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// Code generated by go generate; DO NOT EDIT. |
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// This file was generated by robots. |
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|
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package {{.PACKAGE}} |
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|
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import ( |
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"bytes" |
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"testing" |
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"math" |
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"math/rand" |
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crand "crypto/rand" |
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"io" |
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. "github.com/cloudflare/circl/dh/sidh/internal/common" |
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"time" |
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) |
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|
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func vartimeEqProjFp2(lhs, rhs *ProjectivePoint) bool { |
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var t0, t1 Fp2 |
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mul(&t0, &lhs.X, &rhs.Z) |
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mul(&t1, &lhs.Z, &rhs.X) |
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return vartimeEqFp2(&t0, &t1) |
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} |
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|
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func toAffine(point *ProjectivePoint) *Fp2 { |
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var affineX Fp2 |
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inv(&affineX, &point.Z) |
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mul(&affineX, &affineX, &point.X) |
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return &affineX |
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} |
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|
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func Test_jInvariant(t *testing.T) { |
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curve := ProjectiveCurveParameters{A: curveA, C: curveC} |
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jbufRes := make([]byte, params.SharedSecretSize) |
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jbufExp := make([]byte, params.SharedSecretSize) |
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var jInv Fp2 |
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|
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Jinvariant(&curve, &jInv) |
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FromMontgomery(&jInv, &jInv) |
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Fp2ToBytes(jbufRes, &jInv, params.Bytelen) |
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|
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jInv = expectedJ |
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FromMontgomery(&jInv, &jInv) |
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Fp2ToBytes(jbufExp, &jInv, params.Bytelen) |
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|
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if !bytes.Equal(jbufRes[:], jbufExp[:]) { |
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t.Error("Computed incorrect j-invariant: found\n", jbufRes, "\nexpected\n", jbufExp) |
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} |
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} |
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|
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func TestProjectivePointVartimeEq(t *testing.T) { |
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var xP ProjectivePoint |
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|
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xP = ProjectivePoint{X: affineXP, Z: params.OneFp2} |
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xQ := xP |
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|
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// Scale xQ, which results in the same projective point |
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mul(&xQ.X, &xQ.X, &curveA) |
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mul(&xQ.Z, &xQ.Z, &curveA) |
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if !vartimeEqProjFp2(&xP, &xQ) { |
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t.Error("Expected the scaled point to be equal to the original") |
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} |
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} |
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|
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func TestPointMulVersusSage(t *testing.T) { |
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curve := ProjectiveCurveParameters{A: curveA, C: curveC} |
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cparams := CalcCurveParamsEquiv4(&curve) |
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var xP ProjectivePoint |
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|
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// x 2 |
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xP = ProjectivePoint{X: affineXP, Z: params.OneFp2} |
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Pow2k(&xP, &cparams, 1) |
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afxQ := toAffine(&xP) |
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if !vartimeEqFp2(afxQ, &affineXP2) { |
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t.Error("\nExpected\n", affineXP2, "\nfound\n", afxQ) |
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} |
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|
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// x 4 |
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xP = ProjectivePoint{X: affineXP, Z: params.OneFp2} |
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Pow2k(&xP, &cparams, 2) |
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afxQ = toAffine(&xP) |
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if !vartimeEqFp2(afxQ, &affineXP4) { |
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t.Error("\nExpected\n", affineXP4, "\nfound\n", afxQ) |
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} |
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} |
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|
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func TestPointMul9VersusSage(t *testing.T) { |
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curve := ProjectiveCurveParameters{A: curveA, C: curveC} |
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cparams := CalcCurveParamsEquiv3(&curve) |
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var xP ProjectivePoint |
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|
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xP = ProjectivePoint{X: affineXP, Z: params.OneFp2} |
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Pow3k(&xP, &cparams, 2) |
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afxQ := toAffine(&xP) |
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if !vartimeEqFp2(afxQ, &affineXP9) { |
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t.Error("\nExpected\n", affineXP9, "\nfound\n", afxQ) |
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} |
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} |
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|
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func BenchmarkThreePointLadder(b *testing.B) { |
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curve := ProjectiveCurveParameters{A: curveA, C: curveC} |
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for n := 0; n < b.N; n++ { |
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ScalarMul3Pt(&curve, &threePointLadderInputs[0], &threePointLadderInputs[1], &threePointLadderInputs[2], uint(len(scalar3Pt)*8), scalar3Pt[:]) |
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} |
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} |
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|
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/* ------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
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Generate invalid public key points / ciphertext for test TestKEMInvalidPK |
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-------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ |
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|
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// Left-to-right Montgomery ladder, Algorithm 4 in Costello-Smith |
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// Input: ProjectivePoint P (xP, zP) |
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// Output: x([scalar]P), z([scalar]P) |
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func montgomeryLadder(cparams *ProjectiveCurveParameters, P *ProjectivePoint, scalar []uint8, random uint) ProjectivePoint { |
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var R0, R2, R1 ProjectivePoint |
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coefEq := CalcCurveParamsEquiv4(cparams) // for xDbl |
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aPlus2Over4 := CalcAplus2Over4(cparams) // for xDblAdd |
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R0 = *P // RO <- P |
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R1 = *P |
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Pow2k(&R1, &coefEq, 1) // R1 <- [2]P |
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R2 = *P // R2 = R1-R0 = P |
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|
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prevBit := uint8(0) |
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for i := int(random); i >= 0; i-- { |
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bit := (scalar[i>>3] >> (i & 7) & 1) |
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swap := prevBit ^ bit |
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prevBit = bit |
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cswap(&R0.X, &R0.Z, &R1.X, &R1.Z, swap) |
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R0, R1 = xDbladd(&R0, &R1, &R2, &aPlus2Over4) |
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} |
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cswap(&R0.X, &R0.Z, &R1.X, &R1.Z, prevBit) |
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return R0 |
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} |
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|
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// P = P + T |
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// From paper https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/212.pdf |
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// The map tau_T: P->P+T is (X : Z) -> (Z : X) on Montgomery curves |
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func tauT(P *ProjectivePoint) { |
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P.X, P.Z = P.Z, P.X // magic! |
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} |
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|
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// Construct Invalid public key tuple (P,Q) such that P and Q are linearly dependent |
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// Simulate section 3.1.1 of paper https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/054.pdf |
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// We only construct point P and Q because in the attacks the third point is P-Q by construction |
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// and the countermeasure does not test it |
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// Without loss of generality, we assume the curve is the starting curve |
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func testInvalidPKNoneLinear(t *testing.T) { |
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|
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// Generate random scalar as secret |
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secret := make([]byte, params.B.SecretByteLen) |
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_, err := io.ReadFull(crand.Reader, secret) |
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if err != nil{ |
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t.Error("Fail read random bytes") |
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} |
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|
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var P, Q ProjectivePoint |
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|
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rand.Seed(time.Now().UnixNano()) |
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random_index := rand.Intn(int(params.B.SecretByteLen-1)*8) |
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|
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// Set P as a point of order 3^e3 |
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P = ProjectivePoint{X: params.B.AffineP, Z: params.OneFp2} |
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|
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// Set Q = [k]P, where k = secret[:random_index] |
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Q = montgomeryLadder(¶ms.InitCurve, &P, secret, uint(random_index)) |
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|
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// Make sure Q is of full order 3^e_3, |
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var test_Q ProjectivePoint |
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test_Q = Q |
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|
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var e3 uint32 |
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e3_float := float64(int(params.B.SecretBitLen)+1)/math.Log2(3) |
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e3 = uint32(e3_float) |
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cparam_q := CalcCurveParamsEquiv3(¶ms.InitCurve) |
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Pow3k(&test_Q, &cparam_q, e3-1) |
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|
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var test_QZ Fp2 |
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FromMontgomery(&test_QZ, &test_Q.Z) |
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|
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// Q are not of full order 3^e_3 |
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for((isZero(&test_QZ)==1)){ |
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rand.Seed(time.Now().UnixNano()) |
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random_index = rand.Intn(int(params.B.SecretByteLen-1)*8) |
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Q = montgomeryLadder(¶ms.InitCurve, &P, secret, uint(random_index)) |
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test_Q = Q |
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Pow3k(&test_Q, &cparam_q, e3-1) |
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FromMontgomery(&test_QZ, &test_Q.Z) |
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} |
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|
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// invQz = 1/Q.Z |
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var invQz Fp2 |
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invQz = Q.Z |
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inv(&invQz, &invQz) |
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|
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mul(&P.X, &P.X, &P.Z) |
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mul(&Q.X, &Q.X, &invQz) |
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|
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var xP, xQ, xQmP ProjectivePoint |
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xP = ProjectivePoint{X: P.X, Z: params.OneFp2} |
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xQ = ProjectivePoint{X: Q.X, Z: params.OneFp2} |
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xQmP = ProjectivePoint{X: params.OneFp2, Z: params.OneFp2} |
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|
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error_verify := PublicKeyValidation(¶ms.InitCurve, &xP, &xQ, &xQmP, params.B.SecretBitLen) |
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if error_verify==nil{ |
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t.Errorf("\nExpect linearly dependent ciphertext to fail, index: %v scalar: %v ", random_index, secret) |
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} |
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} |
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|
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// Construct Invalid public key tuple (P,Q) such that Q = [k]P + T, where k is random and T is the point of order 2. |
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// Simulate HB and section 3.1.2 of paper https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/054.pdf |
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// We only construct point P and Q because in the attacks the third point is P-Q by construction |
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// and the countermeasure does not test it |
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// Without loss of generality, we assume the curve is the starting curve |
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func testInvalidPKT(t *testing.T) { |
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|
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// Generate random scalar as secret |
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secret := make([]byte, params.B.SecretByteLen) |
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_, err := io.ReadFull(crand.Reader, secret) |
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if err != nil{ |
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t.Error("Fail read random bytes") |
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} |
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|
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|
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var P, Q ProjectivePoint |
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|
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rand.Seed(time.Now().UnixNano()) |
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random_index := rand.Intn(int(params.B.SecretByteLen-1)*8) |
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|
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// Set P as a point of order 3^e3 |
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P = ProjectivePoint{X: params.B.AffineP, Z: params.OneFp2} |
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|
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// Set Q = [k]P, where k = secret[:random_index] |
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Q = montgomeryLadder(¶ms.InitCurve, &P, secret, uint(random_index)) |
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// Q = [k]P + T |
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tauT(&Q) |
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|
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var invQz Fp2 |
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invQz = Q.Z |
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inv(&invQz, &invQz) |
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|
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mul(&P.X, &P.X, &P.Z) |
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mul(&Q.X, &Q.X, &invQz) |
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|
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var xP, xQ, xQmP ProjectivePoint |
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xP = ProjectivePoint{X: P.X, Z: params.OneFp2} |
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xQ = ProjectivePoint{X: Q.X, Z: params.OneFp2} |
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xQmP = ProjectivePoint{X: params.OneFp2, Z: params.OneFp2} |
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|
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error_verify := PublicKeyValidation(¶ms.InitCurve, &xP, &xQ, &xQmP, params.B.SecretBitLen) |
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if error_verify==nil{ |
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t.Errorf("\nExpect ciphertext involve point T to fail, index: %v scalar: %v ", random_index, secret) |
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} |
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} |
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|
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|
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// Construct Invalid public key tuple (P,Q) such that P and Q are in E[2^e2] |
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// Simulate section 3.2 of paper https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/054.pdf |
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// We only construct point P and Q because in the attacks the third point is P-Q by construction |
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// and the countermeasure does not test it |
| 259 |
// Without loss of generality, we assume the curve is the starting curve |
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func testInvalidPKOrder2(t *testing.T) { |
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|
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// Generate random scalar as secret |
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secret := make([]byte, params.B.SecretByteLen) |
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_, err := io.ReadFull(crand.Reader, secret) |
| 265 |
if err != nil{ |
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t.Error("Fail read random bytes") |
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} |
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|
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|
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var P, Q ProjectivePoint |
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|
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P = ProjectivePoint{X: params.A.AffineP, Z: params.OneFp2} |
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Q = ProjectivePoint{X: params.A.AffineQ, Z: params.OneFp2} |
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|
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rand.Seed(time.Now().UnixNano()) |
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random_index_p := rand.Intn(int(params.A.SecretByteLen-1)*8) |
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random_index_q := rand.Intn(int(params.A.SecretByteLen-1)*8) |
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|
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P = montgomeryLadder(¶ms.InitCurve, &P, secret, uint(random_index_p)) |
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Q = montgomeryLadder(¶ms.InitCurve, &Q, secret, uint(random_index_q)) |
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|
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var invQz, invPz Fp2 |
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invQz = Q.Z |
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invPz = P.Z |
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inv(&invQz, &invQz) |
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inv(&invPz, &invPz) |
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|
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mul(&P.X, &P.X, &invPz) |
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mul(&Q.X, &Q.X, &invQz) |
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|
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var xP, xQ, xQmP ProjectivePoint |
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xP = ProjectivePoint{X: P.X, Z: params.OneFp2} |
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xQ = ProjectivePoint{X: Q.X, Z: params.OneFp2} |
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xQmP = ProjectivePoint{X: params.OneFp2, Z: params.OneFp2} |
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|
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error_verify := PublicKeyValidation(¶ms.InitCurve, &xP, &xQ, &xQmP, params.B.SecretBitLen) |
| 297 |
if error_verify==nil{ |
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t.Errorf("\nExpect ciphertext in torsion E[2^e2] to fail, index_p: %v index_q: %v scalar: %v ", random_index_p, random_index_q, secret) |
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} |
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|
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} |
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|
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|
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// Construct Invalid public key tuple (P,Q) such that P and Q are in E[3^e3] but not of full order 3^e3 |
| 305 |
// Simulate section 3.1.1 of paper https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/054.pdf |
| 306 |
// We only construct point P and Q because in the attacks the third point is P-Q by construction |
| 307 |
// and the countermeasure does not test it |
| 308 |
// Without loss of generality, we assume the curve is the starting curve |
| 309 |
func testInvalidPKFullOrder(t *testing.T) { |
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|
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var P, Q ProjectivePoint |
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|
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P = ProjectivePoint{X: params.B.AffineP, Z: params.OneFp2} |
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Q = ProjectivePoint{X: params.B.AffineQ, Z: params.OneFp2} |
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|
| 316 |
var e3 uint32 |
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e3_float := float64(int(params.B.SecretBitLen)+1)/math.Log2(3) |
| 318 |
e3 = uint32(e3_float) |
| 319 |
|
| 320 |
rand.Seed(time.Now().UnixNano()) |
| 321 |
random_index_p := rand.Intn(int(e3)) |
| 322 |
random_index_q := rand.Intn(int(e3)) |
| 323 |
|
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cparam_q := CalcCurveParamsEquiv3(¶ms.InitCurve) |
| 325 |
Pow3k(&P, &cparam_q, uint32(random_index_p)) |
| 326 |
Pow3k(&Q, &cparam_q, uint32(random_index_q)) |
| 327 |
|
| 328 |
|
| 329 |
var invQz, invPz Fp2 |
| 330 |
invQz = Q.Z |
| 331 |
invPz = P.Z |
| 332 |
inv(&invQz, &invQz) |
| 333 |
inv(&invPz, &invPz) |
| 334 |
|
| 335 |
mul(&P.X, &P.X, &invPz) |
| 336 |
mul(&Q.X, &Q.X, &invQz) |
| 337 |
|
| 338 |
var xP, xQ, xQmP ProjectivePoint |
| 339 |
xP = ProjectivePoint{X: P.X, Z: params.OneFp2} |
| 340 |
xQ = ProjectivePoint{X: Q.X, Z: params.OneFp2} |
| 341 |
xQmP = ProjectivePoint{X: params.OneFp2, Z: params.OneFp2} |
| 342 |
|
| 343 |
error_verify := PublicKeyValidation(¶ms.InitCurve, &xP, &xQ, &xQmP, params.B.SecretBitLen) |
| 344 |
if error_verify==nil{ |
| 345 |
t.Errorf("\nExpect ciphertext not of full order to fail, index_p: %v index_q: %v ", random_index_p, random_index_q) |
| 346 |
} |
| 347 |
|
| 348 |
} |
| 349 |
|
| 350 |
// A trivial test case not covered by paper https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/054.pdf and HB |
| 351 |
// Countermeasure in https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/054.pdf only cares about P and Q |
| 352 |
// But if PmQ is point T or O, that can also lead to recovery of the first bit |
| 353 |
func testInvalidPmQ(t *testing.T) { |
| 354 |
|
| 355 |
var zero Fp2 |
| 356 |
var xP, xQ, xQmP ProjectivePoint |
| 357 |
xP = ProjectivePoint{X: params.A.AffineP, Z: params.OneFp2} |
| 358 |
xQ = ProjectivePoint{X: params.A.AffineQ, Z: params.OneFp2} |
| 359 |
xQmP = ProjectivePoint{X: zero, Z: params.OneFp2} |
| 360 |
|
| 361 |
error_verify := PublicKeyValidation(¶ms.InitCurve, &xP, &xQ, &xQmP, params.B.SecretBitLen) |
| 362 |
if error_verify==nil{ |
| 363 |
t.Errorf("\nExpect PmQ as T to fail\n") |
| 364 |
} |
| 365 |
|
| 366 |
} |
| 367 |
|
| 368 |
// Test valid ciphertext |
| 369 |
// Where P, Q are linearly independent points of correct order 3^e3 in E[3^e3] |
| 370 |
func testValidPQ(t *testing.T) { |
| 371 |
|
| 372 |
var xP, xQ, xQmP ProjectivePoint |
| 373 |
xP = ProjectivePoint{X: params.B.AffineP, Z: params.OneFp2} |
| 374 |
xQ = ProjectivePoint{X: params.B.AffineQ, Z: params.OneFp2} |
| 375 |
xQmP = ProjectivePoint{X: params.OneFp2, Z: params.OneFp2} |
| 376 |
|
| 377 |
error_verify := PublicKeyValidation(¶ms.InitCurve, &xP, &xQ, &xQmP, params.B.SecretBitLen) |
| 378 |
if error_verify!=nil{ |
| 379 |
t.Errorf("\nExpect correct ciphertext to not fail\n") |
| 380 |
} |
| 381 |
|
| 382 |
} |
| 383 |
|
| 384 |
|
| 385 |
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 386 |
Public key / Ciphertext validation against attacks proposed in paper https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/054.pdf and HB |
| 387 |
-------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ |
| 388 |
|
| 389 |
func TestInvalidPK(t *testing.T) { |
| 390 |
|
| 391 |
t.Run("InvalidPmQ", testInvalidPmQ) |
| 392 |
t.Run("InvalidPKNoneLinear", testInvalidPKNoneLinear) |
| 393 |
t.Run("InvalidPKT", testInvalidPKT) |
| 394 |
t.Run("InvalidPKOrder2", testInvalidPKOrder2) |
| 395 |
t.Run("InvalidPKFullOrder", testInvalidPKFullOrder) |
| 396 |
t.Run("ValidPQ", testValidPQ) |
| 397 |
|
| 398 |
} |