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irssi (1.2.0-2) unstable; urgency=low |
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With the release of Irssi 1.2.0 we now bundle the OTR plug-in as part of |
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the Irssi source code. During the import phase of the irssi-otr codebase |
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we fixed a number of issues, but one of them caused us to break backwards |
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compatibility for old irssi-otr users. |
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With the updated OTR implementation the secret keys of the user is no |
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longer stored with an account name of $nickname@$server (for example: |
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[email protected]), but is rather stored with the network (or chatnet |
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if you like) name from Irssi (for example: Freenode). This should remove |
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the issue that some users have reported where if they connect to another |
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server on a given network the OTR implementation generates new keys for |
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you. |
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You can see your list of OTR keys in Irssi using /otr info. |
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Upgrade Path |
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============ |
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This requires a bit of manual work, but if you look at your ~/.irssi/otr |
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directory you should have 3 files: |
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|
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otr.fp - containing the fingerprints of your OTR buddies. |
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otr.instag - containing the tags from OTR. |
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otr.key - containing your secret keys. |
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In otr.fp and otr.key you should manually open these files and modify the |
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old strings to the new format. The otr.key file is the most important one |
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since it contains the secret key material. The file contains an |
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s-expression like structure where the account name key can be found in the |
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(name name-goes-here) tuple. The otr.fp file contains a list of known |
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fingerprints. Correct the account name from your preview keys there as |
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well. |
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-- Rhonda D'Vine <[email protected]> Tue, 12 Feb 2019 22:36:01 +0100 |
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irssi (0.8.10~rc5-1) unstable; urgency=low |
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This package has the beginnings of GNUTLS support for SSL rather |
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than the upstream OpenSSL code. This may have many bugs in and is |
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not feature complete. In particular it does not support verification |
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of the server's certificate. As a result the connection is vunerable |
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to man in the middle attack. This is only a regression if you use |
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the -cafile or -capath options to /connect. The data is still |
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encrypted. |
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-- David Pashley <[email protected]> Sun, 17 Jul 2005 19:39:37 +0300 |
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