| 1 |
// Copyright 2016 The Closure Library Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
| 2 |
// |
| 3 |
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); |
| 4 |
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. |
| 5 |
// You may obtain a copy of the License at |
| 6 |
// |
| 7 |
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 |
| 8 |
// |
| 9 |
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software |
| 10 |
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS-IS" BASIS, |
| 11 |
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. |
| 12 |
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and |
| 13 |
// limitations under the License. |
| 14 |
|
| 15 |
|
| 16 |
/** |
| 17 |
* @fileoverview Unit tests for HTML Sanitizer |
| 18 |
*/ |
| 19 |
|
| 20 |
goog.provide('goog.html.HtmlSanitizerTest'); |
| 21 |
goog.setTestOnly(); |
| 22 |
|
| 23 |
goog.require('goog.array'); |
| 24 |
goog.require('goog.dom'); |
| 25 |
goog.require('goog.functions'); |
| 26 |
goog.require('goog.html.SafeHtml'); |
| 27 |
goog.require('goog.html.SafeUrl'); |
| 28 |
goog.require('goog.html.sanitizer.HtmlSanitizer'); |
| 29 |
goog.require('goog.html.sanitizer.HtmlSanitizer.Builder'); |
| 30 |
goog.require('goog.html.sanitizer.TagBlacklist'); |
| 31 |
goog.require('goog.html.sanitizer.TagWhitelist'); |
| 32 |
goog.require('goog.html.sanitizer.unsafe'); |
| 33 |
goog.require('goog.html.testing'); |
| 34 |
goog.require('goog.object'); |
| 35 |
goog.require('goog.string.Const'); |
| 36 |
goog.require('goog.testing.dom'); |
| 37 |
goog.require('goog.testing.jsunit'); |
| 38 |
goog.require('goog.userAgent'); |
| 39 |
goog.require('goog.userAgent.product'); |
| 40 |
|
| 41 |
|
| 42 |
var isIE8 = goog.userAgent.IE && !goog.userAgent.isVersionOrHigher(9); |
| 43 |
|
| 44 |
|
| 45 |
var isIE9 = |
| 46 |
goog.userAgent.IE && !goog.userAgent.isVersionOrHigher(10) && !isIE8; |
| 47 |
|
| 48 |
|
| 49 |
var justification = goog.string.Const.from('test'); |
| 50 |
|
| 51 |
|
| 52 |
/** |
| 53 |
* Sanitizes the original HTML and asserts that it is the same as the expected |
| 54 |
* HTML. If present the config is passed through to the sanitizer. Supports |
| 55 |
* approximate matching using a RegExp. |
| 56 |
* @param {string} originalHtml |
| 57 |
* @param {string|!RegExp} expectedHtml |
| 58 |
* @param {?goog.html.sanitizer.HtmlSanitizer=} opt_sanitizer |
| 59 |
*/ |
| 60 |
function assertSanitizedHtml(originalHtml, expectedHtml, opt_sanitizer) { |
| 61 |
var sanitizer = |
| 62 |
opt_sanitizer || new goog.html.sanitizer.HtmlSanitizer.Builder().build(); |
| 63 |
try { |
| 64 |
var sanitized = goog.html.SafeHtml.unwrap(sanitizer.sanitize(originalHtml)); |
| 65 |
if (isIE9) { |
| 66 |
assertEquals('', sanitized); |
| 67 |
return; |
| 68 |
} |
| 69 |
if (typeof expectedHtml == 'string') { |
| 70 |
goog.testing.dom.assertHtmlMatches( |
| 71 |
expectedHtml, sanitized, true /* opt_strictAttributes */); |
| 72 |
} else { |
| 73 |
assertRegExp(expectedHtml, sanitized); |
| 74 |
} |
| 75 |
} catch (err) { |
| 76 |
if (!isIE8) { |
| 77 |
throw err; |
| 78 |
} |
| 79 |
} |
| 80 |
if (!opt_sanitizer) { |
| 81 |
// Retry with raw sanitizer created without the builder. |
| 82 |
assertSanitizedHtml( |
| 83 |
originalHtml, expectedHtml, new goog.html.sanitizer.HtmlSanitizer()); |
| 84 |
// Retry with an explicitly passed in Builder. |
| 85 |
var builder = new goog.html.sanitizer.HtmlSanitizer.Builder(); |
| 86 |
assertSanitizedHtml( |
| 87 |
originalHtml, expectedHtml, |
| 88 |
new goog.html.sanitizer.HtmlSanitizer(builder)); |
| 89 |
} |
| 90 |
} |
| 91 |
|
| 92 |
|
| 93 |
/** |
| 94 |
* @param {!goog.html.SafeHtml} safeHtml Sanitized HTML which contains a style. |
| 95 |
* @return {string} cssText contained within SafeHtml. |
| 96 |
*/ |
| 97 |
function getStyle(safeHtml) { |
| 98 |
var tmpElement = goog.dom.safeHtmlToNode(safeHtml); |
| 99 |
return tmpElement.style ? tmpElement.style.cssText : ''; |
| 100 |
} |
| 101 |
|
| 102 |
|
| 103 |
/** |
| 104 |
* Shorthand for sanitized tags |
| 105 |
* @param {string} tag |
| 106 |
* @return {string} |
| 107 |
*/ |
| 108 |
function otag(tag) { |
| 109 |
return 'data-sanitizer-original-tag="' + tag + '"'; |
| 110 |
} |
| 111 |
|
| 112 |
|
| 113 |
/** |
| 114 |
* Sanitize content, let the browser apply its own HTML tree correction by |
| 115 |
* attaching the content to the document, and then assert it matches the |
| 116 |
* expected value. |
| 117 |
* @param {string} expected |
| 118 |
* @param {string} input |
| 119 |
*/ |
| 120 |
function assertAfterInsertionEquals(expected, input) { |
| 121 |
var sanitizer = |
| 122 |
new Builder().allowFormTag().allowStyleTag().withStyleContainer().build(); |
| 123 |
input = SafeHtml.unwrap(sanitizer.sanitize(input)); |
| 124 |
var div = document.createElement('div'); |
| 125 |
document.body.appendChild(div); |
| 126 |
div.innerHTML = input; |
| 127 |
googTestingDom.assertHtmlMatches( |
| 128 |
expected, div.innerHTML, true /* opt_strictAttributes */); |
| 129 |
div.parentNode.removeChild(div); |
| 130 |
} |
| 131 |
|
| 132 |
|
| 133 |
function testHtmlSanitizeSafeHtml() { |
| 134 |
var html; |
| 135 |
html = 'hello world'; |
| 136 |
assertSanitizedHtml(html, html); |
| 137 |
|
| 138 |
html = '<b>hello world</b>'; |
| 139 |
assertSanitizedHtml(html, html); |
| 140 |
|
| 141 |
html = '<i>hello world</i>'; |
| 142 |
assertSanitizedHtml(html, html); |
| 143 |
|
| 144 |
html = '<u>hello world</u>'; |
| 145 |
assertSanitizedHtml(html, html); |
| 146 |
|
| 147 |
// NOTE(user): original did not have tbody |
| 148 |
html = '<table><tbody><tr><td>hello world</td></tr></tbody></table>'; |
| 149 |
assertSanitizedHtml(html, html); |
| 150 |
|
| 151 |
html = '<h1>hello world</h1>'; |
| 152 |
assertSanitizedHtml(html, html); |
| 153 |
|
| 154 |
html = '<div>hello world</div>'; |
| 155 |
assertSanitizedHtml(html, html); |
| 156 |
|
| 157 |
html = '<a>hello world</a>'; |
| 158 |
assertSanitizedHtml(html, html); |
| 159 |
|
| 160 |
html = '<div><span>hello world</span></div>'; |
| 161 |
assertSanitizedHtml(html, html); |
| 162 |
|
| 163 |
html = '<div><a target=\'_blank\'>hello world</a></div>'; |
| 164 |
assertSanitizedHtml(html, html); |
| 165 |
} |
| 166 |
|
| 167 |
|
| 168 |
// TODO(pelizzi): name of test does not make sense |
| 169 |
function testDefaultCssSanitizeImage() { |
| 170 |
var html = '<div></div>'; |
| 171 |
assertSanitizedHtml(html, html); |
| 172 |
} |
| 173 |
|
| 174 |
|
| 175 |
function testBuilderCanOnlyBeUsedOnce() { |
| 176 |
var builder = new goog.html.sanitizer.HtmlSanitizer.Builder(); |
| 177 |
builder.build(); |
| 178 |
assertThrows(function() { |
| 179 |
builder.build(); |
| 180 |
}); |
| 181 |
assertThrows(function() { |
| 182 |
new goog.html.sanitizer.HtmlSanitizer(builder); |
| 183 |
}); |
| 184 |
} |
| 185 |
|
| 186 |
|
| 187 |
function testAllowedCssSanitizeImage() { |
| 188 |
var testUrl = 'http://www.example.com/image3.jpg'; |
| 189 |
var html = '<div style="background: url(' + testUrl + ');"></div>'; |
| 190 |
|
| 191 |
var sanitizer = |
| 192 |
new goog.html.sanitizer.HtmlSanitizer.Builder() |
| 193 |
.allowCssStyles() |
| 194 |
.withCustomNetworkRequestUrlPolicy(goog.html.SafeUrl.sanitize) |
| 195 |
.build(); |
| 196 |
|
| 197 |
try { |
| 198 |
var sanitizedHtml = sanitizer.sanitize(html); |
| 199 |
if (isIE9) { |
| 200 |
assertEquals('', goog.html.SafeHtml.unwrap(sanitizedHtml)); |
| 201 |
return; |
| 202 |
} |
| 203 |
assertRegExp( |
| 204 |
/background(?:-image)?:.*url\(.?http:\/\/www.example.com\/image3.jpg.?\)/, |
| 205 |
getStyle(sanitizedHtml)); |
| 206 |
} catch (err) { |
| 207 |
if (!isIE8) { |
| 208 |
throw err; |
| 209 |
} |
| 210 |
} |
| 211 |
} |
| 212 |
|
| 213 |
|
| 214 |
function testHtmlSanitizeXSS() { |
| 215 |
// NOTE(user): xss cheat sheet found on http://ha.ckers.org/xss.html |
| 216 |
var safeHtml, xssHtml; |
| 217 |
// Inserting <script> tags is unsafe |
| 218 |
// Browser Support [IE7.0|IE6.0|NS8.1-IE] [NS8.1-G|FF2.0] |
| 219 |
safeHtml = ''; |
| 220 |
xssHtml = '<SCRIPT SRC=xss.js><\/SCRIPT>'; |
| 221 |
assertSanitizedHtml(xssHtml, safeHtml); |
| 222 |
// removes strings like javascript:, alert, etc |
| 223 |
// Image XSS using the javascript directive |
| 224 |
// Browser Support [IE6.0|IE8.0|NS8.1-IE] |
| 225 |
safeHtml = '<img />'; |
| 226 |
xssHtml = '<IMG SRC="javascript:xss=true;">'; |
| 227 |
assertSanitizedHtml(xssHtml, safeHtml); |
| 228 |
|
| 229 |
safeHtml = '<div><a>hello world</a></div>'; |
| 230 |
xssHtml = '<div><a target=\'_xss\'>hello world</a></div>'; |
| 231 |
assertSanitizedHtml(xssHtml, safeHtml); |
| 232 |
|
| 233 |
safeHtml = ''; |
| 234 |
xssHtml = '<IFRAME SRC="javascript:xss=true;">'; |
| 235 |
assertSanitizedHtml(xssHtml, safeHtml); |
| 236 |
|
| 237 |
safeHtml = ''; |
| 238 |
xssHtml = '<iframe src=" javascript:xss=true;">'; |
| 239 |
assertSanitizedHtml(xssHtml, safeHtml); |
| 240 |
|
| 241 |
// no quotes and no semicolon |
| 242 |
// Browser Support [IE6.0|NS8.1-IE] |
| 243 |
safeHtml = '<img />'; |
| 244 |
xssHtml = '<IMG SRC=javascript:alert("XSS")>'; |
| 245 |
assertSanitizedHtml(xssHtml, safeHtml); |
| 246 |
|
| 247 |
// case insensitive xss attack |
| 248 |
// Browser Support [IE6.0|NS8.1-IE] |
| 249 |
safeHtml = '<img />'; |
| 250 |
xssHtml = '<IMG SRC=JaVaScRiPt:alert("XSS")>'; |
| 251 |
assertSanitizedHtml(xssHtml, safeHtml); |
| 252 |
|
| 253 |
// HTML Entities |
| 254 |
// Browser Support [IE6.0|NS8.1-IE] |
| 255 |
safeHtml = '<img />'; |
| 256 |
xssHtml = '<IMG SRC=javascript:alert("XSS")>'; |
| 257 |
assertSanitizedHtml(xssHtml, safeHtml); |
| 258 |
|
| 259 |
// Grave accent obfuscation (If you need to use both double and single quotes |
| 260 |
// you can use a grave accent to encapsulate the JavaScript string) |
| 261 |
// Browser Support [IE6.0|NS8.1-IE] |
| 262 |
safeHtml = '<img />'; |
| 263 |
xssHtml = '<IMG SRC=`javascript:alert("foo \'bar\'")`>'; |
| 264 |
assertSanitizedHtml(xssHtml, safeHtml); |
| 265 |
|
| 266 |
safeHtml = '<img />'; |
| 267 |
xssHtml = '<IMG data-xxx=`yyy`>'; |
| 268 |
assertSanitizedHtml(xssHtml, safeHtml); |
| 269 |
|
| 270 |
// Malformed IMG tags |
| 271 |
// http://www.begeek.it/2006/03/18/esclusivo-vulnerabilita-xss-in-firefox/#more-300 |
| 272 |
// Browser Support [IE7.0|IE6.0|NS8.1-IE] [NS8.1-G|FF2.0] |
| 273 |
safeHtml = '<img />">'; |
| 274 |
xssHtml = '<IMG """><SCRIPT defer>exploited = true;<\/SCRIPT>">'; |
| 275 |
assertSanitizedHtml(xssHtml, safeHtml); |
| 276 |
|
| 277 |
// UTF-8 Unicode encoding |
| 278 |
// Browser Support [IE6.0|NS8.1-IE] |
| 279 |
safeHtml = '<img />'; |
| 280 |
xssHtml = '<IMG SRC=javascrip' + |
| 281 |
't:alert('XSS'' + |
| 282 |
')>'; |
| 283 |
assertSanitizedHtml(xssHtml, safeHtml); |
| 284 |
|
| 285 |
// Long UTF-8 Unicode encoding without semicolons (this is often effective |
| 286 |
// in XSS that attempts to look for "&#XX;", since most people don't know |
| 287 |
// about padding - up to 7 numeric characters total). This is also useful |
| 288 |
// against people who decode against strings like |
| 289 |
// $tmp_string =~ s/.*\&#(\d+);.*/$1/; which incorrectly assumes a semicolon |
| 290 |
// is required to terminate a html encoded string: |
| 291 |
// Browser Support [IE6.0|NS8.1-IE] |
| 292 |
safeHtml = '<img />'; |
| 293 |
xssHtml = '<IMG SRC=javasc' + |
| 294 |
'ript:al' + |
| 295 |
'ert('XS' + |
| 296 |
'S')>'; |
| 297 |
assertSanitizedHtml(xssHtml, safeHtml); |
| 298 |
|
| 299 |
// Hex encoding without semicolons (this is also a viable XSS attack against |
| 300 |
// the above string $tmp_string =~ s/.*\&#(\d+);.*/$1/; which assumes that |
| 301 |
// there is a numeric character following the pound symbol - which is not true |
| 302 |
// with hex HTML characters). Use the XSS calculator for more information: |
| 303 |
// Browser Support [IE6.0|NS8.1-IE] |
| 304 |
safeHtml = '<img />'; |
| 305 |
xssHtml = '<IMG SRC=javascript:' + |
| 306 |
'alert('XSS')>'; |
| 307 |
assertSanitizedHtml(xssHtml, safeHtml); |
| 308 |
|
| 309 |
// Embedded tab |
| 310 |
// Browser Support [IE6.0|NS8.1-IE] |
| 311 |
safeHtml = '<img />'; |
| 312 |
xssHtml = '<IMG SRC="jav\tascript:xss=true;">'; |
| 313 |
assertSanitizedHtml(xssHtml, safeHtml); |
| 314 |
|
| 315 |
// Embedded encoded tab |
| 316 |
// Browser Support [IE6.0|NS8.1-IE] |
| 317 |
safeHtml = '<img />'; |
| 318 |
xssHtml = '<IMG SRC="jav	ascript:xss=true;">'; |
| 319 |
assertSanitizedHtml(xssHtml, safeHtml); |
| 320 |
|
| 321 |
// Embeded newline to break up XSS. Some websites claim that any of the chars |
| 322 |
// 09-13 (decimal) will work for this attack. That is incorrect. Only 09 |
| 323 |
// (horizontal tab), 10 (newline) and 13 (carriage return) work. See the ascii |
| 324 |
// chart for more details. The following four XSS examples illustrate this |
| 325 |
// vector: |
| 326 |
// Browser Support [IE6.0|NS8.1-IE] |
| 327 |
safeHtml = '<img />'; |
| 328 |
xssHtml = '<IMG SRC="jav
ascript:xss=true;">'; |
| 329 |
assertSanitizedHtml(xssHtml, safeHtml); |
| 330 |
|
| 331 |
// Multiline Injected JavaScript using ASCII carriage returns (same as above |
| 332 |
// only a more extreme example of this XSS vector) these are not spaces just |
| 333 |
// one of the three characters as described above: |
| 334 |
// Browser Support [IE6.0|NS8.1-IE] |
| 335 |
safeHtml = '<img />'; |
| 336 |
xssHtml = '<IMG\nSRC\n=\n"\nj\na\nv\na\ns\nc\nr\ni\np\nt\n:\na\nl\ne\nr\nt' + |
| 337 |
'\n(\n"\nX\nS\nS\n"\n)\n"\n>'; |
| 338 |
assertSanitizedHtml(xssHtml, safeHtml); |
| 339 |
|
| 340 |
// Null breaks up JavaScript directive. Okay, I lied, null chars also work as |
| 341 |
// XSS vectors but not like above, you need to inject them directly using |
| 342 |
// something like Burp Proxy or use %00 in the URL string or if you want to |
| 343 |
// write your own injection tool you can either use vim (^V^@ will produce a |
| 344 |
// null) or the following program to generate it into a text file. Okay, I |
| 345 |
// lied again, older versions of Opera (circa 7.11 on Windows) were vulnerable |
| 346 |
// to one additional char 173 (the soft hypen control char). But the null |
| 347 |
// char %00 is much more useful and helped me bypass certain real world |
| 348 |
// filters with a variation on this example: |
| 349 |
// Browser Support [IE6.0|IE7.0|NS8.1-IE] |
| 350 |
safeHtml = '<img />'; |
| 351 |
xssHtml = '<IMG SRC=java\0script:alert("hey");>'; |
| 352 |
assertSanitizedHtml(xssHtml, safeHtml); |
| 353 |
|
| 354 |
// On IE9, the null character actually causes us to only see <SCR. The |
| 355 |
// sanitizer on IE9 doesn't "recover as well" as other browsers but the |
| 356 |
// result is safe. |
| 357 |
safeHtml = isIE9 ? '' : '<span>alert("XSS")</span>'; |
| 358 |
xssHtml = '<SCR\0IPT>alert(\"XSS\")</SCR\0IPT>'; |
| 359 |
assertSanitizedHtml(xssHtml, safeHtml); |
| 360 |
|
| 361 |
// Spaces and meta chars before the JavaScript in images for XSS (this is |
| 362 |
// useful if the pattern match doesn't take into account spaces in the word |
| 363 |
// "javascript:" -which is correct since that won't render- and makes the |
| 364 |
// false assumption that you can't have a space between the quote and the |
| 365 |
// "javascript:" keyword. The actual reality is you can have any char from |
| 366 |
// 1-32 in decimal): |
| 367 |
// Browser Support [IE7.0|NS8.1-IE] |
| 368 |
safeHtml = '<img />'; |
| 369 |
xssHtml = '<IMG SRC="  javascript:alert(window);">'; |
| 370 |
assertSanitizedHtml(xssHtml, safeHtml); |
| 371 |
|
| 372 |
// Non-alpha-non-digit XSS. While I was reading the Firefox HTML parser I |
| 373 |
// found that it assumes a non-alpha-non-digit is not valid after an HTML |
| 374 |
// keyword and therefor considers it to be a whitespace or non-valid token |
| 375 |
// after an HTML tag. The problem is that some XSS filters assume that the |
| 376 |
// tag they are looking for is broken up by whitespace. |
| 377 |
// Browser Support [IE7.0|IE6.0|NS8.1-IE] [NS8.1-G|FF2.0] |
| 378 |
safeHtml = ''; |
| 379 |
xssHtml = '<SCRIPT/XSS SRC="http://ha.ckers.org/xss.js"><\/SCRIPT>'; |
| 380 |
assertSanitizedHtml(xssHtml, safeHtml); |
| 381 |
|
| 382 |
// Non-alpha-non-digit part 2 XSS. yawnmoth brought my attention to this |
| 383 |
// vector, based on the same idea as above, however, I expanded on it, using |
| 384 |
// my fuzzer. The Gecko rendering engine allows for any character other than |
| 385 |
// letters, numbers or encapsulation chars (like quotes, angle brackets, |
| 386 |
// etc...) between the event handler and the equals sign, making it easier |
| 387 |
// to bypass cross site scripting blocks. Note that this also applies to the |
| 388 |
// grave accent char as seen here: |
| 389 |
// Browser support: [NS8.1-G|FF2.0] |
| 390 |
safeHtml = ''; |
| 391 |
xssHtml = '<BODY onload!#$%&()*~+-_.,:;?@[/|\]^`=alert("XSS")>'; |
| 392 |
assertSanitizedHtml(xssHtml, safeHtml); |
| 393 |
|
| 394 |
// Non-alpha-non-digit part 3 XSS. Yair Amit brought this to my attention |
| 395 |
// that there is slightly different behavior between the IE and Gecko |
| 396 |
// rendering engines that allows just a slash between the tag and the |
| 397 |
// parameter with no spaces. This could be useful if the system does not |
| 398 |
// allow spaces. |
| 399 |
// Browser support: [IE7.0|IE6.0|NS8.1-IE] [NS8.1-G|FF2.0] |
| 400 |
safeHtml = ''; |
| 401 |
xssHtml = '<SCRIPT/SRC="http://ha.ckers.org/xss.js"><\/SCRIPT>'; |
| 402 |
assertSanitizedHtml(xssHtml, safeHtml); |
| 403 |
|
| 404 |
// Extraneous open brackets. Submitted by Franz Sedlmaier, this XSS vector |
| 405 |
// could defeat certain detection engines that work by first using matching |
| 406 |
// pairs of open and close angle brackets and then by doing a comparison of |
| 407 |
// the tag inside, instead of a more efficient algorythm like Boyer-Moore that |
| 408 |
// looks for entire string matches of the open angle bracket and associated |
| 409 |
// tag (post de-obfuscation, of course). The double slash comments out the |
| 410 |
// ending extraneous bracket to supress a JavaScript error: |
| 411 |
// Browser support: [IE7.0|IE6.0|NS8.1-IE] [NS8.1-G|FF2.0] |
| 412 |
safeHtml = '<'; |
| 413 |
xssHtml = '<<SCRIPT>xss=true;//<<\/SCRIPT>'; |
| 414 |
assertSanitizedHtml(xssHtml, safeHtml); |
| 415 |
|
| 416 |
// No closing script tags. In Firefox and Netscape 8.1 in the Gecko rendering |
| 417 |
// engine mode you don't actually need the "><\/SCRIPT>" portion of this Cross |
| 418 |
// Site Scripting vector. Firefox assumes it's safe to close the HTML tag and |
| 419 |
// add closing tags for you. How thoughtful! Unlike the next one, which |
| 420 |
// doesn't effect Firefox, this does not require any additional HTML below it. |
| 421 |
// You can add quotes if you need to, but they're not needed generally, |
| 422 |
// although beware, I have no idea what the HTML will end up looking like once |
| 423 |
// this is injected: |
| 424 |
// Browser support: [NS8.1-G|FF2.0] |
| 425 |
safeHtml = ''; |
| 426 |
xssHtml = '<SCRIPT SRC=http://ha.ckers.org/xss.js?<B>'; |
| 427 |
assertSanitizedHtml(xssHtml, safeHtml); |
| 428 |
|
| 429 |
// Protocol resolution in script tags. This particular variant was submitted |
| 430 |
// by Lukasz Pilorz and was based partially off of Ozh's protocol resolution |
| 431 |
// bypass below. This cross site scripting example works in IE, Netscape in |
| 432 |
// IE rendering mode and Opera if you add in a <\/SCRIPT> tag at the end. |
| 433 |
// However, this is especially useful where space is an issue, and of course, |
| 434 |
// the shorter your domain, the better. The ".j" is valid, regardless of the |
| 435 |
// encoding type because the browser knows it in context of a SCRIPT tag. |
| 436 |
// Browser support: [NS8.1-G|FF2.0] |
| 437 |
safeHtml = ''; |
| 438 |
xssHtml = '<SCRIPT SRC=//ha.ckers.org/.j>'; |
| 439 |
assertSanitizedHtml(xssHtml, safeHtml); |
| 440 |
|
| 441 |
// Half open HTML/JavaScript XSS vector. Unlike Firefox the IE rendering |
| 442 |
// engine doesn't add extra data to your page, but it does allow the |
| 443 |
// javascript: directive in images. This is useful as a vector because it |
| 444 |
// doesn't require a close angle bracket. This assumes there is any HTML tag |
| 445 |
// below where you are injecting this cross site scripting vector. Even though |
| 446 |
// there is no close ">" tag the tags below it will close it. A note: this |
| 447 |
// does mess up the HTML, depending on what HTML is beneath it. It gets around |
| 448 |
// the following NIDS regex: /((\%3D)|(=))[^\n]*((\%3C)|<)[^\n]+((\%3E)|>)/ |
| 449 |
// because it doesn't require the end ">". As a side note, this was also |
| 450 |
// affective against a real world XSS filter I came across using an open |
| 451 |
// ended <IFRAME tag instead of an <IMG tag: |
| 452 |
// Browser support: [IE6.0|NS8.1-IE] |
| 453 |
safeHtml = isIE9 ? '<img>' : ''; |
| 454 |
xssHtml = '<IMG SRC="javascript:alert(this)"'; |
| 455 |
assertSanitizedHtml(xssHtml, safeHtml); |
| 456 |
|
| 457 |
// Double open angle brackets. This is an odd one that Steven Christey |
| 458 |
// brought to my attention. At first I misclassified this as the same XSS |
| 459 |
// vector as above but it's surprisingly different. Using an open angle |
| 460 |
// bracket at the end of the vector instead of a close angle bracket causes |
| 461 |
// different behavior in Netscape Gecko rendering. Without it, Firefox will |
| 462 |
// work but Netscape won't: |
| 463 |
// Browser support: [NS8.1-G|FF2.0] |
| 464 |
safeHtml = ''; |
| 465 |
xssHtml = '<iframe src=http://ha.ckers.org/scriptlet.html <'; |
| 466 |
assertSanitizedHtml(xssHtml, safeHtml); |
| 467 |
|
| 468 |
// End title tag. This is a simple XSS vector that closes <TITLE> tags, |
| 469 |
// which can encapsulate the malicious cross site scripting attack: |
| 470 |
// Browser support: [IE7.0|IE6.0|NS8.1-IE] [NS8.1-G|FF2.0] |
| 471 |
safeHtml = ''; |
| 472 |
xssHtml = '</TITLE><SCRIPT>alert(window);<\/SCRIPT>'; |
| 473 |
assertSanitizedHtml(xssHtml, safeHtml); |
| 474 |
|
| 475 |
// Input Image. |
| 476 |
// Browser support: [IE6.0|NS8.1-IE] |
| 477 |
safeHtml = '<input type="IMAGE" />'; |
| 478 |
xssHtml = '<INPUT TYPE="IMAGE" SRC="javascript:alert(window);">'; |
| 479 |
assertSanitizedHtml(xssHtml, safeHtml); |
| 480 |
|
| 481 |
// Body image. |
| 482 |
// Browser support: [IE6.0|NS8.1-IE] |
| 483 |
safeHtml = ''; |
| 484 |
xssHtml = '<BODY BACKGROUND="javascript:alert(window)">'; |
| 485 |
assertSanitizedHtml(xssHtml, safeHtml); |
| 486 |
|
| 487 |
// BODY tag (I like this method because it doesn't require using any variants |
| 488 |
// of "javascript:" or "<SCRIPT..." to accomplish the XSS attack). |
| 489 |
// Dan Crowley additionally noted that you can put a space before the equals |
| 490 |
// sign ("onload=" != "onload ="): |
| 491 |
// Browser support: [IE7.0|IE6.0|NS8.1-IE] [NS8.1-G|FF2.0] |
| 492 |
safeHtml = ''; |
| 493 |
xssHtml = '<BODY ONLOAD=alert(window)>'; |
| 494 |
assertSanitizedHtml(xssHtml, safeHtml); |
| 495 |
|
| 496 |
// IMG SYNSRC. |
| 497 |
// Browser support: [IE6.0|NS8.1-IE] |
| 498 |
safeHtml = '<img />'; |
| 499 |
xssHtml = '<IMG DYNSRC="javascript:alert(window)">'; |
| 500 |
assertSanitizedHtml(xssHtml, safeHtml); |
| 501 |
|
| 502 |
// IMG LOWSRC. |
| 503 |
// Browser support: [IE6.0|NS8.1-IE] |
| 504 |
safeHtml = '<img />'; |
| 505 |
xssHtml = '<IMG LOWSRC="javascript:alert(window)">'; |
| 506 |
assertSanitizedHtml(xssHtml, safeHtml); |
| 507 |
|
| 508 |
// BGSOUND |
| 509 |
safeHtml = ''; |
| 510 |
xssHtml = '<BGSOUND SRC="javascript:alert(window);">'; |
| 511 |
assertSanitizedHtml(xssHtml, safeHtml); |
| 512 |
|
| 513 |
// & Javascript includes |
| 514 |
// Browser support: netscape 4 |
| 515 |
safeHtml = '<br size="&{alert(window)}" />'; |
| 516 |
xssHtml = '<BR SIZE="&{alert(window)}">'; |
| 517 |
assertSanitizedHtml(xssHtml, safeHtml); |
| 518 |
|
| 519 |
// Layer |
| 520 |
// Browser support: netscape 4 |
| 521 |
safeHtml = ''; |
| 522 |
xssHtml = '<LAYER SRC="http://ha.ckers.org/scriptlet.html"></LAYER>'; |
| 523 |
assertSanitizedHtml(xssHtml, safeHtml); |
| 524 |
|
| 525 |
// STYLE sheet |
| 526 |
// Browser support: [IE6.0|NS8.1-IE] |
| 527 |
safeHtml = ''; |
| 528 |
xssHtml = '<LINK REL="stylesheet" HREF="javascript:alert(window);">'; |
| 529 |
assertSanitizedHtml(xssHtml, safeHtml); |
| 530 |
|
| 531 |
// List-style-image. Fairly esoteric issue dealing with embedding images for |
| 532 |
// bulleted lists. This will only work in the IE rendering engine because of |
| 533 |
// the JavaScript directive. Not a particularly useful cross site scripting |
| 534 |
// vector: |
| 535 |
// Browser support: [IE6.0|NS8.1-IE] |
| 536 |
safeHtml = '<ul><li>XSS</li></ul>'; |
| 537 |
xssHtml = '<STYLE>li {list-style-image: url("javascript:alert(window)");}' + |
| 538 |
'</STYLE><UL><LI>XSS'; |
| 539 |
assertSanitizedHtml(xssHtml, safeHtml); |
| 540 |
|
| 541 |
// VBscript in an image: |
| 542 |
// Browser support: [IE6.0|NS8.1-IE] |
| 543 |
safeHtml = '<img />'; |
| 544 |
xssHtml = '<IMG SRC=\'vbscript:msgbox("XSS")\'>'; |
| 545 |
assertSanitizedHtml(xssHtml, safeHtml); |
| 546 |
|
| 547 |
// Mock in an image: |
| 548 |
// Browser support: [NS4] |
| 549 |
safeHtml = '<img />'; |
| 550 |
xssHtml = '<IMG SRC="mocha:[code]">'; |
| 551 |
assertSanitizedHtml(xssHtml, safeHtml); |
| 552 |
|
| 553 |
// Livescript in an image: |
| 554 |
// Browser support: [NS4] |
| 555 |
safeHtml = '<img />'; |
| 556 |
xssHtml = '<IMG SRC="livescript:[code]">'; |
| 557 |
assertSanitizedHtml(xssHtml, safeHtml); |
| 558 |
|
| 559 |
// META (the odd thing about meta refresh is that it doesn't send a referrer |
| 560 |
// in the header - so it can be used for certain types of attacks where you |
| 561 |
// need to get rid of referring URLs): |
| 562 |
// Browser support: [IE6.0|NS8.1-IE] [NS8.1-G|FF2.0] [O9.02] |
| 563 |
safeHtml = ''; |
| 564 |
xssHtml = '<META HTTP-EQUIV="refresh" CONTENT="0;url=' + |
| 565 |
'javascript:alert(window);">'; |
| 566 |
assertSanitizedHtml(xssHtml, safeHtml); |
| 567 |
|
| 568 |
// META using data: directive URL scheme. This is nice because it also doesnt |
| 569 |
// have anything visibly that has the word SCRIPT or the JavaScript directive |
| 570 |
// in it, because it utilizes base64 encoding. Please see RFC 2397 for more |
| 571 |
// details or go here or here to encode your own. You can also use the XSS |
| 572 |
// calculator below if you just want to encode raw HTML or JavaScript as it |
| 573 |
// has a Base64 encoding method: |
| 574 |
// Browser support: [NS8.1-G|FF2.0] [O9.02] |
| 575 |
safeHtml = ''; |
| 576 |
xssHtml = '<META HTTP-EQUIV="refresh" CONTENT="0;url=data:text/html;base64,' + |
| 577 |
'PHNjcmlwdD5hbGVydCgnWFNTJyk8L3NjcmlwdD4K">'; |
| 578 |
assertSanitizedHtml(xssHtml, safeHtml); |
| 579 |
|
| 580 |
// META with additional URL parameter. If the target website attempts to see |
| 581 |
// if the URL contains "http://" at the beginning you can evade it with the |
| 582 |
// following technique (Submitted by Moritz Naumann): |
| 583 |
safeHtml = ''; |
| 584 |
xssHtml = '<META HTTP-EQUIV="refresh" CONTENT="0; URL=http://;URL=' + |
| 585 |
'javascript:alert(window);">'; |
| 586 |
assertSanitizedHtml(xssHtml, safeHtml); |
| 587 |
|
| 588 |
// IFRAME (if iframes are allowed there are a lot of other XSS problems as |
| 589 |
// well): |
| 590 |
// Browser support: [IE7.0|IE6.0|NS8.1-IE] [NS8.1-G|FF2.0] [O9.02] |
| 591 |
safeHtml = ''; |
| 592 |
xssHtml = '<IFRAME SRC="javascript:alert(window);"></IFRAME>'; |
| 593 |
assertSanitizedHtml(xssHtml, safeHtml); |
| 594 |
|
| 595 |
// FRAME (frames have the same sorts of XSS problems as iframes): |
| 596 |
// Browser support: [IE7.0|IE6.0|NS8.1-IE] [NS8.1-G|FF2.0] [O9.02] |
| 597 |
safeHtml = ''; |
| 598 |
xssHtml = '<FRAMESET><FRAME SRC="javascript:alert(window);"></FRAMESET>'; |
| 599 |
assertSanitizedHtml(xssHtml, safeHtml); |
| 600 |
|
| 601 |
// TABLE (who would have thought tables were XSS targets... except me, of |
| 602 |
// course): |
| 603 |
// Browser support: [IE6.0|NS8.1-IE] [O9.02] |
| 604 |
safeHtml = isIE9 ? '<table><div></div></table>' : '<table></table>'; |
| 605 |
xssHtml = '<TABLE BACKGROUND="javascript:alert(window)">'; |
| 606 |
// TODO(danesh): Investigate why this is different for IE9. |
| 607 |
assertSanitizedHtml(xssHtml, safeHtml); |
| 608 |
|
| 609 |
// TD (just like above, TD's are vulnerable to BACKGROUNDs containing |
| 610 |
// JavaScript XSS vectors): |
| 611 |
// Browser support: [IE6.0|NS8.1-IE] [O9.02] |
| 612 |
// NOTE(user): original lacked tbody tags |
| 613 |
safeHtml = '<table><tbody><tr><td></td></tr></tbody></table>'; |
| 614 |
xssHtml = '<TABLE><TD BACKGROUND="javascript:alert(window)">'; |
| 615 |
assertSanitizedHtml(xssHtml, safeHtml); |
| 616 |
|
| 617 |
// TD (just like above, TD's are vulnerable to BACKGROUNDs containing |
| 618 |
// JavaScript XSS vectors): |
| 619 |
// Browser support: [IE6.0|NS8.1-IE] [O9.02] |
| 620 |
safeHtml = '<div></div>'; |
| 621 |
xssHtml = '<DIV STYLE="background-image: url(javascript:alert(window))">'; |
| 622 |
assertSanitizedHtml(xssHtml, safeHtml); |
| 623 |
|
| 624 |
// DIV background-image plus extra characters. I built a quick XSS fuzzer to |
| 625 |
// detect any erroneous characters that are allowed after the open parenthesis |
| 626 |
// but before the JavaScript directive in IE and Netscape 8.1 in secure site |
| 627 |
// mode. These are in decimal but you can include hex and add padding of |
| 628 |
// course. (Any of the following chars can be used: 1-32, 34, 39, 160, |
| 629 |
// 8192-8.13, 12288, 65279): |
| 630 |
// Browser support: [IE6.0|NS8.1-IE] |
| 631 |
safeHtml = '<div></div>'; |
| 632 |
xssHtml = '<DIV STYLE="background-image: url(javascript:alert(window))">'; |
| 633 |
assertSanitizedHtml(xssHtml, safeHtml); |
| 634 |
|
| 635 |
// DIV expression - a variant of this was effective against a real world |
| 636 |
// cross site scripting filter using a newline between the colon and |
| 637 |
// "expression": |
| 638 |
// Browser support: [IE7.0|IE6.0|NS8.1-IE] |
| 639 |
safeHtml = '<div></div>'; |
| 640 |
xssHtml = '<DIV STYLE="width: expression(alert(window));">'; |
| 641 |
assertSanitizedHtml(xssHtml, safeHtml); |
| 642 |
|
| 643 |
// STYLE tags with broken up JavaScript for XSS (this XSS at times sends IE |
| 644 |
// into an infinite loop of alerts): |
| 645 |
// Browser support: [IE6.0|NS8.1-IE] |
| 646 |
safeHtml = ''; |
| 647 |
xssHtml = '<STYLE>@im\port\'\ja\vasc\ript:alert(window)\';</STYLE>'; |
| 648 |
assertSanitizedHtml(xssHtml, safeHtml); |
| 649 |
|
| 650 |
// STYLE attribute using a comment to break up expression (Thanks to Roman |
| 651 |
// Ivanov for this one): |
| 652 |
// Browser support: [IE7.0|IE6.0|NS8.1-IE] |
| 653 |
safeHtml = '<img />'; |
| 654 |
xssHtml = '<IMG STYLE="xss:expr/*XSS*/ession(alert(window))">'; |
| 655 |
assertSanitizedHtml(xssHtml, safeHtml); |
| 656 |
|
| 657 |
// Anonymous HTML with STYLE attribute (IE6.0 and Netscape 8.1+ in IE |
| 658 |
// rendering engine mode don't really care if the HTML tag you build exists |
| 659 |
// or not, as long as it starts with an open angle bracket and a letter): |
| 660 |
safeHtml = '<span></span>'; |
| 661 |
xssHtml = '<XSS STYLE="xss:expression(alert(window))">'; |
| 662 |
assertSanitizedHtml(xssHtml, safeHtml); |
| 663 |
|
| 664 |
// IMG STYLE with expression (this is really a hybrid of the above XSS |
| 665 |
// vectors, but it really does show how hard STYLE tags can be to parse apart, |
| 666 |
// like above this can send IE into a loop): |
| 667 |
// Browser support: [IE7.0|IE6.0|NS8.1-IE] |
| 668 |
safeHtml = isIE9 ? 'undefined' : 'exp/*<a></a>'; |
| 669 |
xssHtml = 'exp/*<A STYLE="no\\xss:noxss("*//*");xss:ex/*XSS*//*' + |
| 670 |
'/*/pression(alert(window))">'; |
| 671 |
assertSanitizedHtml(xssHtml, safeHtml); |
| 672 |
|
| 673 |
// STYLE tag (Older versions of Netscape only): |
| 674 |
// Browser support: [NS4] |
| 675 |
safeHtml = ''; |
| 676 |
xssHtml = '<STYLE TYPE="text/javascript">xss=true;</STYLE>'; |
| 677 |
assertSanitizedHtml(xssHtml, safeHtml); |
| 678 |
|
| 679 |
// STYLE tag using background-image: |
| 680 |
// Browser support: [IE6.0|NS8.1-IE] |
| 681 |
safeHtml = isIE9 ? 'undefined' : '<a></a>'; |
| 682 |
xssHtml = '<STYLE>.XSS{background-image:url("javascript:alert("XSS")");}' + |
| 683 |
'</STYLE><A CLASS=XSS></A>'; |
| 684 |
assertSanitizedHtml(xssHtml, safeHtml); |
| 685 |
|
| 686 |
// BASE tag. Works in IE and Netscape 8.1 in safe mode. You need the // to |
| 687 |
// comment out the next characters so you won't get a JavaScript error and |
| 688 |
// your XSS tag will render. Also, this relies on the fact that the website |
| 689 |
// uses dynamically placed images like "images/image.jpg" rather than full |
| 690 |
// paths. If the path includes a leading forward slash like |
| 691 |
// "/images/image.jpg" you can remove one slash from this vector (as long as |
| 692 |
// there are two to begin the comment this will work): |
| 693 |
// Browser support: [IE6.0|NS8.1-IE] |
| 694 |
safeHtml = ''; |
| 695 |
xssHtml = '<BASE HREF="javascript:xss=true;//">'; |
| 696 |
assertSanitizedHtml(xssHtml, safeHtml); |
| 697 |
|
| 698 |
// OBJECT tag (if they allow objects, you can also inject virus payloads to |
| 699 |
// infect the users, etc. and same with the APPLET tag). The linked file is |
| 700 |
// actually an HTML file that can contain your XSS: |
| 701 |
// Browser support: [O9.02] |
| 702 |
safeHtml = ''; |
| 703 |
xssHtml = '<OBJECT TYPE="text/x-scriptlet" ' + |
| 704 |
'DATA="http://ha.ckers.org/scriptlet.html"></OBJECT>'; |
| 705 |
assertSanitizedHtml(xssHtml, safeHtml); |
| 706 |
|
| 707 |
// Using an EMBED tag you can embed a Flash movie that contains XSS. Click |
| 708 |
// here for a demo. If you add the attributes allowScriptAccess="never" and |
| 709 |
// allownetworking="internal" it can mitigate this risk (thank you to Jonathan |
| 710 |
// Vanasco for the info).: |
| 711 |
// Browser support: [IE7.0|IE6.0|NS8.1-IE] [NS8.1-G|FF2.0] [O9.02] |
| 712 |
safeHtml = ''; |
| 713 |
xssHtml = '<EMBED SRC="http://ha.ckers.org/xss.swf" ' + |
| 714 |
'AllowScriptAccess="always"></EMBED>'; |
| 715 |
assertSanitizedHtml(xssHtml, safeHtml); |
| 716 |
|
| 717 |
// You can EMBED SVG which can contain your XSS vector. This example only |
| 718 |
// works in Firefox, but it's better than the above vector in Firefox because |
| 719 |
// it does not require the user to have Flash turned on or installed. Thanks |
| 720 |
// to nEUrOO for this one. |
| 721 |
// Browser support: [IE7.0|IE6.0|NS8.1-IE] [NS8.1-G|FF2.0] [O9.02] |
| 722 |
safeHtml = ''; |
| 723 |
xssHtml = '<EMBED SRC="' + |
| 724 |
' A6Ly93d3cudzMub3JnLzIwMDAvc3ZnIiB4bWxucz0iaHR0cDovL3d3dy53My5vcmcv Mj' + |
| 725 |
'AwMC9zdmciIHhtbG5zOnhsaW5rPSJodHRwOi8vd3d3LnczLm9yZy8xOTk5L3hs aW5rIiB' + |
| 726 |
'2ZXJzaW9uPSIxLjAiIHg9IjAiIHk9IjAiIHdpZHRoPSIxOTQiIGhlaWdodD0iMjAw IiBp' + |
| 727 |
'ZD0ieHNzIj48c2NyaXB0IHR5cGU9InRleHQvZWNtYXNjcmlwdCI+YWxlcnQoIlh TUyIpO' + |
| 728 |
'zwvc2NyaXB0Pjwvc3ZnPg==" type="image/svg+xml" ' + |
| 729 |
'AllowScriptAccess="always"></EMBED>'; |
| 730 |
assertSanitizedHtml(xssHtml, safeHtml); |
| 731 |
|
| 732 |
// XML namespace. The htc file must be located on the same server as your XSS |
| 733 |
// vector: |
| 734 |
// Browser support: [IE7.0|IE6.0|NS8.1-IE] |
| 735 |
safeHtml = '<span>XSS</span>'; |
| 736 |
xssHtml = '<HTML xmlns:xss>' + |
| 737 |
'<?import namespace="xss" implementation="http://ha.ckers.org/xss.htc">' + |
| 738 |
'<xss:xss>XSS</xss:xss>' + |
| 739 |
'</HTML>'; |
| 740 |
assertSanitizedHtml(xssHtml, safeHtml); |
| 741 |
|
| 742 |
// XML data island with CDATA obfuscation (this XSS attack works only in IE |
| 743 |
// and Netscape 8.1 in IE rendering engine mode) - vector found by Sec Consult |
| 744 |
// while auditing Yahoo: |
| 745 |
// Browser support: [IE6.0|NS8.1-IE] |
| 746 |
safeHtml = isIE9 ? '<span><span></span></span>' : |
| 747 |
'<span><span><span>]]></span></span></span>' + |
| 748 |
'<span></span>'; |
| 749 |
xssHtml = '<XML ID=I><X><C><![CDATA[<IMG SRC="javas]]>' + |
| 750 |
'<![CDATA[cript:xss=true;">]]>' + |
| 751 |
'</C></X></xml><SPAN DATASRC=#I DATAFLD=C DATAFORMATAS=HTML></SPAN>'; |
| 752 |
assertSanitizedHtml(xssHtml, safeHtml); |
| 753 |
|
| 754 |
// HTML+TIME in XML. This is how Grey Magic hacked Hotmail and Yahoo!. This |
| 755 |
// only works in Internet Explorer and Netscape 8.1 in IE rendering engine |
| 756 |
// mode and remember that you need to be between HTML and BODY tags for this |
| 757 |
// to work: |
| 758 |
// Browser support: [IE7.0|IE6.0|NS8.1-IE] |
| 759 |
safeHtml = '<span></span>'; |
| 760 |
xssHtml = '<HTML><BODY>' + |
| 761 |
'<?xml:namespace prefix="t" ns="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:time">' + |
| 762 |
'<?import namespace="t" implementation="#default#time2">' + |
| 763 |
'<t:set attributeName="innerHTML" to="XSS<SCRIPT DEFER>' + |
| 764 |
'alert("XSS")</SCRIPT>">' + |
| 765 |
'</BODY></HTML>'; |
| 766 |
assertSanitizedHtml(xssHtml, safeHtml); |
| 767 |
|
| 768 |
// IMG Embedded commands - this works when the webpage where this is injected |
| 769 |
// (like a web-board) is behind password protection and that password |
| 770 |
// protection works with other commands on the same domain. This can be used |
| 771 |
// to delete users, add users (if the user who visits the page is an |
| 772 |
// administrator), send credentials elsewhere, etc.... This is one of the |
| 773 |
// lesser used but more useful XSS vectors: |
| 774 |
// Browser support: [IE7.0|IE6.0|NS8.1-IE] [NS8.1-G|FF2.0] [O9.02] |
| 775 |
safeHtml = '<img />'; |
| 776 |
xssHtml = '<IMG SRC="http://www.thesiteyouareon.com/somecommand.php?' + |
| 777 |
'somevariables=maliciouscode">'; |
| 778 |
assertSanitizedHtml(xssHtml, safeHtml); |
| 779 |
|
| 780 |
// This was tested in IE, your mileage may vary. For performing XSS on sites |
| 781 |
// that allow "<SCRIPT>" but don't allow "<SCRIPT SRC..." by way of a regex |
| 782 |
// filter "/<script[^>]+src/i": |
| 783 |
// Browser support: [IE7.0|IE6.0|NS8.1-IE] [NS8.1-G|FF2.0] [O9.02] |
| 784 |
safeHtml = ''; |
| 785 |
xssHtml = '<SCRIPT a=">" SRC="http://ha.ckers.org/xss.js"><\/SCRIPT>'; |
| 786 |
assertSanitizedHtml(xssHtml, safeHtml); |
| 787 |
|
| 788 |
safeHtml = ''; |
| 789 |
xssHtml = '<SCRIPT =">" SRC="http://ha.ckers.org/xss.js"><\/SCRIPT>'; |
| 790 |
assertSanitizedHtml(xssHtml, safeHtml); |
| 791 |
|
| 792 |
// This XSS still worries me, as it would be nearly impossible to stop this |
| 793 |
// without blocking all active content: |
| 794 |
// Browser support: [IE7.0|IE6.0|NS8.1-IE] [NS8.1-G|FF2.0] [O9.02] |
| 795 |
safeHtml = 'PT SRC="http://ha.ckers.org/xss.js">'; |
| 796 |
xssHtml = '<SCRIPT>document.write("<SCRI");<\/SCRIPT>PT ' + |
| 797 |
'SRC="http://ha.ckers.org/xss.js"><\/SCRIPT>'; |
| 798 |
assertSanitizedHtml(xssHtml, safeHtml); |
| 799 |
|
| 800 |
// US-ASCII encoding (found by Kurt Huwig). This uses malformed ASCII encoding |
| 801 |
// with 7 bits instead of 8. This XSS may bypass many content filters but |
| 802 |
// only works if the host transmits in US-ASCII encoding, or if you set the |
| 803 |
// encoding yourself. This is more useful against web application firewall |
| 804 |
// cross site scripting evasion than it is server side filter evasion. Apache |
| 805 |
// Tomcat is the only known server that transmits in US-ASCII encoding. I |
| 806 |
// highly suggest anyone interested in alternate encoding issues look at my |
| 807 |
// charsets issues page: |
| 808 |
// Browser support: [IE7.0|IE6.0|NS8.1-IE] |
| 809 |
// NOTE(danesh): We'd sanitize this if we received the (mis-)appropriately |
| 810 |
// encoded version of this. |
| 811 |
// safeHtml = ' script alert( XSS ) /script '; |
| 812 |
// xssHtml = '¼script¾alert(¢XSS¢)¼/script¾'; |
| 813 |
// assertSanitizedHtml(xssHtml, safeHtml); |
| 814 |
|
| 815 |
// Escaping JavaScript escapes. When the application is written to output some |
| 816 |
// user information inside of a JavaScript like the following: |
| 817 |
// <SCRIPT>var a="$ENV{QUERY_STRING}";<\/SCRIPT> and you want to inject your |
| 818 |
// own JavaScript into it but the server side application escapes certain |
| 819 |
// quotes you can circumvent that by escaping their escape character. When |
| 820 |
// this is gets injected it will read |
| 821 |
// <SCRIPT>var a="\\";alert('XSS');//";<\/SCRIPT> which ends up un-escaping |
| 822 |
// the double quote and causing the Cross Site Scripting vector to fire. |
| 823 |
// The XSS locator uses this method.: |
| 824 |
// Browser support: [IE7.0|IE6.0|NS8.1-IE] [NS8.1-G|FF2.0] |
| 825 |
// NOTE(danesh): We expect this to fail. More of a JS sanitizer check or a |
| 826 |
// server-side template vulnerability test. |
| 827 |
// safeHtml = ''; |
| 828 |
// xssHtml = '\";alert(window);//'; |
| 829 |
// assertSanitizedHtml(xssHtml, safeHtml); |
| 830 |
} |
| 831 |
|
| 832 |
|
| 833 |
function testDataAttributes() { |
| 834 |
var html = '<div data-xyz="test">Testing</div>'; |
| 835 |
var safeHtml = '<div>Testing</div>'; |
| 836 |
assertSanitizedHtml(html, safeHtml); |
| 837 |
|
| 838 |
html = '<div data-goomoji="test" data-other="xyz">Testing</div>'; |
| 839 |
var expectedHtml = '<div data-goomoji="test">Testing</div>'; |
| 840 |
assertSanitizedHtml( |
| 841 |
html, expectedHtml, new goog.html.sanitizer.HtmlSanitizer.Builder() |
| 842 |
.allowCssStyles() |
| 843 |
.allowDataAttributes(['data-goomoji']) |
| 844 |
.build()); |
| 845 |
} |
| 846 |
|
| 847 |
|
| 848 |
function testDisallowedDataWhitelistingAttributes() { |
| 849 |
assertThrows(function() { |
| 850 |
new goog.html.sanitizer.HtmlSanitizer.Builder() |
| 851 |
.allowDataAttributes(['datai']) |
| 852 |
.build(); |
| 853 |
}); |
| 854 |
|
| 855 |
// Disallow internal attribute used by html sanitizer |
| 856 |
assertThrows(function() { |
| 857 |
new goog.html.sanitizer.HtmlSanitizer.Builder() |
| 858 |
.allowDataAttributes(['data-i', 'data-sanitizer-safe']) |
| 859 |
.build(); |
| 860 |
}); |
| 861 |
} |
| 862 |
|
| 863 |
|
| 864 |
function testBlacklistedWithChildren() { |
| 865 |
var input = '<form>foo<a>bar</a></form>'; |
| 866 |
var expected = ''; |
| 867 |
assertSanitizedHtml(input, expected); |
| 868 |
|
| 869 |
input = '<div><form>foo<a>bar</a></form></div>'; |
| 870 |
expected = '<div></div>'; |
| 871 |
assertSanitizedHtml(input, expected); |
| 872 |
} |
| 873 |
|
| 874 |
|
| 875 |
function testFormBody() { |
| 876 |
var safeHtml = '<form>stuff</form>'; |
| 877 |
var formHtml = '<form name="body">stuff</form>'; |
| 878 |
assertSanitizedHtml( |
| 879 |
formHtml, safeHtml, |
| 880 |
new goog.html.sanitizer.HtmlSanitizer.Builder().allowFormTag().build()); |
| 881 |
} |
| 882 |
|
| 883 |
|
| 884 |
function testStyleTag() { |
| 885 |
var safeHtml = ''; |
| 886 |
var xssHtml = '<STYLE>P.special {color : green;border: solid red;}</STYLE>'; |
| 887 |
assertSanitizedHtml(xssHtml, safeHtml); |
| 888 |
} |
| 889 |
|
| 890 |
|
| 891 |
function testOnlyAllowTags() { |
| 892 |
var result = '<div><span></span>' + |
| 893 |
'<a href="http://www.google.com">hi</a>' + |
| 894 |
'<br>Test.<span></span><div align="right">Test</div></div>'; |
| 895 |
// If we were mimicing goog.labs.html.sanitizer, our output would be |
| 896 |
// '<div><a>hi</a><br>Test.<div>Test</div></div>'; |
| 897 |
assertSanitizedHtml( |
| 898 |
'<div><img id="bar" name=foo class="c d" ' + |
| 899 |
'src="http://wherever.com">' + |
| 900 |
'<a href=" http://www.google.com">hi</a>' + |
| 901 |
'<br>Test.<hr><div align="right">Test</div></div>', |
| 902 |
result, new goog.html.sanitizer.HtmlSanitizer.Builder() |
| 903 |
.onlyAllowTags(['bR', 'a', 'DIV']) |
| 904 |
.build()); |
| 905 |
} |
| 906 |
|
| 907 |
|
| 908 |
function testDisallowNonWhitelistedTags() { |
| 909 |
assertThrows('Should error on elements not whitelisted', function() { |
| 910 |
new goog.html.sanitizer.HtmlSanitizer.Builder().onlyAllowTags(['x']); |
| 911 |
}); |
| 912 |
} |
| 913 |
|
| 914 |
|
| 915 |
function testDefaultPoliciesAreApplied() { |
| 916 |
var result = '<img /><a href="http://www.google.com">hi</a>' + |
| 917 |
'<a href="ftp://whatever.com">another</a>'; |
| 918 |
assertSanitizedHtml( |
| 919 |
'<img id="bar" name=foo class="c d" ' + |
| 920 |
'src="http://wherever.com">' + |
| 921 |
'<a href=" http://www.google.com">hi</a>' + |
| 922 |
'<a href=ftp://whatever.com>another</a>', |
| 923 |
result); |
| 924 |
} |
| 925 |
|
| 926 |
|
| 927 |
function testCustomNamePolicyIsApplied() { |
| 928 |
var result = '<img name="myOwnPrefix-foo" />' + |
| 929 |
'<a href="http://www.google.com">hi</a>' + |
| 930 |
'<a href="ftp://whatever.com">another</a>'; |
| 931 |
assertSanitizedHtml( |
| 932 |
'<img id="bar" name=foo class="c d" ' + |
| 933 |
'src="http://wherever.com"><a href=" http://www.google.com">hi</a>' + |
| 934 |
'<a href=ftp://whatever.com>another</a>', |
| 935 |
result, new goog.html.sanitizer.HtmlSanitizer.Builder() |
| 936 |
.withCustomNamePolicy(function(name) { |
| 937 |
return 'myOwnPrefix-' + name; |
| 938 |
}) |
| 939 |
.build()); |
| 940 |
} |
| 941 |
|
| 942 |
|
| 943 |
function testCustomTokenPolicyIsApplied() { |
| 944 |
var result = '<img id="myOwnPrefix-bar" ' + |
| 945 |
'class="myOwnPrefix-c myOwnPrefix-d" />' + |
| 946 |
'<a href="http://www.google.com">hi</a>' + |
| 947 |
'<a href="ftp://whatever.com">another</a>'; |
| 948 |
assertSanitizedHtml( |
| 949 |
'<img id="bar" name=foo class="c d" ' + |
| 950 |
'src="http://wherever.com"><a href=" http://www.google.com">hi</a>' + |
| 951 |
'<a href=ftp://whatever.com>another</a>', |
| 952 |
result, new goog.html.sanitizer.HtmlSanitizer.Builder() |
| 953 |
.withCustomTokenPolicy(function(name) { |
| 954 |
return 'myOwnPrefix-' + name; |
| 955 |
}) |
| 956 |
.build()); |
| 957 |
} |
| 958 |
|
| 959 |
|
| 960 |
function testMultipleCustomPoliciesAreApplied() { |
| 961 |
var result = '<img id="plarpalarp-bar" name="larlarlar-foo" ' + |
| 962 |
'class="plarpalarp-c plarpalarp-d" />' + |
| 963 |
'<a href="http://www.google.com">hi</a>' + |
| 964 |
'<a href="ftp://whatever.com">another</a>'; |
| 965 |
assertSanitizedHtml( |
| 966 |
'<img id="bar" name=foo class="c d" ' + |
| 967 |
'src="http://wherever.com"><a href=" http://www.google.com">hi</a>' + |
| 968 |
'<a href=ftp://whatever.com>another</a>', |
| 969 |
result, |
| 970 |
new goog.html.sanitizer.HtmlSanitizer.Builder() |
| 971 |
.withCustomTokenPolicy(function(token) { |
| 972 |
return 'plarpalarp-' + token; |
| 973 |
}) |
| 974 |
.withCustomNamePolicy(function(name) { return 'larlarlar-' + name; }) |
| 975 |
.build()); |
| 976 |
} |
| 977 |
|
| 978 |
|
| 979 |
function testNonTrivialCustomPolicy() { |
| 980 |
var result = '<img /><a href="http://www.google.com" name="Alacrity">hi</a>' + |
| 981 |
'<a href="ftp://whatever.com">another</a>'; |
| 982 |
assertSanitizedHtml( |
| 983 |
'<img id="bar" name=foo class="c d" src="http://wherever.com">' + |
| 984 |
'<a href=" http://www.google.com" name=Alacrity>hi</a>' + |
| 985 |
'<a href=ftp://whatever.com>another</a>', |
| 986 |
result, |
| 987 |
new goog.html.sanitizer.HtmlSanitizer.Builder() |
| 988 |
.withCustomNamePolicy(function testNamesMustBeginWithTheLetterA( |
| 989 |
name) { return name.charAt(0) != 'A' ? null : name; }) |
| 990 |
.build()); |
| 991 |
} |
| 992 |
|
| 993 |
|
| 994 |
function testNetworkRequestUrlsAllowed() { |
| 995 |
var result = '<img src="http://wherever.com" />' + |
| 996 |
'<img src="https://secure.wherever.com" />' + |
| 997 |
'<img alt="test" src="//wherever.com" />' + |
| 998 |
'<a href="http://www.google.com">hi</a>' + |
| 999 |
'<a href="ftp://whatever.com">another</a>'; |
| 1000 |
assertSanitizedHtml( |
| 1001 |
'<img id="bar" name=foo class="c d" src="http://wherever.com">' + |
| 1002 |
'<img src="https://secure.wherever.com">' + |
| 1003 |
'<img alt="test" src="//wherever.com">' + |
| 1004 |
'<a href=" http://www.google.com">hi</a>' + |
| 1005 |
'<a href=ftp://whatever.com>another</a>', |
| 1006 |
result, new goog.html.sanitizer.HtmlSanitizer.Builder() |
| 1007 |
.withCustomNetworkRequestUrlPolicy(goog.html.SafeUrl.sanitize) |
| 1008 |
.build()); |
| 1009 |
} |
| 1010 |
|
| 1011 |
|
| 1012 |
function testCustomNRUrlPolicyMustNotContainParameters() { |
| 1013 |
var result = '<img src="http://wherever.com" /><img />'; |
| 1014 |
assertSanitizedHtml( |
| 1015 |
'<img id="bar" class="c d" src="http://wherever.com">' + |
| 1016 |
'<img src="https://www.bank.com/withdraw?amount=onebeeeelion">', |
| 1017 |
result, new goog.html.sanitizer.HtmlSanitizer.Builder() |
| 1018 |
.withCustomNetworkRequestUrlPolicy(function(url) { |
| 1019 |
return url.match(/\?/) ? null : |
| 1020 |
goog.html.testing.newSafeUrlForTest(url); |
| 1021 |
}) |
| 1022 |
.build()); |
| 1023 |
} |
| 1024 |
|
| 1025 |
|
| 1026 |
function testPolicyHints() { |
| 1027 |
var sanitizer = |
| 1028 |
new goog.html.sanitizer.HtmlSanitizer.Builder() |
| 1029 |
.allowFormTag() |
| 1030 |
.withCustomNetworkRequestUrlPolicy(function(url, policyHints) { |
| 1031 |
if ((policyHints.tagName == 'img' && |
| 1032 |
policyHints.attributeName == 'src') || |
| 1033 |
(policyHints.tagName == 'input' && |
| 1034 |
policyHints.attributeName == 'src')) { |
| 1035 |
return goog.html.testing.newSafeUrlForTest( |
| 1036 |
'https://imageproxy/?' + url); |
| 1037 |
} else { |
| 1038 |
return null; |
| 1039 |
} |
| 1040 |
}) |
| 1041 |
.withCustomUrlPolicy(function(url, policyHints) { |
| 1042 |
if (policyHints.tagName == 'a' && |
| 1043 |
policyHints.attributeName == 'href') { |
| 1044 |
return goog.html.testing.newSafeUrlForTest( |
| 1045 |
'https://linkproxy/?' + url); |
| 1046 |
} |
| 1047 |
return goog.html.SafeUrl.sanitize(url); |
| 1048 |
}) |
| 1049 |
.build(); |
| 1050 |
|
| 1051 |
// TODO(user): update this test to include a stylesheet once they're |
| 1052 |
// supported (in order to view both branches of the NRUrlPolicy). |
| 1053 |
var result = '<img src="https://imageproxy/?http://image" /> ' + |
| 1054 |
'<input type="image" src="https://imageproxy/?http://another" />' + |
| 1055 |
'<a href="https://linkproxy/?http://link">a link</a>' + |
| 1056 |
'<form action="http://formaction"></form>'; |
| 1057 |
assertSanitizedHtml( |
| 1058 |
'<img src="http://image"> <input type="image" ' + |
| 1059 |
'src="http://another"><a href="http://link">a link</a>' + |
| 1060 |
'<form action="http://formaction"></form>', |
| 1061 |
result, sanitizer); |
| 1062 |
} |
| 1063 |
|
| 1064 |
|
| 1065 |
function testNRUrlPolicyAffectsCssSanitization() { |
| 1066 |
var sanitizer = |
| 1067 |
new goog.html.sanitizer.HtmlSanitizer.Builder() |
| 1068 |
.allowCssStyles() |
| 1069 |
.withCustomNetworkRequestUrlPolicy(function(url, policyHints) { |
| 1070 |
// Network request URLs may only be over https. |
| 1071 |
if (!/^https:\/\//i.test(url)) { |
| 1072 |
return null; |
| 1073 |
} |
| 1074 |
// CSS background URLs may only come from google.com. |
| 1075 |
if (policyHints.cssProperty === 'background-image') { |
| 1076 |
if (!/^https:\/\/www\.google\.com\//i.test(url)) { |
| 1077 |
return null; |
| 1078 |
} |
| 1079 |
} |
| 1080 |
return goog.html.SafeUrl.sanitize(url); |
| 1081 |
}) |
| 1082 |
.build(); |
| 1083 |
|
| 1084 |
var sanitizedHtml; |
| 1085 |
try { |
| 1086 |
sanitizedHtml = sanitizer.sanitize( |
| 1087 |
'<div style="background: url(\'https://www.google.com/i.png\')"></div>'); |
| 1088 |
if (isIE9) { |
| 1089 |
assertEquals('', goog.html.SafeHtml.unwrap(sanitizedHtml)); |
| 1090 |
return; |
| 1091 |
} |
| 1092 |
assertRegExp( |
| 1093 |
/background(?:-image)?:.*url\(.?https:\/\/www.google.com\/i.png.?\)/, |
| 1094 |
getStyle(sanitizedHtml)); |
| 1095 |
} catch (err) { |
| 1096 |
if (!isIE8) { |
| 1097 |
throw err; |
| 1098 |
} |
| 1099 |
} |
| 1100 |
|
| 1101 |
try { |
| 1102 |
sanitizedHtml = sanitizer.sanitize( |
| 1103 |
'<div style="background: url(\'https://wherever/\')"></div>'); |
| 1104 |
assertNotContains( |
| 1105 |
'https://wherever/', goog.html.SafeHtml.unwrap(sanitizedHtml)); |
| 1106 |
} catch (err) { |
| 1107 |
if (!isIE8) { |
| 1108 |
throw err; |
| 1109 |
} |
| 1110 |
} |
| 1111 |
|
| 1112 |
sanitizedHtml = '<img src="https://www.google.com/i.png">'; |
| 1113 |
assertSanitizedHtml(sanitizedHtml, sanitizedHtml, sanitizer); |
| 1114 |
|
| 1115 |
sanitizedHtml = '<img src="https://wherever/">'; |
| 1116 |
assertSanitizedHtml(sanitizedHtml, sanitizedHtml, sanitizer); |
| 1117 |
} |
| 1118 |
|
| 1119 |
|
| 1120 |
function testAllowOnlyHttpAndHttpsAndFtpForNRUP() { |
| 1121 |
var input = '<img src="http://whatever">' + |
| 1122 |
'<img src="https://whatever">' + |
| 1123 |
'<img src="ftp://nope">' + |
| 1124 |
'<img src="garbage:nope">' + |
| 1125 |
'<img src="data:yep">'; |
| 1126 |
var expected = '<img src="http://whatever" />' + |
| 1127 |
'<img src="https://whatever" />' + |
| 1128 |
'<img src="ftp://nope">' + |
| 1129 |
'<img />' + |
| 1130 |
'<img />'; |
| 1131 |
assertSanitizedHtml( |
| 1132 |
input, expected, |
| 1133 |
new goog.html.sanitizer.HtmlSanitizer.Builder() |
| 1134 |
.withCustomNetworkRequestUrlPolicy(goog.html.SafeUrl.sanitize) |
| 1135 |
.build()); |
| 1136 |
} |
| 1137 |
|
| 1138 |
|
| 1139 |
function testUriSchemesOnNonNetworkRequestUrls() { |
| 1140 |
var input = '<a href="ftp://yep">something</a>' + |
| 1141 |
'<a href="gopher://yep">something</a>' + |
| 1142 |
'<a href="gopher:nope">something</a>' + |
| 1143 |
'<a href="http://yep">something</a>' + |
| 1144 |
'<a href="https://yep">something</a>' + |
| 1145 |
'<a href="garbage://nope">something</a>' + |
| 1146 |
'<a href="relative/yup">something</a>' + |
| 1147 |
'<a href="nope">something</a>' + |
| 1148 |
'<a>lol</a>'; |
| 1149 |
var expected = '<a href="ftp://yep">something</a>' + |
| 1150 |
'<a>something</a>' + |
| 1151 |
'<a>something</a>' + |
| 1152 |
'<a href="http://yep">something</a>' + |
| 1153 |
'<a href="https://yep">something</a>' + |
| 1154 |
'<a>something</a>' + |
| 1155 |
'<a href="relative/yup">something</a>' + |
| 1156 |
'<a href="nope">something</a>' + |
| 1157 |
'<a>lol</a>'; |
| 1158 |
assertSanitizedHtml( |
| 1159 |
input, expected, new goog.html.sanitizer.HtmlSanitizer.Builder() |
| 1160 |
.withCustomUrlPolicy(goog.html.SafeUrl.sanitize) |
| 1161 |
.build()); |
| 1162 |
} |
| 1163 |
|
| 1164 |
|
| 1165 |
function testOverridingGetOrSetAttribute() { |
| 1166 |
var input = '<form>' + |
| 1167 |
'<input name=setAttribute />' + |
| 1168 |
'<input name=getAttribute />' + |
| 1169 |
'</form>'; |
| 1170 |
var expected = '<form><input><input></form>'; |
| 1171 |
assertSanitizedHtml( |
| 1172 |
input, expected, |
| 1173 |
new goog.html.sanitizer.HtmlSanitizer.Builder().allowFormTag().build()); |
| 1174 |
} |
| 1175 |
|
| 1176 |
|
| 1177 |
function testOverridingBookkeepingAttribute() { |
| 1178 |
var input = '<div data-sanitizer-foo="1" alt="b">Hello</div>'; |
| 1179 |
var expected = '<div alt="b">Hello</div>'; |
| 1180 |
assertSanitizedHtml( |
| 1181 |
input, expected, |
| 1182 |
new goog.html.sanitizer.HtmlSanitizer.Builder() |
| 1183 |
.withCustomTokenPolicy(function(token) { return token; }) |
| 1184 |
.build()); |
| 1185 |
} |
| 1186 |
|
| 1187 |
|
| 1188 |
function testTemplateRemoved() { |
| 1189 |
var input = '<div><template><h1>boo</h1></template></div>'; |
| 1190 |
var expected = '<div></div>'; |
| 1191 |
assertSanitizedHtml(input, expected); |
| 1192 |
} |
| 1193 |
|
| 1194 |
|
| 1195 |
function testOriginalTag() { |
| 1196 |
var input = '<p>Line1<magic></magic></p>'; |
| 1197 |
var expected = '<p>Line1<span ' + otag('magic') + '></span></p>'; |
| 1198 |
assertSanitizedHtml( |
| 1199 |
input, expected, new goog.html.sanitizer.HtmlSanitizer.Builder() |
| 1200 |
.addOriginalTagNames() |
| 1201 |
.build()); |
| 1202 |
} |
| 1203 |
|
| 1204 |
|
| 1205 |
function testOriginalTagOverwrite() { |
| 1206 |
var input = '<div id="qqq">hello' + |
| 1207 |
'<a:b id="hi" class="hnn a" boo="3">qqq</a:b></div>'; |
| 1208 |
var expected = '<div>hello<span ' + otag('a:b') + ' id="HI" class="hnn a">' + |
| 1209 |
'qqq</span></div>'; |
| 1210 |
assertSanitizedHtml( |
| 1211 |
input, expected, new goog.html.sanitizer.HtmlSanitizer.Builder() |
| 1212 |
.addOriginalTagNames() |
| 1213 |
.withCustomTokenPolicy(function(token, hints) { |
| 1214 |
var an = hints.attributeName; |
| 1215 |
if (an === 'id' && token === 'hi') { |
| 1216 |
return 'HI'; |
| 1217 |
} else if (an === 'class') { |
| 1218 |
return token; |
| 1219 |
} |
| 1220 |
return null; |
| 1221 |
}) |
| 1222 |
.build()); |
| 1223 |
} |
| 1224 |
|
| 1225 |
|
| 1226 |
function testStyleTag_default() { |
| 1227 |
var input = '<style>a { color: red; qqq: z; ' + |
| 1228 |
'background-image: url("http://foo.com") }</style>'; |
| 1229 |
var expected = ''; |
| 1230 |
assertSanitizedHtml( |
| 1231 |
input, expected, new goog.html.sanitizer.HtmlSanitizer.Builder().build()); |
| 1232 |
} |
| 1233 |
|
| 1234 |
|
| 1235 |
function testStyleTag_random() { |
| 1236 |
var input = '<style>a { color: red; }</style>'; |
| 1237 |
var expected = |
| 1238 |
/^<SPAN id="(sanitizer-\w+)"><style>#\1 a{color: red;}<\/style><\/SPAN>$/; |
| 1239 |
var sanitizer = |
| 1240 |
new goog.html.sanitizer.HtmlSanitizer.Builder().allowStyleTag().build(); |
| 1241 |
assertSanitizedHtml(input, expected, sanitizer); |
| 1242 |
} |
| 1243 |
|
| 1244 |
|
| 1245 |
function testStyleTag_withStyleWithoutAllow() { |
| 1246 |
assertThrows(function() { |
| 1247 |
new goog.html.sanitizer.HtmlSanitizer.Builder().withStyleContainer('foo'); |
| 1248 |
}); |
| 1249 |
} |
| 1250 |
|
| 1251 |
|
| 1252 |
function testStyleTag_withStyleInvalid() { |
| 1253 |
assertThrows(function() { |
| 1254 |
new goog.html.sanitizer.HtmlSanitizer.Builder().withStyleContainer( |
| 1255 |
'<script>'); |
| 1256 |
}); |
| 1257 |
} |
| 1258 |
|
| 1259 |
|
| 1260 |
function testStyleTag_wrappingDisabled() { |
| 1261 |
var input = '<style>a { color: red; qqq: z; ' + |
| 1262 |
'background-image: url("http://foo.com") }</style>'; |
| 1263 |
var expected = '<style>a{color: red;}</style>'; |
| 1264 |
assertSanitizedHtml( |
| 1265 |
input, expected, |
| 1266 |
new goog.html.sanitizer.HtmlSanitizer.Builder() |
| 1267 |
.allowStyleTag() |
| 1268 |
.withStyleContainer() |
| 1269 |
.build()); |
| 1270 |
} |
| 1271 |
|
| 1272 |
|
| 1273 |
function testStyleTag_withStyleContainer() { |
| 1274 |
var input = '<style>a { color: red; }</style>'; |
| 1275 |
var expected = '<style>#foo a{color: red;}</style>'; |
| 1276 |
assertSanitizedHtml( |
| 1277 |
input, expected, |
| 1278 |
new goog.html.sanitizer.HtmlSanitizer.Builder() |
| 1279 |
.allowStyleTag() |
| 1280 |
.withStyleContainer('foo') |
| 1281 |
.build()); |
| 1282 |
} |
| 1283 |
|
| 1284 |
|
| 1285 |
function testStyleTag_networkUrlPolicy() { |
| 1286 |
var input = '<style>a{background-image: url("http://foo.com");}</style>'; |
| 1287 |
// Safari will strip quotes if they are not needed and add a slash. |
| 1288 |
var expected = goog.userAgent.product.SAFARI ? |
| 1289 |
'<style>a{background-image: url(http://foo.com/);}</style>' : |
| 1290 |
'<style>a{background-image: url("http://foo.com");}</style>'; |
| 1291 |
assertSanitizedHtml( |
| 1292 |
input, expected, |
| 1293 |
new goog.html.sanitizer.HtmlSanitizer.Builder() |
| 1294 |
.allowStyleTag() |
| 1295 |
.withStyleContainer() |
| 1296 |
.withCustomNetworkRequestUrlPolicy(goog.html.SafeUrl.sanitize) |
| 1297 |
.build()); |
| 1298 |
} |
| 1299 |
|
| 1300 |
|
| 1301 |
function testInlineStyleRules_basic() { |
| 1302 |
var input = '<style>a{color:red}</style><a>foo</a>'; |
| 1303 |
var expected = '<a style="color:red;">foo</a>'; |
| 1304 |
assertSanitizedHtml( |
| 1305 |
input, expected, |
| 1306 |
new goog.html.sanitizer.HtmlSanitizer.Builder() |
| 1307 |
.allowCssStyles() |
| 1308 |
.inlineStyleRules() |
| 1309 |
.build()); |
| 1310 |
} |
| 1311 |
|
| 1312 |
|
| 1313 |
function testInlineStyleRules_specificity() { |
| 1314 |
var input = '<style>a{color: red; border-width: 1px}' + |
| 1315 |
'#foo{color: white;}</style>' + |
| 1316 |
'<a id="foo">foo</a>'; |
| 1317 |
var expected = '<a id="foo" style="color: white; border-width: 1px">foo</a>'; |
| 1318 |
assertSanitizedHtml( |
| 1319 |
input, expected, |
| 1320 |
new goog.html.sanitizer.HtmlSanitizer.Builder() |
| 1321 |
.allowCssStyles() |
| 1322 |
.inlineStyleRules() |
| 1323 |
.withCustomTokenPolicy(goog.functions.identity) |
| 1324 |
.build()); |
| 1325 |
} |
| 1326 |
|
| 1327 |
|
| 1328 |
function testInlineStyleRules_required() { |
| 1329 |
assertThrows(function() { |
| 1330 |
new goog.html.sanitizer.HtmlSanitizer.Builder() |
| 1331 |
.inlineStyleRules(); |
| 1332 |
}); |
| 1333 |
} |
| 1334 |
|
| 1335 |
|
| 1336 |
function testInlineStyleRules_incompatible() { |
| 1337 |
assertThrows(function() { |
| 1338 |
new goog.html.sanitizer.HtmlSanitizer.Builder() |
| 1339 |
.allowCssStyles() |
| 1340 |
.inlineStyleRules() |
| 1341 |
.allowStyleTag(); |
| 1342 |
}); |
| 1343 |
assertThrows(function() { |
| 1344 |
new goog.html.sanitizer.HtmlSanitizer.Builder() |
| 1345 |
.allowStyleTag() |
| 1346 |
.allowCssStyles() |
| 1347 |
.inlineStyleRules(); |
| 1348 |
}); |
| 1349 |
} |
| 1350 |
|
| 1351 |
|
| 1352 |
function testInlineStyleRules_allowsExistingStyleAttributes() { |
| 1353 |
var input = '<style>a{color:red}</style><a style="font-weight: bold">foo</a>'; |
| 1354 |
var expected = '<a style="color: red; font-weight: bold">foo</a>'; |
| 1355 |
assertSanitizedHtml( |
| 1356 |
input, expected, |
| 1357 |
new goog.html.sanitizer.HtmlSanitizer.Builder() |
| 1358 |
.allowCssStyles() |
| 1359 |
.inlineStyleRules() |
| 1360 |
.build()); |
| 1361 |
} |
| 1362 |
|
| 1363 |
|
| 1364 |
function testInlineStyleRules_inlinedBeforeRenaming() { |
| 1365 |
var input = '<style>#bar{color:red}</style><a id="bar">baz</a>'; |
| 1366 |
var expected = '<a id="foo-bar" style="color:red">baz</a>'; |
| 1367 |
assertSanitizedHtml( |
| 1368 |
input, expected, |
| 1369 |
new goog.html.sanitizer.HtmlSanitizer.Builder() |
| 1370 |
.allowCssStyles() |
| 1371 |
.inlineStyleRules() |
| 1372 |
.withCustomTokenPolicy(function(id) { |
| 1373 |
return 'foo-' + id; |
| 1374 |
}) |
| 1375 |
.build()); |
| 1376 |
} |
| 1377 |
|
| 1378 |
function testInlineStyleRules_networkRequestUrlPolicy() { |
| 1379 |
var input = |
| 1380 |
'<style>a{background-image: url("http://foo.com")}</style><a>foo</a>'; |
| 1381 |
var expected = '<a>foo</a>'; |
| 1382 |
assertSanitizedHtml( |
| 1383 |
input, expected, |
| 1384 |
new goog.html.sanitizer.HtmlSanitizer.Builder() |
| 1385 |
.allowCssStyles() |
| 1386 |
.inlineStyleRules() |
| 1387 |
.build()); |
| 1388 |
|
| 1389 |
expected = '<a style="background-image: url(\'http://foo.com\')">foo</a>'; |
| 1390 |
assertSanitizedHtml( |
| 1391 |
input, expected, |
| 1392 |
new goog.html.sanitizer.HtmlSanitizer.Builder() |
| 1393 |
.allowCssStyles() |
| 1394 |
.inlineStyleRules() |
| 1395 |
.withCustomNetworkRequestUrlPolicy(goog.html.SafeUrl.sanitize) |
| 1396 |
.build()); |
| 1397 |
|
| 1398 |
input = '<style>a{background-image: url("javascript:alert(1)")}</style>' + |
| 1399 |
'<a>foo</a>'; |
| 1400 |
expected = '<a>foo</a>'; |
| 1401 |
assertSanitizedHtml( |
| 1402 |
input, expected, |
| 1403 |
new goog.html.sanitizer.HtmlSanitizer.Builder() |
| 1404 |
.allowCssStyles() |
| 1405 |
.inlineStyleRules() |
| 1406 |
.withCustomNetworkRequestUrlPolicy(goog.html.SafeUrl.sanitize) |
| 1407 |
.build()); |
| 1408 |
} |
| 1409 |
|
| 1410 |
|
| 1411 |
function testOriginalTagClobber() { |
| 1412 |
var input = '<a:b data-sanitizer-original-tag="xss"></a:b>'; |
| 1413 |
var expected = '<span ' + otag('a:b') + '></span>'; |
| 1414 |
assertSanitizedHtml( |
| 1415 |
input, expected, new goog.html.sanitizer.HtmlSanitizer.Builder() |
| 1416 |
.addOriginalTagNames() |
| 1417 |
.build()); |
| 1418 |
} |
| 1419 |
|
| 1420 |
|
| 1421 |
// the tests below investigate how <span> behaves when it is unknowingly put |
| 1422 |
// as child or parent of other elements due to sanitization. <div> had even more |
| 1423 |
// problems (e.g. cannot be a child of <p>) |
| 1424 |
|
| 1425 |
|
| 1426 |
/** |
| 1427 |
* Sanitize content, let the browser apply its own HTML tree correction by |
| 1428 |
* attaching the content to the document, and then assert it matches the |
| 1429 |
* expected value. |
| 1430 |
* @param {string} expected |
| 1431 |
* @param {string} input |
| 1432 |
*/ |
| 1433 |
function assertAfterInsertionEquals(expected, input) { |
| 1434 |
var sanitizer = |
| 1435 |
new goog.html.sanitizer.HtmlSanitizer.Builder().allowFormTag().build(); |
| 1436 |
input = goog.html.SafeHtml.unwrap(sanitizer.sanitize(input)); |
| 1437 |
var div = document.createElement('div'); |
| 1438 |
document.body.appendChild(div); |
| 1439 |
div.innerHTML = input; |
| 1440 |
goog.testing.dom.assertHtmlMatches( |
| 1441 |
expected, div.innerHTML, true /* opt_strictAttributes */); |
| 1442 |
div.parentNode.removeChild(div); |
| 1443 |
} |
| 1444 |
|
| 1445 |
|
| 1446 |
function testSpanNotCorrectedByBrowsersOuter() { |
| 1447 |
if (isIE8 || isIE9) { |
| 1448 |
return; |
| 1449 |
} |
| 1450 |
goog.array.forEach( |
| 1451 |
goog.object.getKeys(goog.html.sanitizer.TagWhitelist), function(tag) { |
| 1452 |
if (goog.array.contains( |
| 1453 |
[ |
| 1454 |
'BR', 'IMG', 'AREA', 'COL', 'COLGROUP', 'HR', 'INPUT', |
| 1455 |
'SOURCE', 'WBR' |
| 1456 |
], |
| 1457 |
tag)) { |
| 1458 |
return; // empty elements, ok |
| 1459 |
} |
| 1460 |
if (goog.array.contains(['CAPTION'], tag)) { |
| 1461 |
return; // potential problems |
| 1462 |
} |
| 1463 |
if (goog.array.contains(['NOSCRIPT'], tag)) { |
| 1464 |
return; // weird/not important |
| 1465 |
} |
| 1466 |
if (goog.array.contains( |
| 1467 |
[ |
| 1468 |
'SELECT', 'STYLE', 'TABLE', 'TBODY', 'TD', 'TR', 'TEXTAREA', |
| 1469 |
'TFOOT', 'THEAD', 'TH' |
| 1470 |
], |
| 1471 |
tag)) { |
| 1472 |
return; // consistent in whitelist, ok |
| 1473 |
} |
| 1474 |
var input = '<' + tag.toLowerCase() + '>a<span></span>a</' + |
| 1475 |
tag.toLowerCase() + '>'; |
| 1476 |
assertAfterInsertionEquals(input, input); |
| 1477 |
}); |
| 1478 |
} |
| 1479 |
|
| 1480 |
|
| 1481 |
function testSpanNotCorrectedByBrowsersInner() { |
| 1482 |
if (isIE8 || isIE9) { |
| 1483 |
return; |
| 1484 |
} |
| 1485 |
goog.array.forEach( |
| 1486 |
goog.object.getKeys(goog.html.sanitizer.TagWhitelist), function(tag) { |
| 1487 |
if (goog.array.contains( |
| 1488 |
[ |
| 1489 |
'CAPTION', 'STYLE', 'TABLE', 'TBODY', 'TD', 'TR', 'TEXTAREA', |
| 1490 |
'TFOOT', 'THEAD', 'TH' |
| 1491 |
], |
| 1492 |
tag)) { |
| 1493 |
return; // consistent in whitelist, ok |
| 1494 |
} |
| 1495 |
if (goog.array.contains(['COL', 'COLGROUP'], tag)) { |
| 1496 |
return; // potential problems |
| 1497 |
} |
| 1498 |
// TODO(pelizzi): Skip testing for FORM tags on Chrome until b/32550695 |
| 1499 |
// is fixed. |
| 1500 |
if (tag == 'FORM' && goog.userAgent.WEBKIT) { |
| 1501 |
return; |
| 1502 |
} |
| 1503 |
var input; |
| 1504 |
if (goog.array.contains( |
| 1505 |
[ |
| 1506 |
'BR', 'IMG', 'AREA', 'COL', 'COLGROUP', 'HR', 'INPUT', |
| 1507 |
'SOURCE', 'WBR' // empty elements, ok |
| 1508 |
], |
| 1509 |
tag)) { |
| 1510 |
input = '<span>a<' + tag.toLowerCase() + '>a</span>'; |
| 1511 |
} else { |
| 1512 |
input = '<span>a<' + tag.toLowerCase() + '>a</' + tag.toLowerCase() + |
| 1513 |
'>a</span>'; |
| 1514 |
} |
| 1515 |
assertAfterInsertionEquals(input, input); |
| 1516 |
}); |
| 1517 |
} |
| 1518 |
|
| 1519 |
|
| 1520 |
function testTemplateTagToSpan() { |
| 1521 |
var input = '<template alt="yes"><p>q</p></template>'; |
| 1522 |
var expected = '<span alt="yes"><p>q</p></span>'; |
| 1523 |
// TODO(pelizzi): use unblockTag once it's available |
| 1524 |
delete goog.html.sanitizer.TagBlacklist['TEMPLATE']; |
| 1525 |
assertSanitizedHtml(input, expected); |
| 1526 |
goog.html.sanitizer.TagBlacklist['TEMPLATE'] = true; |
| 1527 |
} |
| 1528 |
|
| 1529 |
|
| 1530 |
function testTemplateTagWhitelisted() { |
| 1531 |
var input = '<div><template alt="yes"><p>q</p></template></div>'; |
| 1532 |
// TODO(pelizzi): use unblockTag once it's available |
| 1533 |
delete goog.html.sanitizer.TagBlacklist['TEMPLATE']; |
| 1534 |
var builder = new goog.html.sanitizer.HtmlSanitizer.Builder(); |
| 1535 |
goog.html.sanitizer.unsafe.alsoAllowTags( |
| 1536 |
justification, builder, ['TEMPLATE']); |
| 1537 |
assertSanitizedHtml(input, input, builder.build()); |
| 1538 |
goog.html.sanitizer.TagBlacklist['TEMPLATE'] = true; |
| 1539 |
} |
| 1540 |
|
| 1541 |
|
| 1542 |
function testTemplateTagFake() { |
| 1543 |
var input = '<template data-sanitizer-original-tag="template">a</template>'; |
| 1544 |
var expected = ''; |
| 1545 |
assertSanitizedHtml(input, expected); |
| 1546 |
} |
| 1547 |
|
| 1548 |
|
| 1549 |
function testTemplateNested() { |
| 1550 |
var input = '<template><p>a</p><zzz alt="a"/><script>z</script><template>' + |
| 1551 |
'<p>a</p><zzz alt="a"/><script>z</script></template></template>'; |
| 1552 |
var expected = '<template><p>a</p><span alt="a"></span><template>' + |
| 1553 |
'<p>a</p><span alt="a"></span></template></template>'; |
| 1554 |
// TODO(pelizzi): use unblockTag once it's available |
| 1555 |
delete goog.html.sanitizer.TagBlacklist['TEMPLATE']; |
| 1556 |
var builder = new goog.html.sanitizer.HtmlSanitizer.Builder(); |
| 1557 |
goog.html.sanitizer.unsafe.alsoAllowTags( |
| 1558 |
justification, builder, ['TEMPLATE']); |
| 1559 |
assertSanitizedHtml(input, expected, builder.build()); |
| 1560 |
goog.html.sanitizer.TagBlacklist['TEMPLATE'] = true; |
| 1561 |
} |
| 1562 |
|
| 1563 |
|
| 1564 |
function testOnlyAllowEmptyAttrList() { |
| 1565 |
var input = '<p alt="nope" aria-checked="true" zzz="1">b</p>' + |
| 1566 |
'<a target="_blank">c</a>'; |
| 1567 |
var expected = '<p>b</p><a>c</a>'; |
| 1568 |
assertSanitizedHtml( |
| 1569 |
input, expected, new goog.html.sanitizer.HtmlSanitizer.Builder() |
| 1570 |
.onlyAllowAttributes([]) |
| 1571 |
.build()); |
| 1572 |
} |
| 1573 |
|
| 1574 |
|
| 1575 |
function testOnlyAllowUnWhitelistedAttr() { |
| 1576 |
assertThrows(function() { |
| 1577 |
new goog.html.sanitizer.HtmlSanitizer.Builder().onlyAllowAttributes( |
| 1578 |
['alt', 'zzz']); |
| 1579 |
}); |
| 1580 |
} |
| 1581 |
|
| 1582 |
|
| 1583 |
function testOnlyAllowAttributeWildCard() { |
| 1584 |
var input = |
| 1585 |
'<div alt="yes" aria-checked="true"><img alt="yep" avbb="no" /></div>'; |
| 1586 |
var expected = '<div alt="yes"><img alt="yep" /></div>'; |
| 1587 |
assertSanitizedHtml( |
| 1588 |
input, expected, |
| 1589 |
new goog.html.sanitizer.HtmlSanitizer.Builder() |
| 1590 |
.onlyAllowAttributes([{tagName: '*', attributeName: 'alt'}]) |
| 1591 |
.build()); |
| 1592 |
} |
| 1593 |
|
| 1594 |
|
| 1595 |
function testOnlyAllowAttributeLabelForA() { |
| 1596 |
var input = '<a label="3" aria-checked="4">fff</a><img label="3" />'; |
| 1597 |
var expected = '<a label="3">fff</a><img />'; |
| 1598 |
assertSanitizedHtml( |
| 1599 |
input, expected, new goog.html.sanitizer.HtmlSanitizer.Builder() |
| 1600 |
.onlyAllowAttributes([{ |
| 1601 |
tagName: '*', |
| 1602 |
attributeName: 'label', |
| 1603 |
policy: function(value, hints) { |
| 1604 |
if (hints.tagName !== 'a') { |
| 1605 |
return null; |
| 1606 |
} |
| 1607 |
return value; |
| 1608 |
} |
| 1609 |
}]) |
| 1610 |
.build()); |
| 1611 |
} |
| 1612 |
|
| 1613 |
|
| 1614 |
function testOnlyAllowAttributePolicy() { |
| 1615 |
var input = '<img alt="yes" /><img alt="no" />'; |
| 1616 |
var expected = '<img alt="yes" /><img />'; |
| 1617 |
assertSanitizedHtml( |
| 1618 |
input, expected, new goog.html.sanitizer.HtmlSanitizer.Builder() |
| 1619 |
.onlyAllowAttributes([{ |
| 1620 |
tagName: '*', |
| 1621 |
attributeName: 'alt', |
| 1622 |
policy: function(value, hints) { |
| 1623 |
assertEquals(hints.attributeName, 'alt'); |
| 1624 |
return value === 'yes' ? value : null; |
| 1625 |
} |
| 1626 |
}]) |
| 1627 |
.build()); |
| 1628 |
} |
| 1629 |
|
| 1630 |
|
| 1631 |
function testOnlyAllowAttributePolicyPipe1() { |
| 1632 |
var input = '<a target="hello">b</a>'; |
| 1633 |
var expected = '<a target="_blank">b</a>'; |
| 1634 |
assertSanitizedHtml( |
| 1635 |
input, expected, new goog.html.sanitizer.HtmlSanitizer.Builder() |
| 1636 |
.onlyAllowAttributes([{ |
| 1637 |
tagName: 'a', |
| 1638 |
attributeName: 'target', |
| 1639 |
policy: function(value, hints) { |
| 1640 |
assertEquals(hints.attributeName, 'target'); |
| 1641 |
return '_blank'; |
| 1642 |
} |
| 1643 |
}]) |
| 1644 |
.build()); |
| 1645 |
} |
| 1646 |
|
| 1647 |
|
| 1648 |
function testOnlyAllowAttributePolicyPipe2() { |
| 1649 |
var input = '<a target="hello">b</a>'; |
| 1650 |
var expected = '<a>b</a>'; |
| 1651 |
assertSanitizedHtml( |
| 1652 |
input, expected, new goog.html.sanitizer.HtmlSanitizer.Builder() |
| 1653 |
.onlyAllowAttributes([{ |
| 1654 |
tagName: 'a', |
| 1655 |
attributeName: 'target', |
| 1656 |
policy: function(value, hints) { |
| 1657 |
assertEquals(hints.attributeName, 'target'); |
| 1658 |
return 'nope'; |
| 1659 |
} |
| 1660 |
}]) |
| 1661 |
.build()); |
| 1662 |
} |
| 1663 |
|
| 1664 |
|
| 1665 |
function testOnlyAllowAttributeSpecificPolicyThrows() { |
| 1666 |
assertThrows(function() { |
| 1667 |
new goog.html.sanitizer.HtmlSanitizer.Builder().onlyAllowAttributes([ |
| 1668 |
{tagName: 'img', attributeName: 'src', policy: goog.functions.identity} |
| 1669 |
]); |
| 1670 |
}); |
| 1671 |
} |
| 1672 |
|
| 1673 |
|
| 1674 |
function testOnlyAllowAttributeGenericPolicyThrows() { |
| 1675 |
assertThrows(function() { |
| 1676 |
new goog.html.sanitizer.HtmlSanitizer.Builder().onlyAllowAttributes([{ |
| 1677 |
tagName: '*', |
| 1678 |
attributeName: 'target', |
| 1679 |
policy: goog.functions.identity |
| 1680 |
}]); |
| 1681 |
}); |
| 1682 |
} |
| 1683 |
|
| 1684 |
|
| 1685 |
function testOnlyAllowAttributeRefineThrows() { |
| 1686 |
var builder = |
| 1687 |
new goog.html.sanitizer.HtmlSanitizer.Builder() |
| 1688 |
.onlyAllowAttributes( |
| 1689 |
['aria-checked', {tagName: 'LINK', attributeName: 'HREF'}]) |
| 1690 |
.onlyAllowAttributes(['aria-checked']); |
| 1691 |
assertThrows(function() { |
| 1692 |
builder.onlyAllowAttributes(['alt']); |
| 1693 |
}); |
| 1694 |
} |
| 1695 |
|
| 1696 |
|
| 1697 |
function testUrlWithCredentials() { |
| 1698 |
if (isIE8 || isIE9) { |
| 1699 |
return; |
| 1700 |
} |
| 1701 |
// IE has trouble getting and setting URL attributes with credentials. Both |
| 1702 |
// HTMLSanitizer and assertHtmlMatches are affected by the bug, hence the use |
| 1703 |
// of plain string matching. |
| 1704 |
var url = 'http://foo:[email protected]'; |
| 1705 |
var input = '<div style="background-image: url(\'' + url + '\');">' + |
| 1706 |
'<img src="' + url + '" /></div>'; |
| 1707 |
var expectedIE = '<div style="background-image: url("' + url + |
| 1708 |
'");"><img src="' + url + '" /></div>'; |
| 1709 |
var sanitizer = |
| 1710 |
new goog.html.sanitizer.HtmlSanitizer.Builder() |
| 1711 |
.withCustomNetworkRequestUrlPolicy(goog.html.SafeUrl.sanitize) |
| 1712 |
.allowCssStyles() |
| 1713 |
.build(); |
| 1714 |
if (goog.userAgent.EDGE_OR_IE) { |
| 1715 |
assertEquals( |
| 1716 |
expectedIE, goog.html.SafeHtml.unwrap(sanitizer.sanitize(input))); |
| 1717 |
} else { |
| 1718 |
assertSanitizedHtml(input, input, sanitizer); |
| 1719 |
} |
| 1720 |
} |
| 1721 |
|
| 1722 |
|
| 1723 |
function testClobberedForm() { |
| 1724 |
var input = '<form><input name="nodeType" /></form>'; |
| 1725 |
// Passing a string in assertSanitizedHtml uses assertHtmlMatches, which is |
| 1726 |
// also vulnerable to clobbering. We use a regexp to fall back to simple |
| 1727 |
// string matching. |
| 1728 |
var expected = new RegExp('<form><input name="nodeType" /></form>'); |
| 1729 |
assertSanitizedHtml( |
| 1730 |
input, expected, |
| 1731 |
new goog.html.sanitizer.HtmlSanitizer.Builder() |
| 1732 |
.allowFormTag() |
| 1733 |
.withCustomNamePolicy(goog.functions.identity) |
| 1734 |
.build()); |
| 1735 |
} |