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src/plugins/lanplus/README.lanplus

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1 This interface exists to provide a means of connecting to an IPMIv2 enabled
2 BMC. In some places, the IPMIv2 specification is either unclear or
3 inconsistent, and interpretations of the intent of the specification had to
4 be made at the discretion of the implementor. The purpose of this
5 document is to make those decisions clear so that 1) they can be reviewed
6 by others and 2) so that the rationale for those decisions can be made
7 clear.
8
9 * Though it's not stated explicitly with which algorithm the K1 and K2 keys
10 should be generated, we chose to use the authentication algorithm. The
11 specification states that K1 and K2 are generated with an HMAC algorithm,
12 and all of the authentication algorithms (except for "none") are HMAC
13 algorithms, whereas the integrity algorithms are not all HMAC. See section
14 13.32 for details about K1 and K2, and section
15
16
17 * The IPMIv2 specification describes a key, Kg, that is the "BMC key".
18 This key functions as a global key that is required to be known in addition
19 to the user's key, by authenticating users. If the BMC has a null Kg, the
20 users key, Kuid, is used in its place in algorithms where Kg is required,
21 per the specification section 13.33. A user can obtain the status of Kg by
22 querying the BMC with the Get Channel Authentication Capabilities command.
23 Currently, this implementation does not provide a way for a user to specify
24 Kg for BMCs that require it.
25
26
27 * The specification is unclear as to which key is used for HMAC based
28 integrity checking. One the one hand, section 13.28.4 states explicitly
29 that HMAC integrity algorithms use the session integrity key as the HMAC
30 key. Confusing that matter is a statement in section 13.32 regarding the
31 creation of additional keying material. In this section it is stated that
32 "all keying material for the RSP integrity and confidentiality algorithms
33 will be generated by processing a pre-defined set of constants using HMAC
34 per [RFC2104], keyed by sik". And "For the mandatory-to-implement
35 integrity and confidentiality algorithms defined in this specification,
36 processing the first two (2) constants will generate the require amount of
37 keying material." We decided to use K1 as our HMAC key for the generation
38 of authentication codes (integrity checking). Furthermore, we are using
39 all 20 bytes of K1.
40
41
42 * IPMIv2 compliant BMCs are supposed to support 20 byte passwords, as well
43 store metadata describing whether the password was stored as a 16 byte or
44 20 byte class password. We do not currently support 20 byte passwords. It
45 should be noted that there are obvious mistakes in the SET USER PASSWORD
46 command specification, as it mentions the ability to query for 16/20 byte
47 password status, but the packet format does not support this.
48
49
50 * The IPMIv2 specification describes a type of login called a "role only
51 login." This feature allows a user to login providing only a requested
52 privilege level and a password. We do not currently support this feature.
53 Supporting this feature would only require the ability to specify
54 username/privilege lookups in the RAKP 1 message sent from ipmitool. We
55 currently specify the use of username only lookups for authentication.
56
57
58 * In the IPMIv2 packet description in table 13-8 of the IPMv2
59 specification, there are two fields that are rather ambiguous in meaning.
60 The fields are "Pad Length" and "Next Header". Although neither field is
61 listed as belonging to the IPMIv2 packet format, we include/expect them
62 both in our IPMIv2 packets. Are rationale is 1) the Next Headers field's
63 comment states what the value of that field should be for IPMIv2, and 2)
64 for the most part the ASF and IPMIv2 fields seem to parallel each other,
65 and we feel that the Pad Length and Next Header fields were left out of the
66 IPMIv2 column by mistake.
67
68
69 * The GET CHANNEL CIPHER SUITES command documentation seems to have
70 mistakes. The "start of record" byte is stated to be either 0x30 or 0x31,
71 whereas the detailed description in table 22-18 leads us to believe that
72 this byte should really be 0xC0 or 0xC1. Also the description of bits 5:0
73 in the start of record byte should probably be 00_0000 rather than 00_000.
74