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This interface exists to provide a means of connecting to an IPMIv2 enabled |
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BMC. In some places, the IPMIv2 specification is either unclear or |
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inconsistent, and interpretations of the intent of the specification had to |
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be made at the discretion of the implementor. The purpose of this |
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document is to make those decisions clear so that 1) they can be reviewed |
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by others and 2) so that the rationale for those decisions can be made |
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clear. |
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* Though it's not stated explicitly with which algorithm the K1 and K2 keys |
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should be generated, we chose to use the authentication algorithm. The |
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specification states that K1 and K2 are generated with an HMAC algorithm, |
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and all of the authentication algorithms (except for "none") are HMAC |
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algorithms, whereas the integrity algorithms are not all HMAC. See section |
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13.32 for details about K1 and K2, and section |
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* The IPMIv2 specification describes a key, Kg, that is the "BMC key". |
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This key functions as a global key that is required to be known in addition |
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to the user's key, by authenticating users. If the BMC has a null Kg, the |
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users key, Kuid, is used in its place in algorithms where Kg is required, |
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per the specification section 13.33. A user can obtain the status of Kg by |
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querying the BMC with the Get Channel Authentication Capabilities command. |
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Currently, this implementation does not provide a way for a user to specify |
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Kg for BMCs that require it. |
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* The specification is unclear as to which key is used for HMAC based |
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integrity checking. One the one hand, section 13.28.4 states explicitly |
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that HMAC integrity algorithms use the session integrity key as the HMAC |
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key. Confusing that matter is a statement in section 13.32 regarding the |
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creation of additional keying material. In this section it is stated that |
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"all keying material for the RSP integrity and confidentiality algorithms |
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will be generated by processing a pre-defined set of constants using HMAC |
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per [RFC2104], keyed by sik". And "For the mandatory-to-implement |
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integrity and confidentiality algorithms defined in this specification, |
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processing the first two (2) constants will generate the require amount of |
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keying material." We decided to use K1 as our HMAC key for the generation |
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of authentication codes (integrity checking). Furthermore, we are using |
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all 20 bytes of K1. |
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* IPMIv2 compliant BMCs are supposed to support 20 byte passwords, as well |
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store metadata describing whether the password was stored as a 16 byte or |
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20 byte class password. We do not currently support 20 byte passwords. It |
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should be noted that there are obvious mistakes in the SET USER PASSWORD |
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command specification, as it mentions the ability to query for 16/20 byte |
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password status, but the packet format does not support this. |
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* The IPMIv2 specification describes a type of login called a "role only |
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login." This feature allows a user to login providing only a requested |
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privilege level and a password. We do not currently support this feature. |
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Supporting this feature would only require the ability to specify |
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username/privilege lookups in the RAKP 1 message sent from ipmitool. We |
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currently specify the use of username only lookups for authentication. |
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* In the IPMIv2 packet description in table 13-8 of the IPMv2 |
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specification, there are two fields that are rather ambiguous in meaning. |
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The fields are "Pad Length" and "Next Header". Although neither field is |
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listed as belonging to the IPMIv2 packet format, we include/expect them |
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both in our IPMIv2 packets. Are rationale is 1) the Next Headers field's |
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comment states what the value of that field should be for IPMIv2, and 2) |
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for the most part the ASF and IPMIv2 fields seem to parallel each other, |
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and we feel that the Pad Length and Next Header fields were left out of the |
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IPMIv2 column by mistake. |
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* The GET CHANNEL CIPHER SUITES command documentation seems to have |
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mistakes. The "start of record" byte is stated to be either 0x30 or 0x31, |
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whereas the detailed description in table 22-18 leads us to believe that |
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this byte should really be 0xC0 or 0xC1. Also the description of bits 5:0 |
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in the start of record byte should probably be 00_0000 rather than 00_000. |
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