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external/boringssl/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c

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1 /* crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young ([email protected])
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young ([email protected]).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson ([email protected]).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young ([email protected])"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson ([email protected])"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */
57
58 #include <string.h>
59
60 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
61 #include <openssl/buf.h>
62 #include <openssl/digest.h>
63 #include <openssl/err.h>
64 #include <openssl/mem.h>
65 #include <openssl/obj.h>
66 #include <openssl/stack.h>
67 #include <openssl/x509.h>
68 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
69
70 int X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
71 {
72 int i;
73 X509_CINF *ai, *bi;
74
75 ai = a->cert_info;
76 bi = b->cert_info;
77 i = M_ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(ai->serialNumber, bi->serialNumber);
78 if (i)
79 return (i);
80 return (X509_NAME_cmp(ai->issuer, bi->issuer));
81 }
82
83 unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a)
84 {
85 unsigned long ret = 0;
86 EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
87 unsigned char md[16];
88 char *f;
89
90 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
91 f = X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info->issuer, NULL, 0);
92 if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL))
93 goto err;
94 if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, (unsigned char *)f, strlen(f)))
95 goto err;
96 OPENSSL_free(f);
97 if (!EVP_DigestUpdate
98 (&ctx, (unsigned char *)a->cert_info->serialNumber->data,
99 (unsigned long)a->cert_info->serialNumber->length))
100 goto err;
101 if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, &(md[0]), NULL))
102 goto err;
103 ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
104 ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
105 ) & 0xffffffffL;
106 err:
107 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
108 return (ret);
109 }
110
111 int X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
112 {
113 return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->issuer, b->cert_info->issuer));
114 }
115
116 int X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
117 {
118 return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->subject, b->cert_info->subject));
119 }
120
121 int X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
122 {
123 return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl->issuer, b->crl->issuer));
124 }
125
126 int X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
127 {
128 return memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, 20);
129 }
130
131 X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(X509 *a)
132 {
133 return (a->cert_info->issuer);
134 }
135
136 unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *x)
137 {
138 return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->issuer));
139 }
140
141 unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
142 {
143 return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->issuer));
144 }
145
146 X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(X509 *a)
147 {
148 return (a->cert_info->subject);
149 }
150
151 ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *a)
152 {
153 return (a->cert_info->serialNumber);
154 }
155
156 unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x)
157 {
158 return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->subject));
159 }
160
161 unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
162 {
163 return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->subject));
164 }
165
166 /*
167 * Compare two certificates: they must be identical for this to work. NB:
168 * Although "cmp" operations are generally prototyped to take "const"
169 * arguments (eg. for use in STACKs), the way X509 handling is - these
170 * operations may involve ensuring the hashes are up-to-date and ensuring
171 * certain cert information is cached. So this is the point where the
172 * "depth-first" constification tree has to halt with an evil cast.
173 */
174 int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
175 {
176 int rv;
177 /* ensure hash is valid */
178 X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0);
179 X509_check_purpose((X509 *)b, -1, 0);
180
181 rv = memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
182 if (rv)
183 return rv;
184 /* Check for match against stored encoding too */
185 if (!a->cert_info->enc.modified && !b->cert_info->enc.modified) {
186 rv = (int)(a->cert_info->enc.len - b->cert_info->enc.len);
187 if (rv)
188 return rv;
189 return memcmp(a->cert_info->enc.enc, b->cert_info->enc.enc,
190 a->cert_info->enc.len);
191 }
192 return rv;
193 }
194
195 int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b)
196 {
197 int ret;
198
199 /* Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date */
200
201 if (!a->canon_enc || a->modified) {
202 ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, NULL);
203 if (ret < 0)
204 return -2;
205 }
206
207 if (!b->canon_enc || b->modified) {
208 ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, NULL);
209 if (ret < 0)
210 return -2;
211 }
212
213 ret = a->canon_enclen - b->canon_enclen;
214
215 if (ret)
216 return ret;
217
218 return memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen);
219
220 }
221
222 unsigned long X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x)
223 {
224 unsigned long ret = 0;
225 unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
226
227 /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
228 i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL);
229 if (!EVP_Digest(x->canon_enc, x->canon_enclen, md, NULL, EVP_sha1(),
230 NULL))
231 return 0;
232
233 ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
234 ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
235 ) & 0xffffffffL;
236 return (ret);
237 }
238
239 /*
240 * I now DER encode the name and hash it. Since I cache the DER encoding,
241 * this is reasonably efficient.
242 */
243
244 unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME *x)
245 {
246 EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
247 unsigned long ret = 0;
248 unsigned char md[16];
249
250 /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
251 i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL);
252 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
253 /* EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); */
254 if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL)
255 && EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length)
256 && EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL))
257 ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
258 ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
259 ) & 0xffffffffL;
260 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
261
262 return (ret);
263 }
264
265 /* Search a stack of X509 for a match */
266 X509 *X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name,
267 ASN1_INTEGER *serial)
268 {
269 size_t i;
270 X509_CINF cinf;
271 X509 x, *x509 = NULL;
272
273 if (!sk)
274 return NULL;
275
276 x.cert_info = &cinf;
277 cinf.serialNumber = serial;
278 cinf.issuer = name;
279
280 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
281 x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
282 if (X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(x509, &x) == 0)
283 return (x509);
284 }
285 return (NULL);
286 }
287
288 X509 *X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name)
289 {
290 X509 *x509;
291 size_t i;
292
293 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
294 x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
295 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x509), name) == 0)
296 return (x509);
297 }
298 return (NULL);
299 }
300
301 EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x)
302 {
303 if ((x == NULL) || (x->cert_info == NULL))
304 return (NULL);
305 return (X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info->key));
306 }
307
308 ASN1_BIT_STRING *X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(const X509 *x)
309 {
310 if (!x)
311 return NULL;
312 return x->cert_info->key->public_key;
313 }
314
315 int X509_check_private_key(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *k)
316 {
317 EVP_PKEY *xk;
318 int ret;
319
320 xk = X509_get_pubkey(x);
321
322 if (xk)
323 ret = EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk, k);
324 else
325 ret = -2;
326
327 switch (ret) {
328 case 1:
329 break;
330 case 0:
331 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH);
332 break;
333 case -1:
334 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH);
335 break;
336 case -2:
337 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE);
338 }
339 if (xk)
340 EVP_PKEY_free(xk);
341 if (ret > 0)
342 return 1;
343 return 0;
344 }
345
346 /*
347 * Check a suite B algorithm is permitted: pass in a public key and the NID
348 * of its signature (or 0 if no signature). The pflags is a pointer to a
349 * flags field which must contain the suite B verification flags.
350 */
351
352 static int check_suite_b(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int sign_nid, unsigned long *pflags)
353 {
354 const EC_GROUP *grp = NULL;
355 int curve_nid;
356 if (pkey && pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
357 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(pkey->pkey.ec);
358 if (!grp)
359 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM;
360 curve_nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
361 /* Check curve is consistent with LOS */
362 if (curve_nid == NID_secp384r1) { /* P-384 */
363 /*
364 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with curve.
365 */
366 if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384)
367 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
368 if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS))
369 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED;
370 /* If we encounter P-384 we cannot use P-256 later */
371 *pflags &= ~X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY;
372 } else if (curve_nid == NID_X9_62_prime256v1) { /* P-256 */
373 if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
374 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
375 if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY))
376 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED;
377 } else
378 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE;
379
380 return X509_V_OK;
381 }
382
383 int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
384 unsigned long flags)
385 {
386 int rv, sign_nid;
387 size_t i;
388 EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL;
389 unsigned long tflags;
390 if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS))
391 return X509_V_OK;
392 tflags = flags;
393 /* If no EE certificate passed in must be first in chain */
394 if (x == NULL) {
395 x = sk_X509_value(chain, 0);
396 i = 1;
397 } else
398 i = 0;
399
400 if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) {
401 rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION;
402 /* Correct error depth */
403 i = 0;
404 goto end;
405 }
406
407 pk = X509_get_pubkey(x);
408 /* Check EE key only */
409 rv = check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags);
410 if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
411 /* Correct error depth */
412 i = 0;
413 goto end;
414 }
415 for (; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
416 sign_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
417 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
418 if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) {
419 rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION;
420 goto end;
421 }
422 EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
423 pk = X509_get_pubkey(x);
424 rv = check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &tflags);
425 if (rv != X509_V_OK)
426 goto end;
427 }
428
429 /* Final check: root CA signature */
430 rv = check_suite_b(pk, X509_get_signature_nid(x), &tflags);
431 end:
432 if (pk)
433 EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
434 if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
435 /* Invalid signature or LOS errors are for previous cert */
436 if ((rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
437 || rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED) && i)
438 i--;
439 /*
440 * If we have LOS error and flags changed then we are signing P-384
441 * with P-256. Use more meaninggul error.
442 */
443 if (rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED && flags != tflags)
444 rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256;
445 if (perror_depth)
446 *perror_depth = i;
447 }
448 return rv;
449 }
450
451 int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags)
452 {
453 int sign_nid;
454 if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS))
455 return X509_V_OK;
456 sign_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(crl->crl->sig_alg->algorithm);
457 return check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &flags);
458 }
459
460 /*
461 * Not strictly speaking an "up_ref" as a STACK doesn't have a reference
462 * count but it has the same effect by duping the STACK and upping the ref of
463 * each X509 structure.
464 */
465 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
466 {
467 STACK_OF(X509) *ret;
468 size_t i;
469 ret = sk_X509_dup(chain);
470 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ret); i++) {
471 X509_up_ref(sk_X509_value(ret, i));
472 }
473 return ret;
474 }