| 1 |
/* |
| 2 |
* FreeSec: libcrypt for NetBSD |
| 3 |
* |
| 4 |
* Copyright (c) 1994 David Burren |
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* All rights reserved. |
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* |
| 7 |
* Adapted for FreeBSD-2.0 by Geoffrey M. Rehmet |
| 8 |
* this file should now *only* export crypt(), in order to make |
| 9 |
* binaries of libcrypt exportable from the USA |
| 10 |
* |
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* Adapted for FreeBSD-4.0 by Mark R V Murray |
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* this file should now *only* export crypt_des(), in order to make |
| 13 |
* a module that can be optionally included in libcrypt. |
| 14 |
* |
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* Adapted for libxcrypt by Zack Weinberg, 2017 |
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* see notes in des.c |
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* |
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| 19 |
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
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* are met: |
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright |
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the |
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. |
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* 3. Neither the name of the author nor the names of other contributors |
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* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software |
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* without specific prior written permission. |
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* |
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND |
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE |
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE |
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL |
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS |
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT |
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY |
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF |
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* SUCH DAMAGE. |
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* |
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* This is an original implementation of the DES and the crypt(3) interfaces |
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* by David Burren <[email protected]>. |
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*/ |
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|
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#include "crypt-port.h" |
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#include "alg-des.h" |
| 48 |
|
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#include <errno.h> |
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|
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#if INCLUDE_descrypt || INCLUDE_bsdicrypt || INCLUDE_bigcrypt |
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|
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#define DES_TRD_OUTPUT_LEN 14 /* SShhhhhhhhhhh0 */ |
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#define DES_EXT_OUTPUT_LEN 21 /* _CCCCSSSShhhhhhhhhhh0 */ |
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#define DES_BIG_OUTPUT_LEN ((16*11) + 2 + 1) /* SS (hhhhhhhhhhh){1,16} 0 */ |
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|
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#define DES_MAX_OUTPUT_LEN \ |
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MAX (DES_TRD_OUTPUT_LEN, MAX (DES_EXT_OUTPUT_LEN, DES_BIG_OUTPUT_LEN)) |
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|
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static_assert (DES_MAX_OUTPUT_LEN <= CRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE, |
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"CRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE is too small for DES"); |
| 62 |
|
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/* A des_buffer holds all of the sensitive intermediate data used by |
| 64 |
crypt_des_*. */ |
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|
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struct des_buffer |
| 67 |
{ |
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struct des_ctx ctx; |
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uint8_t keybuf[8]; |
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uint8_t pkbuf[8]; |
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}; |
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|
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static_assert (sizeof (struct des_buffer) <= ALG_SPECIFIC_SIZE, |
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"ALG_SPECIFIC_SIZE is too small for DES"); |
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|
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|
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static inline int |
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ascii_to_bin(char ch) |
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{ |
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if (ch > 'z') |
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return -1; |
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if (ch >= 'a') |
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return ch - 'a' + 38; |
| 84 |
if (ch > 'Z') |
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return -1; |
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if (ch >= 'A') |
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return ch - 'A' + 12; |
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if (ch > '9') |
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return -1; |
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if (ch >= '.') |
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return ch - '.'; |
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return -1; |
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} |
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|
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/* Generate an 11-character DES password hash into the buffer at |
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OUTPUT, and nul-terminate it. The salt and key have already been |
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set. The plaintext is 64 bits of zeroes, and the raw ciphertext is |
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written to cbuf[]. */ |
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static void |
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des_gen_hash (struct des_ctx *ctx, uint32_t count, uint8_t *output, |
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uint8_t cbuf[8]) |
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{ |
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uint8_t plaintext[8]; |
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memset (plaintext, 0, 8); |
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des_crypt_block (ctx, cbuf, plaintext, count, false); |
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|
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/* Now encode the result. */ |
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const uint8_t *sptr = cbuf; |
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const uint8_t *end = sptr + 8; |
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unsigned int c1, c2; |
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|
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do |
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{ |
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c1 = *sptr++; |
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*output++ = ascii64[c1 >> 2]; |
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c1 = (c1 & 0x03) << 4; |
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if (end - sptr <= 0) |
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{ |
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*output++ = ascii64[c1]; |
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break; |
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} |
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|
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c2 = *sptr++; |
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c1 |= c2 >> 4; |
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*output++ = ascii64[c1]; |
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c1 = (c2 & 0x0f) << 2; |
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if (end - sptr <= 0) |
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{ |
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*output++ = ascii64[c1]; |
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break; |
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} |
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|
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c2 = *sptr++; |
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c1 |= c2 >> 6; |
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*output++ = ascii64[c1]; |
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*output++ = ascii64[c2 & 0x3f]; |
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} |
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while (end - sptr > 0); |
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*output = '\0'; |
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} |
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#endif |
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|
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#if INCLUDE_descrypt |
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/* The original UNIX DES-based password hash, no extensions. */ |
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void |
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crypt_descrypt_rn (const char *phrase, size_t ARG_UNUSED (phr_size), |
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const char *setting, size_t ARG_UNUSED (set_size), |
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uint8_t *output, size_t out_size, |
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void *scratch, size_t scr_size) |
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{ |
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/* This shouldn't ever happen, but... */ |
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if (out_size < DES_TRD_OUTPUT_LEN || scr_size < sizeof (struct des_buffer)) |
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{ |
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errno = ERANGE; |
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return; |
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} |
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|
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struct des_buffer *buf = scratch; |
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struct des_ctx *ctx = &buf->ctx; |
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uint32_t salt = 0; |
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uint8_t *keybuf = buf->keybuf, *pkbuf = buf->pkbuf; |
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uint8_t *cp = output; |
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int i; |
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|
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/* "old"-style: setting - 2 bytes of salt, phrase - up to 8 characters. |
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Note: ascii_to_bin maps all byte values outside the ascii64 |
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alphabet to -1. Do not read past the end of the string. */ |
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i = ascii_to_bin (setting[0]); |
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if (i < 0) |
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{ |
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errno = EINVAL; |
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return; |
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} |
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salt = (unsigned int)i; |
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i = ascii_to_bin (setting[1]); |
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if (i < 0) |
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{ |
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errno = EINVAL; |
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return; |
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} |
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salt |= ((unsigned int)i << 6); |
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|
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/* Write the canonical form of the salt to the output buffer. We do |
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this instead of copying from the setting because the setting |
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might be catastrophically malformed (e.g. a 0- or 1-byte string; |
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this could plausibly happen if e.g. login(8) doesn't special-case |
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"*" or "!" in the password database). */ |
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*cp++ = ascii64[salt & 0x3f]; |
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*cp++ = ascii64[(salt >> 6) & 0x3f]; |
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|
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/* Copy the first 8 characters of the password into keybuf, shifting |
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each character up by 1 bit and padding on the right with zeroes. */ |
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for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) |
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{ |
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keybuf[i] = (uint8_t)(*phrase << 1); |
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if (*phrase) |
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phrase++; |
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} |
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|
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des_set_key (ctx, keybuf); |
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des_set_salt (ctx, salt); |
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des_gen_hash (ctx, 25, cp, pkbuf); |
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} |
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#endif |
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|
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#if INCLUDE_bigcrypt |
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/* This algorithm is algorithm 0 (default) shipped with the C2 secure |
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implementation of Digital UNIX. |
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|
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Disclaimer: This work is not based on the source code to Digital |
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UNIX, nor am I (Andy Phillips) connected to Digital Equipment Corp, |
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in any way other than as a customer. This code is based on |
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published interfaces and reasonable guesswork. |
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|
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Description: The cleartext is divided into blocks of 8 characters |
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or less. Each block is encrypted using the standard UNIX libc crypt |
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function. The result of the encryption for one block provides the |
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salt for the succeeding block. The output is simply the |
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concatenation of all the blocks. Up to 16 blocks are supported |
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(that is, the password can be no more than 128 characters long). |
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|
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Andy Phillips <[email protected]> */ |
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void |
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crypt_bigcrypt_rn (const char *phrase, size_t phr_size, |
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const char *setting, size_t set_size, |
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uint8_t *output, size_t out_size, |
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void *scratch, size_t scr_size) |
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{ |
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/* descrypt and bigcrypt generate identical hashes when the phrase |
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contains no more than 8 characters. When the phrase is longer |
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than 8 characters, descrypt would truncate it, and bigcrypt would |
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generate a different, longer hash. Therefore, when we encounter |
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a phrase longer than 8 characters together with a short setting |
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string, the appropriate behavior depends on whether descrypt is |
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enabled. When it is, forward to descrypt. When it isn't, reject |
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the operation. */ |
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if (phr_size > 8 && set_size <= 13) |
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{ |
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#if INCLUDE_descrypt |
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crypt_descrypt_rn (phrase, phr_size, setting, set_size, |
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output, out_size, scratch, scr_size); |
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#else |
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errno = EINVAL; |
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#endif |
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return; |
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} |
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|
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/* This shouldn't ever happen, but... */ |
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if (out_size < DES_BIG_OUTPUT_LEN || scr_size < sizeof (struct des_buffer)) |
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{ |
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errno = ERANGE; |
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return; |
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} |
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|
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struct des_buffer *buf = scratch; |
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struct des_ctx *ctx = &buf->ctx; |
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uint32_t salt = 0; |
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uint8_t *keybuf = buf->keybuf, *pkbuf = buf->pkbuf; |
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uint8_t *cp = output; |
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int i, seg; |
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|
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/* The setting string is exactly the same as for a traditional DES |
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hash. */ |
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i = ascii_to_bin (setting[0]); |
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if (i < 0) |
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{ |
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errno = EINVAL; |
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return; |
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} |
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salt = (unsigned int)i; |
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i = ascii_to_bin (setting[1]); |
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if (i < 0) |
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{ |
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errno = EINVAL; |
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return; |
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} |
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salt |= ((unsigned int)i << 6); |
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|
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*cp++ = ascii64[salt & 0x3f]; |
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*cp++ = ascii64[(salt >> 6) & 0x3f]; |
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|
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for (seg = 0; seg < 16; seg++) |
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{ |
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/* Copy and shift each block as for the traditional DES. */ |
| 285 |
for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) |
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{ |
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keybuf[i] = (uint8_t)(*phrase << 1); |
| 288 |
if (*phrase) |
| 289 |
phrase++; |
| 290 |
} |
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|
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des_set_key (ctx, keybuf); |
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des_set_salt (ctx, salt); |
| 294 |
des_gen_hash (ctx, 25, cp, pkbuf); |
| 295 |
|
| 296 |
if (*phrase == 0) |
| 297 |
break; |
| 298 |
|
| 299 |
/* change the salt (1st 2 chars of previous block) - this was found |
| 300 |
by dowsing - no need to check for invalid characters here */ |
| 301 |
salt = (unsigned int)ascii_to_bin ((char)cp[0]); |
| 302 |
salt |= (unsigned int)ascii_to_bin ((char)cp[1]) << 6; |
| 303 |
cp += 11; |
| 304 |
} |
| 305 |
} |
| 306 |
#endif |
| 307 |
|
| 308 |
#if INCLUDE_bsdicrypt |
| 309 |
/* crypt_rn() entry point for BSD-style extended DES hashes. These |
| 310 |
permit long passwords and have more salt and a controllable iteration |
| 311 |
count, but are still unacceptably weak by modern standards. */ |
| 312 |
void |
| 313 |
crypt_bsdicrypt_rn (const char *phrase, size_t ARG_UNUSED (phr_size), |
| 314 |
const char *setting, size_t set_size, |
| 315 |
uint8_t *output, size_t out_size, |
| 316 |
void *scratch, size_t scr_size) |
| 317 |
{ |
| 318 |
/* This shouldn't ever happen, but... */ |
| 319 |
if (out_size < DES_EXT_OUTPUT_LEN || scr_size < sizeof (struct des_buffer)) |
| 320 |
{ |
| 321 |
errno = ERANGE; |
| 322 |
return; |
| 323 |
} |
| 324 |
|
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/* If this is true, this function shouldn't have been called. |
| 326 |
Setting must be at least 9 bytes long, byte 10+ is ignored. */ |
| 327 |
if (*setting != '_' || set_size < 9) |
| 328 |
{ |
| 329 |
errno = EINVAL; |
| 330 |
return; |
| 331 |
} |
| 332 |
|
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struct des_buffer *buf = scratch; |
| 334 |
struct des_ctx *ctx = &buf->ctx; |
| 335 |
uint32_t count = 0, salt = 0; |
| 336 |
uint8_t *keybuf = buf->keybuf, *pkbuf = buf->pkbuf; |
| 337 |
uint8_t *cp = output; |
| 338 |
int i, x; |
| 339 |
|
| 340 |
/* "new"-style DES hash: |
| 341 |
setting - underscore, 4 bytes of count, 4 bytes of salt |
| 342 |
phrase - unlimited characters |
| 343 |
*/ |
| 344 |
for (i = 1; i < 5; i++) |
| 345 |
{ |
| 346 |
x = ascii_to_bin(setting[i]); |
| 347 |
if (x < 0) |
| 348 |
{ |
| 349 |
errno = EINVAL; |
| 350 |
return; |
| 351 |
} |
| 352 |
count |= (unsigned int)x << ((i - 1) * 6); |
| 353 |
} |
| 354 |
|
| 355 |
for (i = 5; i < 9; i++) |
| 356 |
{ |
| 357 |
x = ascii_to_bin(setting[i]); |
| 358 |
if (x < 0) |
| 359 |
{ |
| 360 |
errno = EINVAL; |
| 361 |
return; |
| 362 |
} |
| 363 |
salt |= (unsigned int)x << ((i - 5) * 6); |
| 364 |
} |
| 365 |
|
| 366 |
memcpy (cp, setting, 9); |
| 367 |
cp += 9; |
| 368 |
|
| 369 |
/* Fold passwords longer than 8 bytes into a single DES key using a |
| 370 |
procedure similar to a Merkle-Dåmgard hash construction. Each |
| 371 |
block is shifted and padded, as for the traditional hash, then |
| 372 |
XORed with the output of the previous round (IV all bits zero), |
| 373 |
set as the DES key, and encrypted to produce the round output. |
| 374 |
The salt is zero throughout this procedure. */ |
| 375 |
des_set_salt (ctx, 0); |
| 376 |
memset (pkbuf, 0, 8); |
| 377 |
for (;;) |
| 378 |
{ |
| 379 |
for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) |
| 380 |
{ |
| 381 |
keybuf[i] = (uint8_t)(pkbuf[i] ^ (*phrase << 1)); |
| 382 |
if (*phrase) |
| 383 |
phrase++; |
| 384 |
} |
| 385 |
des_set_key (ctx, keybuf); |
| 386 |
if (*phrase == 0) |
| 387 |
break; |
| 388 |
des_crypt_block (ctx, pkbuf, keybuf, 1, false); |
| 389 |
} |
| 390 |
|
| 391 |
/* Proceed as for the traditional DES hash. */ |
| 392 |
des_set_salt (ctx, salt); |
| 393 |
des_gen_hash (ctx, count, cp, pkbuf); |
| 394 |
} |
| 395 |
#endif |
| 396 |
|
| 397 |
#if INCLUDE_descrypt || INCLUDE_bigcrypt |
| 398 |
void |
| 399 |
gensalt_descrypt_rn (unsigned long count, |
| 400 |
const uint8_t *rbytes, size_t nrbytes, |
| 401 |
uint8_t *output, size_t output_size) |
| 402 |
{ |
| 403 |
if (output_size < 3) |
| 404 |
{ |
| 405 |
errno = ERANGE; |
| 406 |
return; |
| 407 |
} |
| 408 |
|
| 409 |
if (nrbytes < 2 || count != 0) |
| 410 |
{ |
| 411 |
errno = EINVAL; |
| 412 |
return; |
| 413 |
} |
| 414 |
|
| 415 |
output[0] = ascii64[(unsigned int) rbytes[0] & 0x3f]; |
| 416 |
output[1] = ascii64[(unsigned int) rbytes[1] & 0x3f]; |
| 417 |
output[2] = '\0'; |
| 418 |
} |
| 419 |
#if INCLUDE_bigcrypt |
| 420 |
void |
| 421 |
gensalt_bigcrypt_rn (unsigned long count, |
| 422 |
const uint8_t *rbytes, size_t nrbytes, |
| 423 |
uint8_t *output, size_t output_size) |
| 424 |
{ |
| 425 |
#if !INCLUDE_descrypt |
| 426 |
/* We need descrypt + 12 bytes. */ |
| 427 |
if (output_size < 3 + 12) |
| 428 |
{ |
| 429 |
errno = ERANGE; |
| 430 |
return; |
| 431 |
} |
| 432 |
#endif |
| 433 |
|
| 434 |
/* Same setting string as descrypt, but... */ |
| 435 |
gensalt_descrypt_rn (count, rbytes, nrbytes, output, output_size); |
| 436 |
|
| 437 |
#if !INCLUDE_descrypt |
| 438 |
/* ... add 12 trailing dummy characters, which makes the string too |
| 439 |
long to be a descrypt setting, thus bigcrypt will be used. */ |
| 440 |
strcpy_or_abort (output + 2, output_size - 2, "............"); |
| 441 |
#endif |
| 442 |
} |
| 443 |
#endif |
| 444 |
#endif |
| 445 |
|
| 446 |
#if INCLUDE_bsdicrypt |
| 447 |
void |
| 448 |
gensalt_bsdicrypt_rn (unsigned long count, |
| 449 |
const uint8_t *rbytes, size_t nrbytes, |
| 450 |
uint8_t *output, size_t output_size) |
| 451 |
{ |
| 452 |
if (output_size < 1 + 4 + 4 + 1) |
| 453 |
{ |
| 454 |
errno = ERANGE; |
| 455 |
return; |
| 456 |
} |
| 457 |
if (nrbytes < 3) |
| 458 |
{ |
| 459 |
errno = EINVAL; |
| 460 |
return; |
| 461 |
} |
| 462 |
|
| 463 |
if (count == 0) |
| 464 |
count = 725; |
| 465 |
if (count > 0xffffff) |
| 466 |
count = 0xffffff; |
| 467 |
|
| 468 |
/* Even iteration counts make it easier to detect weak DES keys from a look |
| 469 |
at the hash, so they should be avoided. */ |
| 470 |
count |= 1; |
| 471 |
|
| 472 |
unsigned long value = |
| 473 |
((unsigned long) (unsigned char) rbytes[0] << 0) | |
| 474 |
((unsigned long) (unsigned char) rbytes[1] << 8) | |
| 475 |
((unsigned long) (unsigned char) rbytes[2] << 16); |
| 476 |
|
| 477 |
output[0] = '_'; |
| 478 |
|
| 479 |
output[1] = ascii64[(count >> 0) & 0x3f]; |
| 480 |
output[2] = ascii64[(count >> 6) & 0x3f]; |
| 481 |
output[3] = ascii64[(count >> 12) & 0x3f]; |
| 482 |
output[4] = ascii64[(count >> 18) & 0x3f]; |
| 483 |
|
| 484 |
output[5] = ascii64[(value >> 0) & 0x3f]; |
| 485 |
output[6] = ascii64[(value >> 6) & 0x3f]; |
| 486 |
output[7] = ascii64[(value >> 12) & 0x3f]; |
| 487 |
output[8] = ascii64[(value >> 18) & 0x3f]; |
| 488 |
|
| 489 |
output[9] = '\0'; |
| 490 |
} |
| 491 |
#endif |