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security/Kconfig

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1 # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
2 #
3 # Security configuration
4 #
5
6 menu "Security options"
7
8 source "security/keys/Kconfig"
9
10 config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT
11 bool "Restrict unprivileged access to the kernel syslog"
12 default n
13 help
14 This enforces restrictions on unprivileged users reading the kernel
15 syslog via dmesg(8).
16
17 If this option is not selected, no restrictions will be enforced
18 unless the dmesg_restrict sysctl is explicitly set to (1).
19
20 If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
21
22 choice
23 prompt "Allow /proc/pid/mem access override"
24 default PROC_MEM_ALWAYS_FORCE
25 help
26 Traditionally /proc/pid/mem allows users to override memory
27 permissions for users like ptrace, assuming they have ptrace
28 capability.
29
30 This allows people to limit that - either never override, or
31 require actual active ptrace attachment.
32
33 Defaults to the traditional behavior (for now)
34
35 config PROC_MEM_ALWAYS_FORCE
36 bool "Traditional /proc/pid/mem behavior"
37 help
38 This allows /proc/pid/mem accesses to override memory mapping
39 permissions if you have ptrace access rights.
40
41 config PROC_MEM_FORCE_PTRACE
42 bool "Require active ptrace() use for access override"
43 help
44 This allows /proc/pid/mem accesses to override memory mapping
45 permissions for active ptracers like gdb.
46
47 config PROC_MEM_NO_FORCE
48 bool "Never"
49 help
50 Never override memory mapping permissions
51
52 endchoice
53
54 config MSEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS
55 bool "mseal system mappings"
56 depends on 64BIT
57 depends on ARCH_SUPPORTS_MSEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS
58 depends on !CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
59 help
60 Apply mseal on system mappings.
61 The system mappings includes vdso, vvar, vvar_vclock,
62 vectors (arm compat-mode), sigpage (arm compat-mode), uprobes.
63
64 A 64-bit kernel is required for the memory sealing feature.
65 No specific hardware features from the CPU are needed.
66
67 WARNING: This feature breaks programs which rely on relocating
68 or unmapping system mappings. Known broken software at the time
69 of writing includes CHECKPOINT_RESTORE, UML, gVisor, rr. Therefore
70 this config can't be enabled universally.
71
72 For complete descriptions of memory sealing, please see
73 Documentation/userspace-api/mseal.rst
74
75 config SECURITY_PERF_EVENTS_RESTRICT
76 bool "Restrict unprivileged use of performance events"
77 depends on PERF_EVENTS
78 help
79 If you say Y here, the kernel.perf_event_paranoid sysctl
80 will be set to 3 by default, and no unprivileged use of the
81 perf_event_open syscall will be permitted unless it is
82 changed.
83
•84 config SECURITY
85 bool "Enable different security models"
86 depends on SYSFS
87 depends on MULTIUSER
88 help
89 This allows you to choose different security modules to be
90 configured into your kernel.
91
92 If this option is not selected, the default Linux security
93 model will be used.
94
95 If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
96
97 config HAS_SECURITY_AUDIT
98 def_bool y
99 depends on AUDIT
100 depends on SECURITY
101
102 config SECURITYFS
103 bool "Enable the securityfs filesystem"
104 help
105 This will build the securityfs filesystem. It is currently used by
106 various security modules (AppArmor, IMA, SafeSetID, TOMOYO, TPM).
107
108 If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
109
110 config SECURITY_NETWORK
111 bool "Socket and Networking Security Hooks"
112 depends on SECURITY
113 help
114 This enables the socket and networking security hooks.
115 If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
116 implement socket and networking access controls.
117 If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
118
119 config SECURITY_INFINIBAND
120 bool "Infiniband Security Hooks"
121 depends on SECURITY && INFINIBAND
122 help
123 This enables the Infiniband security hooks.
124 If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
125 implement Infiniband access controls.
126 If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
127
128 config SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
129 bool "XFRM (IPSec) Networking Security Hooks"
130 depends on XFRM && SECURITY_NETWORK
131 help
132 This enables the XFRM (IPSec) networking security hooks.
133 If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
134 implement per-packet access controls based on labels
135 derived from IPSec policy. Non-IPSec communications are
136 designated as unlabelled, and only sockets authorized
137 to communicate unlabelled data can send without using
138 IPSec.
139 If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
140
141 config SECURITY_PATH
142 bool "Security hooks for pathname based access control"
143 depends on SECURITY
144 help
145 This enables the security hooks for pathname based access control.
146 If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
147 implement pathname based access controls.
148 If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
149
150 config INTEL_TXT
151 bool "Enable Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology (Intel(R) TXT)"
152 depends on HAVE_INTEL_TXT
153 help
154 This option enables support for booting the kernel with the
155 Trusted Boot (tboot) module. This will utilize
156 Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology to perform a measured launch
157 of the kernel. If the system does not support Intel(R) TXT, this
158 will have no effect.
159
160 Intel TXT will provide higher assurance of system configuration and
161 initial state as well as data reset protection. This is used to
162 create a robust initial kernel measurement and verification, which
163 helps to ensure that kernel security mechanisms are functioning
164 correctly. This level of protection requires a root of trust outside
165 of the kernel itself.
166
167 Intel TXT also helps solve real end user concerns about having
168 confidence that their hardware is running the VMM or kernel that
169 it was configured with, especially since they may be responsible for
170 providing such assurances to VMs and services running on it.
171
172 See <https://www.intel.com/technology/security/> for more information
173 about Intel(R) TXT.
174 See <http://tboot.sourceforge.net> for more information about tboot.
175 See Documentation/arch/x86/intel_txt.rst for a description of how to enable
176 Intel TXT support in a kernel boot.
177
178 If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
179
180 config LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
181 int "Low address space for LSM to protect from user allocation"
182 depends on SECURITY && SECURITY_SELINUX
183 default 32768 if ARM || (ARM64 && COMPAT)
184 default 65536
185 help
186 This is the portion of low virtual memory which should be protected
187 from userspace allocation. Keeping a user from writing to low pages
188 can help reduce the impact of kernel NULL pointer bugs.
189
190 For most ia64, ppc64 and x86 users with lots of address space
191 a value of 65536 is reasonable and should cause no problems.
192 On arm and other archs it should not be higher than 32768.
193 Programs which use vm86 functionality or have some need to map
194 this low address space will need the permission specific to the
195 systems running LSM.
196
197 config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER
198 bool "Force all usermode helper calls through a single binary"
199 help
200 By default, the kernel can call many different userspace
201 binary programs through the "usermode helper" kernel
202 interface. Some of these binaries are statically defined
203 either in the kernel code itself, or as a kernel configuration
204 option. However, some of these are dynamically created at
205 runtime, or can be modified after the kernel has started up.
206 To provide an additional layer of security, route all of these
207 calls through a single executable that can not have its name
208 changed.
209
210 Note, it is up to this single binary to then call the relevant
211 "real" usermode helper binary, based on the first argument
212 passed to it. If desired, this program can filter and pick
213 and choose what real programs are called.
214
215 If you wish for all usermode helper programs are to be
216 disabled, choose this option and then set
217 STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH to an empty string.
218
219 config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH
220 string "Path to the static usermode helper binary"
221 depends on STATIC_USERMODEHELPER
222 default "/sbin/usermode-helper"
223 help
224 The binary called by the kernel when any usermode helper
225 program is wish to be run. The "real" application's name will
226 be in the first argument passed to this program on the command
227 line.
228
229 If you wish for all usermode helper programs to be disabled,
230 specify an empty string here (i.e. "").
231
232 source "security/selinux/Kconfig"
233 source "security/smack/Kconfig"
234 source "security/tomoyo/Kconfig"
235 source "security/apparmor/Kconfig"
236 source "security/loadpin/Kconfig"
237 source "security/yama/Kconfig"
238 source "security/safesetid/Kconfig"
239 source "security/lockdown/Kconfig"
240 source "security/landlock/Kconfig"
241 source "security/ipe/Kconfig"
242
243 source "security/integrity/Kconfig"
244
245 choice
246 prompt "First legacy 'major LSM' to be initialized"
247 default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX if SECURITY_SELINUX
248 default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK if SECURITY_SMACK
249 default DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO if SECURITY_TOMOYO
250 default DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR if SECURITY_APPARMOR
251 default DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
252
253 help
254 This choice is there only for converting CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY
255 in old kernel configs to CONFIG_LSM in new kernel configs. Don't
256 change this choice unless you are creating a fresh kernel config,
257 for this choice will be ignored after CONFIG_LSM has been set.
258
259 Selects the legacy "major security module" that will be
260 initialized first. Overridden by non-default CONFIG_LSM.
261
262 config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX
263 bool "SELinux" if SECURITY_SELINUX=y
264
265 config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
266 bool "Simplified Mandatory Access Control" if SECURITY_SMACK=y
267
268 config DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
269 bool "TOMOYO" if SECURITY_TOMOYO=y
270
271 config DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
272 bool "AppArmor" if SECURITY_APPARMOR=y
273
274 config DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
275 bool "Unix Discretionary Access Controls"
276
277 endchoice
278
279 config LSM
280 string "Ordered list of enabled LSMs"
281 depends on SECURITY
282 default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,smack,selinux,tomoyo,apparmor,ipe,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
283 default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,apparmor,selinux,smack,tomoyo,ipe,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
284 default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,tomoyo,ipe,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
285 default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,ipe,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
286 default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,ipe,bpf"
287 help
288 A comma-separated list of LSMs, in initialization order.
289 Any LSMs left off this list, except for those with order
290 LSM_ORDER_FIRST and LSM_ORDER_LAST, which are always enabled
291 if selected in the kernel configuration, will be ignored.
292 This can be controlled at boot with the "lsm=" parameter.
293
294 If unsure, leave this as the default.
295
296 config SECURITY_COMMONCAP_KUNIT_TEST
297 bool "Build KUnit tests for commoncap" if !KUNIT_ALL_TESTS
298 depends on KUNIT=y && USER_NS
299 default KUNIT_ALL_TESTS
300 help
301 This builds the commoncap KUnit tests.
302
303 KUnit tests run during boot and output the results to the debug log
304 in TAP format (https://testanything.org/). Only useful for kernel devs
305 running KUnit test harness and are not for inclusion into a
306 production build.
307
308 For more information on KUnit and unit tests in general please refer
309 to the KUnit documentation in Documentation/dev-tools/kunit/.
310
311 If unsure, say N.
312
313 source "security/Kconfig.hardening"
314
315 endmenu
316