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/* Copyright (c) 2014, Google Inc. |
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* |
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* Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any |
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* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above |
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* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. |
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* |
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* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES |
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* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF |
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* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY |
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* SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES |
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* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION |
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* OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN |
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* CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ |
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|
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#include <assert.h> |
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#include <limits.h> |
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#include <string.h> |
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|
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#include <openssl/aead.h> |
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#include <openssl/cipher.h> |
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#include <openssl/err.h> |
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#include <openssl/hmac.h> |
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#include <openssl/md5.h> |
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#include <openssl/mem.h> |
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#include <openssl/sha.h> |
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#include <openssl/type_check.h> |
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|
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#include "../crypto/internal.h" |
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#include "internal.h" |
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|
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|
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typedef struct { |
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX cipher_ctx; |
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HMAC_CTX hmac_ctx; |
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/* mac_key is the portion of the key used for the MAC. It is retained |
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* separately for the constant-time CBC code. */ |
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uint8_t mac_key[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
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uint8_t mac_key_len; |
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/* implicit_iv is one iff this is a pre-TLS-1.1 CBC cipher without an explicit |
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* IV. */ |
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char implicit_iv; |
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} AEAD_TLS_CTX; |
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|
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OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE < 256, mac_key_len_fits_in_uint8_t); |
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|
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static void aead_tls_cleanup(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx) { |
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AEAD_TLS_CTX *tls_ctx = (AEAD_TLS_CTX *)ctx->aead_state; |
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx); |
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HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx); |
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OPENSSL_cleanse(&tls_ctx->mac_key, sizeof(tls_ctx->mac_key)); |
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OPENSSL_free(tls_ctx); |
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ctx->aead_state = NULL; |
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} |
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|
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static int aead_tls_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key, size_t key_len, |
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size_t tag_len, enum evp_aead_direction_t dir, |
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const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, const EVP_MD *md, |
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char implicit_iv) { |
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if (tag_len != EVP_AEAD_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH && |
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tag_len != EVP_MD_size(md)) { |
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_UNSUPPORTED_TAG_SIZE); |
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return 0; |
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} |
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|
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if (key_len != EVP_AEAD_key_length(ctx->aead)) { |
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_KEY_LENGTH); |
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return 0; |
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} |
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|
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size_t mac_key_len = EVP_MD_size(md); |
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size_t enc_key_len = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher); |
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assert(mac_key_len + enc_key_len + |
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(implicit_iv ? EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher) : 0) == key_len); |
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/* Although EVP_rc4() is a variable-length cipher, the default key size is |
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* correct for TLS. */ |
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|
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AEAD_TLS_CTX *tls_ctx = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(AEAD_TLS_CTX)); |
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if (tls_ctx == NULL) { |
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
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return 0; |
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} |
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx); |
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HMAC_CTX_init(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx); |
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assert(mac_key_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); |
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memcpy(tls_ctx->mac_key, key, mac_key_len); |
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tls_ctx->mac_key_len = (uint8_t)mac_key_len; |
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tls_ctx->implicit_iv = implicit_iv; |
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|
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ctx->aead_state = tls_ctx; |
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if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx, cipher, NULL, &key[mac_key_len], |
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implicit_iv ? &key[mac_key_len + enc_key_len] : NULL, |
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dir == evp_aead_seal) || |
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!HMAC_Init_ex(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx, key, mac_key_len, md, NULL)) { |
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aead_tls_cleanup(ctx); |
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ctx->aead_state = NULL; |
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return 0; |
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} |
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx, 0); |
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|
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return 1; |
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} |
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|
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static int aead_tls_seal(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, |
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size_t *out_len, size_t max_out_len, |
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const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len, |
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const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, |
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const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) { |
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AEAD_TLS_CTX *tls_ctx = (AEAD_TLS_CTX *)ctx->aead_state; |
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size_t total = 0; |
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|
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if (!tls_ctx->cipher_ctx.encrypt) { |
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/* Unlike a normal AEAD, a TLS AEAD may only be used in one direction. */ |
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_INVALID_OPERATION); |
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return 0; |
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} |
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|
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if (in_len + EVP_AEAD_max_overhead(ctx->aead) < in_len || |
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in_len > INT_MAX) { |
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/* EVP_CIPHER takes int as input. */ |
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE); |
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return 0; |
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} |
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|
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if (max_out_len < in_len + EVP_AEAD_max_overhead(ctx->aead)) { |
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL); |
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return 0; |
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} |
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|
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if (nonce_len != EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(ctx->aead)) { |
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_INVALID_NONCE_SIZE); |
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return 0; |
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} |
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|
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if (ad_len != 13 - 2 /* length bytes */) { |
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_INVALID_AD_SIZE); |
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return 0; |
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} |
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|
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/* To allow for CBC mode which changes cipher length, |ad| doesn't include the |
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* length for legacy ciphers. */ |
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uint8_t ad_extra[2]; |
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ad_extra[0] = (uint8_t)(in_len >> 8); |
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ad_extra[1] = (uint8_t)(in_len & 0xff); |
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|
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/* Compute the MAC. This must be first in case the operation is being done |
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* in-place. */ |
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uint8_t mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
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unsigned mac_len; |
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if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL) || |
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!HMAC_Update(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx, ad, ad_len) || |
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!HMAC_Update(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx, ad_extra, sizeof(ad_extra)) || |
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!HMAC_Update(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx, in, in_len) || |
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!HMAC_Final(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx, mac, &mac_len)) { |
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return 0; |
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} |
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|
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/* Configure the explicit IV. */ |
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if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && |
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!tls_ctx->implicit_iv && |
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!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, nonce)) { |
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return 0; |
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} |
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|
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/* Encrypt the input. */ |
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int len; |
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if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx, out, &len, in, |
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(int)in_len)) { |
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return 0; |
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} |
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total = len; |
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|
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/* Feed the MAC into the cipher. */ |
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if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx, out + total, &len, mac, |
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(int)mac_len)) { |
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return 0; |
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} |
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total += len; |
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|
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unsigned block_size = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx); |
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if (block_size > 1) { |
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assert(block_size <= 256); |
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assert(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE); |
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|
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/* Compute padding and feed that into the cipher. */ |
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uint8_t padding[256]; |
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unsigned padding_len = block_size - ((in_len + mac_len) % block_size); |
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memset(padding, padding_len - 1, padding_len); |
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if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx, out + total, &len, padding, |
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(int)padding_len)) { |
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return 0; |
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} |
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total += len; |
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} |
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|
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if (!EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx, out + total, &len)) { |
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return 0; |
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} |
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total += len; |
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|
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*out_len = total; |
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return 1; |
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} |
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|
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static int aead_tls_open(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, |
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size_t *out_len, size_t max_out_len, |
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const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len, |
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const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, |
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const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) { |
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AEAD_TLS_CTX *tls_ctx = (AEAD_TLS_CTX *)ctx->aead_state; |
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|
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if (tls_ctx->cipher_ctx.encrypt) { |
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/* Unlike a normal AEAD, a TLS AEAD may only be used in one direction. */ |
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_INVALID_OPERATION); |
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return 0; |
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} |
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|
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if (in_len < HMAC_size(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx)) { |
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT); |
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return 0; |
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} |
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|
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if (max_out_len < in_len) { |
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/* This requires that the caller provide space for the MAC, even though it |
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* will always be removed on return. */ |
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL); |
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return 0; |
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} |
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|
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if (nonce_len != EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(ctx->aead)) { |
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_INVALID_NONCE_SIZE); |
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return 0; |
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} |
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|
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if (ad_len != 13 - 2 /* length bytes */) { |
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_INVALID_AD_SIZE); |
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return 0; |
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} |
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|
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if (in_len > INT_MAX) { |
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/* EVP_CIPHER takes int as input. */ |
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE); |
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return 0; |
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} |
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|
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/* Configure the explicit IV. */ |
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if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && |
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!tls_ctx->implicit_iv && |
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!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, nonce)) { |
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return 0; |
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} |
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|
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/* Decrypt to get the plaintext + MAC + padding. */ |
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size_t total = 0; |
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int len; |
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if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx, out, &len, in, (int)in_len)) { |
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return 0; |
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} |
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total += len; |
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if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx, out + total, &len)) { |
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return 0; |
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} |
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total += len; |
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assert(total == in_len); |
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|
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/* Remove CBC padding. Code from here on is timing-sensitive with respect to |
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* |padding_ok| and |data_plus_mac_len| for CBC ciphers. */ |
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int padding_ok; |
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unsigned data_plus_mac_len, data_len; |
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if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { |
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padding_ok = EVP_tls_cbc_remove_padding( |
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&data_plus_mac_len, out, total, |
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx), |
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(unsigned)HMAC_size(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx)); |
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/* Publicly invalid. This can be rejected in non-constant time. */ |
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if (padding_ok == 0) { |
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT); |
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return 0; |
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} |
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} else { |
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padding_ok = 1; |
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data_plus_mac_len = total; |
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/* |data_plus_mac_len| = |total| = |in_len| at this point. |in_len| has |
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* already been checked against the MAC size at the top of the function. */ |
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assert(data_plus_mac_len >= HMAC_size(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx)); |
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} |
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data_len = data_plus_mac_len - HMAC_size(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx); |
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|
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/* At this point, |padding_ok| is 1 or -1. If 1, the padding is valid and the |
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* first |data_plus_mac_size| bytes after |out| are the plaintext and |
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* MAC. Either way, |data_plus_mac_size| is large enough to extract a MAC. */ |
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|
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/* To allow for CBC mode which changes cipher length, |ad| doesn't include the |
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* length for legacy ciphers. */ |
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uint8_t ad_fixed[13]; |
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memcpy(ad_fixed, ad, 11); |
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ad_fixed[11] = (uint8_t)(data_len >> 8); |
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ad_fixed[12] = (uint8_t)(data_len & 0xff); |
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ad_len += 2; |
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|
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/* Compute the MAC and extract the one in the record. */ |
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uint8_t mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
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size_t mac_len; |
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uint8_t record_mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
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uint8_t *record_mac; |
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if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && |
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EVP_tls_cbc_record_digest_supported(tls_ctx->hmac_ctx.md)) { |
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if (!EVP_tls_cbc_digest_record(tls_ctx->hmac_ctx.md, mac, &mac_len, |
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ad_fixed, out, data_plus_mac_len, total, |
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tls_ctx->mac_key, tls_ctx->mac_key_len)) { |
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT); |
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return 0; |
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} |
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assert(mac_len == HMAC_size(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx)); |
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|
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record_mac = record_mac_tmp; |
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EVP_tls_cbc_copy_mac(record_mac, mac_len, out, data_plus_mac_len, total); |
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} else { |
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/* We should support the constant-time path for all CBC-mode ciphers |
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* implemented. */ |
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assert(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx) != EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE); |
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|
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unsigned mac_len_u; |
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if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL) || |
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!HMAC_Update(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx, ad_fixed, ad_len) || |
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!HMAC_Update(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx, out, data_len) || |
| 326 |
!HMAC_Final(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx, mac, &mac_len_u)) { |
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return 0; |
| 328 |
} |
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mac_len = mac_len_u; |
| 330 |
|
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assert(mac_len == HMAC_size(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx)); |
| 332 |
record_mac = &out[data_len]; |
| 333 |
} |
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|
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/* Perform the MAC check and the padding check in constant-time. It should be |
| 336 |
* safe to simply perform the padding check first, but it would not be under a |
| 337 |
* different choice of MAC location on padding failure. See |
| 338 |
* EVP_tls_cbc_remove_padding. */ |
| 339 |
unsigned good = constant_time_eq_int(CRYPTO_memcmp(record_mac, mac, mac_len), |
| 340 |
0); |
| 341 |
good &= constant_time_eq_int(padding_ok, 1); |
| 342 |
if (!good) { |
| 343 |
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT); |
| 344 |
return 0; |
| 345 |
} |
| 346 |
|
| 347 |
/* End of timing-sensitive code. */ |
| 348 |
|
| 349 |
*out_len = data_len; |
| 350 |
return 1; |
| 351 |
} |
| 352 |
|
| 353 |
static int aead_rc4_md5_tls_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key, |
| 354 |
size_t key_len, size_t tag_len, |
| 355 |
enum evp_aead_direction_t dir) { |
| 356 |
return aead_tls_init(ctx, key, key_len, tag_len, dir, EVP_rc4(), EVP_md5(), |
| 357 |
0); |
| 358 |
} |
| 359 |
|
| 360 |
static int aead_rc4_sha1_tls_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key, |
| 361 |
size_t key_len, size_t tag_len, |
| 362 |
enum evp_aead_direction_t dir) { |
| 363 |
return aead_tls_init(ctx, key, key_len, tag_len, dir, EVP_rc4(), EVP_sha1(), |
| 364 |
0); |
| 365 |
} |
| 366 |
|
| 367 |
static int aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key, |
| 368 |
size_t key_len, size_t tag_len, |
| 369 |
enum evp_aead_direction_t dir) { |
| 370 |
return aead_tls_init(ctx, key, key_len, tag_len, dir, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), |
| 371 |
EVP_sha1(), 0); |
| 372 |
} |
| 373 |
|
| 374 |
static int aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv_init( |
| 375 |
EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key, size_t key_len, size_t tag_len, |
| 376 |
enum evp_aead_direction_t dir) { |
| 377 |
return aead_tls_init(ctx, key, key_len, tag_len, dir, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), |
| 378 |
EVP_sha1(), 1); |
| 379 |
} |
| 380 |
|
| 381 |
static int aead_aes_128_cbc_sha256_tls_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, |
| 382 |
const uint8_t *key, size_t key_len, |
| 383 |
size_t tag_len, |
| 384 |
enum evp_aead_direction_t dir) { |
| 385 |
return aead_tls_init(ctx, key, key_len, tag_len, dir, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), |
| 386 |
EVP_sha256(), 0); |
| 387 |
} |
| 388 |
|
| 389 |
static int aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key, |
| 390 |
size_t key_len, size_t tag_len, |
| 391 |
enum evp_aead_direction_t dir) { |
| 392 |
return aead_tls_init(ctx, key, key_len, tag_len, dir, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), |
| 393 |
EVP_sha1(), 0); |
| 394 |
} |
| 395 |
|
| 396 |
static int aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv_init( |
| 397 |
EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key, size_t key_len, size_t tag_len, |
| 398 |
enum evp_aead_direction_t dir) { |
| 399 |
return aead_tls_init(ctx, key, key_len, tag_len, dir, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), |
| 400 |
EVP_sha1(), 1); |
| 401 |
} |
| 402 |
|
| 403 |
static int aead_aes_256_cbc_sha256_tls_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, |
| 404 |
const uint8_t *key, size_t key_len, |
| 405 |
size_t tag_len, |
| 406 |
enum evp_aead_direction_t dir) { |
| 407 |
return aead_tls_init(ctx, key, key_len, tag_len, dir, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), |
| 408 |
EVP_sha256(), 0); |
| 409 |
} |
| 410 |
|
| 411 |
static int aead_aes_256_cbc_sha384_tls_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, |
| 412 |
const uint8_t *key, size_t key_len, |
| 413 |
size_t tag_len, |
| 414 |
enum evp_aead_direction_t dir) { |
| 415 |
return aead_tls_init(ctx, key, key_len, tag_len, dir, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), |
| 416 |
EVP_sha384(), 0); |
| 417 |
} |
| 418 |
|
| 419 |
static int aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, |
| 420 |
const uint8_t *key, size_t key_len, |
| 421 |
size_t tag_len, |
| 422 |
enum evp_aead_direction_t dir) { |
| 423 |
return aead_tls_init(ctx, key, key_len, tag_len, dir, EVP_des_ede3_cbc(), |
| 424 |
EVP_sha1(), 0); |
| 425 |
} |
| 426 |
|
| 427 |
static int aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv_init( |
| 428 |
EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key, size_t key_len, size_t tag_len, |
| 429 |
enum evp_aead_direction_t dir) { |
| 430 |
return aead_tls_init(ctx, key, key_len, tag_len, dir, EVP_des_ede3_cbc(), |
| 431 |
EVP_sha1(), 1); |
| 432 |
} |
| 433 |
|
| 434 |
static int aead_rc4_tls_get_rc4_state(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, |
| 435 |
const RC4_KEY **out_key) { |
| 436 |
const AEAD_TLS_CTX *tls_ctx = (AEAD_TLS_CTX*) ctx->aead_state; |
| 437 |
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx) != EVP_rc4()) { |
| 438 |
return 0; |
| 439 |
} |
| 440 |
|
| 441 |
*out_key = (const RC4_KEY*) tls_ctx->cipher_ctx.cipher_data; |
| 442 |
return 1; |
| 443 |
} |
| 444 |
|
| 445 |
static int aead_tls_get_iv(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t **out_iv, |
| 446 |
size_t *out_iv_len) { |
| 447 |
const AEAD_TLS_CTX *tls_ctx = (AEAD_TLS_CTX*) ctx->aead_state; |
| 448 |
const size_t iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx); |
| 449 |
if (iv_len <= 1) { |
| 450 |
return 0; |
| 451 |
} |
| 452 |
|
| 453 |
*out_iv = tls_ctx->cipher_ctx.iv; |
| 454 |
*out_iv_len = iv_len; |
| 455 |
return 1; |
| 456 |
} |
| 457 |
|
| 458 |
static int aead_null_sha1_tls_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key, |
| 459 |
size_t key_len, size_t tag_len, |
| 460 |
enum evp_aead_direction_t dir) { |
| 461 |
return aead_tls_init(ctx, key, key_len, tag_len, dir, EVP_enc_null(), |
| 462 |
EVP_sha1(), 1 /* implicit iv */); |
| 463 |
} |
| 464 |
|
| 465 |
static const EVP_AEAD aead_rc4_md5_tls = { |
| 466 |
MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + 16, /* key len (MD5 + RC4) */ |
| 467 |
0, /* nonce len */ |
| 468 |
MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* overhead */ |
| 469 |
MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* max tag length */ |
| 470 |
NULL, /* init */ |
| 471 |
aead_rc4_md5_tls_init, |
| 472 |
aead_tls_cleanup, |
| 473 |
aead_tls_seal, |
| 474 |
aead_tls_open, |
| 475 |
aead_rc4_tls_get_rc4_state, /* get_rc4_state */ |
| 476 |
NULL, /* get_iv */ |
| 477 |
}; |
| 478 |
|
| 479 |
static const EVP_AEAD aead_rc4_sha1_tls = { |
| 480 |
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 16, /* key len (SHA1 + RC4) */ |
| 481 |
0, /* nonce len */ |
| 482 |
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* overhead */ |
| 483 |
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* max tag length */ |
| 484 |
NULL, /* init */ |
| 485 |
aead_rc4_sha1_tls_init, |
| 486 |
aead_tls_cleanup, |
| 487 |
aead_tls_seal, |
| 488 |
aead_tls_open, |
| 489 |
aead_rc4_tls_get_rc4_state, /* get_rc4_state */ |
| 490 |
NULL, /* get_iv */ |
| 491 |
}; |
| 492 |
|
| 493 |
static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls = { |
| 494 |
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 16, /* key len (SHA1 + AES128) */ |
| 495 |
16, /* nonce len (IV) */ |
| 496 |
16 + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* overhead (padding + SHA1) */ |
| 497 |
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* max tag length */ |
| 498 |
NULL, /* init */ |
| 499 |
aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls_init, |
| 500 |
aead_tls_cleanup, |
| 501 |
aead_tls_seal, |
| 502 |
aead_tls_open, |
| 503 |
NULL, /* get_rc4_state */ |
| 504 |
NULL, /* get_iv */ |
| 505 |
}; |
| 506 |
|
| 507 |
static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv = { |
| 508 |
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 16 + 16, /* key len (SHA1 + AES128 + IV) */ |
| 509 |
0, /* nonce len */ |
| 510 |
16 + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* overhead (padding + SHA1) */ |
| 511 |
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* max tag length */ |
| 512 |
NULL, /* init */ |
| 513 |
aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv_init, |
| 514 |
aead_tls_cleanup, |
| 515 |
aead_tls_seal, |
| 516 |
aead_tls_open, |
| 517 |
NULL, /* get_rc4_state */ |
| 518 |
aead_tls_get_iv, /* get_iv */ |
| 519 |
}; |
| 520 |
|
| 521 |
static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_128_cbc_sha256_tls = { |
| 522 |
SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH + 16, /* key len (SHA256 + AES128) */ |
| 523 |
16, /* nonce len (IV) */ |
| 524 |
16 + SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* overhead (padding + SHA256) */ |
| 525 |
SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* max tag length */ |
| 526 |
NULL, /* init */ |
| 527 |
aead_aes_128_cbc_sha256_tls_init, |
| 528 |
aead_tls_cleanup, |
| 529 |
aead_tls_seal, |
| 530 |
aead_tls_open, |
| 531 |
NULL, /* get_rc4_state */ |
| 532 |
NULL, /* get_iv */ |
| 533 |
}; |
| 534 |
|
| 535 |
static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls = { |
| 536 |
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 32, /* key len (SHA1 + AES256) */ |
| 537 |
16, /* nonce len (IV) */ |
| 538 |
16 + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* overhead (padding + SHA1) */ |
| 539 |
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* max tag length */ |
| 540 |
NULL, /* init */ |
| 541 |
aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls_init, |
| 542 |
aead_tls_cleanup, |
| 543 |
aead_tls_seal, |
| 544 |
aead_tls_open, |
| 545 |
NULL, /* get_rc4_state */ |
| 546 |
NULL, /* get_iv */ |
| 547 |
}; |
| 548 |
|
| 549 |
static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv = { |
| 550 |
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 32 + 16, /* key len (SHA1 + AES256 + IV) */ |
| 551 |
0, /* nonce len */ |
| 552 |
16 + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* overhead (padding + SHA1) */ |
| 553 |
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* max tag length */ |
| 554 |
NULL, /* init */ |
| 555 |
aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv_init, |
| 556 |
aead_tls_cleanup, |
| 557 |
aead_tls_seal, |
| 558 |
aead_tls_open, |
| 559 |
NULL, /* get_rc4_state */ |
| 560 |
aead_tls_get_iv, /* get_iv */ |
| 561 |
}; |
| 562 |
|
| 563 |
static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_256_cbc_sha256_tls = { |
| 564 |
SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH + 32, /* key len (SHA256 + AES256) */ |
| 565 |
16, /* nonce len (IV) */ |
| 566 |
16 + SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* overhead (padding + SHA256) */ |
| 567 |
SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* max tag length */ |
| 568 |
NULL, /* init */ |
| 569 |
aead_aes_256_cbc_sha256_tls_init, |
| 570 |
aead_tls_cleanup, |
| 571 |
aead_tls_seal, |
| 572 |
aead_tls_open, |
| 573 |
NULL, /* get_rc4_state */ |
| 574 |
NULL, /* get_iv */ |
| 575 |
}; |
| 576 |
|
| 577 |
static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_256_cbc_sha384_tls = { |
| 578 |
SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH + 32, /* key len (SHA384 + AES256) */ |
| 579 |
16, /* nonce len (IV) */ |
| 580 |
16 + SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* overhead (padding + SHA384) */ |
| 581 |
SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* max tag length */ |
| 582 |
NULL, /* init */ |
| 583 |
aead_aes_256_cbc_sha384_tls_init, |
| 584 |
aead_tls_cleanup, |
| 585 |
aead_tls_seal, |
| 586 |
aead_tls_open, |
| 587 |
NULL, /* get_rc4_state */ |
| 588 |
NULL, /* get_iv */ |
| 589 |
}; |
| 590 |
|
| 591 |
static const EVP_AEAD aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls = { |
| 592 |
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 24, /* key len (SHA1 + 3DES) */ |
| 593 |
8, /* nonce len (IV) */ |
| 594 |
8 + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* overhead (padding + SHA1) */ |
| 595 |
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* max tag length */ |
| 596 |
NULL, /* init */ |
| 597 |
aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls_init, |
| 598 |
aead_tls_cleanup, |
| 599 |
aead_tls_seal, |
| 600 |
aead_tls_open, |
| 601 |
NULL, /* get_rc4_state */ |
| 602 |
NULL, /* get_iv */ |
| 603 |
}; |
| 604 |
|
| 605 |
static const EVP_AEAD aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv = { |
| 606 |
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 24 + 8, /* key len (SHA1 + 3DES + IV) */ |
| 607 |
0, /* nonce len */ |
| 608 |
8 + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* overhead (padding + SHA1) */ |
| 609 |
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* max tag length */ |
| 610 |
NULL, /* init */ |
| 611 |
aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv_init, |
| 612 |
aead_tls_cleanup, |
| 613 |
aead_tls_seal, |
| 614 |
aead_tls_open, |
| 615 |
NULL, /* get_rc4_state */ |
| 616 |
aead_tls_get_iv, /* get_iv */ |
| 617 |
}; |
| 618 |
|
| 619 |
static const EVP_AEAD aead_null_sha1_tls = { |
| 620 |
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* key len */ |
| 621 |
0, /* nonce len */ |
| 622 |
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* overhead (SHA1) */ |
| 623 |
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* max tag length */ |
| 624 |
NULL, /* init */ |
| 625 |
aead_null_sha1_tls_init, |
| 626 |
aead_tls_cleanup, |
| 627 |
aead_tls_seal, |
| 628 |
aead_tls_open, |
| 629 |
NULL, /* get_rc4_state */ |
| 630 |
NULL, /* get_iv */ |
| 631 |
}; |
| 632 |
|
| 633 |
const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_rc4_md5_tls(void) { return &aead_rc4_md5_tls; } |
| 634 |
|
| 635 |
const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_rc4_sha1_tls(void) { return &aead_rc4_sha1_tls; } |
| 636 |
|
| 637 |
const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls(void) { |
| 638 |
return &aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls; |
| 639 |
} |
| 640 |
|
| 641 |
const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv(void) { |
| 642 |
return &aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv; |
| 643 |
} |
| 644 |
|
| 645 |
const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_aes_128_cbc_sha256_tls(void) { |
| 646 |
return &aead_aes_128_cbc_sha256_tls; |
| 647 |
} |
| 648 |
|
| 649 |
const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls(void) { |
| 650 |
return &aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls; |
| 651 |
} |
| 652 |
|
| 653 |
const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv(void) { |
| 654 |
return &aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv; |
| 655 |
} |
| 656 |
|
| 657 |
const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_aes_256_cbc_sha256_tls(void) { |
| 658 |
return &aead_aes_256_cbc_sha256_tls; |
| 659 |
} |
| 660 |
|
| 661 |
const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_aes_256_cbc_sha384_tls(void) { |
| 662 |
return &aead_aes_256_cbc_sha384_tls; |
| 663 |
} |
| 664 |
|
| 665 |
const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls(void) { |
| 666 |
return &aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls; |
| 667 |
} |
| 668 |
|
| 669 |
const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv(void) { |
| 670 |
return &aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv; |
| 671 |
} |
| 672 |
|
| 673 |
const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_null_sha1_tls(void) { return &aead_null_sha1_tls; } |