| 1 |
/* |
| 2 |
* gnome-keyring |
| 3 |
* |
| 4 |
* Copyright (C) 2008 Stefan Walter |
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* |
| 6 |
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify |
| 7 |
* it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as |
| 8 |
* published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of |
| 9 |
* the License, or (at your option) any later version. |
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* |
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* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but |
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* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of |
| 13 |
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU |
| 14 |
* Lesser General Public License for more details. |
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* |
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* You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public |
| 17 |
* License along with this program; if not, see |
| 18 |
* <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. |
| 19 |
*/ |
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|
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#include "config.h" |
| 22 |
|
| 23 |
#include "gkm-crypto.h" |
| 24 |
#include "gkm-aes-mechanism.h" |
| 25 |
#include "gkm-dh-mechanism.h" |
| 26 |
#include "gkm-dsa-mechanism.h" |
| 27 |
#include "gkm-ecdsa-mechanism.h" |
| 28 |
#include "gkm-hkdf-mechanism.h" |
| 29 |
#include "gkm-null-mechanism.h" |
| 30 |
#include "gkm-rsa-mechanism.h" |
| 31 |
#include "gkm-session.h" |
| 32 |
#include "gkm-sexp.h" |
| 33 |
#include "gkm-sexp-key.h" |
| 34 |
|
| 35 |
#include "egg/egg-libgcrypt.h" |
| 36 |
#include "egg/egg-secure-memory.h" |
| 37 |
|
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/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 39 |
* PUBLIC |
| 40 |
*/ |
| 41 |
|
| 42 |
CK_RV |
| 43 |
gkm_crypto_data_to_sexp (const gchar *format, guint nbits, EggPadding padding, |
| 44 |
CK_BYTE_PTR data, CK_ULONG n_data, gcry_sexp_t *sexp) |
| 45 |
{ |
| 46 |
gpointer padded = NULL; |
| 47 |
gcry_error_t gcry; |
| 48 |
gcry_mpi_t mpi; |
| 49 |
gsize n_padded; |
| 50 |
gsize block; |
| 51 |
|
| 52 |
g_assert (format); |
| 53 |
g_assert (sexp); |
| 54 |
|
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g_return_val_if_fail (data, CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD); |
| 56 |
|
| 57 |
block = (nbits + 7) / 8; |
| 58 |
if (n_data > block) |
| 59 |
return CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE; |
| 60 |
|
| 61 |
if (padding) { |
| 62 |
if (!(padding) (g_realloc, block, data, n_data, &padded, &n_padded)) |
| 63 |
return CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE; |
| 64 |
} |
| 65 |
|
| 66 |
/* Prepare the input s expression */ |
| 67 |
gcry = gcry_mpi_scan (&mpi, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, |
| 68 |
padded ? padded : data, |
| 69 |
padded ? n_padded : n_data, NULL); |
| 70 |
g_free (padded); |
| 71 |
|
| 72 |
g_return_val_if_fail (gcry == 0, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR); |
| 73 |
|
| 74 |
gcry = gcry_sexp_build (sexp, NULL, format, mpi); |
| 75 |
gcry_mpi_release (mpi); |
| 76 |
|
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g_return_val_if_fail (gcry == 0, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR); |
| 78 |
|
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g_assert (*sexp); |
| 80 |
return CKR_OK; |
| 81 |
} |
| 82 |
|
| 83 |
CK_RV |
| 84 |
gkm_crypto_sexp_to_data (gcry_sexp_t sexp, guint bits, CK_BYTE_PTR data, |
| 85 |
CK_ULONG *n_data, EggPadding padding, ...) |
| 86 |
{ |
| 87 |
gcry_sexp_t at = NULL; |
| 88 |
gsize n_block, offset, len; |
| 89 |
gcry_mpi_t mpi = NULL; |
| 90 |
gpointer padded; |
| 91 |
guchar *block; |
| 92 |
va_list va; |
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gboolean ret; |
| 94 |
gcry_error_t gcry; |
| 95 |
|
| 96 |
g_assert (sexp); |
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g_assert (data); |
| 98 |
g_assert (n_data); |
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g_assert (bits); |
| 100 |
|
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/* First try and dig out sexp child based on arguments */ |
| 102 |
va_start (va, padding); |
| 103 |
at = gkm_sexp_get_childv (sexp, va); |
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va_end (va); |
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|
| 106 |
/* It's expected we would find it */ |
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g_return_val_if_fail (at != NULL, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR); |
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|
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/* Parse out the MPI */ |
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mpi = gcry_sexp_nth_mpi (at, 1, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG); |
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g_return_val_if_fail (mpi != NULL, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR); |
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gcry_sexp_release (at); |
| 113 |
|
| 114 |
/* Print out the MPI into the end of a temporary buffer */ |
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n_block = (bits + 7) / 8; |
| 116 |
gcry = gcry_mpi_print (GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, NULL, 0, &len, mpi); |
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g_return_val_if_fail (gcry == 0, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR); |
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g_return_val_if_fail (len <= n_block, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR); |
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offset = n_block - len; |
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block = g_malloc0 (n_block); |
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memset (block, 0, offset); |
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gcry = gcry_mpi_print (GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, block + offset, len, &len, mpi); |
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g_return_val_if_fail (gcry == 0, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR); |
| 124 |
g_return_val_if_fail (len == n_block - offset, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR); |
| 125 |
gcry_mpi_release (mpi); |
| 126 |
|
| 127 |
/* Pad it properly if necessary */ |
| 128 |
if (padding != NULL) { |
| 129 |
ret = (padding) (g_realloc, n_block, block, n_block, &padded, &n_block); |
| 130 |
g_free (block); |
| 131 |
if (ret == FALSE) |
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return CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE; |
| 133 |
block = padded; |
| 134 |
} |
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|
| 136 |
/* Now stuff it into the output buffer */ |
| 137 |
if (n_block > *n_data) |
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return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; |
| 139 |
|
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memcpy (data, block, n_block); |
| 141 |
*n_data = n_block; |
| 142 |
g_free (block); |
| 143 |
|
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return CKR_OK; |
| 145 |
} |
| 146 |
|
| 147 |
|
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CK_RV |
| 149 |
gkm_crypto_encrypt (GkmSession *session, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, CK_BYTE_PTR data, |
| 150 |
CK_ULONG n_data, CK_BYTE_PTR encrypted, CK_ULONG_PTR n_encrypted) |
| 151 |
{ |
| 152 |
GkmSexp *sexp; |
| 153 |
|
| 154 |
switch (mech) { |
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case CKM_RSA_PKCS: |
| 156 |
case CKM_RSA_X_509: |
| 157 |
sexp = gkm_session_get_crypto_state (session); |
| 158 |
g_return_val_if_fail (sexp, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR); |
| 159 |
return gkm_crypto_encrypt_xsa (gkm_sexp_get (sexp), mech, data, n_data, encrypted, n_encrypted); |
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default: |
| 161 |
g_return_val_if_reached (CKR_GENERAL_ERROR); |
| 162 |
} |
| 163 |
} |
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|
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CK_RV |
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gkm_crypto_encrypt_xsa (gcry_sexp_t sexp, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, CK_BYTE_PTR data, |
| 167 |
CK_ULONG n_data, CK_BYTE_PTR encrypted, CK_ULONG_PTR n_encrypted) |
| 168 |
{ |
| 169 |
int algorithm; |
| 170 |
CK_RV rv; |
| 171 |
|
| 172 |
g_return_val_if_fail (sexp, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR); |
| 173 |
g_return_val_if_fail (n_encrypted, CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD); |
| 174 |
g_return_val_if_fail (data, CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD); |
| 175 |
|
| 176 |
if (!gkm_sexp_parse_key (sexp, &algorithm, NULL, NULL)) |
| 177 |
g_return_val_if_reached (CKR_GENERAL_ERROR); |
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|
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/* |
| 180 |
* The algorithm checks below are merely sanity checks. |
| 181 |
* Other code should have checed this at an earlier stage |
| 182 |
* and return the right error codes if invalid. |
| 183 |
*/ |
| 184 |
|
| 185 |
switch (mech) { |
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case CKM_RSA_PKCS: |
| 187 |
g_return_val_if_fail (algorithm == GCRY_PK_RSA, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR); |
| 188 |
rv = gkm_rsa_mechanism_encrypt (sexp, egg_padding_pkcs1_pad_02, data, n_data, encrypted, n_encrypted); |
| 189 |
break; |
| 190 |
case CKM_RSA_X_509: |
| 191 |
g_return_val_if_fail (algorithm == GCRY_PK_RSA, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR); |
| 192 |
rv = gkm_rsa_mechanism_encrypt (sexp, egg_padding_zero_pad, data, n_data, encrypted, n_encrypted); |
| 193 |
break; |
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default: |
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/* Again shouldn't be reached */ |
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g_return_val_if_reached (CKR_GENERAL_ERROR); |
| 197 |
}; |
| 198 |
|
| 199 |
return rv; |
| 200 |
} |
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|
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CK_RV |
| 203 |
gkm_crypto_decrypt (GkmSession *session, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, CK_BYTE_PTR encrypted, |
| 204 |
CK_ULONG n_encrypted, CK_BYTE_PTR data, CK_ULONG_PTR n_data) |
| 205 |
{ |
| 206 |
GkmSexp *sexp; |
| 207 |
|
| 208 |
switch (mech) { |
| 209 |
case CKM_RSA_PKCS: |
| 210 |
case CKM_RSA_X_509: |
| 211 |
sexp = gkm_session_get_crypto_state (session); |
| 212 |
g_return_val_if_fail (sexp, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR); |
| 213 |
return gkm_crypto_decrypt_xsa (gkm_sexp_get (sexp), mech, encrypted, n_encrypted, data, n_data); |
| 214 |
default: |
| 215 |
g_return_val_if_reached (CKR_GENERAL_ERROR); |
| 216 |
} |
| 217 |
} |
| 218 |
|
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CK_RV |
| 220 |
gkm_crypto_decrypt_xsa (gcry_sexp_t sexp, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, CK_BYTE_PTR encrypted, |
| 221 |
CK_ULONG n_encrypted, CK_BYTE_PTR data, CK_ULONG_PTR n_data) |
| 222 |
{ |
| 223 |
int algorithm; |
| 224 |
CK_RV rv; |
| 225 |
|
| 226 |
g_return_val_if_fail (sexp, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR); |
| 227 |
g_return_val_if_fail (n_data, CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD); |
| 228 |
g_return_val_if_fail (encrypted, CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD); |
| 229 |
|
| 230 |
if (!gkm_sexp_parse_key (sexp, &algorithm, NULL, NULL)) |
| 231 |
g_return_val_if_reached (CKR_GENERAL_ERROR); |
| 232 |
|
| 233 |
/* |
| 234 |
* The algorithm checks below are merely sanity checks. |
| 235 |
* Other code should have checed this at an earlier stage |
| 236 |
* and return the right error codes if invalid. |
| 237 |
*/ |
| 238 |
|
| 239 |
switch (mech) { |
| 240 |
case CKM_RSA_PKCS: |
| 241 |
g_return_val_if_fail (algorithm == GCRY_PK_RSA, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR); |
| 242 |
rv = gkm_rsa_mechanism_decrypt (sexp, egg_padding_pkcs1_unpad_02, encrypted, n_encrypted, data, n_data); |
| 243 |
break; |
| 244 |
case CKM_RSA_X_509: |
| 245 |
g_return_val_if_fail (algorithm == GCRY_PK_RSA, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR); |
| 246 |
rv = gkm_rsa_mechanism_decrypt (sexp, NULL, encrypted, n_encrypted, data, n_data); |
| 247 |
break; |
| 248 |
default: |
| 249 |
/* Again shouldn't be reached */ |
| 250 |
g_return_val_if_reached (CKR_GENERAL_ERROR); |
| 251 |
}; |
| 252 |
|
| 253 |
return rv; |
| 254 |
} |
| 255 |
|
| 256 |
CK_RV |
| 257 |
gkm_crypto_sign (GkmSession *session, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, CK_BYTE_PTR data, |
| 258 |
CK_ULONG n_data, CK_BYTE_PTR signature, CK_ULONG_PTR n_signature) |
| 259 |
{ |
| 260 |
GkmSexp *sexp; |
| 261 |
|
| 262 |
switch (mech) { |
| 263 |
case CKM_RSA_PKCS: |
| 264 |
case CKM_RSA_X_509: |
| 265 |
case CKM_DSA: |
| 266 |
case CKM_ECDSA: |
| 267 |
sexp = gkm_session_get_crypto_state (session); |
| 268 |
g_return_val_if_fail (sexp, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR); |
| 269 |
return gkm_crypto_sign_xsa (gkm_sexp_get (sexp), mech, data, n_data, signature, n_signature); |
| 270 |
default: |
| 271 |
g_return_val_if_reached (CKR_GENERAL_ERROR); |
| 272 |
} |
| 273 |
} |
| 274 |
|
| 275 |
CK_RV |
| 276 |
gkm_crypto_sign_xsa (gcry_sexp_t sexp, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, CK_BYTE_PTR data, |
| 277 |
CK_ULONG n_data, CK_BYTE_PTR signature, CK_ULONG_PTR n_signature) |
| 278 |
{ |
| 279 |
int algorithm; |
| 280 |
CK_RV rv; |
| 281 |
|
| 282 |
g_return_val_if_fail (sexp, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR); |
| 283 |
g_return_val_if_fail (n_signature, CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD); |
| 284 |
g_return_val_if_fail (data, CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD); |
| 285 |
|
| 286 |
if (!gkm_sexp_parse_key (sexp, &algorithm, NULL, NULL)) |
| 287 |
g_return_val_if_reached (CKR_GENERAL_ERROR); |
| 288 |
|
| 289 |
/* |
| 290 |
* The algorithm checks below are merely sanity checks. |
| 291 |
* Other code should have checed this at an earlier stage |
| 292 |
* and return the right error codes if invalid. |
| 293 |
*/ |
| 294 |
|
| 295 |
switch (mech) { |
| 296 |
case CKM_RSA_PKCS: |
| 297 |
g_return_val_if_fail (algorithm == GCRY_PK_RSA, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR); |
| 298 |
rv = gkm_rsa_mechanism_sign (sexp, egg_padding_pkcs1_pad_01, data, n_data, signature, n_signature); |
| 299 |
break; |
| 300 |
case CKM_RSA_X_509: |
| 301 |
g_return_val_if_fail (algorithm == GCRY_PK_RSA, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR); |
| 302 |
rv = gkm_rsa_mechanism_sign (sexp, egg_padding_zero_pad, data, n_data, signature, n_signature); |
| 303 |
break; |
| 304 |
case CKM_DSA: |
| 305 |
g_return_val_if_fail (algorithm == GCRY_PK_DSA, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR); |
| 306 |
rv = gkm_dsa_mechanism_sign (sexp, data, n_data, signature, n_signature); |
| 307 |
break; |
| 308 |
case CKM_ECDSA: |
| 309 |
g_return_val_if_fail (algorithm == GCRY_PK_ECC, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR); |
| 310 |
rv = gkm_ecdsa_mechanism_sign (sexp, data, n_data, signature, n_signature); |
| 311 |
break; |
| 312 |
default: |
| 313 |
/* Again shouldn't be reached */ |
| 314 |
g_return_val_if_reached (CKR_GENERAL_ERROR); |
| 315 |
}; |
| 316 |
|
| 317 |
return rv; |
| 318 |
} |
| 319 |
|
| 320 |
CK_RV |
| 321 |
gkm_crypto_verify (GkmSession *session, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, CK_BYTE_PTR data, |
| 322 |
CK_ULONG n_data, CK_BYTE_PTR signature, CK_ULONG n_signature) |
| 323 |
{ |
| 324 |
GkmSexp *sexp; |
| 325 |
|
| 326 |
switch (mech) { |
| 327 |
case CKM_RSA_PKCS: |
| 328 |
case CKM_RSA_X_509: |
| 329 |
case CKM_DSA: |
| 330 |
case CKM_ECDSA: |
| 331 |
sexp = gkm_session_get_crypto_state (session); |
| 332 |
g_return_val_if_fail (sexp, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR); |
| 333 |
return gkm_crypto_verify_xsa (gkm_sexp_get (sexp), mech, data, n_data, signature, n_signature); |
| 334 |
default: |
| 335 |
g_return_val_if_reached (CKR_GENERAL_ERROR); |
| 336 |
} |
| 337 |
} |
| 338 |
|
| 339 |
CK_RV |
| 340 |
gkm_crypto_verify_xsa (gcry_sexp_t sexp, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, CK_BYTE_PTR data, |
| 341 |
CK_ULONG n_data, CK_BYTE_PTR signature, CK_ULONG n_signature) |
| 342 |
{ |
| 343 |
int algorithm; |
| 344 |
CK_RV rv; |
| 345 |
|
| 346 |
g_return_val_if_fail (sexp, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR); |
| 347 |
g_return_val_if_fail (signature, CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD); |
| 348 |
g_return_val_if_fail (data, CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD); |
| 349 |
|
| 350 |
if (!gkm_sexp_parse_key (sexp, &algorithm, NULL, NULL)) |
| 351 |
g_return_val_if_reached (CKR_GENERAL_ERROR); |
| 352 |
|
| 353 |
/* |
| 354 |
* The algorithm checks below are merely sanity checks. |
| 355 |
* Other code should have checed this at an earlier stage |
| 356 |
* and return the right error codes if invalid. |
| 357 |
*/ |
| 358 |
|
| 359 |
switch (mech) { |
| 360 |
case CKM_RSA_PKCS: |
| 361 |
g_return_val_if_fail (algorithm == GCRY_PK_RSA, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR); |
| 362 |
rv = gkm_rsa_mechanism_verify (sexp, egg_padding_pkcs1_pad_01, data, n_data, signature, n_signature); |
| 363 |
break; |
| 364 |
case CKM_RSA_X_509: |
| 365 |
g_return_val_if_fail (algorithm == GCRY_PK_RSA, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR); |
| 366 |
rv = gkm_rsa_mechanism_verify (sexp, egg_padding_zero_pad, data, n_data, signature, n_signature); |
| 367 |
break; |
| 368 |
case CKM_DSA: |
| 369 |
g_return_val_if_fail (algorithm == GCRY_PK_DSA, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR); |
| 370 |
rv = gkm_dsa_mechanism_verify (sexp, data, n_data, signature, n_signature); |
| 371 |
break; |
| 372 |
case CKM_ECDSA: |
| 373 |
g_return_val_if_fail (algorithm == GCRY_PK_ECC, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR); |
| 374 |
rv = gkm_ecdsa_mechanism_verify (sexp, data, n_data, signature, n_signature); |
| 375 |
break; |
| 376 |
default: |
| 377 |
/* Again shouldn't be reached */ |
| 378 |
g_return_val_if_reached (CKR_GENERAL_ERROR); |
| 379 |
}; |
| 380 |
|
| 381 |
return rv; |
| 382 |
} |
| 383 |
|
| 384 |
CK_RV |
| 385 |
gkm_crypto_perform (GkmSession *session, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE method, |
| 386 |
CK_BYTE_PTR bufone, CK_ULONG n_bufone, CK_BYTE_PTR buftwo, CK_ULONG_PTR n_buftwo) |
| 387 |
{ |
| 388 |
g_return_val_if_fail (GKM_IS_SESSION (session), CKR_GENERAL_ERROR); |
| 389 |
g_return_val_if_fail (method, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR); |
| 390 |
g_return_val_if_fail (n_buftwo, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR); |
| 391 |
|
| 392 |
switch (method) { |
| 393 |
case CKA_ENCRYPT: |
| 394 |
return gkm_crypto_encrypt (session, mech, bufone, n_bufone, buftwo, n_buftwo); |
| 395 |
case CKA_DECRYPT: |
| 396 |
return gkm_crypto_decrypt (session, mech, bufone, n_bufone, buftwo, n_buftwo); |
| 397 |
case CKA_SIGN: |
| 398 |
return gkm_crypto_sign (session, mech, bufone, n_bufone, buftwo, n_buftwo); |
| 399 |
case CKA_VERIFY: |
| 400 |
return gkm_crypto_verify (session, mech, bufone, n_bufone, buftwo, *n_buftwo); |
| 401 |
default: |
| 402 |
g_return_val_if_reached (CKR_GENERAL_ERROR); |
| 403 |
} |
| 404 |
} |
| 405 |
|
| 406 |
CK_RV |
| 407 |
gkm_crypto_generate_key_pair (GkmSession *session, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, |
| 408 |
CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pub_atts, CK_ULONG n_pub_atts, |
| 409 |
CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR priv_atts, CK_ULONG n_priv_atts, |
| 410 |
GkmObject **pub_key, GkmObject **priv_key) |
| 411 |
{ |
| 412 |
g_return_val_if_fail (GKM_IS_SESSION (session), CKR_GENERAL_ERROR); |
| 413 |
g_return_val_if_fail (pub_key, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR); |
| 414 |
g_return_val_if_fail (priv_key, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR); |
| 415 |
|
| 416 |
switch (mech) { |
| 417 |
case CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN: |
| 418 |
return gkm_dh_mechanism_generate (session, pub_atts, n_pub_atts, |
| 419 |
priv_atts, n_priv_atts, |
| 420 |
pub_key, priv_key); |
| 421 |
default: |
| 422 |
return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID; |
| 423 |
} |
| 424 |
} |
| 425 |
|
| 426 |
CK_RV |
| 427 |
gkm_crypto_derive_key (GkmSession *session, CK_MECHANISM_PTR mech, GkmObject *base, |
| 428 |
CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attrs, CK_ULONG n_attrs, GkmObject **derived) |
| 429 |
{ |
| 430 |
g_return_val_if_fail (GKM_IS_SESSION (session), CKR_GENERAL_ERROR); |
| 431 |
g_return_val_if_fail (GKM_IS_OBJECT (base), CKR_GENERAL_ERROR); |
| 432 |
g_return_val_if_fail (derived, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR); |
| 433 |
|
| 434 |
if (!gkm_object_has_attribute_ulong (base, session, CKA_ALLOWED_MECHANISMS, mech->mechanism)) |
| 435 |
return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; |
| 436 |
|
| 437 |
if (!gkm_object_has_attribute_boolean (base, session, CKA_DERIVE, TRUE)) |
| 438 |
return CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED; |
| 439 |
|
| 440 |
switch (mech->mechanism) { |
| 441 |
case CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE: |
| 442 |
return gkm_dh_mechanism_derive (session, mech, base, attrs, |
| 443 |
n_attrs, derived); |
| 444 |
case CKM_G_HKDF_SHA256_DERIVE: |
| 445 |
return gkm_hkdf_mechanism_derive (session, "sha256", mech, base, |
| 446 |
attrs, n_attrs, derived); |
| 447 |
default: |
| 448 |
return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID; |
| 449 |
} |
| 450 |
} |
| 451 |
|
| 452 |
CK_RV |
| 453 |
gkm_crypto_wrap_key (GkmSession *session, CK_MECHANISM_PTR mech, GkmObject *wrapper, |
| 454 |
GkmObject *wrapped, CK_BYTE_PTR output, CK_ULONG_PTR n_output) |
| 455 |
{ |
| 456 |
g_return_val_if_fail (GKM_IS_SESSION (session), CKR_GENERAL_ERROR); |
| 457 |
g_return_val_if_fail (GKM_IS_OBJECT (wrapper), CKR_GENERAL_ERROR); |
| 458 |
g_return_val_if_fail (GKM_IS_OBJECT (wrapped), CKR_GENERAL_ERROR); |
| 459 |
g_return_val_if_fail (mech, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR); |
| 460 |
g_return_val_if_fail (n_output, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR); |
| 461 |
|
| 462 |
if (!gkm_object_has_attribute_ulong (wrapper, session, CKA_ALLOWED_MECHANISMS, mech->mechanism)) |
| 463 |
return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; |
| 464 |
|
| 465 |
if (!gkm_object_has_attribute_boolean (wrapper, session, CKA_WRAP, TRUE)) |
| 466 |
return CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED; |
| 467 |
|
| 468 |
switch (mech->mechanism) { |
| 469 |
case CKM_AES_CBC_PAD: |
| 470 |
return gkm_aes_mechanism_wrap (session, mech, wrapper, wrapped, |
| 471 |
output, n_output); |
| 472 |
case CKM_G_NULL: |
| 473 |
return gkm_null_mechanism_wrap (session, mech, wrapper, wrapped, |
| 474 |
output, n_output); |
| 475 |
default: |
| 476 |
return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID; |
| 477 |
} |
| 478 |
} |
| 479 |
|
| 480 |
CK_RV |
| 481 |
gkm_crypto_unwrap_key (GkmSession *session, CK_MECHANISM_PTR mech, GkmObject *wrapper, |
| 482 |
CK_VOID_PTR input, CK_ULONG n_input, CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attrs, |
| 483 |
CK_ULONG n_attrs, GkmObject **unwrapped) |
| 484 |
{ |
| 485 |
g_return_val_if_fail (GKM_IS_SESSION (session), CKR_GENERAL_ERROR); |
| 486 |
g_return_val_if_fail (GKM_IS_OBJECT (wrapper), CKR_GENERAL_ERROR); |
| 487 |
g_return_val_if_fail (mech, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR); |
| 488 |
g_return_val_if_fail (unwrapped, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR); |
| 489 |
|
| 490 |
if (!gkm_object_has_attribute_ulong (wrapper, session, CKA_ALLOWED_MECHANISMS, mech->mechanism)) |
| 491 |
return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; |
| 492 |
|
| 493 |
if (!gkm_object_has_attribute_boolean (wrapper, session, CKA_UNWRAP, TRUE)) |
| 494 |
return CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED; |
| 495 |
|
| 496 |
switch (mech->mechanism) { |
| 497 |
case CKM_AES_CBC_PAD: |
| 498 |
return gkm_aes_mechanism_unwrap (session, mech, wrapper, input, |
| 499 |
n_input, attrs, n_attrs, unwrapped); |
| 500 |
case CKM_G_NULL: |
| 501 |
return gkm_null_mechanism_unwrap (session, mech, wrapper, input, |
| 502 |
n_input, attrs, n_attrs, unwrapped); |
| 503 |
default: |
| 504 |
return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID; |
| 505 |
} |
| 506 |
} |
| 507 |
|
| 508 |
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 509 |
* PREPARE FUNCTIONS |
| 510 |
*/ |
| 511 |
|
| 512 |
CK_RV |
| 513 |
gkm_crypto_prepare (GkmSession *session, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, GkmObject *key) |
| 514 |
{ |
| 515 |
g_return_val_if_fail (GKM_IS_SESSION (session), CKR_GENERAL_ERROR); |
| 516 |
|
| 517 |
switch (mech) { |
| 518 |
case CKM_RSA_PKCS: |
| 519 |
case CKM_RSA_X_509: |
| 520 |
case CKM_ECDSA: |
| 521 |
case CKM_DSA: |
| 522 |
return gkm_crypto_prepare_xsa (session, mech, key); |
| 523 |
default: |
| 524 |
g_return_val_if_reached (CKR_GENERAL_ERROR); |
| 525 |
} |
| 526 |
} |
| 527 |
|
| 528 |
CK_RV |
| 529 |
gkm_crypto_prepare_xsa (GkmSession *session, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, GkmObject *key) |
| 530 |
{ |
| 531 |
GkmSexp *sexp; |
| 532 |
|
| 533 |
g_return_val_if_fail (GKM_IS_SESSION (session), CKR_GENERAL_ERROR); |
| 534 |
g_return_val_if_fail (GKM_IS_SEXP_KEY (key), CKR_GENERAL_ERROR); |
| 535 |
|
| 536 |
/* Load up the actual sexp we're going to use */ |
| 537 |
sexp = gkm_sexp_key_acquire_crypto_sexp (GKM_SEXP_KEY (key), session); |
| 538 |
if (sexp == NULL) |
| 539 |
return CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN; |
| 540 |
|
| 541 |
gkm_session_set_crypto_state (session, sexp, gkm_sexp_unref); |
| 542 |
return CKR_OK; |
| 543 |
} |
| 544 |
|
| 545 |
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 546 |
* UTILITY |
| 547 |
*/ |
| 548 |
|
| 549 |
|
| 550 |
void |
| 551 |
gkm_crypto_initialize (void) |
| 552 |
{ |
| 553 |
egg_libgcrypt_initialize (); |
| 554 |
} |
| 555 |
|
| 556 |
gulong |
| 557 |
gkm_crypto_secret_key_length (CK_KEY_TYPE type) |
| 558 |
{ |
| 559 |
switch (type) { |
| 560 |
case CKK_AES: |
| 561 |
return GKM_AES_MECHANISM_MIN_LENGTH; |
| 562 |
default: |
| 563 |
return 0; |
| 564 |
} |
| 565 |
} |