| 1 |
/* |
| 2 |
* TLS CBC Record Handling |
| 3 |
* (C) 2012,2013,2014,2015,2016,2020 Jack Lloyd |
| 4 |
* (C) 2016 Juraj Somorovsky |
| 5 |
* (C) 2016 Matthias Gierlings |
| 6 |
* (C) 2016 Daniel Neus, Rohde & Schwarz Cybersecurity |
| 7 |
* |
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* Botan is released under the Simplified BSD License (see license.txt) |
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*/ |
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|
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#include <botan/internal/tls_cbc.h> |
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|
| 13 |
#include <botan/block_cipher.h> |
| 14 |
#include <botan/mac.h> |
| 15 |
#include <botan/tls_alert.h> |
| 16 |
#include <botan/tls_exceptn.h> |
| 17 |
#include <botan/tls_version.h> |
| 18 |
#include <botan/internal/cbc.h> |
| 19 |
#include <botan/internal/ct_utils.h> |
| 20 |
#include <botan/internal/loadstor.h> |
| 21 |
#include <botan/internal/rounding.h> |
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|
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namespace Botan::TLS { |
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|
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TLS_CBC_HMAC_AEAD_Mode::~TLS_CBC_HMAC_AEAD_Mode() = default; |
| 26 |
|
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/* |
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* TLS_CBC_HMAC_AEAD_Mode Constructor |
| 29 |
*/ |
| 30 |
TLS_CBC_HMAC_AEAD_Mode::TLS_CBC_HMAC_AEAD_Mode(Cipher_Dir dir, |
| 31 |
std::unique_ptr<BlockCipher> cipher, |
| 32 |
std::unique_ptr<MessageAuthenticationCode> mac, |
| 33 |
size_t cipher_keylen, |
| 34 |
size_t mac_keylen, |
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const Protocol_Version& version, |
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bool use_encrypt_then_mac) : |
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m_mac(std::move(mac)), |
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m_cipher_name(cipher->name()), |
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m_mac_name(m_mac->name()), |
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m_cipher_keylen(cipher_keylen), |
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m_block_size(cipher->block_size()), |
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m_iv_size(m_block_size), |
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m_mac_keylen(mac_keylen), |
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m_tag_size(m_mac->output_length()), |
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m_use_encrypt_then_mac(use_encrypt_then_mac), |
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m_is_datagram(version.is_datagram_protocol()) { |
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BOTAN_ASSERT_NOMSG(m_mac->valid_keylength(m_mac_keylen)); |
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BOTAN_ASSERT_NOMSG(cipher->valid_keylength(m_cipher_keylen)); |
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|
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auto null_padding = std::make_unique<Null_Padding>(); |
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if(dir == Cipher_Dir::Encryption) { |
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m_cbc = std::make_unique<CBC_Encryption>(std::move(cipher), std::move(null_padding)); |
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} else { |
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m_cbc = std::make_unique<CBC_Decryption>(std::move(cipher), std::move(null_padding)); |
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} |
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} |
| 57 |
|
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void TLS_CBC_HMAC_AEAD_Mode::clear() { |
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cbc().clear(); |
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mac().clear(); |
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reset(); |
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} |
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|
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void TLS_CBC_HMAC_AEAD_Mode::reset() { |
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cbc_state().clear(); |
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m_ad.clear(); |
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m_msg.clear(); |
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} |
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|
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std::string TLS_CBC_HMAC_AEAD_Mode::name() const { |
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return "TLS_CBC(" + m_cipher_name + "," + m_mac_name + ")"; |
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} |
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|
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size_t TLS_CBC_HMAC_AEAD_Mode::update_granularity() const { |
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return 1; // just buffers anyway |
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} |
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|
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size_t TLS_CBC_HMAC_AEAD_Mode::ideal_granularity() const { |
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return 1; // just buffers anyway |
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} |
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|
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bool TLS_CBC_HMAC_AEAD_Mode::valid_nonce_length(size_t nl) const { |
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if(m_cbc_state.empty()) { |
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return nl == block_size(); |
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} |
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return nl == iv_size(); |
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} |
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|
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Key_Length_Specification TLS_CBC_HMAC_AEAD_Mode::key_spec() const { |
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return Key_Length_Specification(m_cipher_keylen + m_mac_keylen); |
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} |
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|
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bool TLS_CBC_HMAC_AEAD_Mode::has_keying_material() const { |
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return mac().has_keying_material() && cbc().has_keying_material(); |
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} |
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|
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void TLS_CBC_HMAC_AEAD_Mode::key_schedule(std::span<const uint8_t> key) { |
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// Both keys are of fixed length specified by the ciphersuite |
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|
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if(key.size() != m_cipher_keylen + m_mac_keylen) { |
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throw Invalid_Key_Length(name(), key.size()); |
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} |
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|
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mac().set_key(key.first(m_mac_keylen)); |
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cbc().set_key(key.subspan(m_mac_keylen, m_cipher_keylen)); |
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} |
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|
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void TLS_CBC_HMAC_AEAD_Mode::start_msg(const uint8_t nonce[], size_t nonce_len) { |
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if(!valid_nonce_length(nonce_len)) { |
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throw Invalid_IV_Length(name(), nonce_len); |
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} |
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|
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m_msg.clear(); |
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|
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if(nonce_len > 0) { |
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m_cbc_state.assign(nonce, nonce + nonce_len); |
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} |
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} |
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|
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size_t TLS_CBC_HMAC_AEAD_Mode::process_msg(uint8_t buf[], size_t sz) { |
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m_msg.insert(m_msg.end(), buf, buf + sz); |
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return 0; |
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} |
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|
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std::vector<uint8_t> TLS_CBC_HMAC_AEAD_Mode::assoc_data_with_len(uint16_t len) { |
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std::vector<uint8_t> ad = m_ad; |
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BOTAN_ASSERT(ad.size() == 13, "Expected AAD size"); |
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ad[11] = get_byte<0>(len); |
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ad[12] = get_byte<1>(len); |
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return ad; |
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} |
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|
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void TLS_CBC_HMAC_AEAD_Mode::set_associated_data_n(size_t idx, std::span<const uint8_t> ad) { |
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BOTAN_ARG_CHECK(idx == 0, "TLS 1.2 CBC/HMAC: cannot handle non-zero index in set_associated_data_n"); |
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if(ad.size() != 13) { |
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throw Invalid_Argument("Invalid TLS AEAD associated data length"); |
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} |
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m_ad.assign(ad.begin(), ad.end()); |
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} |
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|
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TLS_CBC_HMAC_AEAD_Encryption::TLS_CBC_HMAC_AEAD_Encryption(std::unique_ptr<BlockCipher> cipher, |
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std::unique_ptr<MessageAuthenticationCode> mac, |
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const size_t cipher_keylen, |
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const size_t mac_keylen, |
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const Protocol_Version& version, |
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bool use_encrypt_then_mac) : |
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TLS_CBC_HMAC_AEAD_Mode(Cipher_Dir::Encryption, |
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std::move(cipher), |
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std::move(mac), |
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cipher_keylen, |
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mac_keylen, |
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version, |
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use_encrypt_then_mac) {} |
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|
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void TLS_CBC_HMAC_AEAD_Encryption::set_associated_data_n(size_t idx, std::span<const uint8_t> ad) { |
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TLS_CBC_HMAC_AEAD_Mode::set_associated_data_n(idx, ad); |
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|
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if(use_encrypt_then_mac()) { |
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// AAD hack for EtM |
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// EtM uses ciphertext size instead of plaintext size for AEAD input |
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const uint16_t pt_size = make_uint16(assoc_data()[11], assoc_data()[12]); |
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const uint16_t enc_size = static_cast<uint16_t>(round_up(iv_size() + pt_size + 1, block_size())); |
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assoc_data()[11] = get_byte<0, uint16_t>(enc_size); |
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assoc_data()[12] = get_byte<1, uint16_t>(enc_size); |
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} |
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} |
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|
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void TLS_CBC_HMAC_AEAD_Encryption::cbc_encrypt_record(secure_vector<uint8_t>& buffer, |
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size_t offset, |
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size_t padding_length) { |
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// We always do short padding: |
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BOTAN_ASSERT_NOMSG(padding_length <= 16); |
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|
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buffer.resize(buffer.size() + padding_length); |
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|
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const uint8_t padding_val = static_cast<uint8_t>(padding_length - 1); |
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|
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CT::poison(&padding_val, 1); |
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CT::poison(&padding_length, 1); |
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CT::poison(buffer.data(), buffer.size()); |
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|
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const size_t last_block_starts = buffer.size() - block_size(); |
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const size_t padding_starts = buffer.size() - padding_length; |
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for(size_t i = last_block_starts; i != buffer.size(); ++i) { |
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auto add_padding = CT::Mask<uint8_t>(CT::Mask<size_t>::is_gte(i, padding_starts)); |
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buffer[i] = add_padding.select(padding_val, buffer[i]); |
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} |
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|
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CT::unpoison(padding_val); |
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CT::unpoison(padding_length); |
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CT::unpoison(buffer.data(), buffer.size()); |
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|
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cbc().start(cbc_state()); |
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cbc().process(&buffer[offset], buffer.size() - offset); |
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|
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cbc_state().assign(buffer.data() + (buffer.size() - block_size()), buffer.data() + buffer.size()); |
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} |
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|
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size_t TLS_CBC_HMAC_AEAD_Encryption::output_length(size_t input_length) const { |
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return round_up(input_length + 1 + (use_encrypt_then_mac() ? 0 : tag_size()), block_size()) + |
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(use_encrypt_then_mac() ? tag_size() : 0); |
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} |
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|
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void TLS_CBC_HMAC_AEAD_Encryption::finish_msg(secure_vector<uint8_t>& buffer, size_t offset) { |
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update(buffer, offset); |
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|
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const size_t msg_size = msg().size(); |
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|
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const size_t input_size = msg_size + 1 + (use_encrypt_then_mac() ? 0 : tag_size()); |
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const size_t enc_size = round_up(input_size, block_size()); |
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BOTAN_DEBUG_ASSERT(enc_size % block_size() == 0); |
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|
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const uint8_t padding_val = static_cast<uint8_t>(enc_size - input_size); |
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const size_t padding_length = static_cast<size_t>(padding_val) + 1; |
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|
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buffer.reserve(offset + msg_size + padding_length + tag_size()); |
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buffer.resize(offset + msg_size); |
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if(msg_size > 0) { |
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copy_mem(&buffer[offset], msg().data(), msg_size); |
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} |
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|
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mac().update(assoc_data()); |
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|
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if(use_encrypt_then_mac()) { |
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if(iv_size() > 0) { |
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mac().update(cbc_state()); |
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} |
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|
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cbc_encrypt_record(buffer, offset, padding_length); |
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mac().update(&buffer[offset], enc_size); |
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buffer.resize(buffer.size() + tag_size()); |
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mac().final(&buffer[buffer.size() - tag_size()]); |
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} else { |
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if(msg_size > 0) { |
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mac().update(&buffer[offset], msg_size); |
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} |
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buffer.resize(buffer.size() + tag_size()); |
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mac().final(&buffer[buffer.size() - tag_size()]); |
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cbc_encrypt_record(buffer, offset, padding_length); |
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} |
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} |
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|
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/* |
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* Checks the TLS padding. Returns 0 if the padding is invalid (we |
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* count the padding_length field as part of the padding size so a |
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* valid padding will always be at least one byte long), or the length |
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* of the padding otherwise. This is actually padding_length + 1 |
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* because both the padding and padding_length fields are padding from |
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* our perspective. |
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* |
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* Returning 0 in the error case should ensure the MAC check will fail. |
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* This approach is suggested in section 6.2.3.2 of RFC 5246. |
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*/ |
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uint16_t check_tls_cbc_padding(const uint8_t record[], size_t record_len) { |
| 255 |
if(record_len == 0 || record_len > 0xFFFF) { |
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return 0; |
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} |
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|
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const uint16_t rec16 = static_cast<uint16_t>(record_len); |
| 260 |
|
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/* |
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* TLS v1.0 and up require all the padding bytes be the same value |
| 263 |
* and allows up to 255 bytes. |
| 264 |
*/ |
| 265 |
|
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const uint16_t to_check = std::min<uint16_t>(256, static_cast<uint16_t>(record_len)); |
| 267 |
const uint8_t pad_byte = record[record_len - 1]; |
| 268 |
const uint16_t pad_bytes = 1 + pad_byte; |
| 269 |
|
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auto pad_invalid = CT::Mask<uint16_t>::is_lt(rec16, pad_bytes); |
| 271 |
|
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for(uint16_t i = rec16 - to_check; i != rec16; ++i) { |
| 273 |
const uint16_t offset = rec16 - i; |
| 274 |
const auto in_pad_range = CT::Mask<uint16_t>::is_lte(offset, pad_bytes); |
| 275 |
const auto pad_correct = CT::Mask<uint16_t>::is_equal(record[i], pad_byte); |
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pad_invalid |= in_pad_range & ~pad_correct; |
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} |
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|
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return pad_invalid.if_not_set_return(pad_bytes); |
| 280 |
} |
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|
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TLS_CBC_HMAC_AEAD_Decryption::TLS_CBC_HMAC_AEAD_Decryption(std::unique_ptr<BlockCipher> cipher, |
| 283 |
std::unique_ptr<MessageAuthenticationCode> mac, |
| 284 |
const size_t cipher_keylen, |
| 285 |
const size_t mac_keylen, |
| 286 |
const Protocol_Version& version, |
| 287 |
bool use_encrypt_then_mac) : |
| 288 |
TLS_CBC_HMAC_AEAD_Mode(Cipher_Dir::Decryption, |
| 289 |
std::move(cipher), |
| 290 |
std::move(mac), |
| 291 |
cipher_keylen, |
| 292 |
mac_keylen, |
| 293 |
version, |
| 294 |
use_encrypt_then_mac) {} |
| 295 |
|
| 296 |
void TLS_CBC_HMAC_AEAD_Decryption::cbc_decrypt_record(uint8_t record_contents[], size_t record_len) { |
| 297 |
if(record_len == 0 || record_len % block_size() != 0) { |
| 298 |
throw Decoding_Error("Received TLS CBC ciphertext with invalid length"); |
| 299 |
} |
| 300 |
|
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cbc().start(cbc_state()); |
| 302 |
cbc_state().assign(record_contents + record_len - block_size(), record_contents + record_len); |
| 303 |
|
| 304 |
cbc().process(record_contents, record_len); |
| 305 |
} |
| 306 |
|
| 307 |
size_t TLS_CBC_HMAC_AEAD_Decryption::output_length(size_t /*input_length*/) const { |
| 308 |
/* |
| 309 |
* We don't know this because the padding is arbitrary |
| 310 |
*/ |
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return 0; |
| 312 |
} |
| 313 |
|
| 314 |
/* |
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* This function performs additional compression calls in order |
| 316 |
* to protect from the Lucky 13 attack. It adds new compression |
| 317 |
* function calls over dummy data, by computing additional HMAC updates. |
| 318 |
* |
| 319 |
* The countermeasure was described (in a similar way) in the Lucky 13 paper. |
| 320 |
* |
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* Background: |
| 322 |
* - One SHA-1/SHA-256 compression is performed with 64 bytes of data. |
| 323 |
* - HMAC adds 8 byte length field and padding (at least 1 byte) so that we have: |
| 324 |
* - 0 - 55 bytes: 1 compression |
| 325 |
* - 56 - 55+64 bytes: 2 compressions |
| 326 |
* - 56+64 - 55+2*64 bytes: 3 compressions ... |
| 327 |
* - For SHA-384, this works similarly, but we have 128 byte blocks and 16 byte |
| 328 |
* long length field. This results in: |
| 329 |
* - 0 - 111 bytes: 1 compression |
| 330 |
* - 112 - 111+128 bytes: 2 compressions ... |
| 331 |
* |
| 332 |
* The implemented countermeasure works as follows: |
| 333 |
* 1) It computes max_compressions: number of maximum compressions performed on |
| 334 |
* the decrypted data |
| 335 |
* 2) It computes current_compressions: number of compressions performed on the |
| 336 |
* decrypted data, after padding has been removed |
| 337 |
* 3) If current_compressions != max_compressions: It invokes an HMAC update |
| 338 |
* over dummy data so that (max_compressions - current_compressions) |
| 339 |
* compressions are performed. Otherwise, it invokes an HMAC update so that |
| 340 |
* no compressions are performed. |
| 341 |
* |
| 342 |
* Note that the padding validation in Botan is always performed over |
| 343 |
* min(plen,256) bytes, see the function check_tls_cbc_padding. This differs |
| 344 |
* from the countermeasure described in the paper. |
| 345 |
* |
| 346 |
* Note that the padding length padlen does also count the last byte |
| 347 |
* of the decrypted plaintext. This is different from the Lucky 13 paper. |
| 348 |
* |
| 349 |
* This countermeasure leaves a difference of about 100 clock cycles (in |
| 350 |
* comparison to >1000 clock cycles observed without it). |
| 351 |
* |
| 352 |
* plen represents the length of the decrypted plaintext message P |
| 353 |
* padlen represents the padding length |
| 354 |
* |
| 355 |
*/ |
| 356 |
void TLS_CBC_HMAC_AEAD_Decryption::perform_additional_compressions(size_t plen, size_t padlen) { |
| 357 |
const bool is_sha384 = mac().name() == "HMAC(SHA-384)"; |
| 358 |
const uint16_t block_size = is_sha384 ? 128 : 64; |
| 359 |
const uint16_t max_bytes_in_first_block = is_sha384 ? 111 : 55; |
| 360 |
|
| 361 |
// number of maximum MACed bytes |
| 362 |
const uint16_t L1 = static_cast<uint16_t>(13 + plen - tag_size()); |
| 363 |
// number of current MACed bytes (L1 - padlen) |
| 364 |
// Here the Lucky 13 paper is different because the padlen length in the paper |
| 365 |
// does not count the last message byte. |
| 366 |
const uint16_t L2 = static_cast<uint16_t>(13 + plen - padlen - tag_size()); |
| 367 |
// From the paper, for SHA-256/SHA-1 compute: ceil((L1-55)/64) and ceil((L2-55)/64) |
| 368 |
// ceil((L1-55)/64) = floor((L1+64-1-55)/64) |
| 369 |
// Here we compute number of compressions for SHA-* in general |
| 370 |
const uint16_t max_compresssions = ((L1 + block_size - 1 - max_bytes_in_first_block) / block_size); |
| 371 |
const uint16_t current_compressions = ((L2 + block_size - 1 - max_bytes_in_first_block) / block_size); |
| 372 |
// number of additional compressions we have to perform |
| 373 |
const uint16_t add_compressions = max_compresssions - current_compressions; |
| 374 |
const uint16_t equal = CT::Mask<uint16_t>::is_equal(max_compresssions, current_compressions).if_set_return(1); |
| 375 |
// We compute the data length we need to achieve the number of compressions. |
| 376 |
// If there are no compressions, we just add 55/111 dummy bytes so that no |
| 377 |
// compression is performed. |
| 378 |
const uint16_t data_len = block_size * add_compressions + equal * max_bytes_in_first_block; |
| 379 |
std::vector<uint8_t> data(data_len); |
| 380 |
mac().update(data); |
| 381 |
// we do not need to clear the MAC since the connection is broken anyway |
| 382 |
} |
| 383 |
|
| 384 |
void TLS_CBC_HMAC_AEAD_Decryption::finish_msg(secure_vector<uint8_t>& buffer, size_t offset) { |
| 385 |
update(buffer, offset); |
| 386 |
buffer.resize(offset); |
| 387 |
|
| 388 |
const size_t record_len = msg().size(); |
| 389 |
uint8_t* record_contents = msg().data(); |
| 390 |
|
| 391 |
// This early exit does not leak info because all the values compared are public |
| 392 |
if(record_len < tag_size() || (record_len - (use_encrypt_then_mac() ? tag_size() : 0)) % block_size() != 0) { |
| 393 |
throw TLS_Exception(Alert::BadRecordMac, "Message authentication failure"); |
| 394 |
} |
| 395 |
|
| 396 |
if(use_encrypt_then_mac()) { |
| 397 |
const size_t enc_size = record_len - tag_size(); |
| 398 |
const size_t enc_iv_size = enc_size + iv_size(); |
| 399 |
|
| 400 |
BOTAN_ASSERT_NOMSG(enc_iv_size <= 0xFFFF); |
| 401 |
|
| 402 |
mac().update(assoc_data_with_len(static_cast<uint16_t>(enc_iv_size))); |
| 403 |
if(iv_size() > 0) { |
| 404 |
mac().update(cbc_state()); |
| 405 |
} |
| 406 |
mac().update(record_contents, enc_size); |
| 407 |
|
| 408 |
std::vector<uint8_t> mac_buf(tag_size()); |
| 409 |
mac().final(mac_buf.data()); |
| 410 |
|
| 411 |
const size_t mac_offset = enc_size; |
| 412 |
|
| 413 |
const auto mac_ok = CT::is_equal(&record_contents[mac_offset], mac_buf.data(), tag_size()); |
| 414 |
|
| 415 |
if(!mac_ok.as_bool()) { |
| 416 |
throw TLS_Exception(Alert::BadRecordMac, "Message authentication failure"); |
| 417 |
} |
| 418 |
|
| 419 |
cbc_decrypt_record(record_contents, enc_size); |
| 420 |
|
| 421 |
// 0 if padding was invalid, otherwise 1 + padding_bytes |
| 422 |
const uint16_t pad_size = check_tls_cbc_padding(record_contents, enc_size); |
| 423 |
|
| 424 |
// No oracle here, whoever sent us this had the key since MAC check passed |
| 425 |
if(pad_size == 0) { |
| 426 |
throw TLS_Exception(Alert::BadRecordMac, "Message authentication failure"); |
| 427 |
} |
| 428 |
|
| 429 |
const uint8_t* plaintext_block = &record_contents[0]; |
| 430 |
const size_t plaintext_length = enc_size - pad_size; |
| 431 |
|
| 432 |
buffer.insert(buffer.end(), plaintext_block, plaintext_block + plaintext_length); |
| 433 |
} else { |
| 434 |
cbc_decrypt_record(record_contents, record_len); |
| 435 |
|
| 436 |
CT::poison(record_contents, record_len); |
| 437 |
|
| 438 |
// 0 if padding was invalid, otherwise 1 + padding_bytes |
| 439 |
uint16_t pad_size = check_tls_cbc_padding(record_contents, record_len); |
| 440 |
|
| 441 |
/* |
| 442 |
This mask is zero if there is not enough room in the packet to get a valid MAC. |
| 443 |
|
| 444 |
We have to accept empty packets, since otherwise we are not compatible |
| 445 |
with how OpenSSL's countermeasure for fixing BEAST in TLS 1.0 CBC works |
| 446 |
(sending empty records, instead of 1/(n-1) splitting) |
| 447 |
*/ |
| 448 |
|
| 449 |
// We know the cast cannot overflow as pad_size <= 256 && tag_size <= 32 |
| 450 |
const auto size_ok_mask = |
| 451 |
CT::Mask<uint16_t>::is_lte(static_cast<uint16_t>(tag_size() + pad_size), static_cast<uint16_t>(record_len)); |
| 452 |
|
| 453 |
pad_size = size_ok_mask.if_set_return(pad_size); |
| 454 |
|
| 455 |
CT::unpoison(record_contents, record_len); |
| 456 |
|
| 457 |
/* |
| 458 |
This is unpoisoned sooner than it should. The pad_size leaks to plaintext_length and |
| 459 |
then to the timing channel in the MAC computation described in the Lucky 13 paper. |
| 460 |
*/ |
| 461 |
CT::unpoison(pad_size); |
| 462 |
|
| 463 |
const uint8_t* plaintext_block = &record_contents[0]; |
| 464 |
const uint16_t plaintext_length = static_cast<uint16_t>(record_len - tag_size() - pad_size); |
| 465 |
|
| 466 |
mac().update(assoc_data_with_len(plaintext_length)); |
| 467 |
mac().update(plaintext_block, plaintext_length); |
| 468 |
|
| 469 |
std::vector<uint8_t> mac_buf(tag_size()); |
| 470 |
mac().final(mac_buf.data()); |
| 471 |
|
| 472 |
const size_t mac_offset = record_len - (tag_size() + pad_size); |
| 473 |
|
| 474 |
const auto mac_ok = CT::is_equal(&record_contents[mac_offset], mac_buf.data(), tag_size()); |
| 475 |
|
| 476 |
const auto ok_mask = size_ok_mask & CT::Mask<uint16_t>::expand(mac_ok) & CT::Mask<uint16_t>::expand(pad_size); |
| 477 |
|
| 478 |
CT::unpoison(ok_mask); |
| 479 |
|
| 480 |
if(ok_mask.as_bool()) { |
| 481 |
buffer.insert(buffer.end(), plaintext_block, plaintext_block + plaintext_length); |
| 482 |
} else { |
| 483 |
perform_additional_compressions(record_len, pad_size); |
| 484 |
|
| 485 |
/* |
| 486 |
* In DTLS case we have to finish computing the MAC since we require the |
| 487 |
* MAC state be reset for future packets. This extra timing channel may |
| 488 |
* be exploitable in a Lucky13 variant. |
| 489 |
*/ |
| 490 |
if(is_datagram_protocol()) { |
| 491 |
mac().final(mac_buf); |
| 492 |
} |
| 493 |
throw TLS_Exception(Alert::BadRecordMac, "Message authentication failure"); |
| 494 |
} |
| 495 |
} |
| 496 |
} |
| 497 |
|
| 498 |
} // namespace Botan::TLS |