| 1 |
/* dnssec.c is Copyright (c) 2012 Giovanni Bajo <[email protected]> |
| 2 |
and Copyright (c) 2012-2026 Simon Kelley |
| 3 |
|
| 4 |
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify |
| 5 |
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by |
| 6 |
the Free Software Foundation; version 2 dated June, 1991, or |
| 7 |
(at your option) version 3 dated 29 June, 2007. |
| 8 |
|
| 9 |
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, |
| 10 |
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of |
| 11 |
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the |
| 12 |
GNU General Public License for more details. |
| 13 |
|
| 14 |
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License |
| 15 |
along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. |
| 16 |
*/ |
| 17 |
|
| 18 |
#include "dnsmasq.h" |
| 19 |
|
| 20 |
#ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC |
| 21 |
|
| 22 |
#define SERIAL_UNDEF -100 |
| 23 |
#define SERIAL_EQ 0 |
| 24 |
#define SERIAL_LT -1 |
| 25 |
#define SERIAL_GT 1 |
| 26 |
|
| 27 |
/* Input in presentation format */ |
| 28 |
static int count_labels(char *name) |
| 29 |
{ |
| 30 |
int i; |
| 31 |
char *p; |
| 32 |
|
| 33 |
if (*name == 0) |
| 34 |
return 0; |
| 35 |
|
| 36 |
for (p = name, i = 0; *p; p++) |
| 37 |
if (*p == '.') |
| 38 |
i++; |
| 39 |
|
| 40 |
/* Don't count empty first label. */ |
| 41 |
return *name == '.' ? i : i+1; |
| 42 |
} |
| 43 |
|
| 44 |
/* Implement RFC1982 wrapped compare for 32-bit numbers */ |
| 45 |
static int serial_compare_32(u32 s1, u32 s2) |
| 46 |
{ |
| 47 |
if (s1 == s2) |
| 48 |
return SERIAL_EQ; |
| 49 |
|
| 50 |
if ((s1 < s2 && (s2 - s1) < (1UL<<31)) || |
| 51 |
(s1 > s2 && (s1 - s2) > (1UL<<31))) |
| 52 |
return SERIAL_LT; |
| 53 |
if ((s1 < s2 && (s2 - s1) > (1UL<<31)) || |
| 54 |
(s1 > s2 && (s1 - s2) < (1UL<<31))) |
| 55 |
return SERIAL_GT; |
| 56 |
return SERIAL_UNDEF; |
| 57 |
} |
| 58 |
|
| 59 |
/* Called at startup. If the timestamp file is configured and exists, put its mtime on |
| 60 |
timestamp_time. If it doesn't exist, create it, and set the mtime to 1-1-2015. |
| 61 |
return -1 -> Cannot create file. |
| 62 |
0 -> not using timestamp, or timestamp exists and is in past. |
| 63 |
1 -> timestamp exists and is in future. |
| 64 |
*/ |
| 65 |
|
| 66 |
static time_t timestamp_time; |
| 67 |
|
| 68 |
int setup_timestamp(void) |
| 69 |
{ |
| 70 |
struct stat statbuf; |
| 71 |
|
| 72 |
daemon->back_to_the_future = 0; |
| 73 |
|
| 74 |
if (!daemon->timestamp_file) |
| 75 |
return 0; |
| 76 |
|
| 77 |
if (stat(daemon->timestamp_file, &statbuf) != -1) |
| 78 |
{ |
| 79 |
timestamp_time = statbuf.st_mtime; |
| 80 |
check_and_exit: |
| 81 |
if (difftime(timestamp_time, time(0)) <= 0) |
| 82 |
{ |
| 83 |
/* time already OK, update timestamp, and do key checking from the start. */ |
| 84 |
if (utimes(daemon->timestamp_file, NULL) == -1) |
| 85 |
my_syslog(LOG_ERR, _("failed to update mtime on %s: %s"), daemon->timestamp_file, strerror(errno)); |
| 86 |
daemon->back_to_the_future = 1; |
| 87 |
return 0; |
| 88 |
} |
| 89 |
return 1; |
| 90 |
} |
| 91 |
|
| 92 |
if (errno == ENOENT) |
| 93 |
{ |
| 94 |
/* NB. for explanation of O_EXCL flag, see comment on pidfile in dnsmasq.c */ |
| 95 |
int fd = open(daemon->timestamp_file, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_NONBLOCK | O_EXCL, 0666); |
| 96 |
if (fd != -1) |
| 97 |
{ |
| 98 |
struct timeval tv[2]; |
| 99 |
|
| 100 |
close(fd); |
| 101 |
|
| 102 |
timestamp_time = 1420070400; /* 1-1-2015 */ |
| 103 |
tv[0].tv_sec = tv[1].tv_sec = timestamp_time; |
| 104 |
tv[0].tv_usec = tv[1].tv_usec = 0; |
| 105 |
if (utimes(daemon->timestamp_file, tv) == 0) |
| 106 |
goto check_and_exit; |
| 107 |
} |
| 108 |
} |
| 109 |
|
| 110 |
return -1; |
| 111 |
} |
| 112 |
|
| 113 |
/* Check whether today/now is between date_start and date_end */ |
| 114 |
static int is_check_date(unsigned long curtime) |
| 115 |
{ |
| 116 |
/* Checking timestamps may be temporarily disabled */ |
| 117 |
|
| 118 |
/* If the current time if _before_ the timestamp |
| 119 |
on our persistent timestamp file, then assume the |
| 120 |
time if not yet correct, and don't check the |
| 121 |
key timestamps. As soon as the current time is |
| 122 |
later then the timestamp, update the timestamp |
| 123 |
and start checking keys */ |
| 124 |
if (daemon->timestamp_file) |
| 125 |
{ |
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if (daemon->back_to_the_future == 0 && difftime(timestamp_time, curtime) <= 0) |
| 127 |
{ |
| 128 |
if (utimes(daemon->timestamp_file, NULL) != 0) |
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my_syslog(LOG_ERR, _("failed to update mtime on %s: %s"), daemon->timestamp_file, strerror(errno)); |
| 130 |
|
| 131 |
my_syslog(LOG_INFO, _("system time considered valid, now checking DNSSEC signature timestamps.")); |
| 132 |
daemon->back_to_the_future = 1; |
| 133 |
daemon->dnssec_no_time_check = 0; |
| 134 |
queue_event(EVENT_RELOAD); /* purge cache */ |
| 135 |
} |
| 136 |
|
| 137 |
return daemon->back_to_the_future; |
| 138 |
} |
| 139 |
else |
| 140 |
return !daemon->dnssec_no_time_check; |
| 141 |
} |
| 142 |
|
| 143 |
/* Return bytes of canonicalised rrdata one by one. |
| 144 |
Init state->ip with the RR, and state->end with the end of same. |
| 145 |
Init state->op to NULL. |
| 146 |
Init state->desc to RR descriptor. |
| 147 |
Init state->buff with a MAXDNAMESTR+1 buffer. |
| 148 |
|
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After each call which returns 1, state->op points to the next byte of data. |
| 150 |
On returning 0, the end has been reached. |
| 151 |
*/ |
| 152 |
struct rdata_state { |
| 153 |
short *desc; |
| 154 |
size_t c; |
| 155 |
unsigned char *end, *ip, *op; |
| 156 |
char *buff; |
| 157 |
}; |
| 158 |
|
| 159 |
static int get_rdata(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, struct rdata_state *state) |
| 160 |
{ |
| 161 |
int d; |
| 162 |
|
| 163 |
if (state->op && state->c != 1) |
| 164 |
{ |
| 165 |
state->op++; |
| 166 |
state->c--; |
| 167 |
return 1; |
| 168 |
} |
| 169 |
|
| 170 |
while (1) |
| 171 |
{ |
| 172 |
d = *(state->desc); |
| 173 |
|
| 174 |
if (d == -1) |
| 175 |
{ |
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/* all the bytes to the end. */ |
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if ((state->c = state->end - state->ip) != 0) |
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{ |
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state->op = state->ip; |
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state->ip = state->end; |
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} |
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else |
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return 0; |
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} |
| 185 |
else |
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{ |
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state->desc++; |
| 188 |
|
| 189 |
if (d == (u16)0) |
| 190 |
{ |
| 191 |
/* domain-name, canonicalise */ |
| 192 |
|
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/* If the name is malformed, or runs beyond the end of the RR, abort. |
| 194 |
under no circumstances should state->ip be beyond state->end since |
| 195 |
that will cause the run-out code above to turn the negative |
| 196 |
calculted length into a very large postive value for state->c |
| 197 |
and overrun the buffer. */ |
| 198 |
if (!extract_name(header, plen, &state->ip, state->buff, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 0) || |
| 199 |
state->ip > state->end) |
| 200 |
return 0; |
| 201 |
|
| 202 |
/* to_wire() always returns length > 0 */ |
| 203 |
state->c = to_wire(state->buff); |
| 204 |
state->op = (unsigned char *)state->buff; |
| 205 |
} |
| 206 |
else |
| 207 |
{ |
| 208 |
/* Plain data preceding a domain-name. |
| 209 |
Handle short RR, if there are no bytes left, return finished. */ |
| 210 |
if ((state->end - state->ip) < d && |
| 211 |
(d = state->end - state->ip) == 0) |
| 212 |
return 0; |
| 213 |
|
| 214 |
state->op = state->ip; |
| 215 |
state->c = d; |
| 216 |
state->ip += d; |
| 217 |
} |
| 218 |
} |
| 219 |
|
| 220 |
return 1; |
| 221 |
} |
| 222 |
} |
| 223 |
|
| 224 |
/* Bubble sort the RRset into the canonical order. */ |
| 225 |
|
| 226 |
static int sort_rrset(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, short *rr_desc, int rrsetidx, |
| 227 |
unsigned char **rrset, char *buff1, char *buff2) |
| 228 |
{ |
| 229 |
int swap, i, j; |
| 230 |
|
| 231 |
do |
| 232 |
{ |
| 233 |
for (swap = 0, i = 0; i < rrsetidx-1; i++) |
| 234 |
{ |
| 235 |
int rdlen1, rdlen2; |
| 236 |
struct rdata_state state1, state2; |
| 237 |
|
| 238 |
/* Note that these have been determined to be OK previously, |
| 239 |
so we don't need to check for NULL return here. */ |
| 240 |
state1.ip = skip_name(rrset[i], header, plen, 10); |
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state2.ip = skip_name(rrset[i+1], header, plen, 10); |
| 242 |
state1.op = state2.op = NULL; |
| 243 |
state1.buff = buff1; |
| 244 |
state2.buff = buff2; |
| 245 |
state1.desc = state2.desc = rr_desc; |
| 246 |
|
| 247 |
state1.ip += 8; /* skip class, type, ttl */ |
| 248 |
GETSHORT(rdlen1, state1.ip); |
| 249 |
if (!CHECK_LEN(header, state1.ip, plen, rdlen1)) |
| 250 |
return rrsetidx; /* short packet */ |
| 251 |
state1.end = state1.ip + rdlen1; |
| 252 |
|
| 253 |
state2.ip += 8; /* skip class, type, ttl */ |
| 254 |
GETSHORT(rdlen2, state2.ip); |
| 255 |
if (!CHECK_LEN(header, state2.ip, plen, rdlen2)) |
| 256 |
return rrsetidx; /* short packet */ |
| 257 |
state2.end = state2.ip + rdlen2; |
| 258 |
|
| 259 |
/* If the RR has no names in it then canonicalisation |
| 260 |
is the identity function and we can compare |
| 261 |
the RRs directly. If not we compare the |
| 262 |
canonicalised RRs one byte at a time. */ |
| 263 |
if (*rr_desc == -1) |
| 264 |
{ |
| 265 |
int rdmin = rdlen1 > rdlen2 ? rdlen2 : rdlen1; |
| 266 |
int cmp = memcmp(state1.ip, state2.ip, rdmin); |
| 267 |
|
| 268 |
if (cmp > 0 || (cmp == 0 && rdlen1 > rdmin)) |
| 269 |
{ |
| 270 |
unsigned char *tmp = rrset[i+1]; |
| 271 |
rrset[i+1] = rrset[i]; |
| 272 |
rrset[i] = tmp; |
| 273 |
swap = 1; |
| 274 |
} |
| 275 |
else if (cmp == 0 && (rdlen1 == rdlen2)) |
| 276 |
{ |
| 277 |
/* Two RRs are equal, remove one copy. RFC 4034, para 6.3 */ |
| 278 |
for (j = i+1; j < rrsetidx-1; j++) |
| 279 |
rrset[j] = rrset[j+1]; |
| 280 |
rrsetidx--; |
| 281 |
i--; |
| 282 |
} |
| 283 |
} |
| 284 |
else |
| 285 |
/* Comparing canonicalised RRs, byte-at-a-time. */ |
| 286 |
while (1) |
| 287 |
{ |
| 288 |
int ok1, ok2; |
| 289 |
|
| 290 |
ok1 = get_rdata(header, plen, &state1); |
| 291 |
ok2 = get_rdata(header, plen, &state2); |
| 292 |
|
| 293 |
if (!ok1 && !ok2) |
| 294 |
{ |
| 295 |
/* Two RRs are equal, remove one copy. RFC 4034, para 6.3 */ |
| 296 |
for (j = i+1; j < rrsetidx-1; j++) |
| 297 |
rrset[j] = rrset[j+1]; |
| 298 |
rrsetidx--; |
| 299 |
i--; |
| 300 |
break; |
| 301 |
} |
| 302 |
else if (ok1 && (!ok2 || *state1.op > *state2.op)) |
| 303 |
{ |
| 304 |
unsigned char *tmp = rrset[i+1]; |
| 305 |
rrset[i+1] = rrset[i]; |
| 306 |
rrset[i] = tmp; |
| 307 |
swap = 1; |
| 308 |
break; |
| 309 |
} |
| 310 |
else if (ok2 && (!ok1 || *state2.op > *state1.op)) |
| 311 |
break; |
| 312 |
|
| 313 |
/* arrive here when bytes are equal, go round the loop again |
| 314 |
and compare the next ones. */ |
| 315 |
} |
| 316 |
} |
| 317 |
} while (swap); |
| 318 |
|
| 319 |
return rrsetidx; |
| 320 |
} |
| 321 |
|
| 322 |
static unsigned char **rrset = NULL, **sigs = NULL; |
| 323 |
|
| 324 |
/* Get pointers to RRset members and signature(s) for same. |
| 325 |
Check signatures, and return keyname associated in keyname. */ |
| 326 |
static int explore_rrset(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, int class, int type, |
| 327 |
char *name, char *keyname, int *sigcnt, int *rrcnt) |
| 328 |
{ |
| 329 |
static int rrset_sz = 0, sig_sz = 0; |
| 330 |
unsigned char *p; |
| 331 |
int rrsetidx, sigidx, j, rdlen, res; |
| 332 |
int gotkey = 0; |
| 333 |
|
| 334 |
if (!(p = skip_questions(header, plen))) |
| 335 |
return 0; |
| 336 |
|
| 337 |
/* look for RRSIGs for this RRset and get pointers to each RR in the set. */ |
| 338 |
for (rrsetidx = 0, sigidx = 0, j = ntohs(header->ancount) + ntohs(header->nscount); |
| 339 |
j != 0; j--) |
| 340 |
{ |
| 341 |
unsigned char *pstart, *pdata; |
| 342 |
int stype, sclass, type_covered; |
| 343 |
|
| 344 |
pstart = p; |
| 345 |
|
| 346 |
if (!(res = extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, EXTR_NAME_COMPARE, 10))) |
| 347 |
return 0; /* bad packet */ |
| 348 |
|
| 349 |
GETSHORT(stype, p); |
| 350 |
GETSHORT(sclass, p); |
| 351 |
|
| 352 |
pdata = p; |
| 353 |
|
| 354 |
p += 4; /* TTL */ |
| 355 |
GETSHORT(rdlen, p); |
| 356 |
|
| 357 |
if (!CHECK_LEN(header, p, plen, rdlen)) |
| 358 |
return 0; |
| 359 |
|
| 360 |
if (res == 1 && sclass == class) |
| 361 |
{ |
| 362 |
if (stype == type) |
| 363 |
{ |
| 364 |
if (!expand_workspace(&rrset, &rrset_sz, rrsetidx)) |
| 365 |
return 0; |
| 366 |
|
| 367 |
rrset[rrsetidx++] = pstart; |
| 368 |
} |
| 369 |
|
| 370 |
if (stype == T_RRSIG) |
| 371 |
{ |
| 372 |
if (rdlen < 18) |
| 373 |
return 0; /* bad packet */ |
| 374 |
|
| 375 |
GETSHORT(type_covered, p); |
| 376 |
p += 16; /* algo, labels, orig_ttl, sig_expiration, sig_inception, key_tag */ |
| 377 |
|
| 378 |
if (type_covered == type) |
| 379 |
{ |
| 380 |
if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, daemon->workspacename, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 0)) |
| 381 |
return 0; |
| 382 |
|
| 383 |
/* RFC 4035 5.3.1 says that the Signer's Name field MUST equal |
| 384 |
the name of the zone containing the RRset. We can't tell that |
| 385 |
for certain, but we can check that the RRset name is equal to |
| 386 |
or encloses the signers name, which should be enough to stop |
| 387 |
an attacker using signatures made with the key of an unrelated |
| 388 |
zone he controls. Note that the root key is always allowed. |
| 389 |
Ignore sigs which aren't valid */ |
| 390 |
if (*daemon->workspacename == 0 || hostname_issubdomain(daemon->workspacename, name) != 0) |
| 391 |
{ |
| 392 |
if (gotkey) |
| 393 |
{ |
| 394 |
/* If there's more than one valid SIG, they must all have same keyname */ |
| 395 |
if (!hostname_isequal(keyname, daemon->workspacename)) |
| 396 |
return 0; |
| 397 |
} |
| 398 |
else |
| 399 |
{ |
| 400 |
strcpy(keyname, daemon->workspacename); |
| 401 |
gotkey = 1; |
| 402 |
} |
| 403 |
|
| 404 |
if (gotkey) |
| 405 |
{ |
| 406 |
if (!expand_workspace(&sigs, &sig_sz, sigidx)) |
| 407 |
return 0; |
| 408 |
|
| 409 |
sigs[sigidx++] = pdata; |
| 410 |
} |
| 411 |
} |
| 412 |
} |
| 413 |
|
| 414 |
p = pdata + 6; /* restore for ADD_RDLEN */ |
| 415 |
} |
| 416 |
} |
| 417 |
|
| 418 |
if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p, plen, rdlen)) |
| 419 |
return 0; |
| 420 |
} |
| 421 |
|
| 422 |
*sigcnt = sigidx; |
| 423 |
*rrcnt = rrsetidx; |
| 424 |
|
| 425 |
return 1; |
| 426 |
} |
| 427 |
|
| 428 |
int dec_counter(int *counter, char *message) |
| 429 |
{ |
| 430 |
if ((*counter)-- == 0) |
| 431 |
{ |
| 432 |
my_syslog(LOG_WARNING, "limit exceeded: %s", message ? message : _("per-query crypto work")); |
| 433 |
return 1; |
| 434 |
} |
| 435 |
|
| 436 |
return 0; |
| 437 |
} |
| 438 |
|
| 439 |
/* Validate a single RRset (class, type, name) in the supplied DNS reply |
| 440 |
Return code: |
| 441 |
STAT_SECURE if it validates. |
| 442 |
STAT_BOGUS signature is wrong, bad packet. |
| 443 |
STAT_ABANDONED validation abandoned do to excess resource usage. |
| 444 |
STAT_NEED_KEY need DNSKEY to complete validation (name is returned in keyname) |
| 445 |
STAT_NEED_DS need DS to complete validation (name is returned in keyname) |
| 446 |
|
| 447 |
If key is non-NULL, use that key, which has the algo and tag given in the params of those names, |
| 448 |
otherwise find the key in the cache. |
| 449 |
|
| 450 |
Name is unchanged on exit. keyname is used as workspace and trashed. |
| 451 |
|
| 452 |
Call explore_rrset first to find and count RRs and sigs. |
| 453 |
|
| 454 |
ttl_out is the floor on TTL, based on TTL and orig_ttl and expiration of sig used to validate. |
| 455 |
*/ |
| 456 |
static int validate_rrset(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, int class, int type, int sigidx, int rrsetidx, |
| 457 |
char *name, char *keyname, int *wildcard_offset_out, struct blockdata *key, int keylen, |
| 458 |
int algo_in, int keytag_in, unsigned long *ttl_out, int *validate_counter) |
| 459 |
{ |
| 460 |
unsigned char *p; |
| 461 |
int rdlen, j, name_labels, algo, labels, key_tag, sig_fail_cnt; |
| 462 |
struct crec *crecp = NULL; |
| 463 |
short *rr_desc = rrfilter_desc(type); |
| 464 |
u32 sig_expiration, sig_inception; |
| 465 |
unsigned long curtime = time(0); |
| 466 |
int time_check = is_check_date(curtime); |
| 467 |
int failflags = DNSSEC_FAIL_NOSIG; |
| 468 |
|
| 469 |
if (sigidx != 0) |
| 470 |
failflags |= DNSSEC_FAIL_NYV | DNSSEC_FAIL_EXP | DNSSEC_FAIL_NOKEYSUP; |
| 471 |
|
| 472 |
if (wildcard_offset_out) |
| 473 |
*wildcard_offset_out = 0; |
| 474 |
|
| 475 |
name_labels = count_labels(name); /* For 4035 5.3.2 check */ |
| 476 |
|
| 477 |
/* Sort RRset records into canonical order. |
| 478 |
Note that at this point keyname and daemon->workspacename buffs are |
| 479 |
unused, and used as workspace by the sort. */ |
| 480 |
rrsetidx = sort_rrset(header, plen, rr_desc, rrsetidx, rrset, daemon->workspacename, keyname); |
| 481 |
|
| 482 |
/* Now try all the sigs to try and find one which validates */ |
| 483 |
for (sig_fail_cnt = daemon->limit[LIMIT_SIG_FAIL], j = 0; j <sigidx; j++) |
| 484 |
{ |
| 485 |
unsigned char *psav, *sig, *digest; |
| 486 |
int i, wire_len, sig_len; |
| 487 |
const struct nettle_hash *hash; |
| 488 |
void *ctx; |
| 489 |
char *name_start; |
| 490 |
u32 nsigttl, ttl, orig_ttl; |
| 491 |
|
| 492 |
failflags &= ~DNSSEC_FAIL_NOSIG; |
| 493 |
|
| 494 |
p = sigs[j]; |
| 495 |
GETLONG(ttl, p); |
| 496 |
GETSHORT(rdlen, p); /* rdlen >= 18 checked previously */ |
| 497 |
psav = p; |
| 498 |
|
| 499 |
p += 2; /* type_covered - already checked */ |
| 500 |
algo = *p++; |
| 501 |
labels = *p++; |
| 502 |
GETLONG(orig_ttl, p); |
| 503 |
GETLONG(sig_expiration, p); |
| 504 |
GETLONG(sig_inception, p); |
| 505 |
GETSHORT(key_tag, p); |
| 506 |
|
| 507 |
if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, keyname, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 0)) |
| 508 |
return STAT_BOGUS; |
| 509 |
|
| 510 |
if (!time_check) |
| 511 |
failflags &= ~(DNSSEC_FAIL_NYV | DNSSEC_FAIL_EXP); |
| 512 |
else |
| 513 |
{ |
| 514 |
/* We must explicitly check against wanted values, because of SERIAL_UNDEF */ |
| 515 |
if (serial_compare_32(curtime, sig_inception) == SERIAL_LT) |
| 516 |
continue; |
| 517 |
else |
| 518 |
failflags &= ~DNSSEC_FAIL_NYV; |
| 519 |
|
| 520 |
if (serial_compare_32(curtime, sig_expiration) == SERIAL_GT) |
| 521 |
continue; |
| 522 |
else |
| 523 |
failflags &= ~DNSSEC_FAIL_EXP; |
| 524 |
} |
| 525 |
|
| 526 |
if (!(hash = hash_find(algo_digest_name(algo)))) |
| 527 |
continue; |
| 528 |
else |
| 529 |
failflags &= ~DNSSEC_FAIL_NOKEYSUP; |
| 530 |
|
| 531 |
if (labels > name_labels || |
| 532 |
!hash_init(hash, &ctx, &digest)) |
| 533 |
continue; |
| 534 |
|
| 535 |
/* OK, we have the signature record, see if the relevant DNSKEY is in the cache. */ |
| 536 |
if (!key && !(crecp = cache_find_by_name(NULL, keyname, now, F_DNSKEY))) |
| 537 |
return STAT_NEED_KEY; |
| 538 |
|
| 539 |
if (ttl_out) |
| 540 |
{ |
| 541 |
/* 4035 5.3.3 rules on TTLs */ |
| 542 |
if (orig_ttl < ttl) |
| 543 |
ttl = orig_ttl; |
| 544 |
|
| 545 |
if (time_check && difftime(sig_expiration, curtime) < ttl) |
| 546 |
ttl = difftime(sig_expiration, curtime); |
| 547 |
|
| 548 |
*ttl_out = ttl; |
| 549 |
} |
| 550 |
|
| 551 |
/* Don't trust rdlen not to be too small and give us a negative sig_len |
| 552 |
It has already been checked that it doesn't run us off the end |
| 553 |
of the packet. */ |
| 554 |
if ((sig_len = rdlen - (p - psav)) <= 0) |
| 555 |
return STAT_BOGUS; |
| 556 |
|
| 557 |
sig = p; |
| 558 |
nsigttl = htonl(orig_ttl); |
| 559 |
|
| 560 |
hash->update(ctx, 18, psav); |
| 561 |
wire_len = to_wire(keyname); |
| 562 |
hash->update(ctx, (unsigned int)wire_len, (unsigned char*)keyname); |
| 563 |
from_wire(keyname); |
| 564 |
|
| 565 |
#define RRBUFLEN 128 /* Most RRs are smaller than this. */ |
| 566 |
|
| 567 |
for (i = 0; i < rrsetidx; ++i) |
| 568 |
{ |
| 569 |
int j; |
| 570 |
struct rdata_state state; |
| 571 |
u16 len; |
| 572 |
unsigned char rrbuf[RRBUFLEN]; |
| 573 |
|
| 574 |
p = rrset[i]; |
| 575 |
|
| 576 |
if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 10)) |
| 577 |
return STAT_BOGUS; |
| 578 |
|
| 579 |
name_start = name; |
| 580 |
|
| 581 |
/* if more labels than in RRsig name, hash *.<no labels in rrsig labels field> 4035 5.3.2 */ |
| 582 |
/* If the name is already the wildcard, we're not going to change it. */ |
| 583 |
if (labels < name_labels && |
| 584 |
!(name_labels - labels == 1 && name_start[0] == '*' && name_start[1] == '.')) |
| 585 |
{ |
| 586 |
for (j = name_labels - labels; j != 0; j--) |
| 587 |
{ |
| 588 |
while (*name_start != '.' && *name_start != 0) |
| 589 |
name_start++; |
| 590 |
if (j != 1 && *name_start == '.') |
| 591 |
name_start++; |
| 592 |
} |
| 593 |
|
| 594 |
if (wildcard_offset_out) |
| 595 |
*wildcard_offset_out = name_start - name + 1; |
| 596 |
|
| 597 |
name_start--; |
| 598 |
*name_start = '*'; |
| 599 |
} |
| 600 |
|
| 601 |
wire_len = to_wire(name_start); |
| 602 |
hash->update(ctx, (unsigned int)wire_len, (unsigned char *)name_start); |
| 603 |
hash->update(ctx, 4, p); /* class and type */ |
| 604 |
hash->update(ctx, 4, (unsigned char *)&nsigttl); |
| 605 |
|
| 606 |
p += 8; /* skip type, class, ttl */ |
| 607 |
GETSHORT(rdlen, p); |
| 608 |
if (!CHECK_LEN(header, p, plen, rdlen)) |
| 609 |
return STAT_BOGUS; |
| 610 |
|
| 611 |
/* Optimisation for RR types which need no cannonicalisation. |
| 612 |
This includes DNSKEY DS NSEC and NSEC3, which are also long, so |
| 613 |
it saves lots of calls to get_rdata, and avoids the pessimal |
| 614 |
segmented insertion, even with a small rrbuf[]. |
| 615 |
|
| 616 |
If canonicalisation is not needed, a simple insertion into the hash works. |
| 617 |
*/ |
| 618 |
if (*rr_desc == -1) |
| 619 |
{ |
| 620 |
len = htons(rdlen); |
| 621 |
hash->update(ctx, 2, (unsigned char *)&len); |
| 622 |
hash->update(ctx, rdlen, p); |
| 623 |
} |
| 624 |
else |
| 625 |
{ |
| 626 |
/* canonicalise rdata and calculate length of same, use |
| 627 |
name buffer as workspace for get_rdata. */ |
| 628 |
state.ip = p; |
| 629 |
state.op = NULL; |
| 630 |
state.desc = rr_desc; |
| 631 |
state.buff = name; |
| 632 |
state.end = p + rdlen; |
| 633 |
|
| 634 |
for (j = 0; get_rdata(header, plen, &state); j++) |
| 635 |
if (j < RRBUFLEN) |
| 636 |
rrbuf[j] = *state.op; |
| 637 |
|
| 638 |
len = htons((u16)j); |
| 639 |
hash->update(ctx, 2, (unsigned char *)&len); |
| 640 |
|
| 641 |
/* If the RR is shorter than RRBUFLEN (most of them, in practice) |
| 642 |
then we can just digest it now. If it exceeds RRBUFLEN we have to |
| 643 |
go back to the start and do it in chunks. */ |
| 644 |
if (j >= RRBUFLEN) |
| 645 |
{ |
| 646 |
state.ip = p; |
| 647 |
state.op = NULL; |
| 648 |
state.desc = rr_desc; |
| 649 |
|
| 650 |
for (j = 0; get_rdata(header, plen, &state); j++) |
| 651 |
{ |
| 652 |
rrbuf[j] = *state.op; |
| 653 |
|
| 654 |
if (j == RRBUFLEN - 1) |
| 655 |
{ |
| 656 |
hash->update(ctx, RRBUFLEN, rrbuf); |
| 657 |
j = -1; |
| 658 |
} |
| 659 |
} |
| 660 |
} |
| 661 |
|
| 662 |
if (j != 0) |
| 663 |
hash->update(ctx, j, rrbuf); |
| 664 |
} |
| 665 |
} |
| 666 |
|
| 667 |
nettle_digest_wrapper(hash, ctx, hash->digest_size, digest); |
| 668 |
|
| 669 |
/* namebuff used for workspace above, restore to leave unchanged on exit */ |
| 670 |
p = (unsigned char*)(rrset[0]); |
| 671 |
if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 0)) |
| 672 |
return STAT_BOGUS; |
| 673 |
|
| 674 |
if (key) |
| 675 |
{ |
| 676 |
if (algo_in == algo && keytag_in == key_tag) |
| 677 |
{ |
| 678 |
if (dec_counter(validate_counter, NULL)) |
| 679 |
return STAT_ABANDONED; |
| 680 |
|
| 681 |
if (verify(key, keylen, sig, sig_len, digest, hash->digest_size, algo)) |
| 682 |
return STAT_SECURE; |
| 683 |
} |
| 684 |
} |
| 685 |
else |
| 686 |
{ |
| 687 |
/* iterate through all possible keys 4035 5.3.1 */ |
| 688 |
for (; crecp; crecp = cache_find_by_name(crecp, keyname, now, F_DNSKEY)) |
| 689 |
if (crecp->addr.key.algo == algo && |
| 690 |
crecp->addr.key.keytag == key_tag && |
| 691 |
crecp->uid == (unsigned int)class) |
| 692 |
{ |
| 693 |
if (dec_counter(validate_counter, NULL)) |
| 694 |
return STAT_ABANDONED; |
| 695 |
|
| 696 |
if (verify(crecp->addr.key.keydata, crecp->addr.key.keylen, sig, sig_len, digest, hash->digest_size, algo)) |
| 697 |
return STAT_SECURE; |
| 698 |
|
| 699 |
/* An attacker can waste a lot of our CPU by setting up a giant DNSKEY RRSET full of failing |
| 700 |
keys, all of which we have to try. Since many failing keys is not likely for |
| 701 |
a legitimate domain, set a limit on how many can fail. */ |
| 702 |
if ((daemon->limit[LIMIT_SIG_FAIL] - (sig_fail_cnt + 1)) > (int)daemon->metrics[METRIC_SIG_FAIL_HWM]) |
| 703 |
daemon->metrics[METRIC_SIG_FAIL_HWM] = daemon->limit[LIMIT_SIG_FAIL] - (sig_fail_cnt + 1); |
| 704 |
if (dec_counter(&sig_fail_cnt, _("per-RRSet signature fails"))) |
| 705 |
return STAT_ABANDONED; |
| 706 |
} |
| 707 |
} |
| 708 |
} |
| 709 |
|
| 710 |
/* If we reach this point, no verifying key was found */ |
| 711 |
return STAT_BOGUS | failflags | DNSSEC_FAIL_NOKEY; |
| 712 |
} |
| 713 |
|
| 714 |
|
| 715 |
/* The DNS packet is expected to contain the answer to a DNSKEY query. |
| 716 |
Put all DNSKEYs in the answer which are valid into the cache. |
| 717 |
return codes: |
| 718 |
STAT_OK Done, key(s) in cache. |
| 719 |
STAT_BOGUS No DNSKEYs found, which can be validated with DS, |
| 720 |
or self-sign for DNSKEY RRset is not valid, bad packet. |
| 721 |
STAT_ABANDONED resource exhaustion. |
| 722 |
STAT_NEED_DS DS records to validate a key not found, name in keyname |
| 723 |
*/ |
| 724 |
int dnssec_validate_by_ds(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, char *name, |
| 725 |
char *keyname, int class, int *validate_counter) |
| 726 |
{ |
| 727 |
unsigned char *psave, *p = (unsigned char *)(header+1), *keyaddr; |
| 728 |
struct crec *crecp, *recp1; |
| 729 |
int rc, j, qtype, qclass, rdlen, flags, algo, keytag, sigcnt, rrcnt; |
| 730 |
unsigned long ttl, sig_ttl; |
| 731 |
union all_addr a; |
| 732 |
int failflags = DNSSEC_FAIL_NODSSUP | DNSSEC_FAIL_NOZONE; |
| 733 |
char valid_digest[255]; |
| 734 |
static unsigned char **cached_digest; |
| 735 |
static size_t cached_digest_size = 0; |
| 736 |
|
| 737 |
if (ntohs(header->qdcount) != 1 || RCODE(header) != NOERROR || !extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 4)) |
| 738 |
return STAT_BOGUS | DNSSEC_FAIL_NOKEY; |
| 739 |
|
| 740 |
GETSHORT(qtype, p); |
| 741 |
GETSHORT(qclass, p); |
| 742 |
|
| 743 |
if (qtype != T_DNSKEY || qclass != class || |
| 744 |
!explore_rrset(header, plen, class, T_DNSKEY, name, keyname, &sigcnt, &rrcnt) || |
| 745 |
rrcnt == 0) |
| 746 |
return STAT_BOGUS | DNSSEC_FAIL_NOKEY; |
| 747 |
|
| 748 |
if (sigcnt == 0) |
| 749 |
return STAT_BOGUS | DNSSEC_FAIL_NOSIG; |
| 750 |
|
| 751 |
/* See if we have cached a DS record which validates this key */ |
| 752 |
if (!(crecp = cache_find_by_name(NULL, name, now, F_DS))) |
| 753 |
{ |
| 754 |
strcpy(keyname, name); |
| 755 |
return STAT_NEED_DS; |
| 756 |
} |
| 757 |
|
| 758 |
/* NOTE, we need to find ONE DNSKEY which matches the DS */ |
| 759 |
for (j = ntohs(header->ancount); j != 0; j--) |
| 760 |
{ |
| 761 |
/* Ensure we have type, class TTL and length */ |
| 762 |
if (!(rc = extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, EXTR_NAME_COMPARE, 10))) |
| 763 |
return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */ |
| 764 |
|
| 765 |
GETSHORT(qtype, p); |
| 766 |
GETSHORT(qclass, p); |
| 767 |
GETLONG(ttl, p); |
| 768 |
GETSHORT(rdlen, p); |
| 769 |
|
| 770 |
if (!CHECK_LEN(header, p, plen, rdlen)) |
| 771 |
return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */ |
| 772 |
|
| 773 |
if (qclass != class || qtype != T_DNSKEY || rc == 2) |
| 774 |
{ |
| 775 |
p += rdlen; |
| 776 |
continue; |
| 777 |
} |
| 778 |
|
| 779 |
if (rdlen < 5) |
| 780 |
return STAT_BOGUS; /* min 1 byte key! */ |
| 781 |
|
| 782 |
psave = p; |
| 783 |
|
| 784 |
GETSHORT(flags, p); |
| 785 |
if (*p++ != 3) |
| 786 |
{ |
| 787 |
p = psave + rdlen; |
| 788 |
continue; |
| 789 |
} |
| 790 |
algo = *p++; |
| 791 |
keyaddr = p; |
| 792 |
keytag = dnskey_keytag(algo, flags, keyaddr, rdlen - 4); |
| 793 |
|
| 794 |
p = psave + rdlen; |
| 795 |
|
| 796 |
/* key must have zone key flag set */ |
| 797 |
if (!(flags & 0x100)) |
| 798 |
continue; |
| 799 |
|
| 800 |
failflags &= ~DNSSEC_FAIL_NOZONE; |
| 801 |
|
| 802 |
/* clear digest cache. */ |
| 803 |
memset(valid_digest, 0, sizeof(valid_digest)); |
| 804 |
|
| 805 |
for (recp1 = crecp; recp1; recp1 = cache_find_by_name(recp1, name, now, F_DS)) |
| 806 |
{ |
| 807 |
void *ctx; |
| 808 |
unsigned char *digest, *ds_digest; |
| 809 |
const struct nettle_hash *hash; |
| 810 |
int wire_len; |
| 811 |
|
| 812 |
if ((recp1->flags & F_NEG) || |
| 813 |
recp1->addr.ds.algo != algo || |
| 814 |
recp1->addr.ds.keytag != keytag || |
| 815 |
recp1->uid != (unsigned int)class) |
| 816 |
continue; |
| 817 |
|
| 818 |
if (!(hash = hash_find(ds_digest_name(recp1->addr.ds.digest)))) |
| 819 |
continue; |
| 820 |
|
| 821 |
failflags &= ~DNSSEC_FAIL_NODSSUP; |
| 822 |
|
| 823 |
if (recp1->addr.ds.keylen != (int)hash->digest_size || |
| 824 |
!(ds_digest = blockdata_retrieve(recp1->addr.ds.keydata, recp1->addr.ds.keylen, NULL))) |
| 825 |
continue; |
| 826 |
|
| 827 |
if (valid_digest[recp1->addr.ds.digest]) |
| 828 |
digest = cached_digest[recp1->addr.ds.digest]; |
| 829 |
else |
| 830 |
{ |
| 831 |
/* computing a hash is a unit of crypto work. */ |
| 832 |
if (dec_counter(validate_counter, NULL)) |
| 833 |
return STAT_ABANDONED; |
| 834 |
|
| 835 |
if (!hash_init(hash, &ctx, &digest)) |
| 836 |
continue; |
| 837 |
|
| 838 |
wire_len = to_wire(name); |
| 839 |
|
| 840 |
/* Note that digest may be different between DSs, so |
| 841 |
we can't move this outside the loop. We keep |
| 842 |
copies of each digest we make for this key, |
| 843 |
so maximum digest work is O(keys x digests_types) |
| 844 |
rather then O(keys x DSs) */ |
| 845 |
hash->update(ctx, (unsigned int)wire_len, (unsigned char *)name); |
| 846 |
hash->update(ctx, (unsigned int)rdlen, psave); |
| 847 |
nettle_digest_wrapper(hash, ctx, hash->digest_size, digest); |
| 848 |
|
| 849 |
from_wire(name); |
| 850 |
|
| 851 |
if (recp1->addr.ds.digest >= cached_digest_size) |
| 852 |
{ |
| 853 |
unsigned char **new; |
| 854 |
|
| 855 |
/* whine_malloc zeros memory */ |
| 856 |
if ((new = whine_malloc((recp1->addr.ds.digest + 5) * sizeof(unsigned char *)))) |
| 857 |
{ |
| 858 |
if (cached_digest_size != 0) |
| 859 |
{ |
| 860 |
memcpy(new, cached_digest, cached_digest_size * sizeof(unsigned char *)); |
| 861 |
free(cached_digest); |
| 862 |
} |
| 863 |
|
| 864 |
cached_digest_size = recp1->addr.ds.digest + 5; |
| 865 |
cached_digest = new; |
| 866 |
} |
| 867 |
} |
| 868 |
|
| 869 |
if (recp1->addr.ds.digest < cached_digest_size) |
| 870 |
{ |
| 871 |
if (!cached_digest[recp1->addr.ds.digest]) |
| 872 |
cached_digest[recp1->addr.ds.digest] = whine_malloc(recp1->addr.ds.keylen); |
| 873 |
|
| 874 |
if (cached_digest[recp1->addr.ds.digest]) |
| 875 |
{ |
| 876 |
memcpy(cached_digest[recp1->addr.ds.digest], digest, recp1->addr.ds.keylen); |
| 877 |
valid_digest[recp1->addr.ds.digest] = 1; |
| 878 |
} |
| 879 |
} |
| 880 |
} |
| 881 |
|
| 882 |
if (memcmp(ds_digest, digest, recp1->addr.ds.keylen) == 0) |
| 883 |
{ |
| 884 |
/* Found the key validated by a DS record. |
| 885 |
Now check the self-sig for the entire key RRset using that key. |
| 886 |
Note that validate_rrset() will never return STAT_NEED_KEY here, |
| 887 |
since we supply the key it will use as an argument. */ |
| 888 |
struct blockdata *key; |
| 889 |
|
| 890 |
if (!(key = blockdata_alloc((char *)keyaddr, rdlen - 4))) |
| 891 |
break; |
| 892 |
|
| 893 |
rc = validate_rrset(now, header, plen, class, T_DNSKEY, sigcnt, rrcnt, name, keyname, |
| 894 |
NULL, key, rdlen - 4, algo, keytag, &sig_ttl, validate_counter); |
| 895 |
|
| 896 |
blockdata_free(key); |
| 897 |
|
| 898 |
if (STAT_ISEQUAL(rc, STAT_ABANDONED)) |
| 899 |
return rc; |
| 900 |
|
| 901 |
/* can't validate KEY RRset with this key, see if there's another that |
| 902 |
will, which is validated by another DS. */ |
| 903 |
if (!STAT_ISEQUAL(rc, STAT_SECURE)) |
| 904 |
break; |
| 905 |
|
| 906 |
/* DNSKEY RRset determined to be OK, now cache it. */ |
| 907 |
cache_start_insert(); |
| 908 |
|
| 909 |
p = skip_questions(header, plen); |
| 910 |
|
| 911 |
for (j = ntohs(header->ancount); j != 0; j--) |
| 912 |
{ |
| 913 |
/* Ensure we have type, class TTL and length */ |
| 914 |
if (!(rc = extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, EXTR_NAME_COMPARE, 10))) |
| 915 |
return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */ |
| 916 |
|
| 917 |
GETSHORT(qtype, p); |
| 918 |
GETSHORT(qclass, p); |
| 919 |
GETLONG(ttl, p); |
| 920 |
GETSHORT(rdlen, p); |
| 921 |
|
| 922 |
/* TTL may be limited by sig. */ |
| 923 |
if (sig_ttl < ttl) |
| 924 |
ttl = sig_ttl; |
| 925 |
|
| 926 |
if (!CHECK_LEN(header, p, plen, rdlen)) |
| 927 |
return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */ |
| 928 |
|
| 929 |
psave = p; |
| 930 |
|
| 931 |
if (qclass == class && rc == 1 && qtype == T_DNSKEY) |
| 932 |
{ |
| 933 |
if (rdlen < 4) |
| 934 |
return STAT_BOGUS; /* min 1 byte key! */ |
| 935 |
|
| 936 |
GETSHORT(flags, p); |
| 937 |
if (*p++ == 3) |
| 938 |
{ |
| 939 |
algo = *p++; |
| 940 |
keytag = dnskey_keytag(algo, flags, p, rdlen - 4); |
| 941 |
|
| 942 |
if (!(key = blockdata_alloc((char*)p, rdlen - 4))) |
| 943 |
return STAT_BOGUS; |
| 944 |
|
| 945 |
a.key.keylen = rdlen - 4; |
| 946 |
a.key.keydata = key; |
| 947 |
a.key.algo = algo; |
| 948 |
a.key.keytag = keytag; |
| 949 |
a.key.flags = flags; |
| 950 |
|
| 951 |
if (!cache_insert(name, &a, class, now, ttl, F_FORWARD | F_DNSKEY | F_DNSSECOK)) |
| 952 |
{ |
| 953 |
/* cache_insert fails when the cache is too small, so error with STAT_ABANDONED which |
| 954 |
will log this as a resource exhaustion problem, which it is. */ |
| 955 |
blockdata_free(key); |
| 956 |
return STAT_ABANDONED; |
| 957 |
} |
| 958 |
|
| 959 |
a.log.keytag = keytag; |
| 960 |
a.log.algo = algo; |
| 961 |
log_query(F_NOEXTRA | F_KEYTAG | F_UPSTREAM, name, &a, "DNSKEY keytag %hu, algo %hu", !algo_digest_name(algo)); |
| 962 |
} |
| 963 |
} |
| 964 |
|
| 965 |
p = psave + rdlen; |
| 966 |
} |
| 967 |
|
| 968 |
/* commit cache insert. */ |
| 969 |
cache_end_insert(); |
| 970 |
return STAT_OK; |
| 971 |
} |
| 972 |
} |
| 973 |
} |
| 974 |
|
| 975 |
log_query(F_NOEXTRA | F_UPSTREAM, name, NULL, "BOGUS DNSKEY", 0); |
| 976 |
return STAT_BOGUS | failflags; |
| 977 |
} |
| 978 |
|
| 979 |
/* The DNS packet is expected to contain the answer to a DS query |
| 980 |
Put all DSs in the answer which are valid and have hash and signature algos |
| 981 |
we support into the cache. |
| 982 |
Also handles replies which prove that there's no DS at this location, |
| 983 |
either because the zone is unsigned or this isn't a zone cut. These are |
| 984 |
cached too. |
| 985 |
If none of the DS's are for supported algos, treat the answer as if |
| 986 |
it's a proof of no DS at this location. RFC4035 para 5.2. |
| 987 |
return codes: |
| 988 |
STAT_OK At least one valid DS found and in cache. |
| 989 |
STAT_BOGUS no DS in reply or not signed, fails validation, bad packet. |
| 990 |
STAT_NEED_KEY DNSKEY records to validate a DS not found, name in keyname |
| 991 |
STAT_NEED_DS DS record needed. |
| 992 |
STAT_ABANDONED resource exhaustion. |
| 993 |
*/ |
| 994 |
|
| 995 |
int dnssec_validate_ds(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, char *name, |
| 996 |
char *keyname, int class, int *validate_counter) |
| 997 |
{ |
| 998 |
unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)(header+1); |
| 999 |
int qtype, qclass, rc, i, neganswer = 0, prim_ok = 0, nons = 0, servfail = 0, neg_ttl = 0, found_supported = 0; |
| 1000 |
int aclass, atype, rdlen, flags; |
| 1001 |
unsigned long ttl; |
| 1002 |
union all_addr a; |
| 1003 |
|
| 1004 |
/* A SERVFAIL answer has been seen to a DS query not at start of authority, |
| 1005 |
so treat it as such and continue to search for a DS or proof of no existence |
| 1006 |
further down the tree. */ |
| 1007 |
if (RCODE(header) == SERVFAIL) |
| 1008 |
servfail = neganswer = nons = 1; |
| 1009 |
else |
| 1010 |
rc = dnssec_validate_reply(now, header, plen, name, keyname, NULL, 0, &neganswer, &prim_ok, &nons, &neg_ttl, validate_counter); |
| 1011 |
|
| 1012 |
p = (unsigned char *)(header+1); |
| 1013 |
if (ntohs(header->qdcount) != 1 || |
| 1014 |
!extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 4)) |
| 1015 |
return STAT_BOGUS; |
| 1016 |
|
| 1017 |
GETSHORT(qtype, p); |
| 1018 |
GETSHORT(qclass, p); |
| 1019 |
|
| 1020 |
if (qtype != T_DS || qclass != class) |
| 1021 |
return STAT_BOGUS; |
| 1022 |
|
| 1023 |
if (!servfail) |
| 1024 |
{ |
| 1025 |
if (STAT_ISEQUAL(rc, STAT_INSECURE)) |
| 1026 |
{ |
| 1027 |
/* A INSECURE DS answer is OK if it's negative and there's a CNAME answer to the DS answer which is |
| 1028 |
signed, since that's enough to prove that the DS record doesn't exist. */ |
| 1029 |
if (!neganswer || !prim_ok) |
| 1030 |
{ |
| 1031 |
if (option_bool(OPT_BOGUSPRIV) && |
| 1032 |
(flags = in_arpa_name_2_addr(name, &a)) && |
| 1033 |
((flags == F_IPV6 && private_net6(&a.addr6, 0)) || (flags == F_IPV4 && private_net(a.addr4, 0)))) |
| 1034 |
{ |
| 1035 |
my_syslog(LOG_INFO, _("insecure reply received for DS %s, assuming that's OK for a RFC-1918 address"), name); |
| 1036 |
neganswer = 1; |
| 1037 |
nons = 0; /* If we're faking a DS, fake one with an NS. */ |
| 1038 |
neg_ttl = DNSSEC_ASSUMED_DS_TTL; |
| 1039 |
} |
| 1040 |
else if (lookup_domain(name, F_DOMAINSRV, NULL, NULL)) |
| 1041 |
{ |
| 1042 |
my_syslog(LOG_INFO, _("insecure reply received for DS %s, assuming non-DNSSEC domain-specific server"), name); |
| 1043 |
neganswer = 1; |
| 1044 |
nons = 0; /* If we're faking a DS, fake one with an NS. */ |
| 1045 |
neg_ttl = DNSSEC_ASSUMED_DS_TTL; |
| 1046 |
} |
| 1047 |
else |
| 1048 |
{ |
| 1049 |
my_syslog(LOG_WARNING, _("insecure DS reply received for %s, check domain configuration and upstream DNS server DNSSEC support"), name); |
| 1050 |
log_query(F_NOEXTRA | F_UPSTREAM, name, NULL, "BOGUS DS - not secure", 0); |
| 1051 |
return STAT_BOGUS | DNSSEC_FAIL_INDET; |
| 1052 |
} |
| 1053 |
} |
| 1054 |
} |
| 1055 |
else |
| 1056 |
{ |
| 1057 |
if (STAT_ISEQUAL(rc, STAT_NEED_KEY) && hostname_isequal(name, keyname)) |
| 1058 |
{ |
| 1059 |
/* If the key needed to validate the DS is on the same domain as the DS, we'll |
| 1060 |
loop getting nowhere. Stop that now. This can happen of the DS answer comes |
| 1061 |
from the DS's zone, and not the parent zone. */ |
| 1062 |
log_query(F_NOEXTRA | F_UPSTREAM, name, NULL, "BOGUS DS", 0); |
| 1063 |
return STAT_BOGUS; |
| 1064 |
} |
| 1065 |
|
| 1066 |
if (!STAT_ISEQUAL(rc, STAT_SECURE)) |
| 1067 |
return rc; |
| 1068 |
} |
| 1069 |
} |
| 1070 |
|
| 1071 |
if (!neganswer) |
| 1072 |
{ |
| 1073 |
cache_start_insert(); |
| 1074 |
|
| 1075 |
for (i = 0; i < ntohs(header->ancount); i++) |
| 1076 |
{ |
| 1077 |
unsigned char *psave; |
| 1078 |
|
| 1079 |
if (!(rc = extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, EXTR_NAME_COMPARE, 10))) |
| 1080 |
return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */ |
| 1081 |
|
| 1082 |
GETSHORT(atype, p); |
| 1083 |
GETSHORT(aclass, p); |
| 1084 |
GETLONG(ttl, p); |
| 1085 |
GETSHORT(rdlen, p); |
| 1086 |
|
| 1087 |
if (!CHECK_LEN(header, p, plen, rdlen)) |
| 1088 |
return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */ |
| 1089 |
|
| 1090 |
psave = p; |
| 1091 |
|
| 1092 |
if (aclass == class && atype == T_DS && rc == 1) |
| 1093 |
{ |
| 1094 |
int algo, digest, keytag; |
| 1095 |
struct blockdata *key; |
| 1096 |
|
| 1097 |
if (rdlen < 5) |
| 1098 |
return STAT_BOGUS; /* min 1 byte digest! */ |
| 1099 |
|
| 1100 |
GETSHORT(keytag, p); |
| 1101 |
algo = *p++; |
| 1102 |
digest = *p++; |
| 1103 |
|
| 1104 |
if (!ds_digest_name(digest) || !algo_digest_name(algo)) |
| 1105 |
{ |
| 1106 |
a.log.keytag = keytag; |
| 1107 |
a.log.algo = algo; |
| 1108 |
a.log.digest = digest; |
| 1109 |
log_query(F_NOEXTRA | F_KEYTAG | F_UPSTREAM, name, &a, "DS for keytag %hu, algo %hu, digest %hu", 1); |
| 1110 |
neg_ttl = ttl; |
| 1111 |
} |
| 1112 |
else if ((key = blockdata_alloc((char*)p, rdlen - 4))) |
| 1113 |
{ |
| 1114 |
a.ds.digest = digest; |
| 1115 |
a.ds.keydata = key; |
| 1116 |
a.ds.algo = algo; |
| 1117 |
a.ds.keytag = keytag; |
| 1118 |
a.ds.keylen = rdlen - 4; |
| 1119 |
|
| 1120 |
if (!cache_insert(name, &a, class, now, ttl, F_FORWARD | F_DS | F_DNSSECOK)) |
| 1121 |
{ |
| 1122 |
/* cache_insert fails when the cache is too small, so error with STAT_ABANDONED which |
| 1123 |
will log this as a resource exhaustion problem, which it is. */ |
| 1124 |
blockdata_free(key); |
| 1125 |
return STAT_ABANDONED; |
| 1126 |
} |
| 1127 |
else |
| 1128 |
{ |
| 1129 |
a.log.keytag = keytag; |
| 1130 |
a.log.algo = algo; |
| 1131 |
a.log.digest = digest; |
| 1132 |
log_query(F_NOEXTRA | F_KEYTAG | F_UPSTREAM, name, &a, "DS for keytag %hu, algo %hu, digest %hu", 0); |
| 1133 |
found_supported = 1; |
| 1134 |
} |
| 1135 |
} |
| 1136 |
} |
| 1137 |
|
| 1138 |
p = psave + rdlen; |
| 1139 |
} |
| 1140 |
|
| 1141 |
cache_end_insert(); |
| 1142 |
|
| 1143 |
/* Fall through if no supported algo DS found. */ |
| 1144 |
if (found_supported) |
| 1145 |
return STAT_OK; |
| 1146 |
} |
| 1147 |
|
| 1148 |
flags = F_FORWARD | F_DS | F_NEG | F_DNSSECOK; |
| 1149 |
|
| 1150 |
if (neganswer) |
| 1151 |
{ |
| 1152 |
if (RCODE(header) == NXDOMAIN) |
| 1153 |
flags |= F_NXDOMAIN; |
| 1154 |
|
| 1155 |
if (nons) |
| 1156 |
{ |
| 1157 |
if (lookup_domain(name, F_DOMAINSRV, NULL, NULL)) |
| 1158 |
{ |
| 1159 |
my_syslog(LOG_WARNING, _("negative DS reply without NS record received for %s, assuming non-DNSSEC domain-specific server"), name); |
| 1160 |
nons = 0; |
| 1161 |
neg_ttl = DNSSEC_ASSUMED_DS_TTL; |
| 1162 |
} |
| 1163 |
else |
| 1164 |
/* We only cache validated DS records, DNSSECOK flag hijacked |
| 1165 |
to store presence/absence of NS. */ |
| 1166 |
flags &= ~F_DNSSECOK; |
| 1167 |
} |
| 1168 |
|
| 1169 |
log_query(F_NOEXTRA | F_UPSTREAM, name, NULL, |
| 1170 |
servfail ? "SERVFAIL" : (nons ? "no DS/cut" : "no DS"), 0); |
| 1171 |
} |
| 1172 |
|
| 1173 |
return cache_neg_ds(name, flags, class, now, neg_ttl); |
| 1174 |
|
| 1175 |
} |
| 1176 |
|
| 1177 |
int cache_neg_ds(char *name, int flags, int class, time_t now, int ttl) |
| 1178 |
{ |
| 1179 |
cache_start_insert(); |
| 1180 |
|
| 1181 |
/* Use TTL from NSEC for negative cache entries */ |
| 1182 |
if (!cache_insert(name, NULL, class, now, ttl, flags)) |
| 1183 |
return STAT_ABANDONED; |
| 1184 |
|
| 1185 |
cache_end_insert(); |
| 1186 |
|
| 1187 |
return STAT_OK; |
| 1188 |
} |
| 1189 |
|
| 1190 |
/* 4034 6.1 */ |
| 1191 |
static int hostname_cmp(const char *a, const char *b) |
| 1192 |
{ |
| 1193 |
char *sa, *ea, *ca, *sb, *eb, *cb; |
| 1194 |
unsigned char ac, bc; |
| 1195 |
|
| 1196 |
sa = ea = (char *)a + strlen(a); |
| 1197 |
sb = eb = (char *)b + strlen(b); |
| 1198 |
|
| 1199 |
while (1) |
| 1200 |
{ |
| 1201 |
while (sa != a && *(sa-1) != '.') |
| 1202 |
sa--; |
| 1203 |
|
| 1204 |
while (sb != b && *(sb-1) != '.') |
| 1205 |
sb--; |
| 1206 |
|
| 1207 |
ca = sa; |
| 1208 |
cb = sb; |
| 1209 |
|
| 1210 |
while (1) |
| 1211 |
{ |
| 1212 |
if (ca == ea) |
| 1213 |
{ |
| 1214 |
if (cb == eb) |
| 1215 |
break; |
| 1216 |
|
| 1217 |
return -1; |
| 1218 |
} |
| 1219 |
|
| 1220 |
if (cb == eb) |
| 1221 |
return 1; |
| 1222 |
|
| 1223 |
ac = (unsigned char) *ca++; |
| 1224 |
bc = (unsigned char) *cb++; |
| 1225 |
|
| 1226 |
if (ac >= 'A' && ac <= 'Z') |
| 1227 |
ac += 'a' - 'A'; |
| 1228 |
if (bc >= 'A' && bc <= 'Z') |
| 1229 |
bc += 'a' - 'A'; |
| 1230 |
|
| 1231 |
if (ac < bc) |
| 1232 |
return -1; |
| 1233 |
else if (ac != bc) |
| 1234 |
return 1; |
| 1235 |
} |
| 1236 |
|
| 1237 |
|
| 1238 |
if (sa == a) |
| 1239 |
{ |
| 1240 |
if (sb == b) |
| 1241 |
return 0; |
| 1242 |
|
| 1243 |
return -1; |
| 1244 |
} |
| 1245 |
|
| 1246 |
if (sb == b) |
| 1247 |
return 1; |
| 1248 |
|
| 1249 |
ea = --sa; |
| 1250 |
eb = --sb; |
| 1251 |
} |
| 1252 |
} |
| 1253 |
|
| 1254 |
static int check_type_bitmap(unsigned char *p, int type) |
| 1255 |
{ |
| 1256 |
int offset = (type & 0xff) >> 3; |
| 1257 |
|
| 1258 |
if (p[0] == type >> 8 && p[1] > offset && (p[offset + 2] & (0x80 >> (type & 0x07)))) |
| 1259 |
return 1; |
| 1260 |
|
| 1261 |
return 0; |
| 1262 |
} |
| 1263 |
|
| 1264 |
/* returns 0 on success, or DNSSEC_FAIL_* value on failure. */ |
| 1265 |
static int prove_non_existence_nsec(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsigned char **nsecs, unsigned char **labels, int nsec_count, |
| 1266 |
char *workspace1_in, char *workspace2, char *name, int type, int *nons) |
| 1267 |
{ |
| 1268 |
int i, rc, rdlen; |
| 1269 |
unsigned char *p, *psave; |
| 1270 |
|
| 1271 |
if (nons) |
| 1272 |
*nons = 1; |
| 1273 |
|
| 1274 |
/* Find NSEC record that proves name doesn't exist */ |
| 1275 |
for (i = 0; i < nsec_count; i++) |
| 1276 |
{ |
| 1277 |
char *workspace1 = workspace1_in; |
| 1278 |
int sig_labels, name_labels; |
| 1279 |
|
| 1280 |
p = nsecs[i]; |
| 1281 |
if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, workspace1, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 10)) |
| 1282 |
return DNSSEC_FAIL_BADPACKET; |
| 1283 |
p += 8; /* class, type, TTL */ |
| 1284 |
GETSHORT(rdlen, p); |
| 1285 |
psave = p; |
| 1286 |
|
| 1287 |
if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, workspace2, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 0)) |
| 1288 |
return DNSSEC_FAIL_BADPACKET; |
| 1289 |
|
| 1290 |
/* If NSEC comes from wildcard expansion, use original wildcard |
| 1291 |
as name for computation. */ |
| 1292 |
sig_labels = *labels[i]; |
| 1293 |
name_labels = count_labels(workspace1); |
| 1294 |
|
| 1295 |
if (sig_labels < name_labels) |
| 1296 |
{ |
| 1297 |
int k; |
| 1298 |
for (k = name_labels - sig_labels; k != 0; k--) |
| 1299 |
{ |
| 1300 |
while (*workspace1 != '.' && *workspace1 != 0) |
| 1301 |
workspace1++; |
| 1302 |
if (k != 1 && *workspace1 == '.') |
| 1303 |
workspace1++; |
| 1304 |
} |
| 1305 |
|
| 1306 |
workspace1--; |
| 1307 |
*workspace1 = '*'; |
| 1308 |
} |
| 1309 |
|
| 1310 |
rdlen -= p - psave; |
| 1311 |
/* rdlen is now length of type map, and p points to it |
| 1312 |
packet checked to be as long as rdlen implies in prove_non_existence() */ |
| 1313 |
|
| 1314 |
rc = hostname_cmp(workspace1, name); |
| 1315 |
|
| 1316 |
if (rc == 0) |
| 1317 |
{ |
| 1318 |
/* 4035 para 5.4. Last sentence */ |
| 1319 |
if (type == T_NSEC || type == T_RRSIG) |
| 1320 |
return 0; |
| 1321 |
|
| 1322 |
while (rdlen > 0) |
| 1323 |
{ |
| 1324 |
if (rdlen < 2 || rdlen < p[1] + 2) |
| 1325 |
return DNSSEC_FAIL_BADPACKET; |
| 1326 |
|
| 1327 |
/* If we can prove that there's no NS record, return that information. */ |
| 1328 |
if (nons && check_type_bitmap(p, T_NS)) |
| 1329 |
*nons = 0; |
| 1330 |
|
| 1331 |
/* NSEC with the same name as the RR we're testing, check |
| 1332 |
that the type in question doesn't appear in the type map */ |
| 1333 |
if (check_type_bitmap(p, type)) |
| 1334 |
return DNSSEC_FAIL_NONSEC; |
| 1335 |
|
| 1336 |
/* A CNAME answer would also be valid, so if there's a CNAME it should |
| 1337 |
have been returned. */ |
| 1338 |
if (check_type_bitmap(p, T_CNAME)) |
| 1339 |
return DNSSEC_FAIL_NONSEC; |
| 1340 |
|
| 1341 |
/* If the SOA bit is set for a DS record, then we have the |
| 1342 |
DS from the wrong side of the delegation. For the root DS, |
| 1343 |
this is expected. */ |
| 1344 |
if (name_labels != 0 && type == T_DS && check_type_bitmap(p, T_SOA)) |
| 1345 |
return DNSSEC_FAIL_NONSEC; |
| 1346 |
|
| 1347 |
/* RFC 6672 5.3.4.1. */ |
| 1348 |
if (check_type_bitmap(p, T_DNAME) && hostname_issubdomain(name, workspace1) == 1) |
| 1349 |
return DNSSEC_FAIL_NONSEC; |
| 1350 |
|
| 1351 |
rdlen -= p[1] + 2; |
| 1352 |
p += p[1] + 2; |
| 1353 |
} |
| 1354 |
|
| 1355 |
return 0; |
| 1356 |
} |
| 1357 |
else if (rc == -1) |
| 1358 |
{ |
| 1359 |
/* Normal case, name falls between NSEC name and next domain name, |
| 1360 |
wrap around case, name falls between NSEC name (rc == -1) and end */ |
| 1361 |
if (hostname_cmp(workspace2, name) >= 0 || hostname_cmp(workspace1, workspace2) >= 0) |
| 1362 |
return 0; |
| 1363 |
} |
| 1364 |
else |
| 1365 |
{ |
| 1366 |
/* wrap around case, name falls between start and next domain name */ |
| 1367 |
if (hostname_cmp(workspace1, workspace2) >= 0 && hostname_cmp(workspace2, name) >=0 ) |
| 1368 |
return 0; |
| 1369 |
} |
| 1370 |
} |
| 1371 |
|
| 1372 |
return DNSSEC_FAIL_NONSEC; |
| 1373 |
} |
| 1374 |
|
| 1375 |
/* return digest length, or zero on error */ |
| 1376 |
static int hash_name(char *in, unsigned char **out, struct nettle_hash const *hash, |
| 1377 |
unsigned char *salt, int salt_len, int iterations) |
| 1378 |
{ |
| 1379 |
void *ctx; |
| 1380 |
unsigned char *digest; |
| 1381 |
int i; |
| 1382 |
|
| 1383 |
if (!hash_init(hash, &ctx, &digest)) |
| 1384 |
return 0; |
| 1385 |
|
| 1386 |
hash->update(ctx, to_wire(in), (unsigned char *)in); |
| 1387 |
hash->update(ctx, salt_len, salt); |
| 1388 |
nettle_digest_wrapper(hash, ctx, hash->digest_size, digest); |
| 1389 |
|
| 1390 |
for(i = 0; i < iterations; i++) |
| 1391 |
{ |
| 1392 |
hash->update(ctx, hash->digest_size, digest); |
| 1393 |
hash->update(ctx, salt_len, salt); |
| 1394 |
nettle_digest_wrapper(hash, ctx, hash->digest_size, digest); |
| 1395 |
} |
| 1396 |
|
| 1397 |
from_wire(in); |
| 1398 |
|
| 1399 |
*out = digest; |
| 1400 |
return hash->digest_size; |
| 1401 |
} |
| 1402 |
|
| 1403 |
/* Decode base32 to first "." or end of string */ |
| 1404 |
static int base32_decode(char *in, unsigned char *out) |
| 1405 |
{ |
| 1406 |
int oc, on, c, mask, i; |
| 1407 |
unsigned char *p = out; |
| 1408 |
|
| 1409 |
for (c = *in, oc = 0, on = 0; c != 0 && c != '.'; c = *++in) |
| 1410 |
{ |
| 1411 |
if (c >= '0' && c <= '9') |
| 1412 |
c -= '0'; |
| 1413 |
else if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'v') |
| 1414 |
c -= 'a', c += 10; |
| 1415 |
else if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'V') |
| 1416 |
c -= 'A', c += 10; |
| 1417 |
else |
| 1418 |
return 0; |
| 1419 |
|
| 1420 |
for (mask = 0x10, i = 0; i < 5; i++) |
| 1421 |
{ |
| 1422 |
if (c & mask) |
| 1423 |
oc |= 1; |
| 1424 |
mask = mask >> 1; |
| 1425 |
if (((++on) & 7) == 0) |
| 1426 |
{ |
| 1427 |
*p++ = oc; |
| 1428 |
oc = 0; |
| 1429 |
} |
| 1430 |
oc = oc << 1; |
| 1431 |
} |
| 1432 |
} |
| 1433 |
|
| 1434 |
if ((on & 7) != 0) |
| 1435 |
return 0; |
| 1436 |
|
| 1437 |
return p - out; |
| 1438 |
} |
| 1439 |
|
| 1440 |
/* return 1 if we can prove record _doesn't_ exist */ |
| 1441 |
static int check_nsec3_coverage(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, int digest_len, unsigned char *digest, int type, |
| 1442 |
char *workspace1, char *workspace2, unsigned char **nsecs, int nsec_count, int *nons, int name_labels) |
| 1443 |
{ |
| 1444 |
int i, hash_len, salt_len, base32_len, rdlen, flags; |
| 1445 |
unsigned char *p, *psave; |
| 1446 |
|
| 1447 |
for (i = 0; i < nsec_count; i++) |
| 1448 |
if ((p = nsecs[i])) |
| 1449 |
{ |
| 1450 |
if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, workspace1, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 10) || |
| 1451 |
!(base32_len = base32_decode(workspace1, (unsigned char *)workspace2))) |
| 1452 |
return 0; |
| 1453 |
|
| 1454 |
p += 8; /* class, type, TTL */ |
| 1455 |
GETSHORT(rdlen, p); |
| 1456 |
|
| 1457 |
psave = p; |
| 1458 |
|
| 1459 |
/* packet checked to be as long as implied by rdlen, salt_len and hash_len in prove_non_existence() */ |
| 1460 |
p++; /* algo */ |
| 1461 |
flags = *p++; /* flags */ |
| 1462 |
p += 2; /* iterations */ |
| 1463 |
salt_len = *p++; /* salt_len */ |
| 1464 |
p += salt_len; /* salt */ |
| 1465 |
hash_len = *p++; /* p now points to next hashed name */ |
| 1466 |
|
| 1467 |
if (digest_len == base32_len && hash_len == base32_len) |
| 1468 |
{ |
| 1469 |
int rc = memcmp(workspace2, digest, digest_len); |
| 1470 |
|
| 1471 |
if (rc == 0) |
| 1472 |
{ |
| 1473 |
/* We found an NSEC3 whose hashed name exactly matches the query, so |
| 1474 |
we just need to check the type map. p points to the RR data for the record. |
| 1475 |
Note we have packet length up to rdlen bytes checked. */ |
| 1476 |
|
| 1477 |
p += hash_len; /* skip next-domain hash */ |
| 1478 |
rdlen -= p - psave; |
| 1479 |
|
| 1480 |
while (rdlen > 0) |
| 1481 |
{ |
| 1482 |
if (rdlen < 2 || rdlen < p[1] + 2) |
| 1483 |
return 0; |
| 1484 |
|
| 1485 |
/* If we can prove that there's no NS record, return that information. */ |
| 1486 |
if (nons && check_type_bitmap(p, T_NS)) |
| 1487 |
*nons = 0; |
| 1488 |
|
| 1489 |
/* Does the NSEC3 say our type exists? */ |
| 1490 |
if (check_type_bitmap(p, type)) |
| 1491 |
return 0; |
| 1492 |
|
| 1493 |
/* A CNAME answer would also be valid, so if there's a CNAME it should |
| 1494 |
have been returned. */ |
| 1495 |
if (check_type_bitmap(p, T_CNAME)) |
| 1496 |
return 0; |
| 1497 |
|
| 1498 |
/* If the SOA bit is set for a DS record, then we have the |
| 1499 |
DS from the wrong side of the delegation. For the root DS, |
| 1500 |
this is expected. */ |
| 1501 |
if (name_labels != 0 && type == T_DS && check_type_bitmap(p, T_SOA)) |
| 1502 |
return 0; |
| 1503 |
|
| 1504 |
rdlen -= p[1] + 2; |
| 1505 |
p += p[1] + 2; |
| 1506 |
} |
| 1507 |
|
| 1508 |
return 1; |
| 1509 |
} |
| 1510 |
else if (rc < 0) |
| 1511 |
{ |
| 1512 |
/* Normal case, hash falls between NSEC3 name-hash and next domain name-hash, |
| 1513 |
wrap around case, name-hash falls between NSEC3 name-hash and end */ |
| 1514 |
if (memcmp(p, digest, digest_len) >= 0 || memcmp(workspace2, p, digest_len) >= 0) |
| 1515 |
{ |
| 1516 |
if ((flags & 0x01) && nons) /* opt out */ |
| 1517 |
*nons = 0; |
| 1518 |
|
| 1519 |
return 1; |
| 1520 |
} |
| 1521 |
} |
| 1522 |
else |
| 1523 |
{ |
| 1524 |
/* wrap around case, name falls between start and next domain name */ |
| 1525 |
if (memcmp(workspace2, p, digest_len) >= 0 && memcmp(p, digest, digest_len) >= 0) |
| 1526 |
{ |
| 1527 |
if ((flags & 0x01) && nons) /* opt out */ |
| 1528 |
*nons = 0; |
| 1529 |
|
| 1530 |
return 1; |
| 1531 |
} |
| 1532 |
} |
| 1533 |
} |
| 1534 |
} |
| 1535 |
|
| 1536 |
return 0; |
| 1537 |
} |
| 1538 |
|
| 1539 |
/* returns 0 on success, or DNSSEC_FAIL_* value on failure. */ |
| 1540 |
static int prove_non_existence_nsec3(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsigned char **nsecs, int nsec_count, char *workspace1, |
| 1541 |
char *workspace2, char *name, int type, int wild_offset, int *nons, int *validate_counter) |
| 1542 |
{ |
| 1543 |
unsigned char *salt, *p, *digest; |
| 1544 |
int digest_len, i, iterations, salt_len, base32_len, algo = 0; |
| 1545 |
struct nettle_hash const *hash = NULL; |
| 1546 |
char *closest_encloser, *next_closest, *wildcard; |
| 1547 |
|
| 1548 |
if (nons) |
| 1549 |
*nons = 1; |
| 1550 |
|
| 1551 |
/* Look though the NSEC3 records to find the first one with |
| 1552 |
an algorithm we support. |
| 1553 |
|
| 1554 |
Take the algo, iterations, and salt of that record |
| 1555 |
as the ones we're going to use, and prune any |
| 1556 |
that don't match. */ |
| 1557 |
|
| 1558 |
for (i = 0; i < nsec_count; i++) |
| 1559 |
{ |
| 1560 |
if (!(p = skip_name(nsecs[i], header, plen, 15))) |
| 1561 |
return DNSSEC_FAIL_BADPACKET; /* bad packet */ |
| 1562 |
|
| 1563 |
p += 10; /* type, class, TTL, rdlen */ |
| 1564 |
algo = *p++; |
| 1565 |
|
| 1566 |
if ((hash = hash_find(nsec3_digest_name(algo)))) |
| 1567 |
break; /* known algo */ |
| 1568 |
} |
| 1569 |
|
| 1570 |
/* No usable NSEC3s */ |
| 1571 |
if (i == nsec_count) |
| 1572 |
return DNSSEC_FAIL_NONSEC; |
| 1573 |
|
| 1574 |
p++; /* flags */ |
| 1575 |
|
| 1576 |
GETSHORT (iterations, p); |
| 1577 |
/* Upper-bound iterations, to avoid DoS. RFC 9276 refers. */ |
| 1578 |
if (iterations > daemon->limit[LIMIT_NSEC3_ITERS]) |
| 1579 |
return DNSSEC_FAIL_NSEC3_ITERS; |
| 1580 |
|
| 1581 |
salt_len = *p++; |
| 1582 |
salt = p; |
| 1583 |
|
| 1584 |
/* Now prune so we only have NSEC3 records with same iterations, salt and algo */ |
| 1585 |
for (i = 0; i < nsec_count; i++) |
| 1586 |
{ |
| 1587 |
unsigned char *nsec3p = nsecs[i]; |
| 1588 |
int this_iter, flags; |
| 1589 |
|
| 1590 |
nsecs[i] = NULL; /* Speculative, will be restored if OK. */ |
| 1591 |
|
| 1592 |
if (!(p = skip_name(nsec3p, header, plen, 15))) |
| 1593 |
return DNSSEC_FAIL_BADPACKET; /* bad packet */ |
| 1594 |
|
| 1595 |
p += 10; /* type, class, TTL, rdlen */ |
| 1596 |
|
| 1597 |
if (*p++ != algo) |
| 1598 |
continue; |
| 1599 |
|
| 1600 |
flags = *p++; /* flags */ |
| 1601 |
|
| 1602 |
/* 5155 8.2 */ |
| 1603 |
if (flags != 0 && flags != 1) |
| 1604 |
continue; |
| 1605 |
|
| 1606 |
GETSHORT(this_iter, p); |
| 1607 |
if (this_iter != iterations) |
| 1608 |
continue; |
| 1609 |
|
| 1610 |
if (salt_len != *p++) |
| 1611 |
continue; |
| 1612 |
|
| 1613 |
if (memcmp(p, salt, salt_len) != 0) |
| 1614 |
continue; |
| 1615 |
|
| 1616 |
/* All match, put the pointer back */ |
| 1617 |
nsecs[i] = nsec3p; |
| 1618 |
} |
| 1619 |
|
| 1620 |
if (dec_counter(validate_counter, NULL)) |
| 1621 |
return DNSSEC_FAIL_WORK; |
| 1622 |
|
| 1623 |
if ((digest_len = hash_name(name, &digest, hash, salt, salt_len, iterations)) == 0) |
| 1624 |
return DNSSEC_FAIL_NONSEC; |
| 1625 |
|
| 1626 |
if (check_nsec3_coverage(header, plen, digest_len, digest, type, workspace1, workspace2, nsecs, nsec_count, nons, count_labels(name))) |
| 1627 |
return 0; |
| 1628 |
|
| 1629 |
/* Can't find an NSEC3 which covers the name directly, we need the "closest encloser NSEC3" |
| 1630 |
or an answer inferred from a wildcard record. */ |
| 1631 |
closest_encloser = name; |
| 1632 |
next_closest = NULL; |
| 1633 |
|
| 1634 |
do |
| 1635 |
{ |
| 1636 |
if (*closest_encloser == '.') |
| 1637 |
closest_encloser++; |
| 1638 |
|
| 1639 |
if (wild_offset != 0 && name - closest_encloser == wild_offset) |
| 1640 |
break; |
| 1641 |
|
| 1642 |
if (dec_counter(validate_counter, NULL)) |
| 1643 |
return DNSSEC_FAIL_WORK; |
| 1644 |
|
| 1645 |
if ((digest_len = hash_name(closest_encloser, &digest, hash, salt, salt_len, iterations)) == 0) |
| 1646 |
return DNSSEC_FAIL_NONSEC; |
| 1647 |
|
| 1648 |
for (i = 0; i < nsec_count; i++) |
| 1649 |
if ((p = nsecs[i])) |
| 1650 |
{ |
| 1651 |
if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, workspace1, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 0)) |
| 1652 |
return DNSSEC_FAIL_BADPACKET; |
| 1653 |
|
| 1654 |
if (!(base32_len = base32_decode(workspace1, (unsigned char *)workspace2))) |
| 1655 |
return DNSSEC_FAIL_NONSEC; |
| 1656 |
|
| 1657 |
if (digest_len == base32_len && |
| 1658 |
memcmp(digest, workspace2, digest_len) == 0) |
| 1659 |
break; /* Gotit */ |
| 1660 |
} |
| 1661 |
|
| 1662 |
if (i != nsec_count) |
| 1663 |
break; |
| 1664 |
|
| 1665 |
next_closest = closest_encloser; |
| 1666 |
} |
| 1667 |
while ((closest_encloser = strchr(closest_encloser, '.'))); |
| 1668 |
|
| 1669 |
if (!closest_encloser || !next_closest) |
| 1670 |
return DNSSEC_FAIL_NONSEC; |
| 1671 |
|
| 1672 |
/* Look for NSEC3 that proves the non-existence of the next-closest encloser */ |
| 1673 |
if (dec_counter(validate_counter, NULL)) |
| 1674 |
return DNSSEC_FAIL_WORK; |
| 1675 |
|
| 1676 |
if ((digest_len = hash_name(next_closest, &digest, hash, salt, salt_len, iterations)) == 0) |
| 1677 |
return DNSSEC_FAIL_NONSEC; |
| 1678 |
|
| 1679 |
if (!check_nsec3_coverage(header, plen, digest_len, digest, type, workspace1, workspace2, nsecs, nsec_count, NULL, 1)) |
| 1680 |
return DNSSEC_FAIL_NONSEC; |
| 1681 |
|
| 1682 |
/* Finally, check that there's no seat of wildcard synthesis */ |
| 1683 |
if (wild_offset == 0) |
| 1684 |
{ |
| 1685 |
if (!(wildcard = strchr(next_closest, '.')) || wildcard == next_closest) |
| 1686 |
return DNSSEC_FAIL_NONSEC; |
| 1687 |
|
| 1688 |
wildcard--; |
| 1689 |
*wildcard = '*'; |
| 1690 |
|
| 1691 |
if (dec_counter(validate_counter, NULL)) |
| 1692 |
return DNSSEC_FAIL_WORK; |
| 1693 |
|
| 1694 |
if ((digest_len = hash_name(wildcard, &digest, hash, salt, salt_len, iterations)) == 0) |
| 1695 |
return DNSSEC_FAIL_NONSEC; |
| 1696 |
|
| 1697 |
if (!check_nsec3_coverage(header, plen, digest_len, digest, type, workspace1, workspace2, nsecs, nsec_count, NULL, 1)) |
| 1698 |
return DNSSEC_FAIL_NONSEC; |
| 1699 |
} |
| 1700 |
|
| 1701 |
return 0; |
| 1702 |
} |
| 1703 |
|
| 1704 |
/* returns 0 on success, or DNSSEC_FAIL_* value on failure. */ |
| 1705 |
static int prove_non_existence(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, char *keyname, char *name, int qtype, int qclass, |
| 1706 |
int wild_offset, int *nons, int *nsec_ttl, int *validate_counter) |
| 1707 |
{ |
| 1708 |
static unsigned char **nsecset = NULL, **rrsig_labels = NULL; |
| 1709 |
static int nsecset_sz = 0, rrsig_labels_sz = 0; |
| 1710 |
|
| 1711 |
int type_found = 0; |
| 1712 |
unsigned char *auth_start, *p = skip_questions(header, plen); |
| 1713 |
int type, class, rdlen, i, nsecs_found; |
| 1714 |
unsigned long ttl; |
| 1715 |
|
| 1716 |
/* Move to NS section */ |
| 1717 |
if (!p || !(p = skip_section(p, ntohs(header->ancount), header, plen))) |
| 1718 |
return DNSSEC_FAIL_BADPACKET; |
| 1719 |
|
| 1720 |
auth_start = p; |
| 1721 |
|
| 1722 |
for (nsecs_found = 0, i = 0; i < ntohs(header->nscount); i++) |
| 1723 |
{ |
| 1724 |
unsigned char *pstart = p; |
| 1725 |
|
| 1726 |
if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, daemon->workspacename, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 10)) |
| 1727 |
return DNSSEC_FAIL_BADPACKET; |
| 1728 |
|
| 1729 |
GETSHORT(type, p); |
| 1730 |
GETSHORT(class, p); |
| 1731 |
GETLONG(ttl, p); |
| 1732 |
GETSHORT(rdlen, p); |
| 1733 |
|
| 1734 |
if (!CHECK_LEN(header, p, plen, rdlen)) |
| 1735 |
return DNSSEC_FAIL_BADPACKET; |
| 1736 |
|
| 1737 |
if (class == qclass && (type == T_NSEC || type == T_NSEC3)) |
| 1738 |
{ |
| 1739 |
if (nsec_ttl) |
| 1740 |
{ |
| 1741 |
/* Limit TTL with sig TTL */ |
| 1742 |
if (daemon->rr_status[ntohs(header->ancount) + i] < ttl) |
| 1743 |
ttl = daemon->rr_status[ntohs(header->ancount) + i]; |
| 1744 |
*nsec_ttl = ttl; |
| 1745 |
} |
| 1746 |
|
| 1747 |
/* No mixed NSECing 'round here, thankyouverymuch */ |
| 1748 |
if (type_found != 0 && type_found != type) |
| 1749 |
return DNSSEC_FAIL_NONSEC; |
| 1750 |
|
| 1751 |
type_found = type; |
| 1752 |
|
| 1753 |
if (!expand_workspace(&nsecset, &nsecset_sz, nsecs_found)) |
| 1754 |
return DNSSEC_FAIL_BADPACKET; |
| 1755 |
|
| 1756 |
if (type == T_NSEC) |
| 1757 |
{ |
| 1758 |
/* If we're looking for NSECs, find the corresponding SIGs, to |
| 1759 |
extract the labels value, which we need in case the NSECs |
| 1760 |
are the result of wildcard expansion. |
| 1761 |
Note that the NSEC may not have been validated yet |
| 1762 |
so if there are multiple SIGs, make sure the label value |
| 1763 |
is the same in all, to avoid be duped by a rogue one. |
| 1764 |
If there are no SIGs, that's an error */ |
| 1765 |
unsigned char *p1 = auth_start; |
| 1766 |
int res, j, rdlen1, type1, class1; |
| 1767 |
|
| 1768 |
if (!expand_workspace(&rrsig_labels, &rrsig_labels_sz, nsecs_found)) |
| 1769 |
return DNSSEC_FAIL_BADPACKET; |
| 1770 |
|
| 1771 |
rrsig_labels[nsecs_found] = NULL; |
| 1772 |
|
| 1773 |
for (j = ntohs(header->nscount); j != 0; j--) |
| 1774 |
{ |
| 1775 |
unsigned char *psav; |
| 1776 |
|
| 1777 |
if (!(res = extract_name(header, plen, &p1, daemon->workspacename, EXTR_NAME_COMPARE, 10))) |
| 1778 |
return DNSSEC_FAIL_BADPACKET; |
| 1779 |
|
| 1780 |
GETSHORT(type1, p1); |
| 1781 |
GETSHORT(class1, p1); |
| 1782 |
p1 += 4; /* TTL */ |
| 1783 |
GETSHORT(rdlen1, p1); |
| 1784 |
|
| 1785 |
psav = p1; |
| 1786 |
|
| 1787 |
if (!CHECK_LEN(header, p1, plen, rdlen1)) |
| 1788 |
return DNSSEC_FAIL_BADPACKET; |
| 1789 |
|
| 1790 |
if (res == 1 && class1 == qclass && type1 == T_RRSIG) |
| 1791 |
{ |
| 1792 |
int type_covered; |
| 1793 |
|
| 1794 |
if (rdlen1 < 18) |
| 1795 |
return DNSSEC_FAIL_BADPACKET; /* bad packet */ |
| 1796 |
|
| 1797 |
GETSHORT(type_covered, p1); |
| 1798 |
|
| 1799 |
if (type_covered == T_NSEC) |
| 1800 |
{ |
| 1801 |
p1++; /* algo */ |
| 1802 |
|
| 1803 |
/* labels field must be the same in every SIG we find. */ |
| 1804 |
if (!rrsig_labels[nsecs_found]) |
| 1805 |
rrsig_labels[nsecs_found] = p1; |
| 1806 |
else if (*rrsig_labels[nsecs_found] != *p1) /* algo */ |
| 1807 |
return DNSSEC_FAIL_NONSEC; |
| 1808 |
} |
| 1809 |
} |
| 1810 |
|
| 1811 |
p1 = psav + rdlen1; |
| 1812 |
} |
| 1813 |
|
| 1814 |
/* Must have found at least one sig. */ |
| 1815 |
if (!rrsig_labels[nsecs_found]) |
| 1816 |
return DNSSEC_FAIL_NONSEC; |
| 1817 |
} |
| 1818 |
else if (type == T_NSEC3) |
| 1819 |
{ |
| 1820 |
/* Decode the packet structure enough to check that rdlen is big enough |
| 1821 |
to contain everything other than the type bitmap. |
| 1822 |
(packet checked to be long enough to contain rdlen above) |
| 1823 |
We don't need to do any further length checks in check_nes3_coverage() |
| 1824 |
or prove_non_existence_nsec3() */ |
| 1825 |
|
| 1826 |
int salt_len, hash_len; |
| 1827 |
unsigned char *psav = p; |
| 1828 |
|
| 1829 |
if (rdlen < 5) |
| 1830 |
return DNSSEC_FAIL_BADPACKET; |
| 1831 |
|
| 1832 |
p += 4; /* algo, flags, iterations */ |
| 1833 |
salt_len = *p++; /* salt_len */ |
| 1834 |
if (rdlen < (6 + salt_len)) |
| 1835 |
return DNSSEC_FAIL_BADPACKET; /* check up to hash_length */ |
| 1836 |
|
| 1837 |
p += salt_len; /* salt */ |
| 1838 |
hash_len = *p++; |
| 1839 |
if (rdlen < (6 + salt_len + hash_len)) |
| 1840 |
return DNSSEC_FAIL_BADPACKET; /* check to end of next hashed name */ |
| 1841 |
|
| 1842 |
p = psav; |
| 1843 |
} |
| 1844 |
|
| 1845 |
nsecset[nsecs_found++] = pstart; |
| 1846 |
} |
| 1847 |
|
| 1848 |
p += rdlen; |
| 1849 |
} |
| 1850 |
|
| 1851 |
if (type_found == T_NSEC) |
| 1852 |
return prove_non_existence_nsec(header, plen, nsecset, rrsig_labels, nsecs_found, daemon->workspacename, keyname, name, qtype, nons); |
| 1853 |
else if (type_found == T_NSEC3) |
| 1854 |
return prove_non_existence_nsec3(header, plen, nsecset, nsecs_found, daemon->workspacename, keyname, name, qtype, wild_offset, nons, validate_counter); |
| 1855 |
else |
| 1856 |
return DNSSEC_FAIL_NONSEC; |
| 1857 |
} |
| 1858 |
|
| 1859 |
/* Check signing status of name. |
| 1860 |
returns: |
| 1861 |
STAT_SECURE zone is signed. |
| 1862 |
STAT_INSECURE zone proved unsigned. |
| 1863 |
STAT_NEED_DS require DS record of name returned in keyname. |
| 1864 |
STAT_NEED_KEY require DNSKEY record of name returned in keyname. |
| 1865 |
name returned unaltered. |
| 1866 |
*/ |
| 1867 |
static int zone_status(char *name, int class, char *keyname, time_t now) |
| 1868 |
{ |
| 1869 |
int name_start = strlen(name); /* for when TA is root */ |
| 1870 |
struct crec *crecp; |
| 1871 |
char *p; |
| 1872 |
|
| 1873 |
/* First, work towards the root, looking for a trust anchor. |
| 1874 |
This can either be one configured, or one previously cached. |
| 1875 |
We can assume, if we don't find one first, that there is |
| 1876 |
a trust anchor at the root. */ |
| 1877 |
for (p = name; p; p = strchr(p, '.')) |
| 1878 |
{ |
| 1879 |
if (*p == '.') |
| 1880 |
p++; |
| 1881 |
|
| 1882 |
if (cache_find_by_name(NULL, p, now, F_DS)) |
| 1883 |
{ |
| 1884 |
name_start = p - name; |
| 1885 |
break; |
| 1886 |
} |
| 1887 |
} |
| 1888 |
|
| 1889 |
/* Now work away from the trust anchor */ |
| 1890 |
while (1) |
| 1891 |
{ |
| 1892 |
strcpy(keyname, &name[name_start]); |
| 1893 |
|
| 1894 |
if (!(crecp = cache_find_by_name(NULL, keyname, now, F_DS))) |
| 1895 |
return STAT_NEED_DS; |
| 1896 |
|
| 1897 |
/* F_DNSSECOK misused in DS cache records to non-existence of NS record. |
| 1898 |
F_NEG && !F_DNSSECOK implies that we've proved there's no DS record here, |
| 1899 |
but that's because there's no NS record either, ie this isn't the start |
| 1900 |
of a zone. We only prove that the DNS tree below a node is unsigned when |
| 1901 |
we prove that we're at a zone cut AND there's no DS record. */ |
| 1902 |
if (crecp->flags & F_NEG) |
| 1903 |
{ |
| 1904 |
if (crecp->flags & F_DNSSECOK) |
| 1905 |
return STAT_INSECURE; /* proved no DS here */ |
| 1906 |
} |
| 1907 |
else |
| 1908 |
{ |
| 1909 |
/* If all the DS records have digest and/or sig algos we don't support, |
| 1910 |
then the zone is insecure. Note that if an algo |
| 1911 |
appears in the DS, then RRSIGs for that algo MUST |
| 1912 |
exist for each RRset: 4035 para 2.2 So if we find |
| 1913 |
a DS here with digest and sig we can do, we're entitled |
| 1914 |
to assume we can validate the zone and if we can't later, |
| 1915 |
because an RRSIG is missing we return BOGUS. |
| 1916 |
*/ |
| 1917 |
do |
| 1918 |
{ |
| 1919 |
if (crecp->uid == (unsigned int)class && |
| 1920 |
ds_digest_name(crecp->addr.ds.digest) && |
| 1921 |
algo_digest_name(crecp->addr.ds.algo)) |
| 1922 |
break; |
| 1923 |
} |
| 1924 |
while ((crecp = cache_find_by_name(crecp, keyname, now, F_DS))); |
| 1925 |
|
| 1926 |
if (!crecp) |
| 1927 |
return STAT_INSECURE; |
| 1928 |
} |
| 1929 |
|
| 1930 |
if (name_start == 0) |
| 1931 |
break; |
| 1932 |
|
| 1933 |
for (p = &name[name_start-2]; (*p != '.') && (p != name); p--); |
| 1934 |
|
| 1935 |
if (p != name) |
| 1936 |
p++; |
| 1937 |
|
| 1938 |
name_start = p - name; |
| 1939 |
} |
| 1940 |
|
| 1941 |
return STAT_SECURE; |
| 1942 |
} |
| 1943 |
|
| 1944 |
/* Validate all the RRsets in the answer and authority sections of the reply (4035:3.2.3) |
| 1945 |
Return code: |
| 1946 |
STAT_SECURE if it validates. |
| 1947 |
STAT_INSECURE at least one RRset not validated, because in unsigned zone. |
| 1948 |
STAT_BOGUS signature is wrong, bad packet, no validation where there should be. |
| 1949 |
STAT_NEED_KEY need DNSKEY to complete validation (name is returned in keyname, class in *class) |
| 1950 |
STAT_NEED_DS need DS to complete validation (name is returned in keyname) |
| 1951 |
STAT_ABANDONED resource exhaustion. |
| 1952 |
|
| 1953 |
daemon->rr_status points to a char array which corressponds to the RRs in the |
| 1954 |
answer and auth sections. This is set to >1 for each RR which is validated, and 0 for any which aren't. |
| 1955 |
|
| 1956 |
When validating replies to DS records, we're only interested in the NSEC{3} RRs in the auth section. |
| 1957 |
Other RRs in that section missing sigs will not cause am INSECURE reply. We determine this mode |
| 1958 |
if the nons argument is non-NULL. |
| 1959 |
*/ |
| 1960 |
int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, char *name, char *keyname, |
| 1961 |
int *class, int check_unsigned, int *neganswer, int *prim_ok, int *nons, int *nsec_ttl, int *validate_counter) |
| 1962 |
{ |
| 1963 |
static unsigned char **targets = NULL; |
| 1964 |
static int target_sz = 0; |
| 1965 |
|
| 1966 |
unsigned char *ans_start, *p1, *p2, *p3; |
| 1967 |
int type1, class1, rdlen1 = 0, type2, class2, rdlen2, qclass, qtype, targetidx, gotdname; |
| 1968 |
int i, j, k, rc = STAT_INSECURE; |
| 1969 |
int secure = STAT_SECURE; |
| 1970 |
int rc_nsec; |
| 1971 |
unsigned long ttl; |
| 1972 |
|
| 1973 |
/* extend rr_status if necessary */ |
| 1974 |
if (daemon->rr_status_sz < ntohs(header->ancount) + ntohs(header->nscount)) |
| 1975 |
{ |
| 1976 |
unsigned long *new = whine_malloc(sizeof(*daemon->rr_status) * (ntohs(header->ancount) + ntohs(header->nscount) + 64)); |
| 1977 |
|
| 1978 |
if (!new) |
| 1979 |
return STAT_BOGUS; |
| 1980 |
|
| 1981 |
free(daemon->rr_status); |
| 1982 |
daemon->rr_status = new; |
| 1983 |
daemon->rr_status_sz = ntohs(header->ancount) + ntohs(header->nscount) + 64; |
| 1984 |
} |
| 1985 |
|
| 1986 |
memset(daemon->rr_status, 0, sizeof(*daemon->rr_status) * daemon->rr_status_sz); |
| 1987 |
|
| 1988 |
if (neganswer) |
| 1989 |
*neganswer = 0; |
| 1990 |
|
| 1991 |
if (RCODE(header) == SERVFAIL) |
| 1992 |
return STAT_BOGUS | DNSSEC_FAIL_UPSTREAM; |
| 1993 |
|
| 1994 |
if (ntohs(header->qdcount) != 1) |
| 1995 |
return STAT_BOGUS; |
| 1996 |
|
| 1997 |
if (RCODE(header) != NXDOMAIN && RCODE(header) != NOERROR) |
| 1998 |
return STAT_INSECURE; |
| 1999 |
|
| 2000 |
p1 = (unsigned char *)(header+1); |
| 2001 |
|
| 2002 |
/* Find all the targets we're looking for answers to. |
| 2003 |
The zeroth array element is for the query, subsequent ones |
| 2004 |
for CNAME targets, unless the query is for a CNAME or ANY. */ |
| 2005 |
|
| 2006 |
if (!expand_workspace(&targets, &target_sz, 0)) |
| 2007 |
return STAT_BOGUS; |
| 2008 |
|
| 2009 |
targets[0] = p1; |
| 2010 |
targetidx = 1; |
| 2011 |
|
| 2012 |
if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p1, name, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 4)) |
| 2013 |
return STAT_BOGUS; |
| 2014 |
|
| 2015 |
GETSHORT(qtype, p1); |
| 2016 |
GETSHORT(qclass, p1); |
| 2017 |
ans_start = p1; |
| 2018 |
|
| 2019 |
/* Can't validate an RRSIG query */ |
| 2020 |
if (qtype == T_RRSIG) |
| 2021 |
return STAT_INSECURE; |
| 2022 |
|
| 2023 |
/* Find CNAME targets. */ |
| 2024 |
for (gotdname = i = 0; i < ntohs(header->ancount); i++) |
| 2025 |
{ |
| 2026 |
if (!(p1 = skip_name(p1, header, plen, 10))) |
| 2027 |
return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */ |
| 2028 |
|
| 2029 |
GETSHORT(type1, p1); |
| 2030 |
GETSHORT(class1, p1); |
| 2031 |
p1 += 4; /* TTL */ |
| 2032 |
GETSHORT(rdlen1, p1); |
| 2033 |
|
| 2034 |
if (type1 == T_DNAME) |
| 2035 |
gotdname = 1; |
| 2036 |
|
| 2037 |
if (qtype != T_CNAME && qtype != T_ANY && type1 == T_CNAME && class1 == qclass) |
| 2038 |
{ |
| 2039 |
if (!expand_workspace(&targets, &target_sz, targetidx)) |
| 2040 |
return STAT_BOGUS; |
| 2041 |
|
| 2042 |
targets[targetidx++] = p1; /* pointer to target name */ |
| 2043 |
} |
| 2044 |
|
| 2045 |
if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p1, plen, rdlen1)) |
| 2046 |
return STAT_BOGUS; |
| 2047 |
} |
| 2048 |
|
| 2049 |
/* A DNAME capable of sythesising a CNAME means we don't need to validate the CNAME, |
| 2050 |
we can just assume that it's valid. RFC 4035 3.2.3 */ |
| 2051 |
if (gotdname) |
| 2052 |
for (p1 = ans_start, i = 0; i < ntohs(header->ancount); i++) |
| 2053 |
{ |
| 2054 |
if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p1, name, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 10)) |
| 2055 |
return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */ |
| 2056 |
|
| 2057 |
GETSHORT(type1, p1); |
| 2058 |
GETSHORT(class1, p1); |
| 2059 |
p1 += 4; /* TTL */ |
| 2060 |
GETSHORT(rdlen1, p1); |
| 2061 |
|
| 2062 |
if (type1 != T_DNAME) |
| 2063 |
{ |
| 2064 |
if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p1, plen, rdlen1)) |
| 2065 |
return STAT_BOGUS; |
| 2066 |
} |
| 2067 |
else |
| 2068 |
{ |
| 2069 |
if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p1, keyname, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 0)) |
| 2070 |
return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */ |
| 2071 |
|
| 2072 |
/* We now have the name of the DNAME in name, and the target in keyname. |
| 2073 |
Look for any CNAMEs which could have been synthesised from this DNAME |
| 2074 |
and pre-qualify them. */ |
| 2075 |
for (p2 = ans_start, j = 0; j < ntohs(header->ancount); j++) |
| 2076 |
{ |
| 2077 |
if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p2, daemon->cname, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 10)) |
| 2078 |
return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */ |
| 2079 |
|
| 2080 |
GETSHORT(type2, p2); |
| 2081 |
GETSHORT(class2, p2); |
| 2082 |
GETLONG(ttl, p2); |
| 2083 |
GETSHORT(rdlen2, p2); |
| 2084 |
|
| 2085 |
if (type2 != T_CNAME || class2 != class1) |
| 2086 |
{ |
| 2087 |
if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p2, plen, rdlen2)) |
| 2088 |
return STAT_BOGUS; |
| 2089 |
} |
| 2090 |
else |
| 2091 |
{ |
| 2092 |
size_t name_prefix_len = strlen(daemon->cname) - strlen(name); |
| 2093 |
|
| 2094 |
if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p2, daemon->workspacename, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 0)) |
| 2095 |
return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */ |
| 2096 |
|
| 2097 |
/* We have the name of the CNAME in daemon->cname, and the target in daemon->workspacename. |
| 2098 |
See if the CNAME was sythesised from the DNAME. |
| 2099 |
CNAME must be <subdomain>.<dname> |
| 2100 |
CNAME target must be <subdomain>.<dname_target> |
| 2101 |
<subdomain>s must match for name and target. */ |
| 2102 |
if (hostname_issubdomain(name, daemon->cname) == 1 && |
| 2103 |
hostname_issubdomain(keyname, daemon->workspacename) == 1 && |
| 2104 |
name_prefix_len == strlen(daemon->workspacename) - strlen(keyname)) |
| 2105 |
{ |
| 2106 |
char save = daemon->cname[name_prefix_len]; |
| 2107 |
daemon->cname[name_prefix_len] = 0; |
| 2108 |
daemon->workspacename[name_prefix_len] = 0; |
| 2109 |
|
| 2110 |
if (hostname_isequal(daemon->cname, daemon->workspacename)) |
| 2111 |
{ |
| 2112 |
/* pre-qualify this as validated */ |
| 2113 |
daemon->rr_status[j] = ttl > 0 ? ttl : 1; |
| 2114 |
|
| 2115 |
/* and remove it from the targets we need to have validated answers to. */ |
| 2116 |
if (class2 == qclass) |
| 2117 |
{ |
| 2118 |
daemon->cname[name_prefix_len] = save; |
| 2119 |
for (k = 0; k <targetidx; k++) |
| 2120 |
if ((p3 = targets[k])) |
| 2121 |
{ |
| 2122 |
int rc1; |
| 2123 |
if (!(rc1 = extract_name(header, plen, &p3, daemon->cname, EXTR_NAME_COMPARE, 0))) |
| 2124 |
return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */ |
| 2125 |
|
| 2126 |
if (rc1 == 1) |
| 2127 |
targets[k] = NULL; |
| 2128 |
} |
| 2129 |
} |
| 2130 |
} |
| 2131 |
} |
| 2132 |
} |
| 2133 |
} |
| 2134 |
} |
| 2135 |
} |
| 2136 |
|
| 2137 |
for (p1 = ans_start, i = 0; i < ntohs(header->ancount) + ntohs(header->nscount); i++) |
| 2138 |
{ |
| 2139 |
if (i != 0 && !ADD_RDLEN(header, p1, plen, rdlen1)) |
| 2140 |
return STAT_BOGUS; |
| 2141 |
|
| 2142 |
if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p1, name, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 10)) |
| 2143 |
return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */ |
| 2144 |
|
| 2145 |
GETSHORT(type1, p1); |
| 2146 |
GETSHORT(class1, p1); |
| 2147 |
p1 += 4; /* TTL */ |
| 2148 |
GETSHORT(rdlen1, p1); |
| 2149 |
|
| 2150 |
/* Don't try and validate RRSIGs! */ |
| 2151 |
if (type1 == T_RRSIG) |
| 2152 |
continue; |
| 2153 |
|
| 2154 |
/* Pre-validated by DNAME above don't validate. */ |
| 2155 |
if (daemon->rr_status[i] != 0) |
| 2156 |
continue; |
| 2157 |
|
| 2158 |
/* Check if we've done this RRset already */ |
| 2159 |
for (p2 = ans_start, j = 0; j < i; j++) |
| 2160 |
{ |
| 2161 |
if (!(rc = extract_name(header, plen, &p2, name, EXTR_NAME_COMPARE, 10))) |
| 2162 |
return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */ |
| 2163 |
|
| 2164 |
GETSHORT(type2, p2); |
| 2165 |
GETSHORT(class2, p2); |
| 2166 |
p2 += 4; /* TTL */ |
| 2167 |
GETSHORT(rdlen2, p2); |
| 2168 |
|
| 2169 |
if (type2 == type1 && class2 == class1 && rc == 1) |
| 2170 |
break; /* Done it before: name, type, class all match. */ |
| 2171 |
|
| 2172 |
if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p2, plen, rdlen2)) |
| 2173 |
return STAT_BOGUS; |
| 2174 |
} |
| 2175 |
|
| 2176 |
/* Done already: copy the validation status */ |
| 2177 |
if (j != i) |
| 2178 |
daemon->rr_status[i] = daemon->rr_status[j]; |
| 2179 |
else |
| 2180 |
{ |
| 2181 |
/* Not done, validate now */ |
| 2182 |
int sigcnt, rrcnt, wild_offset; |
| 2183 |
|
| 2184 |
if (!explore_rrset(header, plen, class1, type1, name, keyname, &sigcnt, &rrcnt)) |
| 2185 |
return STAT_BOGUS; |
| 2186 |
|
| 2187 |
/* NSEC and NSEC3 records must be signed. We make this assumption elsewhere. */ |
| 2188 |
if (sigcnt == 0 && (type1 == T_NSEC || type1 == T_NSEC3)) |
| 2189 |
return STAT_BOGUS | DNSSEC_FAIL_NOSIG; |
| 2190 |
else if (sigcnt == 0 && nons && i >= ntohs(header->ancount)) |
| 2191 |
/* If we're validating a DS reply, rather than looking for the value of AD bit, |
| 2192 |
we only care that NSEC and NSEC3 RRs in the auth section are signed. |
| 2193 |
Return SECURE even if others (SOA....) are not. */ |
| 2194 |
rc = STAT_SECURE; |
| 2195 |
else if (sigcnt == 0 && (!check_unsigned || i >= ntohs(header->ancount))) |
| 2196 |
/* unsigned RRsets in auth section are not BOGUS, but do make reply insecure. */ |
| 2197 |
rc = STAT_INSECURE; |
| 2198 |
else |
| 2199 |
{ |
| 2200 |
/* explore_rrset() gives us zone name from sigs in keyname, if |
| 2201 |
it didn't find a key, use the name we're validating. |
| 2202 |
Can't overwrite name here. */ |
| 2203 |
if (sigcnt == 0) |
| 2204 |
strcpy(daemon->workspacename, name); |
| 2205 |
else |
| 2206 |
strcpy(daemon->workspacename, keyname); |
| 2207 |
|
| 2208 |
rc = zone_status(daemon->workspacename, class1, keyname, now); |
| 2209 |
|
| 2210 |
if (STAT_ISEQUAL(rc, STAT_BOGUS) || STAT_ISEQUAL(rc, STAT_NEED_KEY) || STAT_ISEQUAL(rc, STAT_NEED_DS)) |
| 2211 |
{ |
| 2212 |
if (class) |
| 2213 |
*class = class1; /* Class for NEED_DS or NEED_KEY */ |
| 2214 |
return rc; |
| 2215 |
} |
| 2216 |
|
| 2217 |
/* If zone is insecure, don't need to validate RRset, and rc remains as STAT_INSECURE*/ |
| 2218 |
if (STAT_ISEQUAL(rc, STAT_SECURE)) |
| 2219 |
{ |
| 2220 |
unsigned long sig_ttl; |
| 2221 |
rc = validate_rrset(now, header, plen, class1, type1, sigcnt, |
| 2222 |
rrcnt, name, keyname, &wild_offset, NULL, 0, 0, 0, &sig_ttl, validate_counter); |
| 2223 |
|
| 2224 |
if (STAT_ISEQUAL(rc, STAT_BOGUS) || STAT_ISEQUAL(rc, STAT_NEED_KEY) || STAT_ISEQUAL(rc, STAT_NEED_DS) || STAT_ISEQUAL(rc, STAT_ABANDONED)) |
| 2225 |
{ |
| 2226 |
if (class) |
| 2227 |
*class = class1; /* Class for DS or DNSKEY */ |
| 2228 |
return rc; |
| 2229 |
} |
| 2230 |
|
| 2231 |
/* rc is now STAT_SECURE */ |
| 2232 |
|
| 2233 |
/* Note that RR is validated */ |
| 2234 |
daemon->rr_status[i] = sig_ttl; |
| 2235 |
|
| 2236 |
/* Note if we've validated either the answer to the question |
| 2237 |
or the target of a CNAME. Any not noted will need NSEC or |
| 2238 |
to be in unsigned space. */ |
| 2239 |
for (j = 0; j <targetidx; j++) |
| 2240 |
if ((p2 = targets[j])) |
| 2241 |
{ |
| 2242 |
int rc1; |
| 2243 |
if (!(rc1 = extract_name(header, plen, &p2, name, EXTR_NAME_COMPARE, 10))) |
| 2244 |
return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */ |
| 2245 |
|
| 2246 |
if (class1 == qclass && rc1 == 1 && (type1 == T_CNAME || type1 == qtype || qtype == T_ANY )) |
| 2247 |
targets[j] = NULL; |
| 2248 |
} |
| 2249 |
|
| 2250 |
/* An attacker replay a wildcard answer with a different |
| 2251 |
answer and overlay a genuine RR. To prove this |
| 2252 |
hasn't happened, the answer must prove that |
| 2253 |
the genuine record doesn't exist. Check that here. |
| 2254 |
Note that we may not yet have validated the NSEC/NSEC3 RRsets. |
| 2255 |
That's not a problem since if the RRsets later fail |
| 2256 |
we'll return BOGUS then. */ |
| 2257 |
if (wild_offset != 0 && |
| 2258 |
((rc_nsec = prove_non_existence(header, plen, keyname, name, type1, class1, wild_offset, NULL, NULL, validate_counter))) != 0) |
| 2259 |
return (rc_nsec & DNSSEC_FAIL_WORK) ? STAT_ABANDONED : (STAT_BOGUS | rc_nsec); |
| 2260 |
|
| 2261 |
rc = STAT_SECURE; |
| 2262 |
} |
| 2263 |
} |
| 2264 |
} |
| 2265 |
|
| 2266 |
if (STAT_ISEQUAL(rc, STAT_INSECURE)) |
| 2267 |
secure = STAT_INSECURE; |
| 2268 |
} |
| 2269 |
|
| 2270 |
|
| 2271 |
/* For a DS record, we are interested also in if the answer to the DS query was |
| 2272 |
a CNAME RRset which validated. That's proof that the DS doesn't exist, |
| 2273 |
even if it's a CNAME which is not signed, and therefore we have no proof |
| 2274 |
of what it actually _is_. This return tells us that the answer to |
| 2275 |
primary query is secure, even is the whole answer is insecure, because |
| 2276 |
something down the CNAME list doesn't validate or doesn't exist. |
| 2277 |
Note that prim_ok is only valid when neganswer is true, ie either |
| 2278 |
the answer is the requested record or it's a CNAME that ends |
| 2279 |
in a missing answer or an unsigned zone. |
| 2280 |
*/ |
| 2281 |
if (prim_ok) |
| 2282 |
*prim_ok = !targets[0]; |
| 2283 |
|
| 2284 |
/* OK, all the RRsets validate, now see if we have a missing answer or CNAME target. */ |
| 2285 |
for (j = 0; j <targetidx; j++) |
| 2286 |
if ((p2 = targets[j])) |
| 2287 |
{ |
| 2288 |
if (neganswer) |
| 2289 |
*neganswer = 1; |
| 2290 |
|
| 2291 |
if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p2, name, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 10)) |
| 2292 |
return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */ |
| 2293 |
|
| 2294 |
/* NXDOMAIN or NODATA reply, unanswered question is (name, qclass, qtype) |
| 2295 |
This situation is OK if either the answer is in an unsigned zone, or there's NSEC records. */ |
| 2296 |
if ((rc_nsec = prove_non_existence(header, plen, keyname, name, qtype, qclass, 0, nons, nsec_ttl, validate_counter)) != 0) |
| 2297 |
{ |
| 2298 |
if (rc_nsec & DNSSEC_FAIL_WORK) |
| 2299 |
return STAT_ABANDONED; |
| 2300 |
|
| 2301 |
if ((rc_nsec & (DNSSEC_FAIL_NONSEC | DNSSEC_FAIL_NSEC3_ITERS)) && |
| 2302 |
!STAT_ISEQUAL((rc = zone_status(name, qclass, keyname, now)), STAT_SECURE)) |
| 2303 |
{ |
| 2304 |
if (class) |
| 2305 |
*class = qclass; /* Class for NEED_DS or NEED_KEY */ |
| 2306 |
return rc; |
| 2307 |
} |
| 2308 |
|
| 2309 |
return STAT_BOGUS | rc_nsec; /* signed zone, no NSECs */ |
| 2310 |
} |
| 2311 |
} |
| 2312 |
|
| 2313 |
return secure; |
| 2314 |
} |
| 2315 |
|
| 2316 |
|
| 2317 |
/* Compute keytag (checksum to quickly index a key). See RFC4034 */ |
| 2318 |
int dnskey_keytag(int alg, int flags, unsigned char *key, int keylen) |
| 2319 |
{ |
| 2320 |
if (alg == 1) |
| 2321 |
{ |
| 2322 |
/* Algorithm 1 (RSAMD5) has a different (older) keytag calculation algorithm. |
| 2323 |
See RFC4034, Appendix B.1 */ |
| 2324 |
return key[keylen-4] * 256 + key[keylen-3]; |
| 2325 |
} |
| 2326 |
else |
| 2327 |
{ |
| 2328 |
unsigned long ac = flags + 0x300 + alg; |
| 2329 |
int i; |
| 2330 |
|
| 2331 |
for (i = 0; i < keylen; ++i) |
| 2332 |
ac += (i & 1) ? key[i] : key[i] << 8; |
| 2333 |
|
| 2334 |
ac += (ac >> 16) & 0xffff; |
| 2335 |
return ac & 0xffff; |
| 2336 |
} |
| 2337 |
} |
| 2338 |
|
| 2339 |
size_t dnssec_generate_query(struct dns_header *header, size_t outlen, char *name, |
| 2340 |
int class, int id, int type) |
| 2341 |
{ |
| 2342 |
unsigned char *p; |
| 2343 |
|
| 2344 |
header->qdcount = htons(1); |
| 2345 |
header->ancount = htons(0); |
| 2346 |
header->nscount = htons(0); |
| 2347 |
header->arcount = htons(0); |
| 2348 |
header->id = htons(id); |
| 2349 |
|
| 2350 |
header->hb3 = HB3_RD; |
| 2351 |
SET_OPCODE(header, QUERY); |
| 2352 |
/* For debugging, set Checking Disabled, otherwise, have the upstream check too, |
| 2353 |
this allows it to select auth servers when one is returning bad data. */ |
| 2354 |
header->hb4 = option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_DEBUG) ? HB4_CD : 0; |
| 2355 |
|
| 2356 |
p = (unsigned char *)(header+1); |
| 2357 |
|
| 2358 |
p = do_rfc1035_name(p, name, NULL); |
| 2359 |
*p++ = 0; |
| 2360 |
PUTSHORT(type, p); |
| 2361 |
PUTSHORT(class, p); |
| 2362 |
|
| 2363 |
return add_do_bit(header, p - (unsigned char *)header, outlen); |
| 2364 |
} |
| 2365 |
|
| 2366 |
int errflags_to_ede(int status) |
| 2367 |
{ |
| 2368 |
/* We can end up with more than one flag set for some errors, |
| 2369 |
so this encodes a rough priority so the (eg) No sig is reported |
| 2370 |
before no-unexpired-sig. */ |
| 2371 |
if (status & DNSSEC_FAIL_UPSTREAM) |
| 2372 |
return EDE_US_SERVFAIL; |
| 2373 |
else if (status & DNSSEC_FAIL_NYV) |
| 2374 |
return EDE_SIG_NYV; |
| 2375 |
else if (status & DNSSEC_FAIL_EXP) |
| 2376 |
return EDE_SIG_EXP; |
| 2377 |
else if (status & DNSSEC_FAIL_NOKEYSUP) |
| 2378 |
return EDE_USUPDNSKEY; |
| 2379 |
else if (status & DNSSEC_FAIL_NOZONE) |
| 2380 |
return EDE_NO_ZONEKEY; |
| 2381 |
else if (status & DNSSEC_FAIL_NOKEY) |
| 2382 |
return EDE_NO_DNSKEY; |
| 2383 |
else if (status & DNSSEC_FAIL_NODSSUP) |
| 2384 |
return EDE_USUPDS; |
| 2385 |
else if (status & DNSSEC_FAIL_NSEC3_ITERS) |
| 2386 |
return EDE_UNS_NS3_ITER; |
| 2387 |
else if (status & DNSSEC_FAIL_NONSEC) |
| 2388 |
return EDE_NO_NSEC; |
| 2389 |
else if (status & DNSSEC_FAIL_INDET) |
| 2390 |
return EDE_DNSSEC_IND; |
| 2391 |
else if (status & DNSSEC_FAIL_NOSIG) |
| 2392 |
return EDE_NO_RRSIG; |
| 2393 |
else |
| 2394 |
return EDE_UNSET; |
| 2395 |
} |
| 2396 |
#endif /* HAVE_DNSSEC */ |