 347 |
} |
| 348 |
|
| 349 |
/// Mark any outstanding frames in the indicated space as "lost" so |
| 350 |
/// that they can be sent again. |
| 351 |
pub fn resend_unacked(&mut self, space: PacketNumberSpace) { |
| 352 |
self.streams.resend_unacked(space); |
| 353 |
} |
| 354 |
|
| 355 |
/// Discard state for a packet number space and return true |
| 356 |
/// if something was discarded. |
| 357 |
pub fn discard(&mut self, space: PacketNumberSpace) -> bool { |
| 358 |
self.streams.discard(space); |
| 359 |
self.states.discard(space) |
| 360 |
} |
| 361 |
|
| 362 |
pub fn create_resumption_token( |
| 363 |
&mut self, |
| 364 |
new_token: Option<&[u8]>, |
| 365 |
tps: &TransportParameters, |
| 366 |
version: Version, |
| 367 |
rtt: u64, |
| 368 |
) -> Option<ResumptionToken> { |
| 369 |
if let Agent::Client(ref mut c) = self.tls { |
| 370 |
c.resumption_token().as_ref().map(|t| { |
| 371 |
qtrace!("TLS token {}", hex(t.as_ref())); |
| 372 |
let mut enc = Encoder::default(); |
| 373 |
enc.encode_uint(4, version.wire_version()); |
| 374 |
enc.encode_varint(rtt); |
| 375 |
enc.encode_vvec_with(|enc_inner| { |
| 376 |
tps.encode(enc_inner); |
| 377 |
}); |
| 378 |
enc.encode_vvec(new_token.unwrap_or(&[])); |
| 379 |
enc.encode(t.as_ref()); |
| 380 |
qdebug!("resumption token {}", hex_snip_middle(enc.as_ref())); |
| 381 |
ResumptionToken::new(enc.into(), t.expiration_time()) |
| 382 |
}) |
| 383 |
} else { |
| 384 |
unreachable!("It is a server"); |
| 385 |
} |
| 386 |
} |
| 387 |
|
| 388 |
pub fn has_resumption_token(&self) -> bool { |
| 389 |
if let Agent::Client(c) = &self.tls { |
| 390 |
c.has_resumption_token() |
| 391 |
} else { |
| 392 |
unreachable!("It is a server"); |
| 393 |
} |
| 394 |
} |
| 395 |
|
| 396 |
#[must_use] |
| 397 |
pub fn tls_mut(&mut self) -> &mut Agent { |
| 398 |
&mut self.tls |
| 399 |
} |
| 400 |
|
| 401 |
#[must_use] |
| 402 |
pub const fn tls(&self) -> &Agent { |
| 403 |
&self.tls |
| 404 |
} |
| 405 |
|
| 406 |
#[must_use] |
| 407 |
pub const fn streams(&self) -> &CryptoStreams { |
| 408 |
&self.streams |
| 409 |
} |
| 410 |
|
| 411 |
#[must_use] |
| 412 |
pub fn streams_mut(&mut self) -> &mut CryptoStreams { |
| 413 |
&mut self.streams |
| 414 |
} |
| 415 |
|
| 416 |
#[must_use] |
| 417 |
pub const fn states(&self) -> &CryptoStates { |
| 418 |
&self.states |
| 419 |
} |
| 420 |
|
| 421 |
#[must_use] |
| 422 |
pub fn states_mut(&mut self) -> &mut CryptoStates { |
| 423 |
&mut self.states |
| 424 |
} |
| 425 |
} |
| 426 |
|
| 427 |
impl Display for Crypto { |
| 428 |
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut Formatter) -> fmt::Result { |
| 429 |
write!(f, "Crypto") |
| 430 |
} |
| 431 |
} |
| 432 |
|
| 433 |
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)] |
| 434 |
pub enum CryptoDxDirection { |
| 435 |
Read, |
| 436 |
Write, |
| 437 |
} |
| 438 |
|
| 439 |
#[derive(Debug)] |
| 440 |
pub struct CryptoDxState { |
| 441 |
/// The QUIC version. |
| 442 |
version: Version, |
| 443 |
/// Whether packets protected with this state will be read or written. |
| 444 |
direction: CryptoDxDirection, |
| 445 |
/// The epoch of this crypto state. This initially tracks TLS epochs |
| 446 |
/// via DTLS: 0 = initial, 1 = 0-RTT, 2 = handshake, 3 = application. |
| 447 |
/// But we don't need to keep that, and QUIC isn't limited in how |
| 448 |
/// many times keys can be updated, so we don't use `u16` for this. |
| 449 |
epoch: usize, |
| 450 |
aead: Aead, |
| 451 |
hpkey: HpKey, |
| 452 |
/// This tracks the range of packet numbers that have been seen. This allows |
| 453 |
/// for verifying that packet numbers before a key update are strictly lower |
| 454 |
/// than packet numbers after a key update. |
| 455 |
used_pn: Range<PacketNumber>, |
| 456 |
/// This is the minimum packet number that is allowed. |
| 457 |
min_pn: PacketNumber, |
| 458 |
/// The total number of operations that are remaining before the keys |
| 459 |
/// become exhausted and can't be used any more. |
| 460 |
invocations: PacketNumber, |
| 461 |
/// The basis of the invocation limits in `invocations`. |
| 462 |
largest_packet_len: usize, |
| 463 |
} |
| 464 |
|
| 465 |
const INITIAL_LARGEST_PACKET_LEN: usize = 1 << 11; // 2048 |
| 466 |
|
| 467 |
impl CryptoDxState { |
| 468 |
pub fn new( |
| 469 |
version: Version, |
| 470 |
direction: CryptoDxDirection, |
| 471 |
epoch: Epoch, |
| 472 |
secret: &SymKey, |
| 473 |
cipher: Cipher, |
| 474 |
) -> Res<Self> { |
| 475 |
qdebug!("Making {direction:?} {epoch:?} CryptoDxState, v={version:?} cipher={cipher}",); |
| 476 |
let hplabel = String::from(version.label_prefix()) + "hp"; |
| 477 |
Ok(Self { |
| 478 |
version, |
| 479 |
direction, |
| 480 |
epoch: usize::from(epoch), |
| 481 |
aead: Aead::new(TLS_VERSION_1_3, cipher, secret, version.label_prefix())?, |
| 482 |
hpkey: HpKey::extract(TLS_VERSION_1_3, cipher, secret, &hplabel)?, |
| 483 |
used_pn: 0..0, |
| 484 |
min_pn: 0, |
| 485 |
invocations: Self::limit(direction, cipher), |
| 486 |
largest_packet_len: INITIAL_LARGEST_PACKET_LEN, |
| 487 |
}) |
| 488 |
} |
| 489 |
|
| 490 |
pub fn new_initial( |
| 491 |
version: Version, |
| 492 |
direction: CryptoDxDirection, |
| 493 |
label: &str, |
| 494 |
dcid: &[u8], |
| 495 |
) -> Res<Self> { |
| 496 |
qtrace!("new_initial {version:?} {}", ConnectionIdRef::from(dcid)); |
| 497 |
let salt = version.initial_salt(); |
| 498 |
let cipher = TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; |
| 499 |
let initial_secret = hkdf::extract( |
| 500 |
TLS_VERSION_1_3, |
| 501 |
cipher, |
| 502 |
Some(&hkdf::import_key(TLS_VERSION_1_3, salt)?), |
| 503 |
&hkdf::import_key(TLS_VERSION_1_3, dcid)?, |
| 504 |
)?; |
| 505 |
|
| 506 |
let secret = hkdf::expand_label(TLS_VERSION_1_3, cipher, &initial_secret, &[], label)?; |
| 507 |
|
| 508 |
Self::new(version, direction, Epoch::Initial, &secret, cipher) |
| 509 |
} |
| 510 |
|
| 511 |
/// Determine the confidentiality and integrity limits for the cipher. |
| 512 |
fn limit(direction: CryptoDxDirection, cipher: Cipher) -> PacketNumber { |
| 513 |
match direction { |
| 514 |
// This uses the smaller limits for 2^16 byte packets |
| 515 |
// as we don't control incoming packet size. |
| 516 |
CryptoDxDirection::Read => match cipher { |
| 517 |
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 => 1 << 52, |
| 518 |
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 => PacketNumber::MAX, |
| 519 |
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 => 1 << 36, |
| 520 |
_ => unreachable!(), |
| 521 |
}, |
| 522 |
// This uses the larger limits for 2^11 byte packets. |
| 523 |
CryptoDxDirection::Write => match cipher { |
| 524 |
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 => 1 << 28, |
| 525 |
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 => PacketNumber::MAX, |
| 526 |
_ => unreachable!(), |
| 527 |
}, |
| 528 |
} |
| 529 |
} |
| 530 |
|
| 531 |
fn invoked(&mut self) -> Res<()> { |
| 532 |
#[cfg(test)] |
| 533 |
OVERWRITE_INVOCATIONS.with(|v| { |
| 534 |
if let Some(i) = v.borrow_mut().take() { |
| 535 |
log::warn!("Setting {:?} invocations to {}", self.direction, i); |
| 536 |
self.invocations = i; |
| 537 |
} |
| 538 |
}); |
| 539 |
self.invocations = self |
| 540 |
.invocations |
| 541 |
.checked_sub(1) |
| 542 |
.ok_or(Error::KeysExhausted)?; |
| 543 |
Ok(()) |
| 544 |
} |
| 545 |
|
| 546 |
/// Determine whether we should initiate a key update. |
| 547 |
pub fn should_update(&self) -> bool { |
| 548 |
// There is no point in updating read keys as the limit is global. |
| 549 |
debug_assert_eq!(self.direction, CryptoDxDirection::Write); |
| 550 |
self.invocations <= UPDATE_WRITE_KEYS_AT |
| 551 |
} |
| 552 |
|
| 553 |
pub fn next(&self, next_secret: &SymKey, cipher: Cipher) -> Res<Self> { |
| 554 |
let pn = self.next_pn(); |
| 555 |
// We count invocations of each write key just for that key, but all |
| 556 |
// attempts to invocations to read count toward a single limit. |
| 557 |
// This doesn't count use of Handshake keys. |
| 558 |
let invocations = if self.direction == CryptoDxDirection::Read { |
| 559 |
self.invocations |
| 560 |
} else { |
| 561 |
Self::limit(CryptoDxDirection::Write, cipher) |
| 562 |
}; |
| 563 |
Ok(Self { |
| 564 |
version: self.version, |
| 565 |
direction: self.direction, |
| 566 |
epoch: self.epoch + 1, |
| 567 |
aead: Aead::new( |
| 568 |
TLS_VERSION_1_3, |
| 569 |
cipher, |
| 570 |
next_secret, |
| 571 |
self.version.label_prefix(), |
| 572 |
)?, |
| 573 |
hpkey: self.hpkey.clone(), |
| 574 |
used_pn: pn..pn, |
| 575 |
min_pn: pn, |
| 576 |
invocations, |
| 577 |
largest_packet_len: INITIAL_LARGEST_PACKET_LEN, |
| 578 |
}) |
| 579 |
} |
| 580 |
|
| 581 |
#[must_use] |
| 582 |
pub const fn version(&self) -> Version { |
| 583 |
self.version |
| 584 |
} |
| 585 |
|
| 586 |
#[must_use] |
| 587 |
pub const fn key_phase(&self) -> bool { |
| 588 |
// Epoch 3 => 0, 4 => 1, 5 => 0, 6 => 1, ... |
| 589 |
self.epoch & 1 != 1 |
| 590 |
} |
| 591 |
|
| 592 |
/// This is a continuation of a previous, so adjust the range accordingly. |
| 593 |
/// Fail if the two ranges overlap. Do nothing if the directions don't match. |
| 594 |
pub fn continuation(&mut self, prev: &Self) -> Res<()> { |
| 595 |
debug_assert_eq!(self.direction, prev.direction); |
| 596 |
let next = prev.next_pn(); |
| 597 |
self.min_pn = next; |
| 598 |
if self.used_pn.is_empty() { |
| 599 |
self.used_pn = next..next; |
| 600 |
Ok(()) |
| 601 |
} else if prev.used_pn.end > self.used_pn.start { |
| 602 |
qdebug!( |
| 603 |
"[{self}] Found packet with too new packet number {} > {}, compared to {prev}", |
| 604 |
self.used_pn.start, |
| 605 |
prev.used_pn.end, |
| 606 |
); |
| 607 |
Err(Error::PacketNumberOverlap) |
| 608 |
} else { |
| 609 |
self.used_pn.start = next; |
| 610 |
Ok(()) |
| 611 |
} |
| 612 |
} |
| 613 |
|
| 614 |
/// Mark a packet number as used. If this is too low, reject it. |
| 615 |
/// Note that this won't catch a value that is too high if packets protected with |
| 616 |
/// old keys are received after a key update. That needs to be caught elsewhere. |
| 617 |
pub fn used(&mut self, pn: PacketNumber) -> Res<()> { |
| 618 |
if pn < self.min_pn { |
| 619 |
qdebug!( |
| 620 |
"[{self}] Found packet with too old packet number: {pn} < {}", |
| 621 |
self.min_pn |
| 622 |
); |
| 623 |
return Err(Error::PacketNumberOverlap); |
| 624 |
} |
| 625 |
if self.used_pn.start == self.used_pn.end { |
| 626 |
self.used_pn.start = pn; |
| 627 |
} |
| 628 |
self.used_pn.end = max(pn + 1, self.used_pn.end); |
| 629 |
Ok(()) |
| 630 |
} |
| 631 |
|
| 632 |
#[must_use] |
| 633 |
pub fn needs_update(&self) -> bool { |
| 634 |
// Only initiate a key update if we have processed exactly one packet |
| 635 |
// and we are in an epoch greater than 3. |
| 636 |
self.used_pn.start + 1 == self.used_pn.end |
| 637 |
&& self.epoch > usize::from(Epoch::ApplicationData) |
| 638 |
} |
| 639 |
|
| 640 |
#[must_use] |
| 641 |
pub fn can_update(&self, largest_acknowledged: Option<PacketNumber>) -> bool { |
| 642 |
largest_acknowledged.map_or_else( |
| 643 |
|| self.epoch == usize::from(Epoch::ApplicationData), |
| 644 |
|la| self.used_pn.contains(&la), |
| 645 |
) |
| 646 |
} |
| 647 |
|
| 648 |
pub fn compute_mask(&self, sample: &[u8]) -> Res<[u8; HpKey::SAMPLE_SIZE]> { |
| 649 |
let mask = self.hpkey.mask(sample)?; |
| 650 |
qtrace!("[{self}] HP sample={} mask={}", hex(sample), hex(mask)); |
| 651 |
Ok(mask) |
| 652 |
} |
| 653 |
|
| 654 |
#[must_use] |
| 655 |
pub const fn next_pn(&self) -> PacketNumber { |
| 656 |
self.used_pn.end |
| 657 |
} |
| 658 |
|
| 659 |
pub fn encrypt<'a>( |
| 660 |
&mut self, |
| 661 |
pn: PacketNumber, |
| 662 |
hdr: Range<usize>, |
| 663 |
data: &'a mut [u8], |
| 664 |
) -> Res<&'a mut [u8]> { |
| 665 |
debug_assert_eq!(self.direction, CryptoDxDirection::Write); |
| 666 |
qtrace!( |
| 667 |
"[{self}] encrypt_in_place pn={pn} hdr={} body={}", |
| 668 |
hex(data[hdr.clone()].as_ref()), |
| 669 |
hex(data[hdr.end..].as_ref()) |
| 670 |
); |
| 671 |
|
| 672 |
// The numbers in `Self::limit` assume a maximum packet size of `LIMIT`. |
| 673 |
// Adjust them as we encounter larger packets. |
| 674 |
let body_len = data.len() - hdr.len() - self.aead.expansion(); |
| 675 |
debug_assert!(body_len <= u16::MAX.into()); |
| 676 |
if body_len > self.largest_packet_len { |
| 677 |
let new_bits = usize::leading_zeros(self.largest_packet_len - 1) |
| 678 |
- usize::leading_zeros(body_len - 1); |
| 679 |
self.invocations >>= new_bits; |
| 680 |
self.largest_packet_len = body_len; |
| 681 |
} |
| 682 |
self.invoked()?; |
| 683 |
|
| 684 |
let (prev, data) = data.split_at_mut(hdr.end); |
| 685 |
// `prev` may have already-encrypted packets this one is being coalesced with. |
| 686 |
// Use only the actual current header for AAD. |
| 687 |
let data = self.aead.encrypt_in_place(pn, &prev[hdr], data)?; |
| 688 |
|
| 689 |
qtrace!("[{self}] encrypt ct={}", hex(&data)); |
| 690 |
debug_assert_eq!(pn, self.next_pn()); |
| 691 |
self.used(pn)?; |
| 692 |
Ok(data) |
| 693 |
} |
| 694 |
|
| 695 |
#[must_use] |
| 696 |
pub const fn expansion(&self) -> usize { |
| 697 |
self.aead.expansion() |
| 698 |
} |
| 699 |
|
| 700 |
pub fn decrypt<'a>( |
| 701 |
&mut self, |
| 702 |
pn: PacketNumber, |
| 703 |
hdr: Range<usize>, |
| 704 |
data: &'a mut [u8], |
| 705 |
) -> Res<&'a mut [u8]> { |
| 706 |
debug_assert_eq!(self.direction, CryptoDxDirection::Read); |
| 707 |
qtrace!( |
| 708 |
"[{self}] decrypt_in_place pn={pn} hdr={} body={}", |
| 709 |
hex(data[hdr.clone()].as_ref()), |
| 710 |
hex(data[hdr.end..].as_ref()) |
| 711 |
); |
| 712 |
self.invoked()?; |
| 713 |
let (hdr, data) = data.split_at_mut(hdr.end); |
| 714 |
let data = self.aead.decrypt_in_place(pn, hdr, data)?; |
| 715 |
self.used(pn)?; |
| 716 |
Ok(data) |
| 717 |
} |
| 718 |
|
| 719 |
#[cfg(not(feature = "disable-encryption"))] |
| 720 |
#[cfg(test)] |
| 721 |
pub(crate) fn test_default() -> Self { |
| 722 |
// This matches the value in packet.rs |
| 723 |
const CLIENT_CID: &[u8] = &[0x83, 0x94, 0xc8, 0xf0, 0x3e, 0x51, 0x57, 0x08]; |
| 724 |
Self::new_initial( |
| 725 |
Version::default(), |
| 726 |
CryptoDxDirection::Write, |
| 727 |
"server in", |
| 728 |
CLIENT_CID, |
| 729 |
) |
| 730 |
.unwrap() |
| 731 |
} |
| 732 |
|
| 733 |
/// Get the amount of extra padding packets protected with this profile need. |
| 734 |
/// This is the difference between the size of the header protection sample |
| 735 |
/// and the AEAD expansion. |
| 736 |
pub const fn extra_padding(&self) -> usize { |
| 737 |
HpKey::SAMPLE_SIZE.saturating_sub(self.aead.expansion()) |
| 738 |
} |
| 739 |
} |
| 740 |
|
| 741 |
impl Display for CryptoDxState { |
| 742 |
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut Formatter) -> fmt::Result { |
| 743 |
write!(f, "epoch {} {:?}", self.epoch, self.direction) |
| 744 |
} |
| 745 |
} |
| 746 |
|
| 747 |
#[derive(Debug)] |
| 748 |
pub struct CryptoState { |
| 749 |
tx: CryptoDxState, |
| 750 |
rx: CryptoDxState, |
| 751 |
} |
| 752 |
|
| 753 |
impl Index<CryptoDxDirection> for CryptoState { |
| 754 |
type Output = CryptoDxState; |
| 755 |
|
| 756 |
fn index(&self, index: CryptoDxDirection) -> &Self::Output { |
| 757 |
match index { |
| 758 |
CryptoDxDirection::Read => &self.rx, |
| 759 |
CryptoDxDirection::Write => &self.tx, |
| 760 |
} |
| 761 |
} |
| 762 |
} |
| 763 |
|
| 764 |
impl IndexMut<CryptoDxDirection> for CryptoState { |
| 765 |
fn index_mut(&mut self, index: CryptoDxDirection) -> &mut Self::Output { |
| 766 |
match index { |
| 767 |
CryptoDxDirection::Read => &mut self.rx, |
| 768 |
CryptoDxDirection::Write => &mut self.tx, |
| 769 |
} |
| 770 |
} |
| 771 |
} |
| 772 |
|
| 773 |
/// `CryptoDxAppData` wraps the state necessary for one direction of application data keys. |
| 774 |
/// This includes the secret needed to generate the next set of keys. |
| 775 |
#[derive(Debug)] |
| 776 |
pub struct CryptoDxAppData { |
| 777 |
dx: CryptoDxState, |
| 778 |
cipher: Cipher, |
| 779 |
// Not the secret used to create `self.dx`, but the one needed for the next iteration. |
| 780 |
next_secret: SymKey, |
| 781 |
} |
| 782 |
|
| 783 |
impl CryptoDxAppData { |
| 784 |
pub fn new( |
| 785 |
version: Version, |
| 786 |
dir: CryptoDxDirection, |
| 787 |
secret: &SymKey, |
| 788 |
cipher: Cipher, |
| 789 |
) -> Res<Self> { |
| 790 |
Ok(Self { |
| 791 |
dx: CryptoDxState::new(version, dir, Epoch::ApplicationData, secret, cipher)?, |
| 792 |
cipher, |
| 793 |
next_secret: Self::update_secret(cipher, secret)?, |
| 794 |
}) |
| 795 |
} |
| 796 |
|
| 797 |
fn update_secret(cipher: Cipher, secret: &SymKey) -> Res<SymKey> { |
| 798 |
let next = hkdf::expand_label(TLS_VERSION_1_3, cipher, secret, &[], "quic ku")?; |
| 799 |
Ok(next) |
| 800 |
} |
| 801 |
|
| 802 |
pub fn next(&self) -> Res<Self> { |
| 803 |
if self.dx.epoch == usize::MAX { |
| 804 |
// Guard against too many key updates. |
| 805 |
return Err(Error::KeysExhausted); |
| 806 |
} |
| 807 |
let next_secret = Self::update_secret(self.cipher, &self.next_secret)?; |
| 808 |
Ok(Self { |
| 809 |
dx: self.dx.next(&self.next_secret, self.cipher)?, |
| 810 |
cipher: self.cipher, |
| 811 |
next_secret, |
| 812 |
}) |
| 813 |
} |
| 814 |
|
| 815 |
pub const fn epoch(&self) -> usize { |
| 816 |
self.dx.epoch |
| 817 |
} |
| 818 |
} |
| 819 |
|
| 820 |
/// All of the keying material needed for a connection. |
| 821 |
/// |
| 822 |
/// Note that the methods on this struct take a version but those are only ever |
| 823 |
/// used for Initial keys; a version has been selected at the time we need to |
| 824 |
/// get other keys, so those have fixed versions. |
| 825 |
#[derive(Debug, Default)] |
| 826 |
pub struct CryptoStates { |
| 827 |
initials: EnumMap<Version, Option<CryptoState>>, |
| 828 |
handshake: Option<CryptoState>, |
| 829 |
zero_rtt: Option<CryptoDxState>, // One direction only! |
| 830 |
cipher: Cipher, |
| 831 |
app_write: Option<CryptoDxAppData>, |
| 832 |
app_read: Option<CryptoDxAppData>, |
| 833 |
app_read_next: Option<CryptoDxAppData>, |
| 834 |
// If this is set, then we have noticed a genuine update. |
| 835 |
// Once this time passes, we should switch in new keys. |
| 836 |
read_update_time: Option<Instant>, |
| 837 |
} |
| 838 |
|
| 839 |
impl CryptoStates { |
| 840 |
fn initials_is_empty(&self) -> bool { |
| 841 |
self.initials.values().flatten().count() == 0 |
| 842 |
} |
| 843 |
|
| 844 |
/// Select a `CryptoDxState` and `CryptoSpace` for the given `PacketNumberSpace`. |
| 845 |
/// This selects 0-RTT keys for `PacketNumberSpace::ApplicationData` if 1-RTT keys are |
| 846 |
/// not yet available. |
| 847 |
pub fn select_tx_mut( |
| 848 |
&mut self, |
| 849 |
version: Version, |
| 850 |
space: PacketNumberSpace, |
| 851 |
) -> Option<(Epoch, &mut CryptoDxState)> { |
| 852 |
match space { |
| 853 |
PacketNumberSpace::Initial => self |
| 854 |
.tx_mut(version, Epoch::Initial) |
| 855 |
.map(|dx| (Epoch::Initial, dx)), |
| 856 |
PacketNumberSpace::Handshake => self |
| 857 |
.tx_mut(version, Epoch::Handshake) |
| 858 |
.map(|dx| (Epoch::Handshake, dx)), |
| 859 |
PacketNumberSpace::ApplicationData => { |
| 860 |
if let Some(app) = self.app_write.as_mut() { |
| 861 |
Some((Epoch::ApplicationData, &mut app.dx)) |
| 862 |
} else { |
| 863 |
self.zero_rtt.as_mut().map(|dx| (Epoch::ZeroRtt, dx)) |
| 864 |
} |
| 865 |
} |
| 866 |
} |
| 867 |
} |
| 868 |
|
| 869 |
pub fn tx_mut<'a>( |
| 870 |
&'a mut self, |
| 871 |
version: Version, |
| 872 |
epoch: Epoch, |
| 873 |
) -> Option<&'a mut CryptoDxState> { |
| 874 |
let tx = |k: Option<&'a mut CryptoState>| k.map(|dx| &mut dx.tx); |
| 875 |
match epoch { |
| 876 |
Epoch::Initial => tx(self.initials[version].as_mut()), |
| 877 |
Epoch::ZeroRtt => self |
| 878 |
.zero_rtt |
| 879 |
.as_mut() |
| 880 |
.filter(|z| z.direction == CryptoDxDirection::Write), |
| 881 |
Epoch::Handshake => tx(self.handshake.as_mut()), |
| 882 |
Epoch::ApplicationData => self.app_write.as_mut().map(|app| &mut app.dx), |
| 883 |
} |
| 884 |
} |
| 885 |
|
| 886 |
pub fn tx<'a>(&'a self, version: Version, epoch: Epoch) -> Option<&'a CryptoDxState> { |
| 887 |
let tx = |k: Option<&'a CryptoState>| k.map(|dx| &dx.tx); |
| 888 |
match epoch { |
| 889 |
Epoch::Initial => tx(self.initials[version].as_ref()), |
| 890 |
Epoch::ZeroRtt => self |
| 891 |
.zero_rtt |
| 892 |
.as_ref() |
| 893 |
.filter(|z| z.direction == CryptoDxDirection::Write), |
| 894 |
Epoch::Handshake => tx(self.handshake.as_ref()), |
| 895 |
Epoch::ApplicationData => self.app_write.as_ref().map(|app| &app.dx), |
| 896 |
} |
| 897 |
} |
| 898 |
|
| 899 |
pub fn select_tx( |
| 900 |
&self, |
| 901 |
version: Version, |
| 902 |
space: PacketNumberSpace, |
| 903 |
) -> Option<(Epoch, &CryptoDxState)> { |
| 904 |
match space { |
| 905 |
PacketNumberSpace::Initial => self |
| 906 |
.tx(version, Epoch::Initial) |
| 907 |
.map(|dx| (Epoch::Initial, dx)), |
| 908 |
PacketNumberSpace::Handshake => self |
| 909 |
.tx(version, Epoch::Handshake) |
| 910 |
.map(|dx| (Epoch::Handshake, dx)), |
| 911 |
PacketNumberSpace::ApplicationData => self.app_write.as_ref().map_or_else( |
| 912 |
|| self.zero_rtt.as_ref().map(|dx| (Epoch::ZeroRtt, dx)), |
| 913 |
|app| Some((Epoch::ApplicationData, &app.dx)), |
| 914 |
), |
| 915 |
} |
| 916 |
} |
| 917 |
|
| 918 |
pub fn rx_hp(&mut self, version: Version, epoch: Epoch) -> Option<&mut CryptoDxState> { |
| 919 |
if epoch == Epoch::ApplicationData { |
| 920 |
self.app_read.as_mut().map(|ar| &mut ar.dx) |
| 921 |
} else { |
| 922 |
self.rx(version, epoch, false) |
| 923 |
} |
| 924 |
} |
| 925 |
|
| 926 |
pub fn rx<'a>( |
| 927 |
&'a mut self, |
| 928 |
version: Version, |
| 929 |
epoch: Epoch, |
| 930 |
key_phase: bool, |
| 931 |
) -> Option<&'a mut CryptoDxState> { |
| 932 |
let rx = |x: Option<&'a mut CryptoState>| x.map(|dx| &mut dx.rx); |
| 933 |
match epoch { |
| 934 |
Epoch::Initial => rx(self.initials[version].as_mut()), |
| 935 |
Epoch::ZeroRtt => self |
| 936 |
.zero_rtt |
| 937 |
.as_mut() |
| 938 |
.filter(|z| z.direction == CryptoDxDirection::Read), |
| 939 |
Epoch::Handshake => rx(self.handshake.as_mut()), |
| 940 |
Epoch::ApplicationData => { |
| 941 |
let f = |a: Option<&'a mut CryptoDxAppData>| { |
| 942 |
a.filter(|ar| ar.dx.key_phase() == key_phase) |
| 943 |
}; |
| 944 |
// XOR to reduce the leakage about which key is chosen. |
| 945 |
f(self.app_read.as_mut()) |
| 946 |
.xor(f(self.app_read_next.as_mut())) |
| 947 |
.map(|ar| &mut ar.dx) |
| 948 |
} |
| 949 |
} |
| 950 |
} |
| 951 |
|
| 952 |
/// Whether keys for processing packets in the indicated space are pending. |
| 953 |
/// This allows the caller to determine whether to save a packet for later |
| 954 |
/// when keys are not available. |
| 955 |
/// NOTE: 0-RTT keys are not considered here. The expectation is that a |
| 956 |
/// server will have to save 0-RTT packets in a different place. Though it |
| 957 |
/// is possible to attribute 0-RTT packets to an existing connection if there |
| 958 |
/// is a multi-packet Initial, that is an unusual circumstance, so we |
| 959 |
/// don't do caching for that in those places that call this function. |
| 960 |
pub fn rx_pending(&self, space: Epoch) -> bool { |
| 961 |
match space { |
| 962 |
Epoch::Initial | Epoch::ZeroRtt => false, |
| 963 |
Epoch::Handshake => self.handshake.is_none() && !self.initials_is_empty(), |
| 964 |
Epoch::ApplicationData => self.app_read.is_none(), |
| 965 |
} |
| 966 |
} |
| 967 |
|
| 968 |
/// Create the initial crypto state. |
| 969 |
/// Note that the version here can change and that's OK. |
| 970 |
pub fn init<'v, V>(&mut self, versions: V, role: Role, dcid: &[u8]) -> Res<()> |
| 971 |
where |
| 972 |
V: IntoIterator<Item = &'v Version>, |
| 973 |
{ |
| 974 |
const CLIENT_INITIAL_LABEL: &str = "client in"; |
| 975 |
const SERVER_INITIAL_LABEL: &str = "server in"; |
| 976 |
|
| 977 |
let (write, read) = match role { |
| 978 |
Role::Client => (CLIENT_INITIAL_LABEL, SERVER_INITIAL_LABEL), |
| 979 |
Role::Server => (SERVER_INITIAL_LABEL, CLIENT_INITIAL_LABEL), |
| 980 |
}; |
| 981 |
|
| 982 |
for v in versions { |
| 983 |
qdebug!( |
| 984 |
"[{self}] Creating initial cipher state v={v:?}, role={role:?} dcid={}", |
| 985 |
hex(dcid) |
| 986 |
); |
| 987 |
|
| 988 |
let mut initial = CryptoState { |
| 989 |
tx: CryptoDxState::new_initial(*v, CryptoDxDirection::Write, write, dcid)?, |
| 990 |
rx: CryptoDxState::new_initial(*v, CryptoDxDirection::Read, read, dcid)?, |
| 991 |
}; |
| 992 |
if let Some(prev) = &self.initials[*v] { |
| 993 |
qinfo!( |
| 994 |
"[{self}] Continue packet numbers for initial after retry (write is {:?})", |
| 995 |
prev.rx.used_pn, |
| 996 |
); |
| 997 |
initial.tx.continuation(&prev.tx)?; |
| 998 |
} |
| 999 |
self.initials[*v] = Some(initial); |
| 1000 |
} |
| 1001 |
Ok(()) |
| 1002 |
} |
| 1003 |
|
| 1004 |
/// At a server, we can be more targeted in initializing. |
| 1005 |
/// Initialize on demand: either to decrypt Initial packets that we receive |
| 1006 |
/// or after a version has been selected. |
| 1007 |
/// This is maybe slightly inefficient in the first case, because we might |
| 1008 |
/// not need the send keys if the packet is subsequently discarded, but |
| 1009 |
/// the overall effort is small enough to write off. |
| 1010 |
pub fn init_server(&mut self, version: Version, dcid: &[u8]) -> Res<()> { |
| 1011 |
if self.initials[version].is_none() { |
| 1012 |
self.init(&[version], Role::Server, dcid)?; |
| 1013 |
} |
| 1014 |
Ok(()) |
| 1015 |
} |
| 1016 |
|
| 1017 |
pub fn confirm_version(&mut self, orig: Version, confirmed: Version) -> Res<()> { |
| 1018 |
if orig != confirmed { |
| 1019 |
// This part where the old data is removed and then re-added is to |
| 1020 |
// appease the borrow checker. |
| 1021 |
// Note that on the server, we might not have initials for |orig| if it |
| 1022 |
// was configured for |orig| and only |confirmed| Initial packets arrived. |
| 1023 |
if let Some(prev) = self.initials[orig].take() { |
| 1024 |
let next = self.initials[confirmed] |
| 1025 |
.as_mut() |
| 1026 |
.ok_or(Error::VersionNegotiation)?; |
| 1027 |
next.tx.continuation(&prev.tx)?; |
| 1028 |
self.initials[orig] = Some(prev); |
| 1029 |
} |
| 1030 |
} |
| 1031 |
Ok(()) |
| 1032 |
} |
| 1033 |
|
| 1034 |
pub fn set_0rtt_keys( |
| 1035 |
&mut self, |
| 1036 |
version: Version, |
| 1037 |
dir: CryptoDxDirection, |
| 1038 |
secret: &SymKey, |
| 1039 |
cipher: Cipher, |
| 1040 |
) -> Res<()> { |
| 1041 |
qtrace!("[{self}] install 0-RTT keys"); |
| 1042 |
self.zero_rtt = Some(CryptoDxState::new( |
| 1043 |
version, |
| 1044 |
dir, |
| 1045 |
Epoch::ZeroRtt, |
| 1046 |
secret, |
| 1047 |
cipher, |
| 1048 |
)?); |
| 1049 |
Ok(()) |
| 1050 |
} |
| 1051 |
|
| 1052 |
/// Discard keys and return true if that happened. |
| 1053 |
pub fn discard(&mut self, space: PacketNumberSpace) -> bool { |
| 1054 |
match space { |
| 1055 |
PacketNumberSpace::Initial => { |
| 1056 |
let empty = self.initials_is_empty(); |
| 1057 |
self.initials.clear(); |
| 1058 |
!empty |
| 1059 |
} |
| 1060 |
PacketNumberSpace::Handshake => self.handshake.take().is_some(), |
| 1061 |
PacketNumberSpace::ApplicationData => panic!("Can't drop application data keys"), |
| 1062 |
} |
| 1063 |
} |
| 1064 |
|
| 1065 |
pub fn discard_0rtt_keys(&mut self) { |
| 1066 |
qtrace!("[{self}] discard 0-RTT keys"); |
| 1067 |
assert!( |
| 1068 |
self.app_read.is_none(), |
| 1069 |
"Can't discard 0-RTT after setting application keys" |
| 1070 |
); |
| 1071 |
self.zero_rtt = None; |
| 1072 |
} |
| 1073 |
|
| 1074 |
pub fn set_handshake_keys( |
| 1075 |
&mut self, |
| 1076 |
version: Version, |
| 1077 |
write_secret: &SymKey, |
| 1078 |
read_secret: &SymKey, |
| 1079 |
cipher: Cipher, |
| 1080 |
) -> Res<()> { |
| 1081 |
self.cipher = cipher; |
| 1082 |
self.handshake = Some(CryptoState { |
| 1083 |
tx: CryptoDxState::new( |
| 1084 |
version, |
| 1085 |
CryptoDxDirection::Write, |
| 1086 |
Epoch::Handshake, |
| 1087 |
write_secret, |
| 1088 |
cipher, |
| 1089 |
)?, |
| 1090 |
rx: CryptoDxState::new( |
| 1091 |
version, |
| 1092 |
CryptoDxDirection::Read, |
| 1093 |
Epoch::Handshake, |
| 1094 |
read_secret, |
| 1095 |
cipher, |
| 1096 |
)?, |
| 1097 |
}); |
| 1098 |
Ok(()) |
| 1099 |
} |
| 1100 |
|
| 1101 |
pub fn set_application_write_key(&mut self, version: Version, secret: &SymKey) -> Res<()> { |
| 1102 |
debug_assert!(self.app_write.is_none()); |
| 1103 |
debug_assert_ne!(self.cipher, 0); |
| 1104 |
let mut app = CryptoDxAppData::new(version, CryptoDxDirection::Write, secret, self.cipher)?; |
| 1105 |
if let Some(z) = &self.zero_rtt { |
| 1106 |
if z.direction == CryptoDxDirection::Write { |
| 1107 |
app.dx.continuation(z)?; |
| 1108 |
} |
| 1109 |
} |
| 1110 |
self.zero_rtt = None; |
| 1111 |
self.app_write = Some(app); |
| 1112 |
Ok(()) |
| 1113 |
} |
| 1114 |
|
| 1115 |
pub fn set_application_read_key( |
| 1116 |
&mut self, |
| 1117 |
version: Version, |
| 1118 |
secret: &SymKey, |
| 1119 |
expire_0rtt: Instant, |
| 1120 |
) -> Res<()> { |
| 1121 |
debug_assert!(self.app_write.is_some(), "should have write keys installed"); |
| 1122 |
debug_assert!(self.app_read.is_none()); |
| 1123 |
let mut app = CryptoDxAppData::new(version, CryptoDxDirection::Read, secret, self.cipher)?; |
| 1124 |
if let Some(z) = &self.zero_rtt { |
| 1125 |
if z.direction == CryptoDxDirection::Read { |
| 1126 |
app.dx.continuation(z)?; |
| 1127 |
} |
| 1128 |
self.read_update_time = Some(expire_0rtt); |
| 1129 |
} |
| 1130 |
self.app_read_next = Some(app.next()?); |
| 1131 |
self.app_read = Some(app); |
| 1132 |
Ok(()) |
| 1133 |
} |
| 1134 |
|
| 1135 |
/// Update the write keys. |
| 1136 |
pub fn initiate_key_update(&mut self, largest_acknowledged: Option<PacketNumber>) -> Res<()> { |
| 1137 |
// Only update if we are able to. We can only do this if we have |
| 1138 |
// received an acknowledgement for a packet in the current phase. |
| 1139 |
// Also, skip this if we are waiting for read keys on the existing |
| 1140 |
// key update to be rolled over. |
| 1141 |
let write = &self.app_write.as_ref().ok_or(Error::InternalError)?.dx; |
| 1142 |
if write.can_update(largest_acknowledged) && self.read_update_time.is_none() { |
| 1143 |
// This call additionally checks that we don't advance to the next |
| 1144 |
// epoch while a key update is in progress. |
| 1145 |
if self.maybe_update_write()? { |
| 1146 |
Ok(()) |
| 1147 |
} else { |
| 1148 |
qdebug!("[{self}] Write keys already updated"); |
| 1149 |
Err(Error::KeyUpdateBlocked) |
| 1150 |
} |
| 1151 |
} else { |
| 1152 |
qdebug!("[{self}] Waiting for ACK or blocked on read key timer"); |
| 1153 |
Err(Error::KeyUpdateBlocked) |
| 1154 |
} |
| 1155 |
} |
| 1156 |
|
| 1157 |
/// Try to update, and return true if it happened. |
| 1158 |
fn maybe_update_write(&mut self) -> Res<bool> { |
| 1159 |
// Update write keys. But only do so if the write keys are not already |
| 1160 |
// ahead of the read keys. If we initiated the key update, the write keys |
| 1161 |
// will already be ahead. |
| 1162 |
debug_assert!(self.read_update_time.is_none()); |
| 1163 |
let write = &self.app_write.as_ref().ok_or(Error::InternalError)?; |
| 1164 |
let read = &self.app_read.as_ref().ok_or(Error::InternalError)?; |
| 1165 |
if write.epoch() == read.epoch() { |
| 1166 |
qdebug!("[{self}] Update write keys to epoch={}", write.epoch() + 1); |
| 1167 |
self.app_write = Some(write.next()?); |
| 1168 |
Ok(true) |
| 1169 |
} else { |
| 1170 |
Ok(false) |
| 1171 |
} |
| 1172 |
} |
| 1173 |
|
| 1174 |
/// Check whether write keys are close to running out of invocations. |
| 1175 |
/// If that is close, update them if possible. Failing to update at |
| 1176 |
/// this stage is cause for a fatal error. |
| 1177 |
pub fn auto_update(&mut self) -> Res<()> { |
| 1178 |
if let Some(app_write) = self.app_write.as_ref() { |
| 1179 |
if app_write.dx.should_update() { |
| 1180 |
qinfo!("[{self}] Initiating automatic key update"); |
| 1181 |
if !self.maybe_update_write()? { |
| 1182 |
return Err(Error::KeysExhausted); |
| 1183 |
} |
| 1184 |
} |
| 1185 |
} |
| 1186 |
Ok(()) |
| 1187 |
} |
| 1188 |
|
| 1189 |
fn has_0rtt_read(&self) -> bool { |
| 1190 |
self.zero_rtt |
| 1191 |
.as_ref() |
| 1192 |
.filter(|z| z.direction == CryptoDxDirection::Read) |
| 1193 |
.is_some() |
| 1194 |
} |
| 1195 |
|
| 1196 |
/// Prepare to update read keys. This doesn't happen immediately as |
| 1197 |
/// we want to ensure that we can continue to receive any delayed |
| 1198 |
/// packets that use the old keys. So we just set a timer. |
| 1199 |
pub fn key_update_received(&mut self, expiration: Instant) -> Res<()> { |
| 1200 |
qtrace!("[{self}] Key update received"); |
| 1201 |
// If we received a key update, then we assume that the peer has |
| 1202 |
// acknowledged a packet we sent in this epoch. It's OK to do that |
| 1203 |
// because they aren't allowed to update without first having received |
| 1204 |
// something from us. If the ACK isn't in the packet that triggered this |
| 1205 |
// key update, it must be in some other packet they have sent. |
| 1206 |
_ = self.maybe_update_write()?; |
| 1207 |
|
| 1208 |
// We shouldn't have 0-RTT keys at this point, but if we do, dump them. |
| 1209 |
debug_assert_eq!(self.read_update_time.is_some(), self.has_0rtt_read()); |
| 1210 |
if self.has_0rtt_read() { |
| 1211 |
self.zero_rtt = None; |
| 1212 |
} |
| 1213 |
self.read_update_time = Some(expiration); |
| 1214 |
Ok(()) |
| 1215 |
} |
| 1216 |
|
| 1217 |
#[must_use] |
| 1218 |
pub const fn update_time(&self) -> Option<Instant> { |
| 1219 |
self.read_update_time |
| 1220 |
} |
| 1221 |
|
| 1222 |
/// Check if time has passed for updating key update parameters. |
| 1223 |
/// If it has, then swap keys over and allow more key updates to be initiated. |
| 1224 |
/// This is also used to discard 0-RTT read keys at the server in the same way. |
| 1225 |
pub fn check_key_update(&mut self, now: Instant) -> Res<()> { |
| 1226 |
if let Some(expiry) = self.read_update_time { |
| 1227 |
// If enough time has passed, then install new keys and clear the timer. |
| 1228 |
if now >= expiry { |
| 1229 |
if self.has_0rtt_read() { |
| 1230 |
qtrace!("[{self}] Discarding 0-RTT keys"); |
| 1231 |
self.zero_rtt = None; |
| 1232 |
} else { |
| 1233 |
qtrace!("[{self}] Rotating read keys"); |
| 1234 |
mem::swap(&mut self.app_read, &mut self.app_read_next); |
| 1235 |
self.app_read_next = |
| 1236 |
Some(self.app_read.as_ref().ok_or(Error::InternalError)?.next()?); |
| 1237 |
} |
| 1238 |
self.read_update_time = None; |
| 1239 |
} |
| 1240 |
} |
| 1241 |
Ok(()) |
| 1242 |
} |
| 1243 |
|
| 1244 |
/// Get the current/highest epoch. This returns (write, read) epochs. |
| 1245 |
#[cfg(test)] |
| 1246 |
pub fn get_epochs(&self) -> (Option<usize>, Option<usize>) { |
| 1247 |
let to_epoch = |app: &Option<CryptoDxAppData>| app.as_ref().map(|a| a.dx.epoch); |
| 1248 |
(to_epoch(&self.app_write), to_epoch(&self.app_read)) |
| 1249 |
} |
| 1250 |
|
| 1251 |
/// While we are awaiting the completion of a key update, we might receive |
| 1252 |
/// valid packets that are protected with old keys. We need to ensure that |
| 1253 |
/// these don't carry packet numbers higher than those in packets protected |
| 1254 |
/// with the newer keys. To ensure that, this is called after every decryption. |
| 1255 |
pub fn check_pn_overlap(&mut self) -> Res<()> { |
| 1256 |
// We only need to do the check while we are waiting for read keys to be updated. |
| 1257 |
if self.read_update_time.is_some() { |
| 1258 |
qtrace!("[{self}] Checking for PN overlap"); |
| 1259 |
let next_dx = &mut self.app_read_next.as_mut().ok_or(Error::InternalError)?.dx; |
| 1260 |
next_dx.continuation(&self.app_read.as_ref().ok_or(Error::InternalError)?.dx)?; |
| 1261 |
} |
| 1262 |
Ok(()) |
| 1263 |
} |
| 1264 |
|
| 1265 |
/// Make some state for removing protection in tests. |
| 1266 |
#[cfg(not(feature = "disable-encryption"))] |
| 1267 |
#[cfg(test)] |
| 1268 |
pub(crate) fn test_default() -> Self { |
| 1269 |
let read = |epoch| { |
| 1270 |
let mut dx = CryptoDxState::test_default(); |
| 1271 |
dx.direction = CryptoDxDirection::Read; |
| 1272 |
dx.epoch = epoch; |
| 1273 |
dx |
| 1274 |
}; |
| 1275 |
let app_read = |epoch| CryptoDxAppData { |
| 1276 |
dx: read(epoch), |
| 1277 |
cipher: TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, |
| 1278 |
next_secret: hkdf::import_key(TLS_VERSION_1_3, &[0xaa; 32]).unwrap(), |
| 1279 |
}; |
| 1280 |
let initials = EnumMap::from_array([ |
| 1281 |
None, |
| 1282 |
Some(CryptoState { |
| 1283 |
tx: CryptoDxState::test_default(), |
| 1284 |
rx: read(0), |
| 1285 |
}), |
| 1286 |
None, |
| 1287 |
]); |
| 1288 |
Self { |
| 1289 |
initials, |
| 1290 |
handshake: None, |
| 1291 |
zero_rtt: None, |
| 1292 |
cipher: TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, |
| 1293 |
// This isn't used, but the epoch is read to check for a key update. |
| 1294 |
app_write: Some(app_read(3)), |
| 1295 |
app_read: Some(app_read(3)), |
| 1296 |
app_read_next: Some(app_read(4)), |
| 1297 |
read_update_time: None, |
| 1298 |
} |
| 1299 |
} |
| 1300 |
|
| 1301 |
#[cfg(all(not(feature = "disable-encryption"), test))] |
| 1302 |
#[cfg(test)] |
| 1303 |
pub(crate) fn test_chacha() -> Self { |
| 1304 |
const SECRET: &[u8] = &[ |
| 1305 |
0x9a, 0xc3, 0x12, 0xa7, 0xf8, 0x77, 0x46, 0x8e, 0xbe, 0x69, 0x42, 0x27, 0x48, 0xad, |
| 1306 |
0x00, 0xa1, 0x54, 0x43, 0xf1, 0x82, 0x03, 0xa0, 0x7d, 0x60, 0x60, 0xf6, 0x88, 0xf3, |
| 1307 |
0x0f, 0x21, 0x63, 0x2b, |
| 1308 |
]; |
| 1309 |
let secret = hkdf::import_key(TLS_VERSION_1_3, SECRET).unwrap(); |
| 1310 |
let app_read = |epoch| CryptoDxAppData { |
| 1311 |
dx: CryptoDxState { |
| 1312 |
version: Version::Version1, |
| 1313 |
direction: CryptoDxDirection::Read, |
| 1314 |
epoch, |
| 1315 |
aead: Aead::new( |
| 1316 |
TLS_VERSION_1_3, |
| 1317 |
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, |
| 1318 |
&secret, |
| 1319 |
"quic ", // This is a v1 test so hard-code the label. |
| 1320 |
) |
| 1321 |
.unwrap(), |
| 1322 |
hpkey: HpKey::extract( |
| 1323 |
TLS_VERSION_1_3, |
| 1324 |
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, |
| 1325 |
&secret, |
| 1326 |
"quic hp", |
| 1327 |
) |
| 1328 |
.unwrap(), |
| 1329 |
used_pn: 0..645_971_972, |
| 1330 |
min_pn: 0, |
| 1331 |
invocations: 10, |
| 1332 |
largest_packet_len: INITIAL_LARGEST_PACKET_LEN, |
| 1333 |
}, |
| 1334 |
cipher: TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, |
| 1335 |
next_secret: secret.clone(), |
| 1336 |
}; |
| 1337 |
Self { |
| 1338 |
initials: EnumMap::default(), |
| 1339 |
handshake: None, |
| 1340 |
zero_rtt: None, |
| 1341 |
cipher: TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, |
| 1342 |
app_write: Some(app_read(3)), |
| 1343 |
app_read: Some(app_read(3)), |
| 1344 |
app_read_next: Some(app_read(4)), |
| 1345 |
read_update_time: None, |
| 1346 |
} |
| 1347 |
} |
| 1348 |
} |
| 1349 |
|
| 1350 |
impl Display for CryptoStates { |
| 1351 |
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut Formatter) -> fmt::Result { |
| 1352 |
write!(f, "CryptoStates") |
| 1353 |
} |
| 1354 |
} |
| 1355 |
|
| 1356 |
#[derive(Debug, Default)] |
| 1357 |
pub struct CryptoStream { |
| 1358 |
tx: TxBuffer, |
| 1359 |
rx: RxStreamOrderer, |
| 1360 |
} |
| 1361 |
|
| 1362 |
#[derive(Debug)] |
| 1363 |
pub enum CryptoStreams { |
| 1364 |
Initial { |
| 1365 |
initial: CryptoStream, |
| 1366 |
handshake: CryptoStream, |
| 1367 |
application: CryptoStream, |
| 1368 |
}, |
| 1369 |
Handshake { |
| 1370 |
handshake: CryptoStream, |
| 1371 |
application: CryptoStream, |
| 1372 |
}, |
| 1373 |
ApplicationData { |
| 1374 |
application: CryptoStream, |
| 1375 |
}, |
| 1376 |
} |
| 1377 |
|
| 1378 |
impl CryptoStreams { |
| 1379 |
/// Keep around 64k if a server wants to push excess data at us. |
| 1380 |
const BUFFER_LIMIT: u64 = 65536; |
| 1381 |
|
| 1382 |
pub fn discard(&mut self, space: PacketNumberSpace) { |
| 1383 |
match space { |
| 1384 |
PacketNumberSpace::Initial => { |
| 1385 |
if let Self::Initial { |
| 1386 |
handshake, |
| 1387 |
application, |
| 1388 |
.. |
| 1389 |
} = self |
| 1390 |
{ |
| 1391 |
*self = Self::Handshake { |
| 1392 |
handshake: mem::take(handshake), |
| 1393 |
application: mem::take(application), |
| 1394 |
}; |
| 1395 |
} |
| 1396 |
} |
| 1397 |
PacketNumberSpace::Handshake => { |
| 1398 |
if let Self::Handshake { application, .. } = self { |
| 1399 |
*self = Self::ApplicationData { |
| 1400 |
application: mem::take(application), |
| 1401 |
}; |
| 1402 |
} else if matches!(self, Self::Initial { .. }) { |
| 1403 |
panic!("Discarding handshake before initial discarded"); |
| 1404 |
} |
| 1405 |
} |
| 1406 |
PacketNumberSpace::ApplicationData => { |
| 1407 |
panic!("Discarding application data crypto streams") |
| 1408 |
} |
| 1409 |
} |
| 1410 |
} |
| 1411 |
|
| 1412 |
pub fn send(&mut self, space: PacketNumberSpace, data: &[u8]) -> Res<()> { |
| 1413 |
self.get_mut(space) |
| 1414 |
.ok_or(Error::ProtocolViolation)? |
| 1415 |
.tx |
| 1416 |
.send(data); |
| 1417 |
Ok(()) |
| 1418 |
} |
| 1419 |
|
| 1420 |
pub fn inbound_frame(&mut self, space: PacketNumberSpace, offset: u64, data: &[u8]) -> Res<()> { |
| 1421 |
let rx = &mut self.get_mut(space).ok_or(Error::InternalError)?.rx; |
| 1422 |
rx.inbound_frame(offset, data); |
| 1423 |
if rx.received() - rx.retired() <= Self::BUFFER_LIMIT { |
| 1424 |
Ok(()) |
| 1425 |
} else { |
| 1426 |
Err(Error::CryptoBufferExceeded) |
| 1427 |
} |
| 1428 |
} |
| 1429 |
|
| 1430 |
pub fn data_ready(&self, space: PacketNumberSpace) -> bool { |
| 1431 |
self.get(space).is_some_and(|cs| cs.rx.data_ready()) |
| 1432 |
} |
| 1433 |
|
| 1434 |
pub fn read_to_end(&mut self, space: PacketNumberSpace, buf: &mut Vec<u8>) -> Res<usize> { |
| 1435 |
Ok(self |
| 1436 |
.get_mut(space) |
| 1437 |
.ok_or(Error::ProtocolViolation)? |
| 1438 |
.rx |
| 1439 |
.read_to_end(buf)) |
| 1440 |
} |
| 1441 |
|
| 1442 |
pub fn acked(&mut self, token: &CryptoRecoveryToken) { |
| 1443 |
if let Some(cs) = self.get_mut(token.space) { |
| 1444 |
cs.tx.mark_as_acked(token.offset, token.length); |
| 1445 |
} |
| 1446 |
} |
| 1447 |
|
| 1448 |
pub fn lost(&mut self, token: &CryptoRecoveryToken) { |
| 1449 |
// See BZ 1624800, ignore lost packets in spaces we've dropped keys |
| 1450 |
if let Some(cs) = self.get_mut(token.space) { |
| 1451 |
cs.tx.mark_as_lost(token.offset, token.length); |
| 1452 |
} |
| 1453 |
} |
| 1454 |
|
| 1455 |
/// Resend any Initial or Handshake CRYPTO frames that might be outstanding. |
| 1456 |
/// This can help speed up handshake times. |
| 1457 |
pub fn resend_unacked(&mut self, space: PacketNumberSpace) { |
| 1458 |
if space != PacketNumberSpace::ApplicationData { |
| 1459 |
if let Some(cs) = self.get_mut(space) { |
| 1460 |
cs.tx.unmark_sent(); |
| 1461 |
} |
| 1462 |
} |
| 1463 |
} |
| 1464 |
|
| 1465 |
pub fn is_empty(&mut self, space: PacketNumberSpace) -> bool { |
| 1466 |
self.get_mut(space).is_none_or(|cs| cs.tx.is_empty()) |
| 1467 |
} |
| 1468 |
|
| 1469 |
const fn get(&self, space: PacketNumberSpace) -> Option<&CryptoStream> { |
| 1470 |
let (initial, hs, app) = match self { |
| 1471 |
Self::Initial { |
| 1472 |
initial, |
| 1473 |
handshake, |
| 1474 |
application, |
| 1475 |
} => (Some(initial), Some(handshake), Some(application)), |
| 1476 |
Self::Handshake { |
| 1477 |
handshake, |
| 1478 |
application, |
| 1479 |
} => (None, Some(handshake), Some(application)), |
| 1480 |
Self::ApplicationData { application } => (None, None, Some(application)), |
| 1481 |
}; |
| 1482 |
match space { |
| 1483 |
PacketNumberSpace::Initial => initial, |
| 1484 |
PacketNumberSpace::Handshake => hs, |
| 1485 |
PacketNumberSpace::ApplicationData => app, |
| 1486 |
} |
| 1487 |
} |
| 1488 |
|
| 1489 |
fn get_mut(&mut self, space: PacketNumberSpace) -> Option<&mut CryptoStream> { |
| 1490 |
let (initial, hs, app) = match self { |
| 1491 |
Self::Initial { |
| 1492 |
initial, |
| 1493 |
handshake, |
| 1494 |
application, |
| 1495 |
} => (Some(initial), Some(handshake), Some(application)), |
| 1496 |
Self::Handshake { |
| 1497 |
handshake, |
| 1498 |
application, |
| 1499 |
} => (None, Some(handshake), Some(application)), |
| 1500 |
Self::ApplicationData { application } => (None, None, Some(application)), |
| 1501 |
}; |
| 1502 |
match space { |
| 1503 |
PacketNumberSpace::Initial => initial, |
| 1504 |
PacketNumberSpace::Handshake => hs, |
| 1505 |
PacketNumberSpace::ApplicationData => app, |
| 1506 |
} |
| 1507 |
} |
| 1508 |
|
| 1509 |
pub fn write_frame( |
| 1510 |
&mut self, |
| 1511 |
space: PacketNumberSpace, |
| 1512 |
sni_slicing: bool, |
| 1513 |
builder: &mut PacketBuilder, |
| 1514 |
tokens: &mut Vec<RecoveryToken>, |
| 1515 |
stats: &mut FrameStats, |
| 1516 |
) { |
| 1517 |
fn write_chunk( |
| 1518 |
offset: u64, |
| 1519 |
data: &[u8], |
| 1520 |
builder: &mut PacketBuilder, |
| 1521 |
) -> Option<(u64, usize)> { |
| 1522 |
let mut header_len = 1 + Encoder::varint_len(offset) + 1; |
| 1523 |
|
| 1524 |
// Don't bother if there isn't room for the header and some data. |
| 1525 |
if builder.remaining() < header_len + 1 { |
| 1526 |
return None; |
| 1527 |
} |
| 1528 |
// Calculate length of data based on the minimum of: |
| 1529 |
// - available data |
| 1530 |
// - remaining space, less the header, which counts only one byte for the length at |
| 1531 |
// first to avoid underestimating length |
| 1532 |
let length = min(data.len(), builder.remaining() - header_len); |
| 1533 |
header_len += |
| 1534 |
Encoder::varint_len(u64::try_from(length).expect("usize fits in u64")) - 1; |
| 1535 |
let length = min(data.len(), builder.remaining() - header_len); |
| 1536 |
|
| 1537 |
builder.encode_varint(FrameType::Crypto); |
| 1538 |
builder.encode_varint(offset); |
| 1539 |
builder.encode_vvec(&data[..length]); |
| 1540 |
Some((offset, length)) |
| 1541 |
} |
| 1542 |
|
| 1543 |
fn mark_as_sent( |
| 1544 |
cs: &mut CryptoStream, |
| 1545 |
space: PacketNumberSpace, |
| 1546 |
tokens: &mut Vec<RecoveryToken>, |
| 1547 |
offset: u64, |
| 1548 |
len: usize, |
| 1549 |
stats: &mut FrameStats, |
| 1550 |
) { |
| 1551 |
cs.tx.mark_as_sent(offset, len); |
| 1552 |
qdebug!("CRYPTO for {space} offset={offset}, len={len}"); |
| 1553 |
tokens.push(RecoveryToken::Crypto(CryptoRecoveryToken { |
| 1554 |
space, |
| 1555 |
offset, |
| 1556 |
length: len, |
| 1557 |
})); |
| 1558 |
stats.crypto += 1; |
| 1559 |
} |
| 1560 |
|
| 1561 |
#[expect(clippy::type_complexity, reason = "Yeah, a bit complex but still OK.")] |
| 1562 |
const fn limit_chunks<'a>( |
| 1563 |
left: (u64, &'a [u8]), |
| 1564 |
right: (u64, &'a [u8]), |
| 1565 |
limit: usize, |
| 1566 |
) -> ((u64, &'a [u8]), (u64, &'a [u8])) { |
| 1567 |
let (left_offset, mut left) = left; |
| 1568 |
let (mut right_offset, mut right) = right; |
| 1569 |
if left.len() + right.len() <= limit { |
| 1570 |
// Nothing to do. Both chunks will fit into one packet, meaning the SNI isn't spread |
| 1571 |
// over multiple packets. But at least it's in two unordered CRYPTO frames. |
| 1572 |
} else if left.len() <= limit { |
| 1573 |
// `left` is short enough to fit into this packet. So send from the *end* |
| 1574 |
// of `right`, so that the second half of the SNI is in another packet. |
| 1575 |
let right_len = right.len() + left.len() - limit; |
| 1576 |
right_offset += right_len as u64; |
| 1577 |
(_, right) = right.split_at(right_len); |
| 1578 |
} else if right.len() <= limit { |
| 1579 |
// `right` is short enough to fit into this packet. So only send a part of `left`. |
| 1580 |
// The SNI begins at the end of `left`, so send the beginnig of it in this packet. |
| 1581 |
(left, _) = left.split_at(limit - right.len()); |
| 1582 |
} else { |
| 1583 |
// Both chunks are too long to fit into one packet. Just send a part of each. |
| 1584 |
(left, _) = left.split_at(limit / 2); |
| 1585 |
(right, _) = right.split_at(limit / 2); |
| 1586 |
} |
| 1587 |
((left_offset, left), (right_offset, right)) |
| 1588 |
} |
| 1589 |
|
| 1590 |
let Some(cs) = self.get_mut(space) else { |
| 1591 |
return; |
| 1592 |
}; |
| 1593 |
while let Some((offset, data)) = cs.tx.next_bytes() { |
| 1594 |
let written = if sni_slicing && offset == 0 { |
| 1595 |
if let Some(sni) = find_sni(data) { |
| 1596 |
// Cut the crypto data in two at the midpoint of the SNI and swap the chunks. |
| 1597 |
let mid = sni.start + (sni.end - sni.start) / 2; |
| 1598 |
let (left, right) = data.split_at(mid); |
| 1599 |
|
| 1600 |
// Truncate the chunks so we can fit them into roughly evenly-filled packets. |
| 1601 |
let packets_needed = data.len().div_ceil(builder.limit()); |
| 1602 |
let limit = data.len() / packets_needed; |
| 1603 |
let ((left_offset, left), (right_offset, right)) = |
| 1604 |
limit_chunks((offset, left), (offset + mid as u64, right), limit); |
| 1605 |
( |
| 1606 |
write_chunk(right_offset, right, builder), |
| 1607 |
write_chunk(left_offset, left, builder), |
| 1608 |
) |
| 1609 |
} else { |
| 1610 |
// No SNI found, write the entire data. |
| 1611 |
(write_chunk(offset, data, builder), None) |
| 1612 |
} |
| 1613 |
} else { |
| 1614 |
// SNI slicing disabled or data not at offset 0, write the entire data. |
| 1615 |
(write_chunk(offset, data, builder), None) |
| 1616 |
}; |
| 1617 |
|
| 1618 |
match written { |
| 1619 |
(None, None) => break, |
| 1620 |
(None, Some((offset, len))) | (Some((offset, len)), None) => { |
| 1621 |
mark_as_sent(cs, space, tokens, offset, len, stats); |
| 1622 |
} |
| 1623 |
(Some((offset1, len1)), Some((offset2, len2))) => { |
| 1624 |
mark_as_sent(cs, space, tokens, offset1, len1, stats); |
| 1625 |
mark_as_sent(cs, space, tokens, offset2, len2, stats); |
| 1626 |
// We only end up in this arm if we successfully sliced above. In that case, |
| 1627 |
// don't try and fit more crypto data into this packet. |
| 1628 |
break; |
| 1629 |
} |
| 1630 |
} |
| 1631 |
} |
| 1632 |
} |
| 1633 |
} |
| 1634 |
|
| 1635 |
impl Default for CryptoStreams { |
| 1636 |
fn default() -> Self { |
| 1637 |
Self::Initial { |
| 1638 |
initial: CryptoStream::default(), |
| 1639 |
handshake: CryptoStream::default(), |
| 1640 |
application: CryptoStream::default(), |
| 1641 |
} |
| 1642 |
} |
| 1643 |
} |
| 1644 |
|
| 1645 |
#[derive(Debug, Clone)] |
| 1646 |
pub struct CryptoRecoveryToken { |
| 1647 |
space: PacketNumberSpace, |
| 1648 |
offset: u64, |
| 1649 |
length: usize, |
| 1650 |
} |