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# Notes concerning wider use of capabilities |
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## Overview |
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**NOTE** These notes were added to the libcap package in |
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libcap-1.03. They pre-date file capability support, but fully |
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anticipate it. They are some thoughts on how to restructure a system |
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to better leverage capability support. I've updated them to render as |
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an `.md` formatted file. |
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As of Linux 2.2.0, the power of the superuser has been partitioned |
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into a set of discrete capabilities (in other places, these |
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capabilities are know as privileges). |
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The contents of the libcap package are a library and a number of |
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simple programs that are intended to show how an application/daemon |
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can be protected (with wrappers) or rewritten to take advantage of |
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this fine grained approach to constraining the danger to your system |
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from programs running as 'root'. |
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## Notes on securing your system |
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### Adopting a role approach to system security |
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Changing all of the system binaries and directories to be owned by |
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some user that cannot log on. You might like to create a user with |
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the name 'system' who's account is locked with a '*' password. This |
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user can be made the owner of all of the system directories on your |
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system and critical system binaries too. |
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Why is this a good idea? In a simple case, the `CAP_FOWNER` capability |
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is required for the superuser to delete files owned by a non-root user |
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in a _sticky-bit_ protected non-root owned directory. Thus, the sticky |
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bit can help you protect the `/lib/` directory from a compromized |
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daemon where the directory and the files it contains are owned by the |
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system user. It can be protected to ensure that the daemon is not |
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running with the `CAP_FOWNER` capability... |
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### Limiting the damage |
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If your daemon only needs to be setuid-root in order to bind to a low |
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numbered port. You should restrict it to only having access to the |
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`CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE` capability. Coupled with not having any files |
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on the system owned by root, it becomes significantly harder for such |
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a daemon to damage your system. |
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Note, you should think of this kind of trick as making things harder |
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for a potential attacker to exploit a hole in a daemon of this |
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type. Being able to bind to any privileged port is still a formidable |
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privilege and can lead to difficult but _interesting_ |
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man-in-the-middle attacks -- hijack the telnet port for example and |
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masquerade as the login program... Collecting passwords for another |
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day. |
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### The /proc/ filesystem |
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This Linux-specific directory tree holds most of the state of the |
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system in a form that can sometimes be manipulated by file |
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read/writes. Take care to ensure that the filesystem is not mounted |
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with uid=0, since root (with no capabilities) would still be able to |
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read sensitive files in the `/proc/` tree - `kcore` for example. |
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[Patch is available for 2.2.1 - I just wrote it!] |