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.\" ======================================================================== |
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.\" |
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.IX Title "SSL_CTX_DANE_ENABLE 3SSL" |
| 58 |
.TH SSL_CTX_DANE_ENABLE 3SSL 2026-04-07 3.6.2 OpenSSL |
| 59 |
.\" For nroff, turn off justification. Always turn off hyphenation; it makes |
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.\" way too many mistakes in technical documents. |
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.if n .ad l |
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.nh |
| 63 |
.SH NAME |
| 64 |
SSL_CTX_dane_enable, SSL_CTX_dane_mtype_set, SSL_dane_enable, |
| 65 |
SSL_dane_tlsa_add, SSL_get0_dane_authority, SSL_get0_dane_tlsa, |
| 66 |
SSL_CTX_dane_set_flags, SSL_CTX_dane_clear_flags, |
| 67 |
SSL_dane_set_flags, SSL_dane_clear_flags |
| 68 |
\&\- enable DANE TLS authentication of the remote TLS server in the local |
| 69 |
TLS client |
| 70 |
.SH SYNOPSIS |
| 71 |
.IX Header "SYNOPSIS" |
| 72 |
.Vb 1 |
| 73 |
\& #include <openssl/ssl.h> |
| 74 |
\& |
| 75 |
\& int SSL_CTX_dane_enable(SSL_CTX *ctx); |
| 76 |
\& int SSL_CTX_dane_mtype_set(SSL_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md, |
| 77 |
\& uint8_t mtype, uint8_t ord); |
| 78 |
\& int SSL_dane_enable(SSL *s, const char *basedomain); |
| 79 |
\& int SSL_dane_tlsa_add(SSL *s, uint8_t usage, uint8_t selector, |
| 80 |
\& uint8_t mtype, const unsigned char *data, size_t dlen); |
| 81 |
\& int SSL_get0_dane_authority(SSL *s, X509 **mcert, EVP_PKEY **mspki); |
| 82 |
\& int SSL_get0_dane_tlsa(SSL *s, uint8_t *usage, uint8_t *selector, |
| 83 |
\& uint8_t *mtype, const unsigned char **data, |
| 84 |
\& size_t *dlen); |
| 85 |
\& unsigned long SSL_CTX_dane_set_flags(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags); |
| 86 |
\& unsigned long SSL_CTX_dane_clear_flags(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags); |
| 87 |
\& unsigned long SSL_dane_set_flags(SSL *ssl, unsigned long flags); |
| 88 |
\& unsigned long SSL_dane_clear_flags(SSL *ssl, unsigned long flags); |
| 89 |
.Ve |
| 90 |
.SH DESCRIPTION |
| 91 |
.IX Header "DESCRIPTION" |
| 92 |
These functions implement support for DANE TLSA (RFC6698 and RFC7671) |
| 93 |
peer authentication. |
| 94 |
.PP |
| 95 |
\&\fBSSL_CTX_dane_enable()\fR must be called first to initialize the shared state |
| 96 |
required for DANE support. |
| 97 |
Individual connections associated with the context can then enable |
| 98 |
per-connection DANE support as appropriate. |
| 99 |
DANE authentication is implemented in the \fBX509_verify_cert\fR\|(3) function, and |
| 100 |
applications that override \fBX509_verify_cert\fR\|(3) via |
| 101 |
\&\fBSSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback\fR\|(3) are responsible to authenticate the peer |
| 102 |
chain in whatever manner they see fit. |
| 103 |
.PP |
| 104 |
\&\fBSSL_CTX_dane_mtype_set()\fR may then be called zero or more times to adjust the |
| 105 |
supported digest algorithms. |
| 106 |
This must be done before any SSL handles are created for the context. |
| 107 |
.PP |
| 108 |
The \fBmtype\fR argument specifies a DANE TLSA matching type and the \fBmd\fR |
| 109 |
argument specifies the associated digest algorithm handle. |
| 110 |
The \fBord\fR argument specifies a strength ordinal. |
| 111 |
Algorithms with a larger strength ordinal are considered more secure. |
| 112 |
Strength ordinals are used to implement RFC7671 digest algorithm agility. |
| 113 |
Specifying a \fBNULL\fR digest algorithm for a matching type disables |
| 114 |
support for that matching type. |
| 115 |
Matching type \fBFull\fR\|(0) cannot be modified or disabled. |
| 116 |
.PP |
| 117 |
By default, matching type \f(CW\*(C`SHA2\-256(1)\*(C'\fR (see RFC7218 for definitions |
| 118 |
of the DANE TLSA parameter acronyms) is mapped to \f(CWEVP_sha256()\fR |
| 119 |
with a strength ordinal of \f(CW1\fR and matching type \f(CW\*(C`SHA2\-512(2)\*(C'\fR |
| 120 |
is mapped to \f(CWEVP_sha512()\fR with a strength ordinal of \f(CW2\fR. |
| 121 |
.PP |
| 122 |
\&\fBSSL_dane_enable()\fR must be called before the SSL handshake is initiated with |
| 123 |
\&\fBSSL_connect\fR\|(3) if (and only if) you want to enable DANE for that connection. |
| 124 |
(The connection must be associated with a DANE-enabled SSL context). |
| 125 |
The \fBbasedomain\fR argument specifies the RFC7671 TLSA base domain, |
| 126 |
which will be the primary peer reference identifier for certificate |
| 127 |
name checks. |
| 128 |
Additional server names can be specified via \fBSSL_add1_host\fR\|(3). |
| 129 |
The \fBbasedomain\fR is used as the default SNI hint if none has yet been |
| 130 |
specified via \fBSSL_set_tlsext_host_name\fR\|(3). |
| 131 |
.PP |
| 132 |
\&\fBSSL_dane_tlsa_add()\fR may then be called one or more times, to load each of the |
| 133 |
TLSA records that apply to the remote TLS peer. |
| 134 |
(This too must be done prior to the beginning of the SSL handshake). |
| 135 |
The arguments specify the fields of the TLSA record. |
| 136 |
The \fBdata\fR field is provided in binary (wire RDATA) form, not the hexadecimal |
| 137 |
ASCII presentation form, with an explicit length passed via \fBdlen\fR. |
| 138 |
The library takes a copy of the \fBdata\fR buffer contents and the caller may |
| 139 |
free the original \fBdata\fR buffer when convenient. |
| 140 |
A return value of 0 indicates that "unusable" TLSA records (with invalid or |
| 141 |
unsupported parameters) were provided. |
| 142 |
A negative return value indicates an internal error in processing the record. |
| 143 |
.PP |
| 144 |
The caller is expected to check the return value of each \fBSSL_dane_tlsa_add()\fR |
| 145 |
call and take appropriate action if none are usable or an internal error |
| 146 |
is encountered in processing some records. |
| 147 |
.PP |
| 148 |
If no TLSA records are added successfully, DANE authentication is not enabled, |
| 149 |
and authentication will be based on any configured traditional trust-anchors; |
| 150 |
authentication success in this case does not mean that the peer was |
| 151 |
DANE-authenticated. |
| 152 |
.PP |
| 153 |
\&\fBSSL_get0_dane_authority()\fR can be used to get more detailed information about |
| 154 |
the matched DANE trust-anchor after successful connection completion. |
| 155 |
The return value is negative if DANE verification failed (or was not enabled), |
| 156 |
0 if an EE TLSA record directly matched the leaf certificate, or a positive |
| 157 |
number indicating the depth at which a TA record matched an issuer certificate. |
| 158 |
The complete verified chain can be retrieved via \fBSSL_get0_verified_chain\fR\|(3). |
| 159 |
The return value is an index into this verified chain, rather than the list of |
| 160 |
certificates sent by the peer as returned by \fBSSL_get_peer_cert_chain\fR\|(3). |
| 161 |
.PP |
| 162 |
If the \fBmcert\fR argument is not \fBNULL\fR and a TLSA record matched a chain |
| 163 |
certificate, a pointer to the matching certificate is returned via \fBmcert\fR. |
| 164 |
The returned address is a short-term internal reference to the certificate and |
| 165 |
must not be freed by the application. |
| 166 |
Applications that want to retain access to the certificate can call |
| 167 |
\&\fBX509_up_ref\fR\|(3) to obtain a long-term reference which must then be freed via |
| 168 |
\&\fBX509_free\fR\|(3) once no longer needed. |
| 169 |
.PP |
| 170 |
If no TLSA records directly matched any elements of the certificate chain, but |
| 171 |
a \fBDANE\-TA\fR\|(2) \fBSPKI\fR\|(1) \fBFull\fR\|(0) record provided the public key that signed an |
| 172 |
element of the chain, then that key is returned via \fBmspki\fR argument (if not |
| 173 |
NULL). |
| 174 |
In this case the return value is the depth of the top-most element of the |
| 175 |
validated certificate chain. |
| 176 |
As with \fBmcert\fR this is a short-term internal reference, and |
| 177 |
\&\fBEVP_PKEY_up_ref\fR\|(3) and \fBEVP_PKEY_free\fR\|(3) can be used to acquire and |
| 178 |
release long-term references respectively. |
| 179 |
.PP |
| 180 |
\&\fBSSL_get0_dane_tlsa()\fR can be used to retrieve the fields of the TLSA record that |
| 181 |
matched the peer certificate chain. |
| 182 |
The return value indicates the match depth or failure to match just as with |
| 183 |
\&\fBSSL_get0_dane_authority()\fR. |
| 184 |
When the return value is nonnegative, the storage pointed to by the \fBusage\fR, |
| 185 |
\&\fBselector\fR, \fBmtype\fR and \fBdata\fR parameters is updated to the corresponding |
| 186 |
TLSA record fields. |
| 187 |
The \fBdata\fR field is in binary wire form, and is therefore not NUL-terminated, |
| 188 |
its length is returned via the \fBdlen\fR parameter. |
| 189 |
If any of these parameters is NULL, the corresponding field is not returned. |
| 190 |
The \fBdata\fR parameter is set to a short-term internal-copy of the associated |
| 191 |
data field and must not be freed by the application. |
| 192 |
Applications that need long-term access to this field need to copy the content. |
| 193 |
.PP |
| 194 |
\&\fBSSL_CTX_dane_set_flags()\fR and \fBSSL_dane_set_flags()\fR can be used to enable |
| 195 |
optional DANE verification features. |
| 196 |
\&\fBSSL_CTX_dane_clear_flags()\fR and \fBSSL_dane_clear_flags()\fR can be used to disable |
| 197 |
the same features. |
| 198 |
The \fBflags\fR argument is a bit-mask of the features to enable or disable. |
| 199 |
The \fBflags\fR set for an \fBSSL_CTX\fR context are copied to each \fBSSL\fR handle |
| 200 |
associated with that context at the time the handle is created. |
| 201 |
Subsequent changes in the context's \fBflags\fR have no effect on the \fBflags\fR set |
| 202 |
for the handle. |
| 203 |
.PP |
| 204 |
At present, the only available option is \fBDANE_FLAG_NO_DANE_EE_NAMECHECKS\fR |
| 205 |
which can be used to disable server name checks when authenticating via |
| 206 |
\&\fBDANE\-EE\fR\|(3) TLSA records. |
| 207 |
For some applications, primarily web browsers, it is not safe to disable name |
| 208 |
checks due to "unknown key share" attacks, in which a malicious server can |
| 209 |
convince a client that a connection to a victim server is instead a secure |
| 210 |
connection to the malicious server. |
| 211 |
The malicious server may then be able to violate cross-origin scripting |
| 212 |
restrictions. |
| 213 |
Thus, despite the text of RFC7671, name checks are by default enabled for |
| 214 |
\&\fBDANE\-EE\fR\|(3) TLSA records, and can be disabled in applications where it is safe |
| 215 |
to do so. |
| 216 |
In particular, SMTP and XMPP clients should set this option as SRV and MX |
| 217 |
records already make it possible for a remote domain to redirect client |
| 218 |
connections to any server of its choice, and in any case SMTP and XMPP clients |
| 219 |
do not execute scripts downloaded from remote servers. |
| 220 |
.SH "RETURN VALUES" |
| 221 |
.IX Header "RETURN VALUES" |
| 222 |
The functions \fBSSL_CTX_dane_enable()\fR, \fBSSL_CTX_dane_mtype_set()\fR, |
| 223 |
\&\fBSSL_dane_enable()\fR and \fBSSL_dane_tlsa_add()\fR return a positive value on success. |
| 224 |
Negative return values indicate resource problems (out of memory, etc.) in the |
| 225 |
SSL library, while a return value of \fB0\fR indicates incorrect usage or invalid |
| 226 |
input, such as an unsupported TLSA record certificate usage, selector or |
| 227 |
matching type. |
| 228 |
Invalid input also includes malformed data, either a digest length that does |
| 229 |
not match the digest algorithm, or a \f(CWFull(0)\fR (binary ASN.1 DER form) |
| 230 |
certificate or a public key that fails to parse. |
| 231 |
.PP |
| 232 |
The functions \fBSSL_get0_dane_authority()\fR and \fBSSL_get0_dane_tlsa()\fR return a |
| 233 |
negative value when DANE authentication failed or was not enabled, a |
| 234 |
nonnegative value indicates the chain depth at which the TLSA record matched a |
| 235 |
chain certificate, or the depth of the top-most certificate, when the TLSA |
| 236 |
record is a full public key that is its signer. |
| 237 |
.PP |
| 238 |
The functions \fBSSL_CTX_dane_set_flags()\fR, \fBSSL_CTX_dane_clear_flags()\fR, |
| 239 |
\&\fBSSL_dane_set_flags()\fR and \fBSSL_dane_clear_flags()\fR return the \fBflags\fR in effect |
| 240 |
before they were called. |
| 241 |
.SH EXAMPLES |
| 242 |
.IX Header "EXAMPLES" |
| 243 |
Suppose "smtp.example.com" is the MX host of the domain "example.com", and has |
| 244 |
DNSSEC-validated TLSA records. |
| 245 |
The calls below will perform DANE authentication and arrange to match either |
| 246 |
the MX hostname or the destination domain name in the SMTP server certificate. |
| 247 |
Wildcards are supported, but must match the entire label. |
| 248 |
The actual name matched in the certificate (which might be a wildcard) is |
| 249 |
retrieved, and must be copied by the application if it is to be retained beyond |
| 250 |
the lifetime of the SSL connection. |
| 251 |
.PP |
| 252 |
.Vb 7 |
| 253 |
\& SSL_CTX *ctx; |
| 254 |
\& SSL *ssl; |
| 255 |
\& int (*verify_cb)(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *sctx) = NULL; |
| 256 |
\& int num_usable = 0; |
| 257 |
\& const char *nexthop_domain = "example.com"; |
| 258 |
\& const char *dane_tlsa_domain = "smtp.example.com"; |
| 259 |
\& uint8_t usage, selector, mtype; |
| 260 |
\& |
| 261 |
\& if ((ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_client_method())) == NULL) |
| 262 |
\& /* error */ |
| 263 |
\& if (SSL_CTX_dane_enable(ctx) <= 0) |
| 264 |
\& /* error */ |
| 265 |
\& if ((ssl = SSL_new(ctx)) == NULL) |
| 266 |
\& /* error */ |
| 267 |
\& if (SSL_dane_enable(ssl, dane_tlsa_domain) <= 0) |
| 268 |
\& /* error */ |
| 269 |
\& |
| 270 |
\& /* |
| 271 |
\& * For many applications it is safe to skip DANE\-EE(3) namechecks. Do not |
| 272 |
\& * disable the checks unless "unknown key share" attacks pose no risk for |
| 273 |
\& * your application. |
| 274 |
\& */ |
| 275 |
\& SSL_dane_set_flags(ssl, DANE_FLAG_NO_DANE_EE_NAMECHECKS); |
| 276 |
\& |
| 277 |
\& if (!SSL_add1_host(ssl, nexthop_domain)) |
| 278 |
\& /* error */ |
| 279 |
\& SSL_set_hostflags(ssl, X509_CHECK_FLAG_NO_PARTIAL_WILDCARDS); |
| 280 |
\& |
| 281 |
\& for (... each TLSA record ...) { |
| 282 |
\& unsigned char *data; |
| 283 |
\& size_t len; |
| 284 |
\& int ret; |
| 285 |
\& |
| 286 |
\& /* set usage, selector, mtype, data, len */ |
| 287 |
\& |
| 288 |
\& /* |
| 289 |
\& * Opportunistic DANE TLS clients support only DANE\-TA(2) or DANE\-EE(3). |
| 290 |
\& * They treat all other certificate usages, and in particular PKIX\-TA(0) |
| 291 |
\& * and PKIX\-EE(1), as unusable. |
| 292 |
\& */ |
| 293 |
\& switch (usage) { |
| 294 |
\& default: |
| 295 |
\& case 0: /* PKIX\-TA(0) */ |
| 296 |
\& case 1: /* PKIX\-EE(1) */ |
| 297 |
\& continue; |
| 298 |
\& case 2: /* DANE\-TA(2) */ |
| 299 |
\& case 3: /* DANE\-EE(3) */ |
| 300 |
\& break; |
| 301 |
\& } |
| 302 |
\& |
| 303 |
\& ret = SSL_dane_tlsa_add(ssl, usage, selector, mtype, data, len); |
| 304 |
\& /* free data as appropriate */ |
| 305 |
\& |
| 306 |
\& if (ret < 0) |
| 307 |
\& /* handle SSL library internal error */ |
| 308 |
\& else if (ret == 0) |
| 309 |
\& /* handle unusable TLSA record */ |
| 310 |
\& else |
| 311 |
\& ++num_usable; |
| 312 |
\& } |
| 313 |
\& |
| 314 |
\& /* |
| 315 |
\& * At this point, the verification mode is still the default SSL_VERIFY_NONE. |
| 316 |
\& * Opportunistic DANE clients use unauthenticated TLS when all TLSA records |
| 317 |
\& * are unusable, so continue the handshake even if authentication fails. |
| 318 |
\& */ |
| 319 |
\& if (num_usable == 0) { |
| 320 |
\& /* Log all records unusable? */ |
| 321 |
\& |
| 322 |
\& /* Optionally set verify_cb to a suitable non\-NULL callback. */ |
| 323 |
\& SSL_set_verify(ssl, SSL_VERIFY_NONE, verify_cb); |
| 324 |
\& } else { |
| 325 |
\& /* At least one usable record. We expect to verify the peer */ |
| 326 |
\& |
| 327 |
\& /* Optionally set verify_cb to a suitable non\-NULL callback. */ |
| 328 |
\& |
| 329 |
\& /* |
| 330 |
\& * Below we elect to fail the handshake when peer verification fails. |
| 331 |
\& * Alternatively, use the permissive SSL_VERIFY_NONE verification mode, |
| 332 |
\& * complete the handshake, check the verification status, and if not |
| 333 |
\& * verified disconnect gracefully at the application layer, especially if |
| 334 |
\& * application protocol supports informing the server that authentication |
| 335 |
\& * failed. |
| 336 |
\& */ |
| 337 |
\& SSL_set_verify(ssl, SSL_VERIFY_PEER, verify_cb); |
| 338 |
\& } |
| 339 |
\& |
| 340 |
\& /* |
| 341 |
\& * Load any saved session for resumption, making sure that the previous |
| 342 |
\& * session applied the same security and authentication requirements that |
| 343 |
\& * would be expected of a fresh connection. |
| 344 |
\& */ |
| 345 |
\& |
| 346 |
\& /* Perform SSL_connect() handshake and handle errors here */ |
| 347 |
\& |
| 348 |
\& if (SSL_session_reused(ssl)) { |
| 349 |
\& if (SSL_get_verify_result(ssl) == X509_V_OK) { |
| 350 |
\& /* |
| 351 |
\& * Resumed session was originally verified, this connection is |
| 352 |
\& * authenticated. |
| 353 |
\& */ |
| 354 |
\& } else { |
| 355 |
\& /* |
| 356 |
\& * Resumed session was not originally verified, this connection is not |
| 357 |
\& * authenticated. |
| 358 |
\& */ |
| 359 |
\& } |
| 360 |
\& } else if (SSL_get_verify_result(ssl) == X509_V_OK) { |
| 361 |
\& const char *peername = SSL_get0_peername(ssl); |
| 362 |
\& EVP_PKEY *mspki = NULL; |
| 363 |
\& |
| 364 |
\& int depth = SSL_get0_dane_authority(ssl, NULL, &mspki); |
| 365 |
\& if (depth >= 0) { |
| 366 |
\& (void) SSL_get0_dane_tlsa(ssl, &usage, &selector, &mtype, NULL, NULL); |
| 367 |
\& printf("DANE TLSA %d %d %d ", usage, selector, mtype); |
| 368 |
\& if (SSL_get0_peer_rpk(ssl) == NULL) |
| 369 |
\& printf("%s certificate at depth %d\en", |
| 370 |
\& (mspki != NULL) ? "signed the peer" : |
| 371 |
\& mdpth ? "matched the TA" : "matched the EE", mdpth); |
| 372 |
\& else |
| 373 |
\& printf(bio, "matched the peer raw public key\en"); |
| 374 |
\& } |
| 375 |
\& if (peername != NULL) { |
| 376 |
\& /* Name checks were in scope and matched the peername */ |
| 377 |
\& printf("Verified peername: %s\en", peername); |
| 378 |
\& } |
| 379 |
\& } else { |
| 380 |
\& /* |
| 381 |
\& * Not authenticated, presumably all TLSA rrs unusable, but possibly a |
| 382 |
\& * callback suppressed connection termination despite the presence of |
| 383 |
\& * usable TLSA RRs none of which matched. Do whatever is appropriate for |
| 384 |
\& * fresh unauthenticated connections. |
| 385 |
\& */ |
| 386 |
\& } |
| 387 |
.Ve |
| 388 |
.SH NOTES |
| 389 |
.IX Header "NOTES" |
| 390 |
It is expected that the majority of clients employing DANE TLS will be doing |
| 391 |
"opportunistic DANE TLS" in the sense of RFC7672 and RFC7435. |
| 392 |
That is, they will use DANE authentication when DNSSEC-validated TLSA records |
| 393 |
are published for a given peer, and otherwise will use unauthenticated TLS or |
| 394 |
even cleartext. |
| 395 |
.PP |
| 396 |
Such applications should generally treat any TLSA records published by the peer |
| 397 |
with usages \fBPKIX\-TA\fR\|(0) and \fBPKIX\-EE\fR\|(1) as "unusable", and should not include |
| 398 |
them among the TLSA records used to authenticate peer connections. |
| 399 |
In addition, some TLSA records with supported usages may be "unusable" as a |
| 400 |
result of invalid or unsupported parameters. |
| 401 |
.PP |
| 402 |
When a peer has TLSA records, but none are "usable", an opportunistic |
| 403 |
application must avoid cleartext, but cannot authenticate the peer, |
| 404 |
and so should generally proceed with an unauthenticated connection. |
| 405 |
Opportunistic applications need to note the return value of each |
| 406 |
call to \fBSSL_dane_tlsa_add()\fR, and if all return 0 (due to invalid |
| 407 |
or unsupported parameters) disable peer authentication by calling |
| 408 |
\&\fBSSL_set_verify\fR\|(3) with \fBmode\fR equal to \fBSSL_VERIFY_NONE\fR. |
| 409 |
.SH "SEE ALSO" |
| 410 |
.IX Header "SEE ALSO" |
| 411 |
\&\fBssl\fR\|(7), |
| 412 |
\&\fBSSL_new\fR\|(3), |
| 413 |
\&\fBSSL_add1_host\fR\|(3), |
| 414 |
\&\fBSSL_set_hostflags\fR\|(3), |
| 415 |
\&\fBSSL_set_tlsext_host_name\fR\|(3), |
| 416 |
\&\fBSSL_set_verify\fR\|(3), |
| 417 |
\&\fBSSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback\fR\|(3), |
| 418 |
\&\fBSSL_get0_verified_chain\fR\|(3), |
| 419 |
\&\fBSSL_get_peer_cert_chain\fR\|(3), |
| 420 |
\&\fBSSL_get_verify_result\fR\|(3), |
| 421 |
\&\fBSSL_connect\fR\|(3), |
| 422 |
\&\fBSSL_get0_peername\fR\|(3), |
| 423 |
\&\fBX509_verify_cert\fR\|(3), |
| 424 |
\&\fBX509_up_ref\fR\|(3), |
| 425 |
\&\fBX509_free\fR\|(3), |
| 426 |
\&\fBEVP_get_digestbyname\fR\|(3), |
| 427 |
\&\fBEVP_PKEY_up_ref\fR\|(3), |
| 428 |
\&\fBEVP_PKEY_free\fR\|(3) |
| 429 |
.SH HISTORY |
| 430 |
.IX Header "HISTORY" |
| 431 |
These functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0. |
| 432 |
.SH COPYRIGHT |
| 433 |
.IX Header "COPYRIGHT" |
| 434 |
Copyright 2016\-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
| 435 |
.PP |
| 436 |
Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use |
| 437 |
this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
| 438 |
in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at |
| 439 |
<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>. |