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--- /dev/null |
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+++ b/extra/gpgverify |
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@@ -0,0 +1,230 @@ |
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+#!/usr/bin/perl -w |
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+require '/usr/lib/news/innshellvars.pl'; |
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+ |
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+# written April 1996, [email protected] (David C Lawrence) |
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+# mostly rewritten 2001-03-21 by Marco d'Itri <[email protected]> |
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+# |
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+# requirements: |
| 11 |
+# - GnuPG |
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+# - perl 5.004_03 and working Sys::Syslog |
| 13 |
+# - syslog daemon |
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+# |
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+# There is no locking because gpg is supposed to not need it and controlchan |
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+# will serialize control messages processing anyway. |
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+ |
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+require 5.004_03; |
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+use strict; |
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+ |
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+# if you keep your keyring somewhere that is not the default used by gpg, |
| 22 |
+# set appropriately the next line. |
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+my $keyring = '/etc/news/pgp/pubring.pgp'; |
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+ |
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+# If you have INN and the script is able to successfully include your |
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+# innshellvars.pl file, the value of the next two variables will be |
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+# overridden. |
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+my $tmpdir = '/var/log/news/'; |
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+my $syslog_facility = 'news'; |
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+ |
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+# 1: print PGP output |
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+my $debug = 0; |
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+$debug = 1 if -t 1; |
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+ |
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+### Exit value: |
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+### 0 good signature |
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+### 1 no signature |
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+### 2 unknown signature |
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+### 3 bad signature |
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+### 255 problem not directly related to gpg analysis of signature |
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+ |
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+############################################################################## |
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+################ NO USER SERVICEABLE PARTS BELOW THIS COMMENT ################ |
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+############################################################################## |
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+my $tmp = ($inn::pathtmp ? $inn::pathtmp : $tmpdir) . "/pgp$$"; |
| 46 |
+$syslog_facility = $inn::syslog_facility if $inn::syslog_facility; |
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+ |
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+my $nntp_format = 0; |
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+$0 =~ s#^.*/##; # trim /path/to/prog to prog |
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+ |
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+die "Usage: $0 < message\n" if $#ARGV != -1; |
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+ |
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+# Path to gpg binary |
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+my $gpg; |
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+foreach (split(/:/, $ENV{PATH}), qw(/usr/local/bin /opt/gnu/bin)) { |
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+ if (-x "$_/gpgv") { |
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+ $gpg = "$_/gpgv"; last; |
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+ } |
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+} |
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+fail('cannot find the gpgv binary') if not $gpg; |
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+ |
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+# this is, by design, case-sensitive with regards to the headers it checks. |
| 63 |
+# it's also insistent about the colon-space rule. |
| 64 |
+my ($label, $value, %dup, %header); |
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+while (<STDIN>) { |
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+ # if a header line ends with \r\n, this article is in the encoding |
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+ # it would be in during an NNTP session. some article storage |
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+ # managers keep them this way for efficiency. |
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+ $nntp_format = /\r\n$/ if $. == 1; |
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+ s/\r?\n$//; |
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+ |
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+ last if /^$/; |
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+ if (/^(\S+):[ \t](.+)/) { |
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+ ($label, $value) = ($1, $2); |
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+ $dup{$label} = 1 if $header{$label}; |
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+ $header{$label} = $value; |
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+ } elsif (/^\s/) { |
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+ fail("non-header at line $.: $_") unless $label; |
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+ $header{$label} .= "\n$_"; |
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+ } else { |
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+ fail("non-header at line $.: $_"); |
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+ } |
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+} |
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+ |
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+my $pgpheader = 'X-PGP-Sig'; |
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+$_ = $header{$pgpheader}; |
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+exit 1 if not $_; # no signature |
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+ |
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+# the $sep value means the separator between the radix64 signature lines |
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+# can have any amount of spaces or tabs, but must have at least one space |
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+# or tab, if there is a newline then the space or tab has to follow the |
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+# newline. any number of newlines can appear as long as each is followed |
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+# by at least one space or tab. *phew* |
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+my $sep = "[ \t]*(\n?[ \t]+)+"; |
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+# match all of the characters in a radix64 string |
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+my $r64 = '[a-zA-Z0-9+/]'; |
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+fail("$pgpheader not in expected format") |
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+ unless /^(\S+)$sep(\S+)(($sep$r64{64})+$sep$r64+=?=?$sep=$r64{4})$/; |
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+ |
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+my ($version, $signed_headers, $signature) = ($1, $3, $4); |
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+$signature =~ s/$sep/\n/g; |
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+ |
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+my $message = "-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----\n\n" |
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+ . "X-Signed-Headers: $signed_headers\n"; |
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+ |
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+foreach $label (split(',', $signed_headers)) { |
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+ fail("duplicate signed $label header, can't verify") if $dup{$label}; |
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+ $message .= "$label: "; |
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+ $message .= $header{$label} if $header{$label}; |
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+ $message .= "\n"; |
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+} |
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+$message .= "\n"; # end of headers |
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+ |
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+while (<STDIN>) { # read body lines |
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+ if ($nntp_format) { |
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+ # check for end of article; some news servers (eg, Highwind's |
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+ # "Breeze") include the dot-CRLF of the NNTP protocol in the |
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+ # article data passed to this script |
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+ last if $_ eq ".\r\n"; |
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+ |
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+ # remove NNTP encoding |
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+ s/^\.\./\./; |
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+ s/\r\n$/\n/; |
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+ } |
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+ |
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+ s/^-/- -/; # pgp quote ("ASCII armor") dashes |
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+ $message .= $_; |
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+} |
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+ |
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+$message .= |
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+ "\n-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----\n" . |
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+ "Version: $version\n" . |
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+ $signature . |
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+ "\n-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----\n"; |
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+ |
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+open(TMP, ">$tmp") or fail("open $tmp: $!"); |
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+print TMP $message; |
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+close TMP or errmsg("close $tmp: $!"); |
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+ |
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+my $opts = '--quiet --status-fd=1 --logger-fd=1'; |
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+$opts .= " --keyring=$keyring" if $keyring; |
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+ |
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+open(PGP, "$gpg $opts $tmp |") or fail("failed to execute $gpg: $!"); |
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+ |
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+undef $/; |
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+$_ = <PGP>; |
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+ |
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+unlink $tmp or errmsg("unlink $tmp: $!"); |
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+ |
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+if (not close PGP) { |
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+ if ($? >> 8) { |
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+ my $status = $? >> 8; |
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+ errmsg("gpg exited status $status") if $status > 1; |
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+ } else { |
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+ errmsg('gpg died on signal ' . ($? & 255)); |
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+ } |
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+} |
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+ |
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+print STDERR $_ if $debug; |
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+ |
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+my $ok = 255; # default exit status |
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+my $signer; |
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+if (/^\[GNUPG:\]\s+GOODSIG\s+\S+\s+(\S+)/m) { |
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+ $ok = 0; |
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+ $signer = $1; |
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+} elsif (/^\[GNUPG:\]\s+NODATA/m or /^\[GNUPG:\]\s+UNEXPECTED/m) { |
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+ $ok = 1; |
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+} elsif (/^\[GNUPG:\]\s+NO_PUBKEY/m) { |
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+ $ok = 2; |
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+} elsif (/^\[GNUPG:\]\s+BADSIG\s+/m) { |
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+ $ok = 3; |
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+} |
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+ |
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+print "$signer\n" if $signer; |
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+exit $ok; |
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+ |
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+sub errmsg { |
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+ my $msg = $_[0]; |
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+ |
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+ eval 'use Sys::Syslog qw(:DEFAULT setlogsock)'; |
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+ die "$0: cannot use Sys::Syslog: $@ [$msg]\n" if $@; |
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+ |
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+ die "$0: cannot set syslog method [$msg]\n" |
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+ if not (setlogsock('unix') or setlogsock('inet')); |
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+ |
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+ $msg .= " processing $header{'Message-ID'}" if $header{'Message-ID'}; |
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+ |
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+ openlog($0, 'pid', $syslog_facility); |
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+ syslog('err', '%s', $msg); |
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+ closelog(); |
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+} |
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+ |
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+sub fail { |
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+ errmsg($_[0]); |
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+ unlink $tmp; |
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+ exit 255; |
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+} |
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+ |
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+__END__ |
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+ |
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+# Copyright 2000 by Marco d'Itri |
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+ |
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+# License of the original version distributed by David C. Lawrence: |
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+ |
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+# Copyright (c) 1996 UUNET Technologies, Inc. |
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+# All rights reserved. |
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+# |
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+# Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
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+# modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
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+# are met: |
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+# 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright |
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+# notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
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+# 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
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+# notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the |
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+# documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. |
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+# 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software |
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+# must display the following acknowledgement: |
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+# This product includes software developed by UUNET Technologies, Inc. |
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+# 4. The name of UUNET Technologies ("UUNET") may not be used to endorse or |
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+# promote products derived from this software without specific prior |
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+# written permission. |
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+# |
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+# THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY UUNET ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR |
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+# IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED |
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+# WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE |
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+# ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL UUNET BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, |
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+# INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES |
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+# (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR |
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+# SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
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+# HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, |
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+# STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) |
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+# ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED |
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+# OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. |
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--- /dev/null |
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+++ b/extra/pgpverify.8 |
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@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@ |
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+.\" |
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+.\" $Id: pgpverify.8,v 1.1 1999/06/21 16:44:22 bdale Exp $ |
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+.\" |
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+.\" This manual page was provided by James Ralston <[email protected]> |
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+.TH pgpverify 8 |
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+.SH NAME |
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+pgpverify - cryptographically verify Usenet control messages |
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+.SH SYNOPSIS |
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+.B pgpverify |
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+.SH DESCRIPTION |
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+The |
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+.I pgpverify |
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+program reads (on standard input) a Usenet control message that has |
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+been cryptographically signed using the |
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+.I signcontrol |
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+program. |
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+.I pgpverify |
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+then uses the |
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+.I pgp |
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+program to determine who signed the control message. If the control |
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+message was validly signed, |
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+.I pgpverify |
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+outputs (to stdout) the User ID of the key ID that signed the message. |
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+.SH OPTIONS |
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+The |
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+.I pgpverify |
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+program takes no options. |
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+.SH EXIT STATUS |
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+.I pgpverify |
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+returns the follow exit statuses for the following cases: |
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+.P |
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+.TP |
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+.B 0 |
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+The control message had a good PGP signature. |
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+.TP |
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+.B 1 |
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+The control message had no PGP signature. |
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+.TP |
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+.B 2 |
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+The control message had an unknown PGP signature. |
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+.TP |
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+.B 3 |
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+The control message had a bad PGP signature. |
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+.TP |
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+.B 255 |
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+A problem occurred not directly related to PGP analysis of signature. |
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+.SH AUTHOR |
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+David C Lawrence <[email protected]> |
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+.SH ENVIRONMENT |
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+.I pgpverify |
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+does not modify or otherwise alter the environment before invoking the |
| 288 |
+.I pgp |
| 289 |
+program. It is the responsibility of the person who installs |
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+.I pgpverify |
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+to ensure that when |
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+.I pgp |
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+runs, it has the ability to locate and read a PGP key file that |
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+contains the PGP public keys for the appropriate Usenet hierarchy |
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+administrators. |
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+.SH SEE ALSO |
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+pgp(1) |
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+.SH NOTES |
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+Historically, Usenet news server administrators have configured their |
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+news servers to automatically honor Usenet control messages based on |
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+the originator of the control messages and the hierarchies for which |
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+the control messages applied. For example, in the past, David C |
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+Lawrence <[email protected]> always issued control messages for the |
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+"Big 8" hierarchies (comp, humanities, misc, news, rec, sci, soc, |
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+talk). Usenet news administrators would configure their news server |
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+software to automatically honor newgroup and rmgroup control messages |
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+that originated from David Lawrence and applied to any of the Big 8 |
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+hierarchies. |
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+.P |
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+Unfortunately, Usenet news articles (including control messages) are |
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+notoriously easy to forge. Soon, malicious users realized they could |
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+create or remove (at least temporarily) any Big 8 newsgroup they |
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+wanted by simply forging an appropriate control message in David |
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+Lawrence's name. As Usenet became more widely used, forgeries became |
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+more common. |
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+.P |
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+The |
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+.I pgpverify |
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+program was designed to allow Usenet news administrators to configure |
| 320 |
+their servers to cryptographically verify control messages before |
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+automatically acting on them. Under the pgpverify system, a Usenet |
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+hierarchy maintainer creates a PGP public/private key pair and |
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+disseminates the public key. Whenever the hierarchy maintainer issues |
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+a control message, he uses the |
| 325 |
+.I signcontrol |
| 326 |
+program to sign the control message with the PGP private key. Usenet |
| 327 |
+news administrators configure their news servers to run the |
| 328 |
+.I pgpverify |
| 329 |
+program on the appropriate control messages, and take action based on |
| 330 |
+the PGP key User ID that signed the control message, not the name and |
| 331 |
+address that appear in the control message's From or Sender headers. |
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+.P |
| 333 |
+Thus, using the |
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+.I signcontrol |
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+and |
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+.I pgpverify programs |
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+appropriately essentially eliminates the possibility of malicious |
| 338 |
+users forging Usenet control messages that sites will act upon, as |
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+such users would have to obtain the PGP private key in order to forge |
| 340 |
+a control message that would pass the cryptographic verification step. |
| 341 |
+If the hierarchy administrators properly protect their PGP private |
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+keys, the only way a malicious user could forge a validly-signed |
| 343 |
+control message would be by breaking the RSA encryption algorithm, |
| 344 |
+which (at least at this time) is believed to be an NP-complete |
| 345 |
+problem. If this is indeed the case, discovering the PGP private key |
| 346 |
+based on the PGP public key is computationally impossible for PGP keys |
| 347 |
+of a sufficient bit length. |
| 348 |
+.P |
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+<URL:ftp://ftp.isc.org/pub/pgpcontrol/> is where the most recent |
| 350 |
+versions of |
| 351 |
+.I signcontrol |
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+and |
| 353 |
+.I pgpverify |
| 354 |
+live, along with PGP public keys used for hierarchy administration. |