| 1 |
<!DOCTYPE html |
| 2 |
PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" |
| 3 |
"http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd"> |
| 4 |
<html><head> |
| 5 |
<title>Off-the-Record Messaging Protocol version 3</title> |
| 6 |
<style type="text/css"> |
| 7 |
body { background: white; color: black } |
| 8 |
h1 { text-align: center } |
| 9 |
dd ul.note { list-style: none } |
| 10 |
dl.doublespace dd { margin-bottom: 2ex } |
| 11 |
</style> |
| 12 |
</head><body> |
| 13 |
<h1>Off-the-Record Messaging Protocol version 3</h1> |
| 14 |
<p>This document describes version 3 of the Off-the-Record Messaging |
| 15 |
protocol. The main changes over version 2 include:</p> |
| 16 |
<ul> |
| 17 |
<li>Both fragmented and unfragmented messages contain sender and |
| 18 |
recipient instance tags. This avoids an issue on IM networks that |
| 19 |
always relay all messages to all sessions of a client who is logged |
| 20 |
in multiple times. In this situation, OTR clients can attempt to |
| 21 |
establish an OTR session indefinitely if there are interleaving |
| 22 |
messages from each of the sessions.</li> |
| 23 |
<li>An extra symmetric key is derived during AKE. This may be used for |
| 24 |
secure communication over a different channel (e.g., file transfer, |
| 25 |
voice chat).</li> |
| 26 |
</ul> |
| 27 |
<h2>Very high level overview</h2> |
| 28 |
<p>OTR assumes a network model which provides in-order delivery of |
| 29 |
messages, but that some messages may not get delivered at all |
| 30 |
(for example, if the user disconnects). There may be |
| 31 |
an active attacker, who is allowed to perform a Denial of |
| 32 |
Service attack, but not to learn the contents of messages.</p> |
| 33 |
<ol> |
| 34 |
<li>Alice signals to Bob that she would like (using an OTR Query Message) |
| 35 |
or is willing (using a whitespace-tagged plaintext message) to use OTR |
| 36 |
to communicate. Either mechanism should convey the version(s) of OTR |
| 37 |
that Alice is willing to use.</li> |
| 38 |
<li>Bob initiates the authenticated key exchange (AKE) with Alice. |
| 39 |
Versions 2 and 3 of OTR use a variant of the SIGMA protocol as its AKE.</li> |
| 40 |
<li>Alice and Bob exchange Data Messages to send information to each |
| 41 |
other.</li> |
| 42 |
</ol> |
| 43 |
<h2>High level overview</h2> |
| 44 |
<h3>Requesting an OTR conversation</h3> |
| 45 |
<p>There are two ways Alice can inform Bob that she is willing to use |
| 46 |
the OTR protocol to speak with him: by sending him the OTR Query Message, |
| 47 |
or by including a special "tag" consisting of whitespace characters in |
| 48 |
one of her messages to him. Each method also includes a way for Alice |
| 49 |
to communicate to Bob which versions of the OTR protocol she is willing |
| 50 |
to speak with him.</p> |
| 51 |
<p>The semantics of the OTR Query Message are that Alice is |
| 52 |
<em>requesting</em> that Bob start an OTR conversation with her (if, of |
| 53 |
course, he is willing and able to do so). On the other hand, the |
| 54 |
semantics of the whitespace tag are that Alice is merely |
| 55 |
<em>indicating</em> to Bob that she is willing and able to have an OTR |
| 56 |
conversation with him. If Bob has a policy of "only use OTR when it's |
| 57 |
explicitly requested", for example, then he <em>would</em> start an OTR |
| 58 |
conversation upon receiving an OTR Query Message, but <em>would not</em> |
| 59 |
upon receiving the whitespace tag.</p> |
| 60 |
<h3>Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE)</h3> |
| 61 |
<p>This section outlines the version of the SIGMA protocol used as the |
| 62 |
AKE. All exponentiations are done modulo a particular 1536-bit prime, |
| 63 |
and g is a generator of that group, as indicated in the detailed |
| 64 |
description below. Alice and Bob's long-term authentication public keys |
| 65 |
are pub<sub>A</sub> and pub<sub>B</sub>, respectively.</p> |
| 66 |
<p>The general idea is that Alice and Bob do an <em>unauthenticated</em> |
| 67 |
Diffie-Hellman (D-H) key exchange to set up an encrypted channel, and |
| 68 |
then do mutual authentication <em>inside</em> that channel.</p> |
| 69 |
<p>Bob will be initiating the AKE with Alice.</p> |
| 70 |
<ul> |
| 71 |
<li>Bob: |
| 72 |
<ol> |
| 73 |
<li>Picks a random value r (128 bits)</li> |
| 74 |
<li>Picks a random value x (at least 320 bits)</li> |
| 75 |
<li>Sends Alice AES<sub>r</sub>(g<sup>x</sup>), HASH(g<sup>x</sup>)</li> |
| 76 |
</ol></li> |
| 77 |
<li>Alice: |
| 78 |
<ol> |
| 79 |
<li>Picks a random value y (at least 320 bits)</li> |
| 80 |
<li>Sends Bob g<sup>y</sup></li> |
| 81 |
</ol></li> |
| 82 |
<li>Bob: |
| 83 |
<ol> |
| 84 |
<li>Verifies that Alice's g<sup>y</sup> is a legal value (2 <= |
| 85 |
g<sup>y</sup> <= modulus-2)</li> |
| 86 |
<li>Computes s = (g<sup>y</sup>)<sup>x</sup></li> |
| 87 |
<li>Computes two AES keys c, c' and four MAC keys m1, m1', m2, m2' by |
| 88 |
hashing s in various ways</li> |
| 89 |
<li>Picks keyid<sub>B</sub>, a serial number for his D-H key |
| 90 |
g<sup>x</sup></li> |
| 91 |
<li>Computes M<sub>B</sub> = MAC<sub>m1</sub>(g<sup>x</sup>, g<sup>y</sup>, |
| 92 |
pub<sub>B</sub>, keyid<sub>B</sub>)</li> |
| 93 |
<li>Computes X<sub>B</sub> = pub<sub>B</sub>, keyid<sub>B</sub>, |
| 94 |
sig<sub>B</sub>(M<sub>B</sub>)</li> |
| 95 |
<li>Sends Alice r, AES<sub>c</sub>(X<sub>B</sub>), |
| 96 |
MAC<sub>m2</sub>(AES<sub>c</sub>(X<sub>B</sub>))</li> |
| 97 |
</ol></li> |
| 98 |
<li>Alice: |
| 99 |
<ol> |
| 100 |
<li>Uses r to decrypt the value of g<sup>x</sup> sent earlier</li> |
| 101 |
<li>Verifies that HASH(g<sup>x</sup>) matches the value sent earlier</li> |
| 102 |
<li>Verifies that Bob's g<sup>x</sup> is a legal value (2 <= |
| 103 |
g<sup>x</sup> <= modulus-2)</li> |
| 104 |
<li>Computes s = (g<sup>x</sup>)<sup>y</sup> (note that this will be the |
| 105 |
same as the value of s Bob calculated)</li> |
| 106 |
<li>Computes two AES keys c, c' and four MAC keys m1, m1', m2, m2' by |
| 107 |
hashing s in various ways (the same as Bob)</li> |
| 108 |
<li>Uses m2 to verify MAC<sub>m2</sub>(AES<sub>c</sub>(X<sub>B</sub>))</li> |
| 109 |
<li>Uses c to decrypt AES<sub>c</sub>(X<sub>B</sub>) to obtain |
| 110 |
X<sub>B</sub> = pub<sub>B</sub>, keyid<sub>B</sub>, |
| 111 |
sig<sub>B</sub>(M<sub>B</sub>)</li> |
| 112 |
<li>Computes M<sub>B</sub> = MAC<sub>m1</sub>(g<sup>x</sup>, |
| 113 |
g<sup>y</sup>, pub<sub>B</sub>, keyid<sub>B</sub>)</li> |
| 114 |
<li>Uses pub<sub>B</sub> to verify sig<sub>B</sub>(M<sub>B</sub>)</li> |
| 115 |
|
| 116 |
<li>Picks keyid<sub>A</sub>, a serial number for her D-H key |
| 117 |
g<sup>y</sup></li> |
| 118 |
<li>Computes M<sub>A</sub> = MAC<sub>m1'</sub>(g<sup>y</sup>, g<sup>x</sup>, |
| 119 |
pub<sub>A</sub>, keyid<sub>A</sub>)</li> |
| 120 |
<li>Computes X<sub>A</sub> = pub<sub>A</sub>, keyid<sub>A</sub>, |
| 121 |
sig<sub>A</sub>(M<sub>A</sub>)</li> |
| 122 |
<li>Sends Bob AES<sub>c'</sub>(X<sub>A</sub>), |
| 123 |
MAC<sub>m2'</sub>(AES<sub>c'</sub>(X<sub>A</sub>))</li> |
| 124 |
</ol></li> |
| 125 |
<li>Bob: |
| 126 |
<ol> |
| 127 |
<li>Uses m2' to verify MAC<sub>m2'</sub>(AES<sub>c'</sub>(X<sub>A</sub>))</li> |
| 128 |
<li>Uses c' to decrypt AES<sub>c'</sub>(X<sub>A</sub>) to obtain |
| 129 |
X<sub>A</sub> = pub<sub>A</sub>, keyid<sub>A</sub>, |
| 130 |
sig<sub>A</sub>(M<sub>A</sub>)</li> |
| 131 |
<li>Computes M<sub>A</sub> = MAC<sub>m1'</sub>(g<sup>y</sup>, |
| 132 |
g<sup>x</sup>, pub<sub>A</sub>, keyid<sub>A</sub>)</li> |
| 133 |
<li>Uses pub<sub>A</sub> to verify sig<sub>A</sub>(M<sub>A</sub>)</li> |
| 134 |
</ol></li> |
| 135 |
<li>If all of the verifications succeeded, Alice and Bob now know each |
| 136 |
other's Diffie-Hellman public keys, and share the value s. Alice is |
| 137 |
assured that s is known by someone with access to the private key |
| 138 |
corresponding to pub<sub>B</sub>, and similarly for Bob.</li> |
| 139 |
</ul> |
| 140 |
<h3>Exchanging data</h3> |
| 141 |
<p>This section outlines the method used to protect data being exchanged |
| 142 |
between Alice and Bob. As above, all exponentiations are done modulo |
| 143 |
a particular 1536-bit prime, and g is a generator of |
| 144 |
that group, as indicated in the detailed description below.</p> |
| 145 |
<p>Suppose Alice has a message (msg) to send to Bob.</p> |
| 146 |
<ul> |
| 147 |
<li>Alice: |
| 148 |
<ol> |
| 149 |
<li>Picks the most recent of her own D-H encryption keys that Bob has |
| 150 |
acknowledged receiving (by using it in a Data Message, or failing that, |
| 151 |
in the AKE). Let key<sub>A</sub> be that key, and let keyid<sub>A</sub> |
| 152 |
be its serial number.</li> |
| 153 |
<li>If the above key is Alice's most recent key, she generates a new D-H key |
| 154 |
(next_dh), to get the serial number keyid<sub>A</sub>+1.</li> |
| 155 |
<li>Picks the most recent of Bob's D-H encryption keys that she has |
| 156 |
received from him (either in a Data Message or in the AKE). Let |
| 157 |
key<sub>B</sub> by that key, and let keyid<sub>B</sub> be its serial |
| 158 |
number.</li> |
| 159 |
<li>Uses Diffie-Hellman to compute a shared secret from the two keys |
| 160 |
key<sub>A</sub> and key<sub>B</sub>, and generates the |
| 161 |
sending AES key, ek, and the sending MAC key, mk, as detailed |
| 162 |
below.</li> |
| 163 |
<li>Collects any old MAC keys that were used in previous messages, but |
| 164 |
will never again be used (because their associated D-H keys are no |
| 165 |
longer the most recent ones) into a list, oldmackeys.</li> |
| 166 |
<li>Picks a value of the counter, ctr, so that the triple |
| 167 |
(key<sub>A</sub>, key<sub>B</sub>, ctr) is never the same for more |
| 168 |
than one Data Message Alice sends to Bob.</li> |
| 169 |
<li>Computes T<sub>A</sub> = (keyid<sub>A</sub>, keyid<sub>B</sub>, next_dh, |
| 170 |
ctr, AES-CTR<sub>ek,ctr</sub>(msg))</li> |
| 171 |
<li>Sends Bob T<sub>A</sub>, MAC<sub>mk</sub>(T<sub>A</sub>), |
| 172 |
oldmackeys</li> |
| 173 |
</ol></li> |
| 174 |
<li>Bob: |
| 175 |
<ol> |
| 176 |
<li>Uses Diffie-Hellman to compute a shared secret from the two keys |
| 177 |
labelled by keyid<sub>A</sub> and keyid<sub>B</sub>, and generates the |
| 178 |
receiving AES key, ek, and the receiving MAC key, mk, as detailed |
| 179 |
below. (These will be the same as the keys Alice generated, above.)</li> |
| 180 |
<li>Uses mk to verify MAC<sub>mk</sub>(T<sub>A</sub>).</li> |
| 181 |
<li>Uses ek and ctr to decrypt |
| 182 |
AES-CTR<sub>ek,ctr</sub>(msg).</li> |
| 183 |
</ol> |
| 184 |
</li> |
| 185 |
</ul> |
| 186 |
<h3>Socialist Millionaires' Protocol (SMP)</h3> |
| 187 |
<p>While data messages are being exchanged, either Alice or Bob may |
| 188 |
run SMP to detect impersonation or man-in-the-middle attacks. |
| 189 |
As above, all exponentiations are done modulo a particular 1536-bit |
| 190 |
prime, and g<sub>1</sub> is a generator of that group. All sent values |
| 191 |
include zero-knowledge proofs that they were generated according to |
| 192 |
this protocol, as indicated in the detailed description below.</p> |
| 193 |
<p>Suppose Alice and Bob have secret information x and y respectively, |
| 194 |
and they wish to know whether x = y. The Socialist Millionaires' Protocol |
| 195 |
allows them to compare x and y without revealing any other information |
| 196 |
than the value of (x == y). For OTR, the secrets contain |
| 197 |
information about both parties' long-term authentication public keys, |
| 198 |
as well as information entered by the users themselves. If x = y, |
| 199 |
this means that Alice and Bob entered the same secret information, and |
| 200 |
so must be the same entities who established that secret to begin with.</p> |
| 201 |
<p>Assuming that Alice begins the exchange:</p> |
| 202 |
<ul> |
| 203 |
<li>Alice: |
| 204 |
<ol> |
| 205 |
<li>Picks random exponents a<sub>2</sub> and a<sub>3</sub></li> |
| 206 |
<li>Sends Bob g<sub>2a</sub> = g<sub>1</sub><sup>a<sub>2</sub></sup> and |
| 207 |
g<sub>3a</sub> = g<sub>1</sub><sup>a<sub>3</sub></sup></li> |
| 208 |
</ol></li> |
| 209 |
<li>Bob: |
| 210 |
<ol> |
| 211 |
<li>Picks random exponents b<sub>2</sub> and b<sub>3</sub></li> |
| 212 |
<li>Computes g<sub>2b</sub> = g<sub>1</sub><sup>b<sub>2</sub></sup> and |
| 213 |
g<sub>3b</sub> = g<sub>1</sub><sup>b<sub>3</sub></sup></li> |
| 214 |
<li>Computes g<sub>2</sub> = g<sub>2a</sub><sup>b<sub>2</sub></sup> and |
| 215 |
g<sub>3</sub> = g<sub>3a</sub><sup>b<sub>3</sub></sup></li> |
| 216 |
<li>Picks random exponent r</li> |
| 217 |
<li>Computes P<sub>b</sub> = g<sub>3</sub><sup>r</sup> and |
| 218 |
Q<sub>b</sub> = g<sub>1</sub><sup>r</sup> g<sub>2</sub><sup>y</sup></li> |
| 219 |
<li>Sends Alice g<sub>2b</sub>, g<sub>3b</sub>, P<sub>b</sub> and |
| 220 |
Q<sub>b</sub></li> |
| 221 |
</ol></li> |
| 222 |
<li>Alice: |
| 223 |
<ol> |
| 224 |
<li>Computes g<sub>2</sub> = g<sub>2b</sub><sup>a<sub>2</sub></sup> and |
| 225 |
g<sub>3</sub> = g<sub>3b</sub><sup>a<sub>3</sub></sup></li> |
| 226 |
<li>Picks random exponent s</li> |
| 227 |
<li>Computes P<sub>a</sub> = g<sub>3</sub><sup>s</sup> and |
| 228 |
Q<sub>a</sub> = g<sub>1</sub><sup>s</sup> g<sub>2</sub><sup>x</sup></li> |
| 229 |
<li>Computes R<sub>a</sub> = (Q<sub>a</sub> / Q<sub>b</sub>) |
| 230 |
<sup>a<sub>3</sub></sup></li> |
| 231 |
<li>Sends Bob P<sub>a</sub>, Q<sub>a</sub> and R<sub>a</sub></li> |
| 232 |
</ol></li> |
| 233 |
<li>Bob: |
| 234 |
<ol> |
| 235 |
<li>Computes R<sub>b</sub> = (Q<sub>a</sub> / Q<sub>b</sub>) |
| 236 |
<sup>b<sub>3</sub></sup></li> |
| 237 |
<li>Computes R<sub>ab</sub> = R<sub>a</sub><sup>b<sub>3</sub></sup></li> |
| 238 |
<li>Checks whether R<sub>ab</sub> == (P<sub>a</sub> / P<sub>b</sub>)</li> |
| 239 |
<li>Sends Alice R<sub>b</sub></li> |
| 240 |
</ol></li> |
| 241 |
<li>Alice: |
| 242 |
<ol> |
| 243 |
<li>Computes R<sub>ab</sub> = R<sub>b</sub><sup>a<sub>3</sub></sup></li> |
| 244 |
<li>Checks whether R<sub>ab</sub> == (P<sub>a</sub> / P<sub>b</sub>)</li> |
| 245 |
</ol></li> |
| 246 |
<li>If everything is done correctly, then R<sub>ab</sub> should hold the |
| 247 |
value of (P<sub>a</sub> / P<sub>b</sub>) times |
| 248 |
(g<sub>2</sub><sup>a<sub>3</sub>b<sub>3</sub></sup>)<sup>(x - y)</sup>, which means that the test at the end of |
| 249 |
the protocol will only succeed if x == y. Further, since |
| 250 |
g<sub>2</sub><sup>a<sub>3</sub>b<sub>3</sub></sup> is a random number |
| 251 |
not known to any party, if x is not equal to y, no other information is |
| 252 |
revealed.</li> |
| 253 |
</ul> |
| 254 |
<h2>Details of the protocol</h2> |
| 255 |
<h3>Unencoded messages</h3> |
| 256 |
<p>This section describes the messages in the OTR protocol that are not |
| 257 |
base-64 encoded binary.</p> |
| 258 |
<h4>OTR Query Messages</h4> |
| 259 |
<p>If Alice wishes to communicate to Bob that she would like to use OTR, |
| 260 |
she sends a message containing the string "?OTR" followed by an |
| 261 |
indication of what versions of OTR she is willing to use with Bob. The |
| 262 |
version string is constructed as follows:</p> |
| 263 |
<ul> |
| 264 |
<li>If she is willing to use OTR version 1, the version string must |
| 265 |
start with "?".</li> |
| 266 |
<li>If she is willing to use OTR versions other than 1, a "v" followed |
| 267 |
by the byte identifiers for the versions in question, followed by "?". |
| 268 |
The byte identifier for OTR version 2 is "2", and similarly for 3. The |
| 269 |
order of the identifiers between the "v" and the "?" does not matter, |
| 270 |
but none should be listed more than once.</li> |
| 271 |
</ul> |
| 272 |
<p>For example:</p> |
| 273 |
<dl> |
| 274 |
<dt>"?OTR?"</dt> |
| 275 |
<dd>Version 1 only</dd> |
| 276 |
<dt>"?OTRv2?"</dt> |
| 277 |
<dd>Version 2 only</dd> |
| 278 |
<dt>"?OTRv23?"</dt> |
| 279 |
<dd>Versions 2 and 3</dd> |
| 280 |
<dt>"?OTR?v2?"</dt> |
| 281 |
<dd>Versions 1 and 2</dd> |
| 282 |
<dt>"?OTRv24x?"</dt> |
| 283 |
<dd>Version 2, and hypothetical future versions identified by "4" and |
| 284 |
"x"</dd> |
| 285 |
<dt>"?OTR?v24x?"</dt> |
| 286 |
<dd>Versions 1, 2, and hypothetical future versions identified by "4" and |
| 287 |
"x"</dd> |
| 288 |
<dt>"?OTR?v?"</dt> |
| 289 |
<dd>Also version 1 only</dd> |
| 290 |
<dt>"?OTRv?"</dt> |
| 291 |
<dd>A bizarre claim that Alice would like to start an OTR conversation, |
| 292 |
but is unwilling to speak any version of the protocol</dd> |
| 293 |
</dl> |
| 294 |
<p>These strings may be hidden from the user (for example, in |
| 295 |
an attribute of an HTML tag), and/or may be accompanied by an |
| 296 |
explanitory message ("Alice has requested an Off-the-Record private |
| 297 |
conversation."). If Bob is willing to use OTR with Alice (with a |
| 298 |
protocol version that Alice has offered), he should start the AKE.</p> |
| 299 |
<h4>Tagged plaintext messages</h4> |
| 300 |
<p>If Alice wishes to communicate to Bob that she is willing to use OTR, |
| 301 |
she can attach a special whitespace tag to any plaintext message she |
| 302 |
sends him. This tag may occur anywhere in the message, and may be |
| 303 |
hidden from the user (as in the Query Messages, above).</p> |
| 304 |
<p>The tag consists of the following 16 bytes, followed by one or more |
| 305 |
sets of 8 bytes indicating the version of OTR Alice is willing to |
| 306 |
use:</p> |
| 307 |
<ul> |
| 308 |
<li>Always send "\x20\x09\x20\x20\x09\x09\x09\x09" |
| 309 |
"\x20\x09\x20\x09\x20\x09\x20\x20", followed by one or more of:</li> |
| 310 |
<li>"\x20\x09\x20\x09\x20\x20\x09\x20" to indicate a willingness to use |
| 311 |
OTR version 1 with Bob (note: this string must come before all other |
| 312 |
whitespace version tags, if it is present, for backwards |
| 313 |
compatibility)</li> |
| 314 |
<li>"\x20\x20\x09\x09\x20\x20\x09\x20" to indicate a willingness to use |
| 315 |
OTR version 2 with Bob</li> |
| 316 |
<li>"\x20\x20\x09\x09\x20\x20\x09\x09" to indicate a willingness to use |
| 317 |
OTR version 3 with Bob</li> |
| 318 |
</ul> |
| 319 |
<p>If Bob is willing to use OTR with Alice (with a protocol version that |
| 320 |
Alice has offered), he should start the AKE. On the other hand, if |
| 321 |
Alice receives a plaintext message from Bob (rather than an initiation |
| 322 |
of the AKE), she should stop sending him the whitespace tag.</p> |
| 323 |
<h4>OTR Error Messages</h4> |
| 324 |
<p>Any message containing the string "?OTR Error:" is an OTR Error |
| 325 |
Message. The following part of the message should contain |
| 326 |
human-readable details of the error.</p> |
| 327 |
<h3>Encoded messages</h3> |
| 328 |
<p>This section describes the byte-level format of the base-64 encoded |
| 329 |
binary OTR messages. The binary form of each of the messages is |
| 330 |
described below. To transmit one of these messages, construct the ASCII |
| 331 |
string consisting of the five bytes "?OTR:", followed by the base-64 |
| 332 |
encoding of the binary form of the message, followed by the byte |
| 333 |
".".</p> |
| 334 |
<p>For the Diffie-Hellman group computations, the group is the one |
| 335 |
defined in RFC 3526 with 1536-bit modulus (hex, big-endian):</p> |
| 336 |
<blockquote><pre> |
| 337 |
FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF C90FDAA2 2168C234 C4C6628B 80DC1CD1 |
| 338 |
29024E08 8A67CC74 020BBEA6 3B139B22 514A0879 8E3404DD |
| 339 |
EF9519B3 CD3A431B 302B0A6D F25F1437 4FE1356D 6D51C245 |
| 340 |
E485B576 625E7EC6 F44C42E9 A637ED6B 0BFF5CB6 F406B7ED |
| 341 |
EE386BFB 5A899FA5 AE9F2411 7C4B1FE6 49286651 ECE45B3D |
| 342 |
C2007CB8 A163BF05 98DA4836 1C55D39A 69163FA8 FD24CF5F |
| 343 |
83655D23 DCA3AD96 1C62F356 208552BB 9ED52907 7096966D |
| 344 |
670C354E 4ABC9804 F1746C08 CA237327 FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF |
| 345 |
</pre></blockquote> |
| 346 |
<p>and a generator (g) of 2. Note that this means that whenever you see a |
| 347 |
Diffie-Hellman exponentiation in this document, it always means that the |
| 348 |
exponentiation is done modulo the above 1536-bit number.</p> |
| 349 |
<h4>Data types</h4> |
| 350 |
<dl> |
| 351 |
<dt>Bytes (BYTE):</dt> |
| 352 |
<dd> 1 byte unsigned value</dd> |
| 353 |
<dt>Shorts (SHORT):</dt> |
| 354 |
<dd> 2 byte unsigned value, big-endian</dd> |
| 355 |
<dt>Ints (INT):</dt> |
| 356 |
<dd> 4 byte unsigned value, big-endian</dd> |
| 357 |
<dt>Multi-precision integers (MPI):</dt> |
| 358 |
<dd> 4 byte unsigned len, big-endian |
| 359 |
<br /> len byte unsigned value, big-endian |
| 360 |
<br /> (MPIs must use the minimum-length encoding; i.e. no leading 0x00 |
| 361 |
bytes. This is important when calculating public key |
| 362 |
fingerprints.)</dd> |
| 363 |
<dt>Opaque variable-length data (DATA):</dt> |
| 364 |
<dd> 4 byte unsigned len, big-endian |
| 365 |
<br /> len byte data</dd> |
| 366 |
<dt>Initial CTR-mode counter value (CTR):</dt> |
| 367 |
<dd> 8 bytes data</dd> |
| 368 |
<dt>Message Authentication Code (MAC):</dt> |
| 369 |
<dd> 20 bytes MAC data</dd> |
| 370 |
</dl> |
| 371 |
<h4>Public keys, signatures, and fingerprints</h4> |
| 372 |
<p>OTR users have long-lived public keys that they use for |
| 373 |
authentication (but <em>not</em> encryption). The current version of |
| 374 |
the OTR protocol only supports DSA public keys, but there is a key type |
| 375 |
marker for future extensibility.</p> |
| 376 |
<dl> |
| 377 |
<dt>OTR public authentication DSA key (PUBKEY):</dt> |
| 378 |
<dd>Pubkey type (SHORT) |
| 379 |
<ul class="note"><li>DSA public keys have type 0x0000</li></ul> |
| 380 |
p (MPI) |
| 381 |
<br />q (MPI) |
| 382 |
<br />g (MPI) |
| 383 |
<br />y (MPI) |
| 384 |
<ul class="note"><li>(p,q,g,y) are the DSA public key parameters</li></ul> |
| 385 |
</dd> |
| 386 |
</dl> |
| 387 |
<p>OTR public keys are used to generate <b>signatures</b>; different |
| 388 |
types of keys produce signatures in different formats. The format for a |
| 389 |
signature made by a DSA public key is as follows:</p> |
| 390 |
<dl> |
| 391 |
<dt>DSA signature (SIG):</dt> |
| 392 |
<dd> (len is the length of the DSA public parameter q, which in |
| 393 |
current implementations must be 20 bytes, or 160 bits) |
| 394 |
<br /> len byte unsigned r, big-endian |
| 395 |
<br /> len byte unsigned s, big-endian</dd> |
| 396 |
</dl> |
| 397 |
<p>OTR public keys have <b>fingerprints</b>, which are hex strings that |
| 398 |
serve as identifiers for the public key. The fingerprint is calculated |
| 399 |
by taking the SHA-1 hash of the byte-level representation of the public |
| 400 |
key. However, there is an exception for backwards compatibility: if the |
| 401 |
pubkey type is 0x0000, those two leading 0x00 bytes are omitted from the |
| 402 |
data to be hashed. The encoding assures that, assuming the hash |
| 403 |
function itself has no useful collisions, and DSA keys have length less |
| 404 |
than 524281 bits (500 times larger than most DSA keys), no two public |
| 405 |
keys will have the same fingerprint.</p> |
| 406 |
<h4>Instance Tags</h4> |
| 407 |
<p>Clients include instance tags in all OTR version 3 messages. Instance |
| 408 |
tags are 32-bit values that are intended to be persistent. If the same |
| 409 |
client is logged into the same account from multiple locations, the |
| 410 |
intention is that the client will have different instance tags at each |
| 411 |
location. As shown below, OTR version 3 messages (fragmented and |
| 412 |
unfragmented) include the source and destination instance tags. If a client |
| 413 |
receives a message that lists a destination instance tag different from its |
| 414 |
own, the client should discard the message.</p> |
| 415 |
<p>The smallest valid instance tag is 0x00000100. It is appropriate to set the |
| 416 |
destination instance tag to '0' when an actual destination instance tag is |
| 417 |
not known at the time the message is prepared. If a client receives a |
| 418 |
message with the sender instance tag set to less than 0x00000100, it should |
| 419 |
discard the message. Similarly, if a client receives a message with the |
| 420 |
recipient instance tag set to greater than 0 but less than 0x00000100, it |
| 421 |
should discard the message. |
| 422 |
</p> |
| 423 |
|
| 424 |
<p>This avoids an issue on IM networks that always relay all messages to |
| 425 |
all sessions of a client who is logged in multiple times. In this |
| 426 |
situation, OTR clients can attempt to establish an OTR session indefinitely |
| 427 |
if there are interleaving messages from each of the sessions.</p> |
| 428 |
<h4>D-H Commit Message</h4> |
| 429 |
<p>This is the first message of the AKE. Bob sends it to Alice to |
| 430 |
commit to a choice of D-H encryption key (but the key itself is not yet |
| 431 |
revealed). This allows the secure session id to be much shorter than in |
| 432 |
OTR version 1, while still preventing a man-in-the-middle attack on |
| 433 |
it.</p> |
| 434 |
<dl> |
| 435 |
<dt>Protocol version (SHORT)</dt> |
| 436 |
<dd>The version number of this protocol is 0x0003.</dd> |
| 437 |
<dt>Message type (BYTE)</dt> |
| 438 |
<dd>The D-H Commit Message has type 0x02.</dd> |
| 439 |
<dt>Sender Instance tag (INT)</dt> |
| 440 |
<dd>The instance tag of the person sending this message.</dd> |
| 441 |
<dt>Receiver Instance tag (INT)</dt> |
| 442 |
<dd>The instance tag of the intended recipient. |
| 443 |
For a commit message this will often be 0, since the other party |
| 444 |
may not have identified their instance tag yet.</dd> |
| 445 |
<dt>Encrypted g<sup>x</sup> (DATA)</dt> |
| 446 |
<dd>Produce this field as follows: |
| 447 |
<ul> |
| 448 |
<li>Choose a random value r (128 bits)</li> |
| 449 |
<li>Choose a random value x (at least 320 bits)</li> |
| 450 |
<li>Serialize g<sup>x</sup> as an MPI, gxmpi. [gxmpi will probably be |
| 451 |
196 bytes long, starting with "\x00\x00\x00\xc0".]</li> |
| 452 |
<li>Encrypt gxmpi using AES128-CTR, with key r and initial counter value |
| 453 |
0. The result will be the same length as gxmpi.</li> |
| 454 |
<li>Encode this encrypted value as the DATA field.</li> |
| 455 |
</ul></dd> |
| 456 |
<dt>Hashed g<sup>x</sup> (DATA)</dt> |
| 457 |
<dd>This is the SHA256 hash of gxmpi.</dd> |
| 458 |
</dl> |
| 459 |
<h4>D-H Key Message</h4> |
| 460 |
<p>This is the second message of the AKE. Alice sends it to Bob, and it |
| 461 |
simply consists of Alice's D-H encryption key.</p> |
| 462 |
<dl> |
| 463 |
<dt>Protocol version (SHORT)</dt> |
| 464 |
<dd>The version number of this protocol is 0x0003.</dd> |
| 465 |
<dt>Message type (BYTE)</dt> |
| 466 |
<dd>The D-H Key Message has type 0x0a.</dd> |
| 467 |
<dt>Sender Instance tag (INT)</dt> |
| 468 |
<dd>The instance tag of the person sending this message.</dd> |
| 469 |
<dt>Receiver Instance tag (INT)</dt> |
| 470 |
<dd>The instance tag of the intended recipient.</dd> |
| 471 |
<dt>g<sup>y</sup> (MPI)</dt> |
| 472 |
<dd>Choose a random value y (at least 320 bits), and calculate |
| 473 |
g<sup>y</sup>.</dd> |
| 474 |
</dl> |
| 475 |
<h4>Reveal Signature Message</h4> |
| 476 |
<p>This is the third message of the AKE. Bob sends it to Alice, |
| 477 |
revealing his D-H encryption key (and thus opening an encrypted |
| 478 |
channel), and also authenticating himself (and the parameters of the |
| 479 |
channel, preventing a man-in-the-middle attack on the channel itself) to |
| 480 |
Alice.</p> |
| 481 |
<dl> |
| 482 |
<dt>Protocol version (SHORT)</dt> |
| 483 |
<dd>The version number of this protocol is 0x0003.</dd> |
| 484 |
<dt>Message type (BYTE)</dt> |
| 485 |
<dd>The Reveal Signature Message has type 0x11.</dd> |
| 486 |
<dt>Sender Instance tag (INT)</dt> |
| 487 |
<dd>The instance tag of the person sending this message.</dd> |
| 488 |
<dt>Receiver Instance tag (INT)</dt> |
| 489 |
<dd>The instance tag of the intended recipient.</dd> |
| 490 |
<dt>Revealed key (DATA)</dt> |
| 491 |
<dd>This is the value r picked earlier.</dd> |
| 492 |
<dt>Encrypted signature (DATA)</dt> |
| 493 |
<dd>This field is calculated as follows: |
| 494 |
<ul> |
| 495 |
<li>Compute the Diffie-Hellman shared secret s.</li> |
| 496 |
<li>Use s to compute an AES key c and two MAC keys m1 and m2, as specified below.</li> |
| 497 |
<li>Select keyid<sub>B</sub>, a serial number for the D-H key computed |
| 498 |
earlier. It is an INT, and must be greater than 0.</li> |
| 499 |
<li>Compute the 32-byte value M<sub>B</sub> to be the SHA256-HMAC of the |
| 500 |
following data, using the key m1:<dl> |
| 501 |
<dt>g<sup>x</sup> (MPI)</dt> |
| 502 |
<dt>g<sup>y</sup> (MPI)</dt> |
| 503 |
<dt>pub<sub>B</sub> (PUBKEY)</dt> |
| 504 |
<dt>keyid<sub>B</sub> (INT)</dt> |
| 505 |
</dl></li> |
| 506 |
<li>Let X<sub>B</sub> be the following structure:<dl> |
| 507 |
<dt>pub<sub>B</sub> (PUBKEY)</dt> |
| 508 |
<dt>keyid<sub>B</sub> (INT)</dt> |
| 509 |
<dt>sig<sub>B</sub>(M<sub>B</sub>) (SIG)</dt> |
| 510 |
<dd>This is the signature, using the private part of the key |
| 511 |
pub<sub>B</sub>, of the 32-byte M<sub>B</sub> (taken modulo q instead of |
| 512 |
being truncated (as described in FIPS-186), and not hashed again).</dd> |
| 513 |
</dl></li> |
| 514 |
<li>Encrypt X<sub>B</sub> using AES128-CTR with key c and initial |
| 515 |
counter value 0.</li> |
| 516 |
<li>Encode this encrypted value as the DATA field.</li> |
| 517 |
</ul></dd> |
| 518 |
<dt>MAC'd signature (MAC)</dt> |
| 519 |
<dd>This is the SHA256-HMAC-160 (that is, the first 160 bits of the |
| 520 |
SHA256-HMAC) of the encrypted signature field (including the four-byte |
| 521 |
length), using the key m2.</dd> |
| 522 |
</dl> |
| 523 |
<h4>Signature Message</h4> |
| 524 |
<p>This is the final message of the AKE. Alice sends it to Bob, |
| 525 |
authenticating herself and the channel parameters to him.</p> |
| 526 |
<dl> |
| 527 |
<dt>Protocol version (SHORT)</dt> |
| 528 |
<dd>The version number of this protocol is 0x0003.</dd> |
| 529 |
<dt>Message type (BYTE)</dt> |
| 530 |
<dd>The Signature Message has type 0x12.</dd> |
| 531 |
<dt>Sender Instance tag (INT)</dt> |
| 532 |
<dd>The instance tag of the person sending this message.</dd> |
| 533 |
<dt>Receiver Instance tag (INT)</dt> |
| 534 |
<dd>The instance tag of the intended recipient.</dd> |
| 535 |
<dt>Encrypted signature (DATA)</dt> |
| 536 |
<dd>This field is calculated as follows: |
| 537 |
<ul> |
| 538 |
<li>Compute the Diffie-Hellman shared secret s.</li> |
| 539 |
<li>Use s to compute an AES key c' and two MAC keys m1' and m2', as specified below.</li> |
| 540 |
<li>Select keyid<sub>A</sub>, a serial number for the D-H key computed |
| 541 |
earlier. It is an INT, and must be greater than 0.</li> |
| 542 |
<li>Compute the 32-byte value M<sub>A</sub> to be the SHA256-HMAC of the |
| 543 |
following data, using the key m1':<dl> |
| 544 |
<dt>g<sup>y</sup> (MPI)</dt> |
| 545 |
<dt>g<sup>x</sup> (MPI)</dt> |
| 546 |
<dt>pub<sub>A</sub> (PUBKEY)</dt> |
| 547 |
<dt>keyid<sub>A</sub> (INT)</dt> |
| 548 |
</dl></li> |
| 549 |
<li>Let X<sub>A</sub> be the following structure:<dl> |
| 550 |
<dt>pub<sub>A</sub> (PUBKEY)</dt> |
| 551 |
<dt>keyid<sub>A</sub> (INT)</dt> |
| 552 |
<dt>sig<sub>A</sub>(M<sub>A</sub>) (SIG)</dt> |
| 553 |
<dd>This is the signature, using the private part of the key |
| 554 |
pub<sub>A</sub>, of the 32-byte M<sub>A</sub> (which does not need to be |
| 555 |
hashed again to produce the signature).</dd> |
| 556 |
</dl></li> |
| 557 |
<li>Encrypt X<sub>A</sub> using AES128-CTR with key c' and initial |
| 558 |
counter value 0.</li> |
| 559 |
<li>Encode this encrypted value as the DATA field.</li> |
| 560 |
</ul></dd> |
| 561 |
<dt>MAC'd signature (MAC)</dt> |
| 562 |
<dd>This is the SHA256-HMAC-160 (that is, the first 160 bits of the |
| 563 |
SHA256-HMAC) of the encrypted signature field (including the four-byte |
| 564 |
length), using the key m2'.</dd> |
| 565 |
</dl> |
| 566 |
<h4>Data Message</h4> |
| 567 |
<p>This message is used to transmit a private message to the |
| 568 |
correspondent. It is also used to reveal old MAC keys.</p> |
| 569 |
<p>The plaintext message (either before encryption, or after decryption) |
| 570 |
consists of a human-readable message (encoded in UTF-8, optionally with |
| 571 |
HTML markup), optionally followed by:</p> |
| 572 |
<ul> |
| 573 |
<li>a single NUL (a BYTE with value 0x00), <b>and</b></li> |
| 574 |
<li>zero or more TLV (type/length/value) records (with no padding |
| 575 |
between them)</li> |
| 576 |
</ul> |
| 577 |
<p>Each TLV record is of the form:</p> |
| 578 |
<dl> |
| 579 |
<dt>Type (SHORT)</dt> |
| 580 |
<dd>The type of this record. Records with unrecognized types should be |
| 581 |
ignored.</dd> |
| 582 |
<dt>Length (SHORT)</dt> |
| 583 |
<dd>The length of the following field</dd> |
| 584 |
<dt>Value (len BYTEs) [where len is the value of the Length field]</dt> |
| 585 |
<dd>Any pertinent data for the record type.</dd> |
| 586 |
</dl> |
| 587 |
<p>Some TLV examples:</p> |
| 588 |
<dl> |
| 589 |
<dt>\x00\x01\x00\x00</dt> |
| 590 |
<dd>A TLV of type 1, containing no data</dd> |
| 591 |
<dt>\x00\x00\x00\x05\x68\x65\x6c\x6c\x6f</dt> |
| 592 |
<dd>A TLV of type 0, containing the value "hello"</dd> |
| 593 |
</dl> |
| 594 |
<p>The currently defined TLV record types are:</p> |
| 595 |
<dl> |
| 596 |
<dt>Type 0: Padding</dt> |
| 597 |
<dd>The value may be an arbitrary amount of data, which should be |
| 598 |
ignored. This type can be used to disguise the length of the plaintext |
| 599 |
message.</dd> |
| 600 |
<dt>Type 1: Disconnected</dt> |
| 601 |
<dd>If the user requests to close the private connection, you may send a |
| 602 |
message (possibly with empty human-readable part) containing a record |
| 603 |
with this TLV type just before you discard the session keys, and |
| 604 |
transition to MSGSTATE_PLAINTEXT (see below). If you receive a TLV |
| 605 |
record of this type, you should transition to MSGSTATE_FINISHED (see |
| 606 |
below), and inform the user that his correspondent has closed his end of |
| 607 |
the private connection, and the user should do the same.</dd> |
| 608 |
<dt>Type 2: SMP Message 1</dt> |
| 609 |
<dd>The value represents an initiating message of the Socialist |
| 610 |
Millionaires' Protocol, described below.</dd> |
| 611 |
<dt>Type 3: SMP Message 2</dt> |
| 612 |
<dd>The value represents the second message in an instance of SMP.</dd> |
| 613 |
<dt>Type 4: SMP Message 3</dt> |
| 614 |
<dd>The value represents the third message in an instance of SMP.</dd> |
| 615 |
<dt>Type 5: SMP Message 4</dt> |
| 616 |
<dd>The value represents the final message in an instance of SMP.</dd> |
| 617 |
<dt>Type 6: SMP Abort Message</dt> |
| 618 |
<dd>If the user cancels SMP prematurely or encounters an error in the |
| 619 |
protocol and cannot continue, you may send a message (possibly with empty |
| 620 |
human-readable part) with this TLV type to instruct the other party's |
| 621 |
client to abort the protocol. The associated length should be zero and |
| 622 |
the associated value should be empty. If you receive a TLV of this type, |
| 623 |
you should change the SMP state to SMP_EXPECT1 (see below).</dd> |
| 624 |
<dt>Type 7: SMP Message 1Q</dt> |
| 625 |
<dd>Like a SMP Message 1, but whose value begins with a NUL-terminated |
| 626 |
user-specified question.</dd> |
| 627 |
<dt>Type 8: Extra symmetric key</dt> |
| 628 |
<dd>If you wish to use the extra symmetric key, compute it yourself as |
| 629 |
outlined in the section "Extra symmetric key", below. Then send this |
| 630 |
type 8 TLV to your buddy to indicate that you'd like to use the extra |
| 631 |
symmetric key for something. The value of the TLV begins with a 4-byte |
| 632 |
indication of what this symmetric key will be used for (file transfer, |
| 633 |
voice encryption, etc.). After that, the contents are use-specific |
| 634 |
(which file, etc.). There are no currently defined uses. Note that the |
| 635 |
value of the key itself is <em>not</em> placed into the TLV; your buddy |
| 636 |
will compute it on his/her own. |
| 637 |
</dd> |
| 638 |
</dl> |
| 639 |
<p>SMP Message TLVs (types 2-5) all carry data sharing the same general |
| 640 |
format:</p> |
| 641 |
<dl> |
| 642 |
<dt>MPI count (INT)</dt> |
| 643 |
<dd>The number of MPIs contained in the remainder of the TLV.</dd> |
| 644 |
<dt>MPI 1 (MPI)</dt> |
| 645 |
<dd>The first MPI of the TLV, serialized into a byte array.</dd> |
| 646 |
<dt>MPI 2 (MPI)</dt> |
| 647 |
<dd>The second MPI of the TLV, serialized into a byte array.</dd> |
| 648 |
<dt>etc.</dt> |
| 649 |
</dl> |
| 650 |
<p>There should be as many MPIs as declared in the MPI count field. For |
| 651 |
the exact MPIs passed for each SMP TLV, see the SMP state machine |
| 652 |
below.</p> |
| 653 |
<p>A message with an empty human-readable part (the plaintext is of zero |
| 654 |
length, or starts with a NUL) is a "heartbeat" packet, and should not |
| 655 |
be displayed to the user. (But it's still useful to effect key |
| 656 |
rotations.)</p> |
| 657 |
<p>Data Message format:</p> |
| 658 |
<dl> |
| 659 |
<dt>Protocol version (SHORT)</dt> |
| 660 |
<dd>The version number of this protocol is 0x0003.</dd> |
| 661 |
<dt>Message type (BYTE)</dt> |
| 662 |
<dd>The Data Message has type 0x03.</dd> |
| 663 |
<dt>Sender Instance tag (INT)</dt> |
| 664 |
<dd>The instance tag of the person sending this message.</dd> |
| 665 |
<dt>Receiver Instance tag (INT)</dt> |
| 666 |
<dd>The instance tag of the intended recipient.</dd> |
| 667 |
<dt>Flags (BYTE)</dt> |
| 668 |
<dd>The bitwise-OR of the flags for this message. Usually you should |
| 669 |
set this to 0x00. The only currently defined flag is:<dl> |
| 670 |
<dt>IGNORE_UNREADABLE (0x01)</dt> |
| 671 |
<dd>If you receive a Data Message with this flag set, and you are unable |
| 672 |
to decrypt the message or verify the MAC (because, for example, you |
| 673 |
don't have the right keys), just ignore the message instead of producing |
| 674 |
some kind of error or notification to the user.</dd> |
| 675 |
</dl></dd> |
| 676 |
<dt>Sender keyid (INT)</dt> |
| 677 |
<dd>Must be strictly greater than 0, and increment by 1 with each key |
| 678 |
change</dd> |
| 679 |
<dt>Recipient keyid (INT)</dt> |
| 680 |
<dd>Must therefore be strictly greater than 0, as the receiver has no |
| 681 |
key with id 0. |
| 682 |
<br />The sender and recipient keyids are those used to encrypt and MAC |
| 683 |
this message.</dd> |
| 684 |
<dt>DH y (MPI)</dt> |
| 685 |
<dd>The *next* [i.e. sender_keyid+1] public key for the sender</dd> |
| 686 |
<dt>Top half of counter init (CTR)</dt> |
| 687 |
<dd>This should monotonically increase (as a big-endian value) for |
| 688 |
each message sent with the same (sender keyid, recipient keyid) |
| 689 |
pair, and must not be all 0x00.</dd> |
| 690 |
<dt>Encrypted message (DATA)</dt> |
| 691 |
<dd>Using the appropriate encryption key (see below) derived from the |
| 692 |
sender's and recipient's DH public keys (with the keyids given in |
| 693 |
this message), perform AES128 counter-mode (CTR) encryption of the |
| 694 |
message. The initial counter is a 16-byte value whose first 8 |
| 695 |
bytes are the above "top half of counter init" value, and whose |
| 696 |
last 8 bytes are all 0x00. Note that counter mode does not change |
| 697 |
the length of the message, so no message padding needs to be done. |
| 698 |
If you *want* to do message padding (to disguise the length of |
| 699 |
your message), use the above TLV of type 0.</dd> |
| 700 |
<dt>Authenticator (MAC)</dt> |
| 701 |
<dd>The SHA1-HMAC, using the appropriate MAC key (see below) of everything |
| 702 |
from the Protocol version to the end of the encrypted message</dd> |
| 703 |
<dt>Old MAC keys to be revealed (DATA)</dt> |
| 704 |
<dd>See "Revealing MAC Keys", below.</dd> |
| 705 |
</dl> |
| 706 |
<h3>Socialist Millionaires' Protocol (SMP)</h3> |
| 707 |
<p>The Socialist Millionaires' Protocol allows two parties with secret |
| 708 |
information x and y respectively to check whether (x==y) without revealing |
| 709 |
any additional information about the secrets. The protocol used by OTR is |
| 710 |
based on the work of Boudot, Schoenmakers and Traore (2001). A full |
| 711 |
justification for its use in OTR is made by Alexander and Goldberg, |
| 712 |
in a paper published in 2007. The following is a technical account |
| 713 |
of what is transmitted during the course of the protocol.</p> |
| 714 |
<h4>Secret information</h4> |
| 715 |
<p>The secret information x and y compared during this protocol contains |
| 716 |
not only information entered by the users, but also information unique to |
| 717 |
the conversation in which SMP takes place. Specifically, the format is:</p> |
| 718 |
<dl> |
| 719 |
<dt>Version (BYTE)</dt> |
| 720 |
<dd>The version of SMP used. The version described here is 1.</dd> |
| 721 |
<dt>Initiator fingerprint (20 BYTEs)</dt> |
| 722 |
<dd>The fingerprint that the party initiating SMP is using in |
| 723 |
the current conversation.</dd> |
| 724 |
<dt>Responder fingerprint (20 BYTEs)</dt> |
| 725 |
<dd>The fingerprint that the party that did not initiate SMP is |
| 726 |
using in the current conversation.</dd> |
| 727 |
<dt>Secure Session ID</dt> |
| 728 |
<dd>The ssid described below.</dd> |
| 729 |
<dt>User-specified secret</dt> |
| 730 |
<dd>The input string given by the user at runtime.</dd> |
| 731 |
</dl> |
| 732 |
<p>Then the SHA256 hash of the above is taken, and the digest becomes the |
| 733 |
actual secret (x or y) to be used in SMP. The additional fields insure |
| 734 |
that not only do both parties know the same secret input string, but no |
| 735 |
man-in-the-middle is capable of reading their communication either.</p> |
| 736 |
<h3>The SMP state machine</h3> |
| 737 |
<p>Whenever the OTR message state machine has MSGSTATE_ENCRYPTED set |
| 738 |
(see below), the SMP state machine may progress. If at any point |
| 739 |
MSGSTATE_ENCRYPTED becomes unset, SMP must abandon its state and return |
| 740 |
to its initial setup. The SMP state consists of one main variable, as |
| 741 |
well as information from the partial computations at each protocol step.</p> |
| 742 |
<h4>Expected Message</h4> |
| 743 |
<p>This main state variable for SMP controls what SMP-specific TLVs will |
| 744 |
be accepted. This variable has no effect on type 0 or type 1 TLVs, which |
| 745 |
are always allowed. smpstate can take one of four values:</p> |
| 746 |
<dl> |
| 747 |
<dt>SMPSTATE_EXPECT1</dt> |
| 748 |
<dd>This state indicates that only type 2 (SMP message 1) and type 7 |
| 749 |
(SMP message 1Q) TLVs should be accepted. This is the default state when |
| 750 |
SMP has not yet begun. This state is also reached whenever an error |
| 751 |
occurs or SMP is aborted, and the protocol must be restarted from the |
| 752 |
beginning.</dd> |
| 753 |
<dt>SMPSTATE_EXPECT2</dt> |
| 754 |
<dd>This state indicates that only type 3 TLVs (SMP message 2) should |
| 755 |
be accepted.</dd> |
| 756 |
<dt>SMPSTATE_EXPECT3</dt> |
| 757 |
<dd>This state indicates that only type 4 TLVs (SMP message 3) should |
| 758 |
be accepted.</dd> |
| 759 |
<dt>SMPSTATE_EXPECT4</dt> |
| 760 |
<dd>This state indicates that only type 5 TLVs (SMP message 4) should |
| 761 |
be accepted.</dd> |
| 762 |
</dl> |
| 763 |
<h4>State Transitions</h4> |
| 764 |
<p>There are 7 actions that an OTR client must handle:</p> |
| 765 |
<ul> |
| 766 |
<li>Received TLVs: |
| 767 |
<ul> |
| 768 |
<li>SMP Message 1</li> |
| 769 |
<li>SMP Message 2</li> |
| 770 |
<li>SMP Message 3</li> |
| 771 |
<li>SMP Message 4</li> |
| 772 |
<li>SMP Abort Message</li> |
| 773 |
</ul></li> |
| 774 |
<li>User actions:</li> |
| 775 |
<ul> |
| 776 |
<li>User requests to begin SMP</li> |
| 777 |
<li>User requests to abort SMP</li> |
| 778 |
</ul></li> |
| 779 |
</ul> |
| 780 |
<p>The following sections outline what is to be done in each case. They |
| 781 |
all assume that MSGSTATE_ENCRYPTED is set. For simplicity, they also |
| 782 |
assume that Alice has begun SMP, and Bob is responding to her.</p> |
| 783 |
<h4>SMP Hash function</h4> |
| 784 |
<p>In the following actions, there are many places where a SHA256 hash of |
| 785 |
an integer followed by one or two MPIs is taken. The input to this hash |
| 786 |
function is:</p> |
| 787 |
<dl> |
| 788 |
<dt>Version (BYTE)</dt> |
| 789 |
<dd>This distinguishes calls to the hash function at different points in |
| 790 |
the protocol, to prevent Alice from replaying Bob's zero knowledge proofs |
| 791 |
or vice versa.</dd> |
| 792 |
<dt>First MPI (MPI)</dt> |
| 793 |
<dd>The first MPI given as input, serialized in the usual way.</dd> |
| 794 |
<dt>Second MPI (MPI)</dt> |
| 795 |
<dd>The second MPI given as input, if present, serialized in the usual way. |
| 796 |
If only one MPI is given as input, this field is simply omitted.</dd> |
| 797 |
</dl> |
| 798 |
<h4>Receiving a type 2 TLV (SMP message 1)</h4> |
| 799 |
<p>SMP message 1 is sent by Alice to begin a DH exchange to determine two |
| 800 |
new generators, g<sub>2</sub> and g<sub>3</sub>. It contains the |
| 801 |
following mpi values:</p> |
| 802 |
<dl> |
| 803 |
<dt>g<sub>2a</sub></dt> |
| 804 |
<dd>Alice's half of the DH exchange to determine g<sub>2</sub>.</dd> |
| 805 |
<dt>c2, D2</dt> |
| 806 |
<dd>A zero-knowledge proof that Alice knows the exponent associated with |
| 807 |
her transmitted value g<sub>2a</sub>.</dd> |
| 808 |
<dt>g<sub>3a</sub></dt> |
| 809 |
<dd>Alice's half of the DH exchange to determine g<sub>3</sub>.</dd> |
| 810 |
<dt>c3, D3</dt> |
| 811 |
<dd>A zero-knowledge proof that Alice knows the exponent associated with |
| 812 |
her transmitted value g<sub>3a</sub>.</dd> |
| 813 |
</dl> |
| 814 |
<p>A type 7 (SMP Message 1Q) TLV is the same as the above, but is |
| 815 |
preceded by a user-specified question, which is associated with the |
| 816 |
user-specified portion of the secret.</p> |
| 817 |
<p>When Bob receives this TLV he should do:</p> |
| 818 |
<dl> |
| 819 |
<dt>If smpstate is not SMPSTATE_EXPECT1:</dt> |
| 820 |
<dd>Set smpstate to SMPSTATE_EXPECT1 and send a type 6 TLV (SMP abort) |
| 821 |
to Alice.</dd> |
| 822 |
<dt>If smpstate is SMPSTATE_EXPECT1:</dt> |
| 823 |
<dd>Verify Alice's zero-knowledge proofs for g<sub>2a</sub> and |
| 824 |
g<sub>3a</sub>: |
| 825 |
<ol> |
| 826 |
<li>Check that both g<sub>2a</sub> and g<sub>3a</sub> are >= 2 and |
| 827 |
<= modulus-2.</li> |
| 828 |
<li>Check that c2 = SHA256(1, g<sub>1</sub><sup>D2</sup> |
| 829 |
g<sub>2a</sub><sup>c2</sup>).</li> |
| 830 |
<li>Check that c3 = SHA256(2, g<sub>1</sub><sup>D3</sup> |
| 831 |
g<sub>3a</sub><sup>c3</sup>).</li> |
| 832 |
</ol> |
| 833 |
Create a type 3 TLV (SMP message 2) and send it to Alice: |
| 834 |
<ol> |
| 835 |
<li>Determine Bob's secret input y, which is to be compared to Alice's |
| 836 |
secret x.</li> |
| 837 |
<li>Pick random exponents b<sub>2</sub> and b<sub>3</sub>. |
| 838 |
These will used during the DH exchange to pick generators.</li> |
| 839 |
<li>Pick random exponents r2, r3, r4, r5 and r6. |
| 840 |
These will be used to add a blinding factor to the final results, and |
| 841 |
to generate zero-knowledge proofs that this message was created honestly.</li> |
| 842 |
<li>Compute g<sub>2b</sub> = g<sub>1</sub><sup>b<sub>2</sub></sup> and |
| 843 |
g<sub>3b</sub> = g<sub>1</sub><sup>b<sub>3</sub></sup></li> |
| 844 |
<li>Generate a zero-knowledge proof that the exponent b<sub>2</sub> is |
| 845 |
known by setting c2 = SHA256(3, g<sub>1</sub><sup>r2</sup>) and |
| 846 |
D2 = r2 - b<sub>2</sub> c2 mod q. In the zero-knowledge proofs the D values |
| 847 |
are calculated modulo q = (p - 1) / 2, where p is the same 1536-bit prime |
| 848 |
as elsewhere. The random exponents are 1536-bit numbers.</li> |
| 849 |
<li>Generate a zero-knowledge proof that the exponent b<sub>3</sub> is |
| 850 |
known by setting c3 = SHA256(4, g<sub>1</sub><sup>r3</sup>) and |
| 851 |
D3 = r3 - b<sub>3</sub> c3 mod q.</li> |
| 852 |
<li>Compute g<sub>2</sub> = g<sub>2a</sub><sup>b<sub>2</sub></sup> and |
| 853 |
g<sub>3</sub> = g<sub>3a</sub><sup>b<sub>3</sub></sup></li> |
| 854 |
<li>Compute P<sub>b</sub> = g<sub>3</sub><sup>r4</sup> and |
| 855 |
Q<sub>b</sub> = g<sub>1</sub><sup>r4</sup> g<sub>2</sub><sup>y</sup></li> |
| 856 |
<li>Generate a zero-knowledge proof that P<sub>b</sub> and Q<sub>b</sub> |
| 857 |
were created according to the protocol by setting |
| 858 |
cP = SHA256(5, g<sub>3</sub><sup>r5</sup>, g<sub>1</sub><sup>r5</sup> |
| 859 |
g<sub>2</sub><sup>r6</sup>), D5 = r5 - r4 cP mod q and D6 = r6 - y cP mod q.</li> |
| 860 |
<li>Store the values of g<sub>3a</sub>, g<sub>2</sub>, g<sub>3</sub>, |
| 861 |
b<sub>3</sub>, P<sub>b</sub> and Q<sub>b</sub> for use later in the |
| 862 |
protocol.</li> |
| 863 |
<li>Send Alice a type 3 TLV (SMP message 2) containing g<sub>2b</sub>, |
| 864 |
c2, D2, g<sub>3b</sub>, c3, D3, P<sub>b</sub>, Q<sub>b</sub>, cP, D5 |
| 865 |
and D6, in that order.</li> |
| 866 |
</ol> |
| 867 |
Set smpstate to SMPSTATE_EXPECT3.</dd> |
| 868 |
</dl> |
| 869 |
<h4>Receiving a type 3 TLV (SMP message 2)</h4> |
| 870 |
<p>SMP message 2 is sent by Bob to complete the DH exchange to |
| 871 |
determine the new generators, g<sub>2</sub> and g<sub>3</sub>. |
| 872 |
It also begins the construction of the values used in the final |
| 873 |
comparison of the protocol. It contains the following mpi values:</p> |
| 874 |
<dl> |
| 875 |
<dt>g<sub>2b</sub></dt> |
| 876 |
<dd>Bob's half of the DH exchange to determine g<sub>2</sub>.</dd> |
| 877 |
<dt>c2, D2</dt> |
| 878 |
<dd>A zero-knowledge proof that Bob knows the exponent associated with |
| 879 |
his transmitted value g<sub>2b</sub>.</dd> |
| 880 |
<dt>g<sub>3b</sub></dt> |
| 881 |
<dd>Bob's half of the DH exchange to determine g<sub>3</sub>.</dd> |
| 882 |
<dt>c3, D3</dt> |
| 883 |
<dd>A zero-knowledge proof that Bob knows the exponent associated with |
| 884 |
his transmitted value g<sub>3b</sub>.</dd> |
| 885 |
<dt>P<sub>b</sub>, Q<sub>b</sub></dt> |
| 886 |
<dd>These values are used in the final comparison to determine if Alice |
| 887 |
and Bob share the same secret.</dd> |
| 888 |
<dt>cP, D5, D6</dt> |
| 889 |
<dd>A zero-knowledge proof that P<sub>b</sub> and Q<sub>b</sub> were |
| 890 |
created according to the protcol given above.</dd> |
| 891 |
</dl> |
| 892 |
<p>When Alice receives this TLV she should do:</p> |
| 893 |
<dl> |
| 894 |
<dt>If smpstate is not SMPSTATE_EXPECT2:</dt> |
| 895 |
<dd>Set smpstate to SMPSTATE_EXPECT1 and send a type 6 TLV (SMP abort) |
| 896 |
to Bob.</dd> |
| 897 |
<dt>If smpstate is SMPSTATE_EXPECT2:</dt> |
| 898 |
<dd>Verify Bob's zero-knowledge proofs for g<sub>2b</sub>, |
| 899 |
g<sub>3b</sub>, P<sub>b</sub> and Q<sub>b</sub>: |
| 900 |
<ol> |
| 901 |
<li>Check that g<sub>2b</sub>, |
| 902 |
g<sub>3b</sub>, P<sub>b</sub> and Q<sub>b</sub> are >= 2 and |
| 903 |
<= modulus-2.</li> |
| 904 |
<li>Check that c2 = SHA256(3, g<sub>1</sub><sup>D2</sup> |
| 905 |
g<sub>2b</sub><sup>c2</sup>).</li> |
| 906 |
<li>Check that c3 = SHA256(4, g<sub>1</sub><sup>D3</sup> |
| 907 |
g<sub>3b</sub><sup>c3</sup>).</li> |
| 908 |
<li>Check that cP = SHA256(5, g<sub>3</sub><sup>D5</sup> |
| 909 |
P<sub>b</sub><sup>cP</sup>, g<sub>1</sub><sup>D5</sup> |
| 910 |
g<sub>2</sub><sup>D6</sup> Q<sub>b</sub><sup>cP</sup>).</li> |
| 911 |
</ol> |
| 912 |
Create a type 4 TLV (SMP message 3) and send it to Bob: |
| 913 |
<ol> |
| 914 |
<li>Pick random exponents r4, r5, r6 and r7. |
| 915 |
These will be used to add a blinding factor to the final results, and |
| 916 |
to generate zero-knowledge proofs that this message was created honestly.</li> |
| 917 |
<li>Compute g<sub>2</sub> = g<sub>2b</sub><sup>a<sub>2</sub></sup> and |
| 918 |
g<sub>3</sub> = g<sub>3b</sub><sup>a<sub>3</sub></sup></li> |
| 919 |
<li>Compute P<sub>a</sub> = g<sub>3</sub><sup>r4</sup> and |
| 920 |
Q<sub>a</sub> = g<sub>1</sub><sup>r4</sup> g<sub>2</sub><sup>x</sup></li> |
| 921 |
<li>Generate a zero-knowledge proof that P<sub>a</sub> and Q<sub>a</sub> |
| 922 |
were created according to the protocol by setting |
| 923 |
cP = SHA256(6, g<sub>3</sub><sup>r5</sup>, g<sub>1</sub><sup>r5</sup> |
| 924 |
g<sub>2</sub><sup>r6</sup>), D5 = r5 - r4 cP mod q and D6 = r6 - x cP mod q.</li> |
| 925 |
<li>Compute R<sub>a</sub> = (Q<sub>a</sub> / Q<sub>b</sub>) |
| 926 |
<sup>a<sub>3</sub></sup></li> |
| 927 |
<li>Generate a zero-knowledge proof that R<sub>a</sub> was created |
| 928 |
according to the protocol by setting cR = SHA256(7, g<sub>1</sub><sup>r7</sup>, |
| 929 |
(Q<sub>a</sub> / Q<sub>b</sub>)<sup>r7</sup>) and |
| 930 |
D7 = r7 - a<sub>3</sub> cR mod q.</li> |
| 931 |
<li>Store the values of g<sub>3b</sub>, (P<sub>a</sub> / P<sub>b</sub>), |
| 932 |
(Q<sub>a</sub> / Q<sub>b</sub>) and a<sub>3</sub> for use later in the |
| 933 |
protocol.</li> |
| 934 |
<li>Send Bob a type 4 TLV (SMP message 3) containing P<sub>a</sub>, |
| 935 |
Q<sub>a</sub>, cP, D5, D6, R<sub>a</sub>, cR and D7 in that order.</li> |
| 936 |
</ol> |
| 937 |
Set smpstate to SMPSTATE_EXPECT4.</dd> |
| 938 |
</dl> |
| 939 |
<h4>Receiving a type 4 TLV (SMP message 3)</h4> |
| 940 |
<p>SMP message 3 is Alice's final message in the SMP exchange. It |
| 941 |
has the last of the information required by Bob to determine if x = y. |
| 942 |
It contains the following mpi values:</p> |
| 943 |
<dl> |
| 944 |
<dt>P<sub>a</sub>, Q<sub>a</sub></dt> |
| 945 |
<dd>These values are used in the final comparison to determine if Alice |
| 946 |
and Bob share the same secret.</dd> |
| 947 |
<dt>cP, D5, D6</dt> |
| 948 |
<dd>A zero-knowledge proof that P<sub>a</sub> and Q<sub>a</sub> were |
| 949 |
created according to the protcol given above.</dd> |
| 950 |
<dt>R<sub>a</sub></dt> |
| 951 |
<dd>This value is used in the final comparison to determine if Alice |
| 952 |
and Bob share the same secret.</dd> |
| 953 |
<dt>cR, D7</dt> |
| 954 |
<dd>A zero-knowledge proof that R<sub>a</sub> was |
| 955 |
created according to the protcol given above.</dd> |
| 956 |
<dt> |
| 957 |
</dl> |
| 958 |
<p>When Bob receives this TLV he should do:</p> |
| 959 |
<dl> |
| 960 |
<dt>If smpstate is not SMPSTATE_EXPECT3:</dt> |
| 961 |
<dd>Set smpstate to SMPSTATE_EXPECT1 and send a type 6 TLV (SMP abort) |
| 962 |
to Bob.</dd> |
| 963 |
<dt>If smpstate is SMPSTATE_EXPECT3:</dt> |
| 964 |
<dd>Verify Alice's zero-knowledge proofs for P<sub>a</sub>, Q<sub>a</sub> |
| 965 |
and R<sub>a</sub>: |
| 966 |
<ol> |
| 967 |
<li>Check that P<sub>a</sub>, Q<sub>a</sub> and R<sub>a</sub> are >= 2 and |
| 968 |
<= modulus-2.</li> |
| 969 |
<li>Check that cP = SHA256(6, g<sub>3</sub><sup>D5</sup> |
| 970 |
P<sub>a</sub><sup>cP</sup>, g<sub>1</sub><sup>D5</sup> g<sub>2</sub><sup>D6</sup> |
| 971 |
Q<sub>a</sub><sup>cP</sup>).</li> |
| 972 |
<li>Check that cR = SHA256(7, g<sub>1</sub><sup>D7</sup> |
| 973 |
g<sub>3a</sub><sup>cR</sup>, (Q<sub>a</sub> / Q<sub>b</sub>)<sup>D7</sup> |
| 974 |
R<sub>a</sub><sup>cR</sup>).</li> |
| 975 |
</ol> |
| 976 |
Create a type 5 TLV (SMP message 4) and send it to Alice: |
| 977 |
<ol> |
| 978 |
<li>Pick a random exponent r7. |
| 979 |
This will be used to generate Bob's final zero-knowledge proof that |
| 980 |
this message was created honestly.</li> |
| 981 |
<li>Compute R<sub>b</sub> = (Q<sub>a</sub> / Q<sub>b</sub>) |
| 982 |
<sup>b<sub>3</sub></sup></li> |
| 983 |
<li>Generate a zero-knowledge proof that R<sub>b</sub> was created |
| 984 |
according to the protocol by setting cR = SHA256(8, g<sub>1</sub><sup>r7</sup>, |
| 985 |
(Q<sub>a</sub> / Q<sub>b</sub>)<sup>r7</sup>) and |
| 986 |
D7 = r7 - b<sub>3</sub> cR mod q.</li> |
| 987 |
<li>Send Alice a type 5 TLV (SMP message 4) containing R<sub>b</sub>, |
| 988 |
cR and D7 in that order.</li> |
| 989 |
</ol> |
| 990 |
Check whether the protocol was successful: |
| 991 |
<ol> |
| 992 |
<li>Compute R<sub>ab</sub> = R<sub>a</sub><sup>b<sub>3</sub></sup>.</li> |
| 993 |
<li>Determine if x = y by checking the equivalent condition that |
| 994 |
(P<sub>a</sub> / P<sub>b</sub>) = R<sub>ab</sub>.</li> |
| 995 |
</ol> |
| 996 |
Set smpstate to SMPSTATE_EXPECT1, as no more messages are expected from |
| 997 |
Alice.</dd> |
| 998 |
</dl> |
| 999 |
<h4>Receiving a type 5 TLV (SMP message 4)</h4> |
| 1000 |
<p>SMP message 4 is Bob's final message in the SMP exchange. It |
| 1001 |
has the last of the information required by Alice to determine if x = y. |
| 1002 |
It contains the following mpi values:</p> |
| 1003 |
<dl> |
| 1004 |
<dt>R<sub>b</sub></dt> |
| 1005 |
<dd>This value is used in the final comparison to determine if Alice |
| 1006 |
and Bob share the same secret.</dd> |
| 1007 |
<dt>cR, D7</dt> |
| 1008 |
<dd>A zero-knowledge proof that R<sub>b</sub> was |
| 1009 |
created according to the protcol given above.</dd> |
| 1010 |
<dt> |
| 1011 |
</dl> |
| 1012 |
<p>When Alice receives this TLV she should do:</p> |
| 1013 |
<dl> |
| 1014 |
<dt>If smpstate is not SMPSTATE_EXPECT4:</dt> |
| 1015 |
<dd>Set smpstate to SMPSTATE_EXPECT1 and send a type 6 TLV (SMP abort) |
| 1016 |
to Bob.</dd> |
| 1017 |
<dt>If smpstate is SMPSTATE_EXPECT4:</dt> |
| 1018 |
<dd>Verify Bob's zero-knowledge proof for R<sub>b</sub>: |
| 1019 |
<ol> |
| 1020 |
<li>Check that R<sub>b</sub> is >= 2 and |
| 1021 |
<= modulus-2.</li> |
| 1022 |
<li>Check that cR = SHA256(8, g<sub>1</sub><sup>D7</sup> |
| 1023 |
g<sub>3b</sub><sup>cR</sup>, (Q<sub>a</sub> / Q<sub>b</sub>)<sup>D7</sup> |
| 1024 |
R<sub>b</sub><sup>cR</sup>).</li> |
| 1025 |
</ol> |
| 1026 |
Check whether the protocol was successful: |
| 1027 |
<ol> |
| 1028 |
<li>Compute R<sub>ab</sub> = R<sub>b</sub><sup>a<sub>3</sub></sup>.</li> |
| 1029 |
<li>Determine if x = y by checking the equivalent condition that |
| 1030 |
(P<sub>a</sub> / P<sub>b</sub>) = R<sub>ab</sub>.</li> |
| 1031 |
</ol> |
| 1032 |
Set smpstate to SMPSTATE_EXPECT1, as no more messages are expected from |
| 1033 |
Bob.</dd> |
| 1034 |
</dl> |
| 1035 |
<h4>User requests to begin SMP</h4> |
| 1036 |
<dl> |
| 1037 |
<dt>If smpstate is not set to SMPSTATE_EXPECT1:</dt> |
| 1038 |
<dd>SMP is already underway. If you wish to restart SMP, send a |
| 1039 |
type 6 TLV (SMP abort) to the other party and then proceed as if |
| 1040 |
smpstate was SMPSTATE_EXPECT1. Otherwise, you may simply continue the |
| 1041 |
current SMP instance.</dd> |
| 1042 |
<dt>If smpstate is set to SMPSTATE_EXPECT1:</dt> |
| 1043 |
<dd>No current exchange is underway. In this case, Alice should |
| 1044 |
create a valid type 2 TLV (SMP message 1) as follows: |
| 1045 |
<ol> |
| 1046 |
<li>Determine her secret input x, which is to be compared to Bob's |
| 1047 |
secret y.</li> |
| 1048 |
<li>Pick random values a<sub>2</sub> and a<sub>3</sub> (1536 bits). |
| 1049 |
These will be Alice's exponents for the DH exchange to pick generators.</li> |
| 1050 |
<li>Pick random values r2 and r3 (1536 bits). |
| 1051 |
These will be used to generate zero-knowledge proofs that this message |
| 1052 |
was created according to the protocol.</li> |
| 1053 |
<li>Compute g<sub>2a</sub> = g<sub>1</sub><sup>a<sub>2</sub></sup> and |
| 1054 |
g<sub>3a</sub> = g<sub>1</sub><sup>a<sub>3</sub></sup></li> |
| 1055 |
<li>Generate a zero-knowledge proof that the exponent a<sub>2</sub> is |
| 1056 |
known by setting c2 = SHA256(1, g<sub>1</sub><sup>r2</sup>) and |
| 1057 |
D2 = r2 - a<sub>2</sub> c2 mod q.</li> |
| 1058 |
<li>Generate a zero-knowledge proof that the exponent a<sub>3</sub> is |
| 1059 |
known by setting c3 = SHA256(2, g<sub>1</sub><sup>r3</sup>) and |
| 1060 |
D3 = r3 - a<sub>3</sub> c3 mod q.</li> |
| 1061 |
<li>Store the values of x, a<sub>2</sub> and a<sub>3</sub> |
| 1062 |
for use later in the protocol.</li> |
| 1063 |
<li>Send Bob a type 2 TLV (SMP message 1) containing g<sub>2a</sub>, |
| 1064 |
c2, D2, g<sub>3a</sub>, c3 and D3 in that order.</li> |
| 1065 |
</ol> |
| 1066 |
Set smpstate to SMPSTATE_EXPECT2.</dd> |
| 1067 |
</dl> |
| 1068 |
<h4>User requests to abort SMP</h4> |
| 1069 |
<p>In all cases, send a type 6 TLV (SMP abort) to the correspondent and |
| 1070 |
set smpstate to SMPSTATE_EXPECT1.</p> |
| 1071 |
<h3>Key Management</h3> |
| 1072 |
<p>For each correspondent, keep track of:</p> |
| 1073 |
<dl> |
| 1074 |
<dt>Your two most recent DH public/private key pairs</dt> |
| 1075 |
<dd>our_dh[our_keyid] (most recent) and our_dh[our_keyid-1] (previous)</dd> |
| 1076 |
<dt>His two most recent DH public keys</dt> |
| 1077 |
<dd>their_y[their_keyid] (most recent) and their_y[their_keyid-1] |
| 1078 |
(previous)</dd> |
| 1079 |
</dl> |
| 1080 |
|
| 1081 |
<p>When starting a private conversation with a correspondent, generate |
| 1082 |
two DH key pairs for yourself, and set our_keyid = 2. Note that all DH |
| 1083 |
key pairs should have a private part that is at least 320 bits long.</p> |
| 1084 |
|
| 1085 |
<dl class="doublespace"> |
| 1086 |
<dt>When you send AKE messages:</dt> |
| 1087 |
<dd>Send the public part of our_dh[our_keyid-1], with the keyid field, |
| 1088 |
of course, set to (our_keyid-1).</dd> |
| 1089 |
|
| 1090 |
<dt>Upon completing the AKE:</dt> |
| 1091 |
<dd>If the specified keyid equals either their_keyid or their_keyid-1, |
| 1092 |
and the DH pubkey contained in the AKE messages matches the |
| 1093 |
one you've stored for that keyid, that's great. Otherwise, forget |
| 1094 |
all values of their_y[], and of their_keyid, and set their_keyid to |
| 1095 |
the keyid value given in the AKE messages, and |
| 1096 |
their_y[their_keyid] to the DH pubkey value given in the AKE |
| 1097 |
messages. their_y[their_keyid-1] should be set to NULL.</dd> |
| 1098 |
|
| 1099 |
<dt>When you send a Data Message:</dt> |
| 1100 |
<dd>Set the sender keyid to (our_keyid-1), and the recipient keyid to |
| 1101 |
(their_keyid). Set the DH pubkey in the Data message to the public |
| 1102 |
part of our_dh[our_keyid]. Use our_dh[our_keyid-1] and |
| 1103 |
their_y[their_keyid] to calculate session keys, as outlined below. |
| 1104 |
Use the "sending AES key" to encrypt the message, and the "sending |
| 1105 |
MAC key" to calculate its MAC.</dd> |
| 1106 |
|
| 1107 |
<dt>When you receive a Data Message:</dt> |
| 1108 |
<dd>Use the keyids in the message to select which of your DH key pairs |
| 1109 |
and which of his DH pubkeys to use to verify the MAC. If the keyids |
| 1110 |
do not represent either the most recent key or the previous key (for |
| 1111 |
either the sender or receiver), reject the message. Also reject the |
| 1112 |
message if the sender keyid is their_keyid-1, but |
| 1113 |
their_y[their_keyid-1] is NULL. |
| 1114 |
|
| 1115 |
<p>Otherwise, calculate the session keys as outlined below. Use the |
| 1116 |
"receiving MAC key" to verify the MAC on the message. If it does not |
| 1117 |
verify, reject the message.</p> |
| 1118 |
|
| 1119 |
<p>Check that the counter in the Data message is strictly larger than the |
| 1120 |
last counter you saw using this pair of keys. If not, reject the |
| 1121 |
message.</p> |
| 1122 |
|
| 1123 |
<p>If the MAC verifies, decrypt the message using the "receiving AES |
| 1124 |
key".</p> |
| 1125 |
|
| 1126 |
<p>Finally, check if keys need rotation:</p> |
| 1127 |
<ul> |
| 1128 |
<li>If the "recipient keyid" in the Data message equals our_keyid, then |
| 1129 |
he's seen the public part of our most recent DH key pair, so you |
| 1130 |
must securely forget our_dh[our_keyid-1], increment our_keyid, and set |
| 1131 |
our_dh[our_keyid] to a new DH key pair which you generate.</li> |
| 1132 |
<li>If the "sender keyid" in the Data message equals their_keyid, |
| 1133 |
increment their_keyid, and set their_y[their_keyid] to the new DH |
| 1134 |
pubkey specified in the Data message.</li> |
| 1135 |
</ul></dd> |
| 1136 |
</dl> |
| 1137 |
|
| 1138 |
<h4>Computing AES keys, MAC keys, and the secure session id</h4> |
| 1139 |
<p>OTR uses Diffie-Hellman to calculate shared secrets in the usual way: |
| 1140 |
if Bob knows x, and tells Alice g<sup>x</sup>, and Alice knows y, and |
| 1141 |
tells Bob g<sup>y</sup>, then they each can calculate s = |
| 1142 |
g<sup>xy</sup>: Alice calculates (g<sup>x</sup>)<sup>y</sup>, and Bob |
| 1143 |
calculates (g<sup>y</sup>)<sup>x</sup>.</p> |
| 1144 |
<p>During the AKE, Alice and Bob each calculate s in this way, and then |
| 1145 |
they each compute seven values based on s:</p> |
| 1146 |
<ul> |
| 1147 |
<li>A 64-bit secure session id, ssid</li> |
| 1148 |
<li>Two 128-bit AES encryption keys, c and c'</li> |
| 1149 |
<li>Four 256-bit SHA256-HMAC keys, m1, m2, m1', and m2'</li> |
| 1150 |
</ul> |
| 1151 |
<p>This is done in the following way:</p> |
| 1152 |
<ul> |
| 1153 |
<li>Write the value of s as a minimum-length MPI, as specified above |
| 1154 |
(4-byte big-endian len, len-byte big-endian value). Let this |
| 1155 |
(4+len)-byte value be "secbytes".</li> |
| 1156 |
<li>For a given byte b, define h2(b) to be the 256-bit output of the |
| 1157 |
SHA256 hash of the (5+len) bytes consisting of the byte b followed by |
| 1158 |
secbytes.</li> |
| 1159 |
<li>Let ssid be the first 64 bits of h2(0x00).</li> |
| 1160 |
<li>Let c be the first 128 bits of h2(0x01), and let c' be the second |
| 1161 |
128 bits of h2(0x01).</li> |
| 1162 |
<li>Let m1 be h2(0x02).</li> |
| 1163 |
<li>Let m2 be h2(0x03).</li> |
| 1164 |
<li>Let m1' be h2(0x04).</li> |
| 1165 |
<li>Let m2' be h2(0x05).</li> |
| 1166 |
</ul> |
| 1167 |
<p>c, m1, and m2 are used to create and verify the Reveal Signature |
| 1168 |
Message; c', m1', and m2' are used to create and verify the Signature |
| 1169 |
message.</p> |
| 1170 |
<p>If the user requests to see the secure session id, it should be |
| 1171 |
displayed as two 32-bit bigendian unsigned values, in C "%08x" format. |
| 1172 |
If the user transmitted the Reveal Signature message during the AKE that |
| 1173 |
produced this ssid, then display the first 32 bits in bold, and the |
| 1174 |
second 32 bits in non-bold. If the user transmitted the Signature |
| 1175 |
message instead, display the first 32 bits in non-bold, and the |
| 1176 |
second 32 bits in bold. This session id can be used by the parties to |
| 1177 |
verify (say, over the telephone, assuming the parties recognize each |
| 1178 |
others' voices) that there is no man-in-the-middle by having each side |
| 1179 |
read his bold part to the other. [Note that this only needs to be done |
| 1180 |
in the event that the users do not trust that their long-term signature |
| 1181 |
keys have not been compromised.]</p> |
| 1182 |
<p>During the exchange of Data Messages, Alice and Bob use the keyids |
| 1183 |
listed in the Data Message to select Diffie-Hellman keys to use to |
| 1184 |
compute s, and the (4+len)-byte value of secbytes, as above.</p> |
| 1185 |
<p>From this, they calculate four values:</p> |
| 1186 |
<ul> |
| 1187 |
<li>Two 128-bit AES encryption keys, the "sending AES key", and the |
| 1188 |
"receiving AES key"</li> |
| 1189 |
<li>Two 160-bit SHA1-HMAC keys, the "sending MAC key", and the |
| 1190 |
"receiving MAC key"</li> |
| 1191 |
</ul> |
| 1192 |
<p>These keys are calculated as follows:</p> |
| 1193 |
<ul> |
| 1194 |
<li>Alice (and similarly for Bob) determines if she is the "low" end |
| 1195 |
or the "high" end of this Data Message. If Alice's public key is |
| 1196 |
numerically greater than Bob's public key, then she |
| 1197 |
is the "high" end. Otherwise, she is the "low" end. Note that who is the |
| 1198 |
"low" end and who is the "high" end can change every time a new D-H |
| 1199 |
public key is exchanged in a Data Message.</li> |
| 1200 |
<li>She sets the values of "sendbyte" and "recvbyte" according to |
| 1201 |
whether she is the the "low" or the "high" end of the Data Message: |
| 1202 |
<ul> |
| 1203 |
<li>If she is the "high" end, she sets "sendbyte" to 0x01 and "recvbyte" |
| 1204 |
to 0x02.</li> |
| 1205 |
<li>If she is the "low" end, she sets "sendbyte" to 0x02 and "recvbyte" |
| 1206 |
to 0x01.</li> |
| 1207 |
</ul></li> |
| 1208 |
<li>For a given byte b, define h1(b) to be the 160-bit output of the |
| 1209 |
SHA-1 hash of the (5+len) bytes consisting of the byte b, followed by |
| 1210 |
secbytes.</li> |
| 1211 |
<li>The "sending AES key" is the first 16 bytes of h1(sendbyte).</li> |
| 1212 |
<li>The "sending MAC key" is the 20-byte SHA-1 hash of the 16-byte |
| 1213 |
sending AES key.</li> |
| 1214 |
<li>The "receiving AES key" is the first 16 bytes of h1(recvbyte).</li> |
| 1215 |
<li>The "receiving MAC key" is the 20-byte SHA-1 hash of the 16-byte |
| 1216 |
receiving AES key.</li> |
| 1217 |
</ul> |
| 1218 |
<h4>Extra symmetric key</h4> |
| 1219 |
<p>OTR version 3 defines an additional symmetric key that can be derived |
| 1220 |
by the communicating parties to use for application-specific purposes, |
| 1221 |
such as file transfer, voice encryption, etc. When one party wishes to |
| 1222 |
use the extra symmetric key, he or she creates a type 8 TLV attached to |
| 1223 |
a Data Message (see above). The key itself is then derived using the |
| 1224 |
same "secbytes" used to compute the encryption and MAC keys used to |
| 1225 |
protect the Data Message. |
| 1226 |
The extra symmetric key is derived by calculating |
| 1227 |
h2(0xFF) and keeping the entire 256 bits, using the same definition |
| 1228 |
of h2 as above.</p> |
| 1229 |
<p>Upon receipt of the Data Message containing the type 8 TLV, the |
| 1230 |
recipient will compute the extra symmetric key in the same way. Note |
| 1231 |
that the value of the extra symmetric key is <em>not</em> contained in |
| 1232 |
the TLV itself.</p> |
| 1233 |
<h4>Revealing MAC keys</h4> |
| 1234 |
<p>Whenever you are about to forget either one of your old D-H key pairs, or |
| 1235 |
one of your correspondent's old D-H public keys, take all of the |
| 1236 |
receiving MAC keys |
| 1237 |
that were generated by that key (note that there are up to two: the |
| 1238 |
receiving MAC keys produced by the pairings of that key with |
| 1239 |
each of two of the other side's keys; but note that you only need to |
| 1240 |
take MAC keys that were actually used to verify a MAC on a message), and |
| 1241 |
put them (as a set of |
| 1242 |
concatenated 20-byte values) into the "Old MAC keys to be revealed" |
| 1243 |
section of the next Data Message you send. This in done to allow the |
| 1244 |
forgeability of OTR transcripts: once the MAC keys are revealed, anyone |
| 1245 |
can modify an OTR message and still have it appear valid. But since we |
| 1246 |
don't reveal the MAC keys until their corresponding pubkeys are being |
| 1247 |
discarded, there is no danger of accepting a message as valid which |
| 1248 |
uses a MAC key which has already been revealed.</p> |
| 1249 |
<h3>Fragmentation</h3> |
| 1250 |
<p>Some networks may have a maximum message size that is too small to |
| 1251 |
contain an encoded OTR message. In that event, the sender may choose |
| 1252 |
to split the message into a number of <em>fragments</em>. This section |
| 1253 |
describes the format of the fragments. All OTR version 2 and 3 clients |
| 1254 |
must be able to assemble received fragments, but performing |
| 1255 |
fragmentation on outgoing messages is optional.</p> |
| 1256 |
|
| 1257 |
<dl class="doublespace"> |
| 1258 |
<dt>Transmitting Fragments</dt> |
| 1259 |
<dd>If you have information about the maximum size of message you are |
| 1260 |
able to send (the different IM networks have different limits), you |
| 1261 |
can fragment an encoded OTR message as follows: |
| 1262 |
<ul> |
| 1263 |
<li>Start with the OTR message as you would normally transmit it. For |
| 1264 |
example, a Data Message would start with "?OTR:AAED" and end |
| 1265 |
with ".".</li> |
| 1266 |
<li>Break it up into sufficiently small pieces. Let the number of |
| 1267 |
pieces be (n), and the pieces be |
| 1268 |
piece[1],piece[2],...,piece[n].</li> |
| 1269 |
<li>Transmit (n) OTR version 3 fragmented messages with the following |
| 1270 |
(printf-like) structure (as k runs from 1 to n inclusive): |
| 1271 |
|
| 1272 |
<p>"?OTR|%x|%x,%hu,%hu,%s," , sender_instance, receiver_instance, |
| 1273 |
k , n , piece[k]</p> |
| 1274 |
|
| 1275 |
OTR version 2 messages get fragmented in a similar format, but |
| 1276 |
without the instance tags fields: |
| 1277 |
|
| 1278 |
<p>"?OTR,%hu,%hu,%s," , |
| 1279 |
k , n , piece[k]</p></li> |
| 1280 |
|
| 1281 |
<li>Note that k and n are unsigned short ints (2 bytes), and each has |
| 1282 |
a maximum value of 65535. Also, each piece[k] must be |
| 1283 |
non-empty. The instance tags (if applicable) and the k and n |
| 1284 |
values may have leading zeroes.</li> |
| 1285 |
</ul> |
| 1286 |
<p>Note that fragments are not themselves messages that can be |
| 1287 |
fragmented: you can't fragment a fragment.</p></dd> |
| 1288 |
|
| 1289 |
<dt>Receiving Fragments:</dt> |
| 1290 |
|
| 1291 |
<dd>If you receive a message containing "?OTR|" (note that you'll need |
| 1292 |
to check for this _before_ checking for any of the other "?OTR:" |
| 1293 |
markers): |
| 1294 |
|
| 1295 |
<ul> |
| 1296 |
<li>Parse it as the printf statement above into k, n, and |
| 1297 |
piece.</li> |
| 1298 |
<li>If the recipient's own instance tag does not match the listed |
| 1299 |
receiver instance tag, and the listed receiver instance tag is not |
| 1300 |
zero, the recipient should discard the message and optionally pass |
| 1301 |
along a warning for the user.</li> |
| 1302 |
<li>Let (K,N) be your currently stored fragment number, and F be your |
| 1303 |
currently stored fragment. [If you have no currently stored |
| 1304 |
fragment, then K = N = 0 and F = "".]</li> |
| 1305 |
|
| 1306 |
<li>If k == 0 or n == 0 or k > n, discard this (illegal) |
| 1307 |
fragment.</li> |
| 1308 |
|
| 1309 |
<li>If k == 1: |
| 1310 |
<ul> |
| 1311 |
<li>Forget any stored fragment you may have</li> |
| 1312 |
<li>Store (piece) as F.</li> |
| 1313 |
<li>Store (k,n) as (K,N).</li> |
| 1314 |
</ul></li> |
| 1315 |
|
| 1316 |
<li>If n == N and k == K+1: |
| 1317 |
<ul> |
| 1318 |
<li>Append (piece) to F.</li> |
| 1319 |
<li>Store (k,n) as (K,N).</li> |
| 1320 |
</ul></li> |
| 1321 |
|
| 1322 |
<li>Otherwise: |
| 1323 |
<ul> |
| 1324 |
<li>Forget any stored fragment you may have</li> |
| 1325 |
<li>Store "" as F.</li> |
| 1326 |
<li>Store (0,0) as (K,N).</li> |
| 1327 |
</ul></li> |
| 1328 |
</ul> |
| 1329 |
|
| 1330 |
<p>After this, if N > 0 and K == N, treat F as the received |
| 1331 |
message.</p> |
| 1332 |
|
| 1333 |
<p>If you receive a non-OTR message, or an unfragmented message, |
| 1334 |
forget any stored fragment you may have, store "" as F and store |
| 1335 |
(0,0) as (K,N).</p> |
| 1336 |
|
| 1337 |
<p>OTR version 2 fragmented messages follow the same behaviour as |
| 1338 |
described above, but do not list the sender and receiver instance |
| 1339 |
tags.</dd> |
| 1340 |
</dl> |
| 1341 |
|
| 1342 |
<p>For example, here is a Data Message we would like to transmit over a |
| 1343 |
network with an unreasonably small maximum message size:</p> |
| 1344 |
|
| 1345 |
<blockquote><pre> |
| 1346 |
?OTR:AAMDJ+MVmSfjFZcAAAAAAQAAAAIAAADA1g5IjD1ZGLDVQEyCgCyn9hb |
| 1347 |
rL3KAbGDdzE2ZkMyTKl7XfkSxh8YJnudstiB74i4BzT0W2haClg6dMary/jo |
| 1348 |
9sMudwmUdlnKpIGEKXWdvJKT+hQ26h9nzMgEditLB8vjPEWAJ6gBXvZrY6ZQ |
| 1349 |
rx3gb4v0UaSMOMiR5sB7Eaulb2Yc6RmRnnlxgUUC2alosg4WIeFN951PLjSc |
| 1350 |
ajVba6dqlDi+q1H5tPvI5SWMN7PCBWIJ41+WvF+5IAZzQZYgNaVLbAAAAAAA |
| 1351 |
AAAEAAAAHwNiIi5Ms+4PsY/L2ipkTtquknfx6HodLvk3RAAAAAA==. |
| 1352 |
</pre></blockquote> |
| 1353 |
|
| 1354 |
<p>We could fragment this message into (for example) three |
| 1355 |
pieces:</p> |
| 1356 |
|
| 1357 |
<blockquote><pre> |
| 1358 |
?OTR|5a73a599|27e31597,00001,00003,?OTR:AAMDJ+MVmSfjFZcAAAAA |
| 1359 |
AQAAAAIAAADA1g5IjD1ZGLDVQEyCgCyn9hbrL3KAbGDdzE2ZkMyTKl7XfkSx |
| 1360 |
h8YJnudstiB74i4BzT0W2haClg6dMary/jo9sMudwmUdlnKpIGEKXWdvJKT+ |
| 1361 |
hQ26h9nzMgEditLB8v, |
| 1362 |
</pre></blockquote> |
| 1363 |
|
| 1364 |
<blockquote><pre> |
| 1365 |
?OTR|5a73a599|27e31597,00002,00003,jPEWAJ6gBXvZrY6ZQrx3gb4v0 |
| 1366 |
UaSMOMiR5sB7Eaulb2Yc6RmRnnlxgUUC2alosg4WIeFN951PLjScajVba6dq |
| 1367 |
lDi+q1H5tPvI5SWMN7PCBWIJ41+WvF+5IAZzQZYgNaVLbAAAAAAAAAAEAAAA |
| 1368 |
HwNiIi5Ms+4PsY/L2i, |
| 1369 |
</pre></blockquote> |
| 1370 |
|
| 1371 |
<blockquote><pre> |
| 1372 |
?OTR|5a73a599|27e31597,00003,00003,pkTtquknfx6HodLvk3RAAAAAA |
| 1373 |
==., |
| 1374 |
</pre></blockquote> |
| 1375 |
<h3>The protocol state machine</h3> |
| 1376 |
<p>An OTR client maintains separate state for every correspondent. For |
| 1377 |
example, Alice may have an active OTR conversation with Bob, while |
| 1378 |
having an unprotected conversation with Charlie. This state consists of |
| 1379 |
two main state variables, as well as some other information (such as |
| 1380 |
encryption keys). The two main state variables are:</p> |
| 1381 |
<h4>Message state</h4> |
| 1382 |
<p>The message state variable, msgstate, controls what happens to |
| 1383 |
outgoing messages typed by the user. It can take one of three |
| 1384 |
values:</p> |
| 1385 |
<dl> |
| 1386 |
<dt>MSGSTATE_PLAINTEXT</dt> |
| 1387 |
<dd>This state indicates that outgoing messages are sent without |
| 1388 |
encryption. This is the state that is used before an OTR conversation |
| 1389 |
is initiated. This is the initial state, and the only way to |
| 1390 |
subsequently enter this state is for the user to explicitly request to |
| 1391 |
do so via some UI operation.</dd> |
| 1392 |
<dt>MSGSTATE_ENCRYPTED</dt> |
| 1393 |
<dd>This state indicates that outgoing messages are sent encrypted. |
| 1394 |
This is the state that is used during an OTR conversation. The only way |
| 1395 |
to enter this state is for the authentication state machine (below) to |
| 1396 |
successfully complete.</dd> |
| 1397 |
<dt>MSGSTATE_FINISHED</dt> |
| 1398 |
<dd>This state indicates that outgoing messages are not delivered at |
| 1399 |
all. This state is entered only when the other party indicates he has |
| 1400 |
terminated his side of the OTR conversation. For example, if Alice and |
| 1401 |
Bob are having an OTR conversation, and Bob instructs his OTR client to |
| 1402 |
end its private session with Alice (for example, by logging out), Alice |
| 1403 |
will be notified of this, and <em>her</em> client will switch to |
| 1404 |
MSGSTATE_FINISHED mode. This prevents Alice from accidentally sending a |
| 1405 |
message to Bob in plaintext. (Consider what happens if Alice was in the |
| 1406 |
middle of typing a private message to Bob when he suddenly logs out, |
| 1407 |
just as Alice hits Enter.)</dd> |
| 1408 |
</dl> |
| 1409 |
<h4>Authentication state</h4> |
| 1410 |
<p>The authentication state variable, authstate, can take one of four |
| 1411 |
values (plus one extra for OTR version 1 compatibility):</p> |
| 1412 |
<dl> |
| 1413 |
<dt>AUTHSTATE_NONE</dt> |
| 1414 |
<dd>This state indicates that the authentication protocol is not |
| 1415 |
currently in progress. This is the initial state.</dd> |
| 1416 |
<dt>AUTHSTATE_AWAITING_DHKEY</dt> |
| 1417 |
<dd>After Bob initiates the authentication protocol by sending Alice |
| 1418 |
the D-H Commit Message, he enters this state to await Alice's reply.</dd> |
| 1419 |
<dt>AUTHSTATE_AWAITING_REVEALSIG</dt> |
| 1420 |
<dd>After Alice receives Bob's D-H Commit Message, and replies with her |
| 1421 |
own D-H Key Message, she enters this state to await Bob's reply.</dd> |
| 1422 |
<dt>AUTHSTATE_AWAITING_SIG</dt> |
| 1423 |
<dd>After Bob receives Alice's D-H Key Message, and replies with his own |
| 1424 |
Reveal Signature Message, he enters this state to await Alice's reply.</dd> |
| 1425 |
<dt>AUTHSTATE_V1_SETUP</dt> |
| 1426 |
<dd>For OTR version 1 compatibility, if Bob sends a version 1 Key |
| 1427 |
Exchange Message to Alice, he enters this state to await Alice's |
| 1428 |
reply.</dd> |
| 1429 |
</dl> |
| 1430 |
<p>After:</p> |
| 1431 |
<ul> |
| 1432 |
<li>Alice (in AUTHSTATE_AWAITING_REVEALSIG) receives Bob's Reveal |
| 1433 |
Signature Message (and replies with her own Signature Message), <b>or</b> |
| 1434 |
</li> |
| 1435 |
<li>Bob (in AUTHSTATE_AWAITING_SIG) receives Alice's Signature Message, |
| 1436 |
/li> |
| 1437 |
</ul> |
| 1438 |
<p>then, |
| 1439 |
assuming the signature verifications succeed, the msgstate |
| 1440 |
variable is transitioned to MSGSTATE_ENCRYPTED. Regardless of whether |
| 1441 |
the signature verifications succeed, the authstate variable is |
| 1442 |
transitioned to AUTHSTATE_NONE.</p> |
| 1443 |
<h4>Policies</h4> |
| 1444 |
<p>OTR clients can set different <b>policies</b> for different |
| 1445 |
correspondents. For example, Alice could set up her client so that it |
| 1446 |
speaks only OTR version 3, except with Charlie, who she knows has only |
| 1447 |
an old client; so that it will opportunistically start an OTR conversation |
| 1448 |
whenever it detects the correspondent supports it; or so that it refuses |
| 1449 |
to send non-encrypted messages to Bob, ever.</p> |
| 1450 |
<p>The policies that can be set (on a global or per-correspondent basis) |
| 1451 |
are any combination of the following boolean flags:</p> |
| 1452 |
<dl> |
| 1453 |
<dt>ALLOW_V1</dt> |
| 1454 |
<dd>Allow version 1 of the OTR protocol to be used (in general this |
| 1455 |
document will not address OTR protocol version 1; see previous |
| 1456 |
protocol documents for these details).</dd> |
| 1457 |
<dt>ALLOW_V2</dt> |
| 1458 |
<dd>Allow version 2 of the OTR protocol to be used.</dd> |
| 1459 |
<dt>ALLOW_V3</dt> |
| 1460 |
<dd>Allow version 3 of the OTR protocol to be used.</dd> |
| 1461 |
<dt>REQUIRE_ENCRYPTION</dt> |
| 1462 |
<dd>Refuse to send unencrypted messages.</dd> |
| 1463 |
<dt>SEND_WHITESPACE_TAG</dt> |
| 1464 |
<dd>Advertise your support of OTR using the whitespace tag.</dd> |
| 1465 |
<dt>WHITESPACE_START_AKE</dt> |
| 1466 |
<dd>Start the OTR AKE when you receive a whitespace tag.</dd> |
| 1467 |
<dt>ERROR_START_AKE</dt> |
| 1468 |
<dd>Start the OTR AKE when you receive an OTR Error Message.</dd> |
| 1469 |
</dl> |
| 1470 |
<p>Note that it is possible for UIs simply to offer the old |
| 1471 |
"combinations" of options, and not ask about each one separately.</p> |
| 1472 |
<h4>State transitions</h4> |
| 1473 |
<p>There are twelve actions an OTR client must handle:</p> |
| 1474 |
<ul> |
| 1475 |
<li>Received messages: |
| 1476 |
<ul> |
| 1477 |
<li>Plaintext without the whitespace tag</li> |
| 1478 |
<li>Plaintext with the whitespace tag</li> |
| 1479 |
<li>Query Message</li> |
| 1480 |
<li>Error Message</li> |
| 1481 |
<li>D-H Commit Message</li> |
| 1482 |
<li>D-H Key Message</li> |
| 1483 |
<li>Reveal Signature Message</li> |
| 1484 |
<li>Signature Message</li> |
| 1485 |
<li>Data Message</li> |
| 1486 |
</ul></li> |
| 1487 |
<li>User actions: |
| 1488 |
<ul> |
| 1489 |
<li>User requests to start an OTR conversation</li> |
| 1490 |
<li>User requests to end an OTR conversation</li> |
| 1491 |
<li>User types a message to be sent</li> |
| 1492 |
</ul></li> |
| 1493 |
</ul> |
| 1494 |
<p>The following sections will outline what actions to take in each |
| 1495 |
case. They all assume that at least one of ALLOW_V1, ALLOW_V2 or |
| 1496 |
ALLOW_V3 is set; if not, then OTR is completely disabled, and no |
| 1497 |
special handling of messages should be done at all. For version 1 |
| 1498 |
messages, please refer to previous OTR protocol documents. For version |
| 1499 |
3 messages, someone receiving a message with a recipient instance tag |
| 1500 |
specified that does not equal their own should discard the message |
| 1501 |
and optionally warn the user. The exception here is the D-H Commit |
| 1502 |
Message where the recipient instance tag may be 0, indicating that no |
| 1503 |
particular instance is specified.</p> |
| 1504 |
<h4>Receiving plaintext without the whitespace tag</h4> |
| 1505 |
<dl> |
| 1506 |
<dt>If msgstate is MSGSTATE_PLAINTEXT:</dt> |
| 1507 |
<dd>Simply display the message to the user. If REQUIRE_ENCRYPTION is |
| 1508 |
set, warn him that the message was received unencrypted.</dd> |
| 1509 |
<dt>If msgstate is MSGSTATE_ENCRYPTED or MSGSTATE_FINISHED:</dt> |
| 1510 |
<dd>Display the message to the user, but warn him that the message was |
| 1511 |
received unencrypted.</dd> |
| 1512 |
</dl> |
| 1513 |
<h4>Receiving plaintext with the whitespace tag</h4> |
| 1514 |
<dl> |
| 1515 |
<dt>If msgstate is MSGSTATE_PLAINTEXT:</dt> |
| 1516 |
<dd>Remove the whitespace tag and display the message to the user. If |
| 1517 |
REQUIRE_ENCRYPTION is set, warn him that the message was received |
| 1518 |
unencrypted.</dd> |
| 1519 |
<dt>If msgstate is MSGSTATE_ENCRYPTED or MSGSTATE_FINISHED:</dt> |
| 1520 |
<dd>Remove the whitespace tag and display the message to the user, but |
| 1521 |
warn him that the message was received unencrypted.</dd> |
| 1522 |
</dl> |
| 1523 |
<p>In any event, if WHITESPACE_START_AKE is set:</p> |
| 1524 |
<dl> |
| 1525 |
<dt>If the tag offers OTR version 3 and ALLOW_V3 is set:</dt> |
| 1526 |
<dd>Send a version 3 D-H Commit Message, and transition authstate to |
| 1527 |
AUTHSTATE_AWAITING_DHKEY.</dd> |
| 1528 |
<dt>Otherwise, if the tag offers OTR version 2 and ALLOW_V2 is set:</dt> |
| 1529 |
<dd>Send a version 2 D-H Commit Message, and transition authstate to |
| 1530 |
AUTHSTATE_AWAITING_DHKEY.</dd> |
| 1531 |
</dl> |
| 1532 |
<h4>Receiving a Query Message</h4> |
| 1533 |
<dl> |
| 1534 |
<dt>If the query message offers OTR version 3 and ALLOW_V3 is set:</dt> |
| 1535 |
<dd>Send a version 3 D-H Commit Message, and transition authstate to |
| 1536 |
AUTHSTATE_AWAITING_DHKEY.</dd> |
| 1537 |
<dt>Otherwise, if the message offers OTR version 2 and ALLOW_V2 is set:</dt> |
| 1538 |
<dd>Send a version 2 D-H Commit Message, and transition authstate to |
| 1539 |
AUTHSTATE_AWAITING_DHKEY.</dd> |
| 1540 |
</dl> |
| 1541 |
<h4>Receiving an Error Message</h4> |
| 1542 |
<p>Display the message to the user. If ERROR_START_AKE is set, reply |
| 1543 |
with a Query Message.</p> |
| 1544 |
<h4>User requests to start an OTR conversation</h4> |
| 1545 |
<p>Send an OTR Query Message to the correspondent.</p> |
| 1546 |
<h4>Receiving a D-H Commit Message</h4> |
| 1547 |
<p>If the message is version 2 and ALLOW_V2 is not set, ignore this message. |
| 1548 |
Similarly if the message is version 3 and ALLOW_V3 is not set, ignore the |
| 1549 |
message. Otherwise:</p> |
| 1550 |
<dl> |
| 1551 |
<dt>If authstate is AUTHSTATE_NONE:</dt> |
| 1552 |
<dd>Reply with a D-H Key Message, and transition authstate to |
| 1553 |
AUTHSTATE_AWAITING_REVEALSIG.</dd> |
| 1554 |
<dt>If authstate is AUTHSTATE_AWAITING_DHKEY:</dt> |
| 1555 |
<dd>This is the trickiest transition in the whole protocol. It |
| 1556 |
indicates that you have already sent a D-H Commit message to your |
| 1557 |
correspondent, but that he either didn't receive it, or just didn't |
| 1558 |
receive it <em>yet</em>, and has sent you one as well. The symmetry |
| 1559 |
will be broken by comparing the hashed g<sup>x</sup> you sent in your |
| 1560 |
D-H Commit Message with the one you received, considered as 32-byte |
| 1561 |
unsigned big-endian values. |
| 1562 |
<dl> |
| 1563 |
<dt>If yours is the higher hash value:</dt> |
| 1564 |
<dd>Ignore the incoming D-H Commit message, but resend your D-H |
| 1565 |
Commit message.</dd> |
| 1566 |
<dt>Otherwise:</dt> |
| 1567 |
<dd>Forget your old g<sup>x</sup> value that you sent (encrypted) |
| 1568 |
earlier, and pretend you're in AUTHSTATE_NONE; i.e. reply with a D-H Key |
| 1569 |
Message, and transition authstate to AUTHSTATE_AWAITING_REVEALSIG.</dd> |
| 1570 |
</dl></dd> |
| 1571 |
<dt>If authstate is AUTHSTATE_AWAITING_REVEALSIG:</dt> |
| 1572 |
<dd>Retransmit your D-H Key Message (the same |
| 1573 |
one as you sent when you entered AUTHSTATE_AWAITING_REVEALSIG). Forget |
| 1574 |
the old D-H Commit message, and use this new one instead. There |
| 1575 |
are a number of reasons this might happen, including: |
| 1576 |
<ul> |
| 1577 |
<li>Your correspondent simply started a new AKE.</li> |
| 1578 |
<li>Your correspondent resent his D-H Commit message, as specified |
| 1579 |
above.</li> |
| 1580 |
<li>On some networks, like AIM, if your correspondent is logged in |
| 1581 |
multiple times, each of his clients will send a D-H Commit Message in |
| 1582 |
response to a Query Message; resending the same D-H Key Message in |
| 1583 |
response to each of those messages will prevent compounded confusion, |
| 1584 |
since each of his clients will see each of the D-H Key Messages you |
| 1585 |
send. [And the problem gets even worse if you are <em>each</em> logged |
| 1586 |
in multiple times.]</li> |
| 1587 |
</ul></dd> |
| 1588 |
<dt>If authstate is AUTHSTATE_AWAITING_SIG or AUTHSTATE_V1_SETUP:</dt> |
| 1589 |
<dd>Reply with a new D-H Key message, and transition authstate to |
| 1590 |
AUTHSTATE_AWAITING_REVEALSIG.</dd> |
| 1591 |
</dl> |
| 1592 |
<h4>Receiving a D-H Key Message</h4> |
| 1593 |
<p>If the message is version 2 and ALLOW_V2 is not set, ignore this |
| 1594 |
message. Similarly if the message is version 3 and ALLOW_V3 is not |
| 1595 |
set, ignore this message. Otherwise:</p> |
| 1596 |
<dl> |
| 1597 |
<dt>If authstate is AUTHSTATE_AWAITING_DHKEY:</dt> |
| 1598 |
<dd>Reply with a Reveal Signature Message and transition authstate to |
| 1599 |
AUTHSTATE_AWAITING_SIG.</dd> |
| 1600 |
<dt>If authstate is AUTHSTATE_AWAITING_SIG:</dt> |
| 1601 |
<dd> |
| 1602 |
<dl> |
| 1603 |
<dt>If this D-H Key message is the same the one you received earlier |
| 1604 |
(when you entered AUTHSTATE_AWAITING_SIG):</dt> |
| 1605 |
<dd>Retransmit your Reveal Signature Message.</dd> |
| 1606 |
<dt>Otherwise:</dt> |
| 1607 |
<dd>Ignore the message.</dd> |
| 1608 |
</dl></dd> |
| 1609 |
<dt>If authstate is AUTHSTATE_NONE, AUTHSTATE_AWAITING_REVEALSIG, or |
| 1610 |
AUTHSTATE_V1_SETUP:</dt> |
| 1611 |
<dd>Ignore the message.</dd> |
| 1612 |
</dl> |
| 1613 |
<h4>Receiving a Reveal Signature Message</h4> |
| 1614 |
<p>If the message is version 2 and ALLOW_V2 is not set, ignore this message. |
| 1615 |
Similarly if the message is version 3 and ALLOW_V3 is not set, ignore the |
| 1616 |
message. Otherwise:</p> |
| 1617 |
<dl> |
| 1618 |
<dt>If authstate is AUTHSTATE_AWAITING_REVEALSIG:</dt> |
| 1619 |
<dd>Use the received value of r to decrypt the value of g<sup>x</sup> |
| 1620 |
received in the D-H Commit Message, and verify the hash therein. |
| 1621 |
Decrypt the encrypted signature, and verify the signature and the MACs. |
| 1622 |
If everything checks out: |
| 1623 |
<ul> |
| 1624 |
<li>Reply with a Signature Message.</li> |
| 1625 |
<li>Transition authstate to AUTHSTATE_NONE.</li> |
| 1626 |
<li>Transition msgstate to MSGSTATE_ENCRYPTED.</li> |
| 1627 |
<li>If there is a recent stored message, encrypt it and send it as a |
| 1628 |
Data Message.</li> |
| 1629 |
</ul> |
| 1630 |
Otherwise, ignore the message.</dd> |
| 1631 |
<dt>If authstate is AUTHSTATE_NONE, AUTHSTATE_AWAITING_DHKEY, |
| 1632 |
AUTHSTATE_AWAITING_SIG, or AUTHSTATE_V1_SETUP:</dt> |
| 1633 |
<dd>Ignore the message.</dd> |
| 1634 |
</dl> |
| 1635 |
<h4>Receiving a Signature Message</h4> |
| 1636 |
<p>If the message is version 2 and ALLOW_V2 is not set, ignore this message. |
| 1637 |
Similarly if the message is version 3 and ALLOW_V3 is not set, ignore the |
| 1638 |
message. Otherwise:</p> |
| 1639 |
<dl> |
| 1640 |
<dt>If authstate is AUTHSTATE_AWAITING_SIG:</dt> |
| 1641 |
<dd>Decrypt the encrypted signature, and verify the signature and the MACs. |
| 1642 |
If everything checks out: |
| 1643 |
<ul> |
| 1644 |
<li>Transition authstate to AUTHSTATE_NONE.</li> |
| 1645 |
<li>Transition msgstate to MSGSTATE_ENCRYPTED.</li> |
| 1646 |
<li>If there is a recent stored message, encrypt it and send it as a |
| 1647 |
Data Message.</li> |
| 1648 |
</ul> |
| 1649 |
Otherwise, ignore the message.</dd> |
| 1650 |
<dt>If authstate is AUTHSTATE_NONE, AUTHSTATE_AWAITING_DHKEY, |
| 1651 |
or AUTHSTATE_AWAITING_REVEALSIG:</dt> |
| 1652 |
<dd>Ignore the message.</dd> |
| 1653 |
</dl> |
| 1654 |
<h4>User types a message to be sent</h4> |
| 1655 |
<dl> |
| 1656 |
<dt>If msgstate is MSGSTATE_PLAINTEXT:</dt> |
| 1657 |
<dd><dl><dt>If REQUIRE_ENCRYPTION is set:</dt> |
| 1658 |
<dd>Store the plaintext message for possible retransmission, and send a |
| 1659 |
Query Message.</dd> |
| 1660 |
<dt>Otherwise:</dt> |
| 1661 |
<dd>If SEND_WHITESPACE_TAG is set, and you have not received a plaintext |
| 1662 |
message from this correspondent since last entering MSGSTATE_PLAINTEXT, |
| 1663 |
attach the whitespace tag to the message. Send the (possibly modified) |
| 1664 |
message as plaintext.</dd></dl></dd> |
| 1665 |
<dt>If msgstate is MSGSTATE_ENCRYPTED:</dt> |
| 1666 |
<dd>Encrypt the message, and send it as a Data Message. Store the |
| 1667 |
plaintext message for possible retransmission.</dd> |
| 1668 |
<dt>If msgstate is MSGSTATE_FINISHED:</dt> |
| 1669 |
<dd>Inform the user that the message cannot be sent at this time. Store |
| 1670 |
the plaintext message for possible retransmission.</dd> |
| 1671 |
</dl> |
| 1672 |
<h4>Receiving a Data Message</h4> |
| 1673 |
<dl> |
| 1674 |
<dt>If msgstate is MSGSTATE_ENCRYPTED:</dt> |
| 1675 |
<dd>Verify the information (MAC, keyids, ctr value, etc.) in the |
| 1676 |
message. |
| 1677 |
<dl> |
| 1678 |
<dt>If the verification succeeds:</dt> |
| 1679 |
<dd> |
| 1680 |
<ul> |
| 1681 |
<li>Decrypt the message and display the human-readable part (if |
| 1682 |
non-empty) to the user.</li> |
| 1683 |
<li>Update the D-H encryption keys, if necessary.</li> |
| 1684 |
<li>If you have not sent a message to this correspondent in some |
| 1685 |
(configurable) time, send a "heartbeat" message, consisting of a Data |
| 1686 |
Message encoding an empty plaintext. The heartbeat message should have |
| 1687 |
the IGNORE_UNREADABLE flag set.</li> |
| 1688 |
<li>If the received message contains a TLV type 1, forget all encryption |
| 1689 |
keys for this correspondent, and transition msgstate to |
| 1690 |
MSGSTATE_FINISHED.</li> |
| 1691 |
</ul> |
| 1692 |
</dd> |
| 1693 |
<dt>Otherwise, inform the user that an unreadable encrypted message was |
| 1694 |
received, and reply with an Error Message.</dt> |
| 1695 |
</dl></dd> |
| 1696 |
<dt>If msgstate is MSGSTATE_PLAINTEXT or MSGSTATE_FINISHED:</dt> |
| 1697 |
<dd>Inform the user that an unreadable encrypted message was received, |
| 1698 |
and reply with an Error Message.</dd> |
| 1699 |
</dl> |
| 1700 |
<h4>User requests to end an OTR conversation</h4> |
| 1701 |
<dl> |
| 1702 |
<dt>If msgstate is MSGSTATE_PLAINTEXT:</dt> |
| 1703 |
<dd>Do nothing.</dd> |
| 1704 |
<dt>If msgstate is MSGSTATE_ENCRYPTED:</dt> |
| 1705 |
<dd>Send a Data Message, encoding a message with an empty human-readable |
| 1706 |
part, and TLV type 1. Transition msgstate to MSGSTATE_PLAINTEXT.</dd> |
| 1707 |
<dt>If msgstate is MSGSTATE_FINISHED:</dt> |
| 1708 |
<dd>Transition msgstate to MSGSTATE_PLAINTEXT.</dd> |
| 1709 |
</dl> |
| 1710 |
</body></html> |