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lib/el3_runtime/aarch64/context_mgmt.c

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1 /*
2 * Copyright (c) 2013-2025, Arm Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2022, NVIDIA Corporation. All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
6 */
7
8 #include <assert.h>
9 #include <stdbool.h>
10 #include <string.h>
11
12 #include <platform_def.h>
13
14 #include <arch.h>
15 #include <arch_helpers.h>
16 #include <arch_features.h>
17 #include <bl31/interrupt_mgmt.h>
18 #include <common/bl_common.h>
19 #include <common/debug.h>
20 #include <context.h>
21 #include <drivers/arm/gicv3.h>
22 #include <lib/cpus/cpu_ops.h>
23 #include <lib/cpus/errata.h>
24 #include <lib/el3_runtime/context_mgmt.h>
25 #include <lib/el3_runtime/cpu_data.h>
26 #include <lib/el3_runtime/pubsub_events.h>
27 #include <lib/extensions/amu.h>
28 #include <lib/extensions/brbe.h>
29 #include <lib/extensions/debug_v8p9.h>
30 #include <lib/extensions/fgt2.h>
31 #include <lib/extensions/mpam.h>
32 #include <lib/extensions/pmuv3.h>
33 #include <lib/extensions/sme.h>
34 #include <lib/extensions/spe.h>
35 #include <lib/extensions/sve.h>
36 #include <lib/extensions/sysreg128.h>
37 #include <lib/extensions/sys_reg_trace.h>
38 #include <lib/extensions/tcr2.h>
39 #include <lib/extensions/trbe.h>
40 #include <lib/extensions/trf.h>
41 #include <lib/utils.h>
42
43 #if ENABLE_FEAT_TWED
44 /* Make sure delay value fits within the range(0-15) */
45 CASSERT(((TWED_DELAY & ~SCR_TWEDEL_MASK) == 0U), assert_twed_delay_value_check);
46 #endif /* ENABLE_FEAT_TWED */
47
48 per_world_context_t per_world_context[CPU_DATA_CONTEXT_NUM];
49 static bool has_secure_perworld_init;
50
51 static void manage_extensions_common(cpu_context_t *ctx);
52 static void manage_extensions_nonsecure(cpu_context_t *ctx);
53 static void manage_extensions_secure(cpu_context_t *ctx);
54 static void manage_extensions_secure_per_world(void);
55
56 #if ((IMAGE_BL1) || (IMAGE_BL31 && (!CTX_INCLUDE_EL2_REGS)))
57 static void setup_el1_context(cpu_context_t *ctx, const struct entry_point_info *ep)
58 {
59 u_register_t sctlr_elx, actlr_elx;
60
61 /*
62 * Initialise SCTLR_EL1 to the reset value corresponding to the target
63 * execution state setting all fields rather than relying on the hw.
64 * Some fields have architecturally UNKNOWN reset values and these are
65 * set to zero.
66 *
67 * SCTLR.EE: Endianness is taken from the entrypoint attributes.
68 *
69 * SCTLR.M, SCTLR.C and SCTLR.I: These fields must be zero (as
70 * required by PSCI specification)
71 */
72 sctlr_elx = (EP_GET_EE(ep->h.attr) != 0U) ? SCTLR_EE_BIT : 0UL;
73 if (GET_RW(ep->spsr) == MODE_RW_64) {
74 sctlr_elx |= SCTLR_EL1_RES1;
75 } else {
76 /*
77 * If the target execution state is AArch32 then the following
78 * fields need to be set.
79 *
80 * SCTRL_EL1.nTWE: Set to one so that EL0 execution of WFE
81 * instructions are not trapped to EL1.
82 *
83 * SCTLR_EL1.nTWI: Set to one so that EL0 execution of WFI
84 * instructions are not trapped to EL1.
85 *
86 * SCTLR_EL1.CP15BEN: Set to one to enable EL0 execution of the
87 * CP15DMB, CP15DSB, and CP15ISB instructions.
88 */
89 sctlr_elx |= SCTLR_AARCH32_EL1_RES1 | SCTLR_CP15BEN_BIT
90 | SCTLR_NTWI_BIT | SCTLR_NTWE_BIT;
91 }
92
93 /*
94 * If workaround of errata 764081 for Cortex-A75 is used then set
95 * SCTLR_EL1.IESB to enable Implicit Error Synchronization Barrier.
96 */
97 if (errata_a75_764081_applies()) {
98 sctlr_elx |= SCTLR_IESB_BIT;
99 }
100
101 /* Store the initialised SCTLR_EL1 value in the cpu_context */
102 write_ctx_sctlr_el1_reg_errata(ctx, sctlr_elx);
103
104 /*
105 * Base the context ACTLR_EL1 on the current value, as it is
106 * implementation defined. The context restore process will write
107 * the value from the context to the actual register and can cause
108 * problems for processor cores that don't expect certain bits to
109 * be zero.
110 */
111 actlr_elx = read_actlr_el1();
112 write_el1_ctx_common(get_el1_sysregs_ctx(ctx), actlr_el1, actlr_elx);
113 }
114 #endif /* (IMAGE_BL1) || (IMAGE_BL31 && (!CTX_INCLUDE_EL2_REGS)) */
115
116 /******************************************************************************
117 * This function performs initializations that are specific to SECURE state
118 * and updates the cpu context specified by 'ctx'.
119 *****************************************************************************/
120 static void setup_secure_context(cpu_context_t *ctx, const struct entry_point_info *ep)
121 {
122 u_register_t scr_el3;
123 el3_state_t *state;
124
125 state = get_el3state_ctx(ctx);
126 scr_el3 = read_ctx_reg(state, CTX_SCR_EL3);
127
128 #if defined(IMAGE_BL31) && !defined(SPD_spmd)
129 /*
130 * SCR_EL3.IRQ, SCR_EL3.FIQ: Enable the physical FIQ and IRQ routing as
131 * indicated by the interrupt routing model for BL31.
132 */
133 scr_el3 |= get_scr_el3_from_routing_model(SECURE);
134 #endif
135
136 /* Allow access to Allocation Tags when FEAT_MTE2 is implemented and enabled. */
137 if (is_feat_mte2_supported()) {
138 scr_el3 |= SCR_ATA_BIT;
139 }
140
141 write_ctx_reg(state, CTX_SCR_EL3, scr_el3);
142
143 /*
144 * Initialize EL1 context registers unless SPMC is running
145 * at S-EL2.
146 */
147 #if (!SPMD_SPM_AT_SEL2)
148 setup_el1_context(ctx, ep);
149 #endif
150
151 manage_extensions_secure(ctx);
152
153 /**
154 * manage_extensions_secure_per_world api has to be executed once,
155 * as the registers getting initialised, maintain constant value across
156 * all the cpus for the secure world.
157 * Henceforth, this check ensures that the registers are initialised once
158 * and avoids re-initialization from multiple cores.
159 */
160 if (!has_secure_perworld_init) {
161 manage_extensions_secure_per_world();
162 }
163 }
164
165 #if ENABLE_RME
166 /******************************************************************************
167 * This function performs initializations that are specific to REALM state
168 * and updates the cpu context specified by 'ctx'.
169 *****************************************************************************/
170 static void setup_realm_context(cpu_context_t *ctx, const struct entry_point_info *ep)
171 {
172 u_register_t scr_el3;
173 el3_state_t *state;
174
175 state = get_el3state_ctx(ctx);
176 scr_el3 = read_ctx_reg(state, CTX_SCR_EL3);
177
178 scr_el3 |= SCR_NS_BIT | SCR_NSE_BIT;
179
180 /* CSV2 version 2 and above */
181 if (is_feat_csv2_2_supported()) {
182 /* Enable access to the SCXTNUM_ELx registers. */
183 scr_el3 |= SCR_EnSCXT_BIT;
184 }
185
186 if (is_feat_sctlr2_supported()) {
187 /* Set the SCTLR2En bit in SCR_EL3 to enable access to
188 * SCTLR2_ELx registers.
189 */
190 scr_el3 |= SCR_SCTLR2En_BIT;
191 }
192
193 write_ctx_reg(state, CTX_SCR_EL3, scr_el3);
194 }
195 #endif /* ENABLE_RME */
196
197 /******************************************************************************
198 * This function performs initializations that are specific to NON-SECURE state
199 * and updates the cpu context specified by 'ctx'.
200 *****************************************************************************/
201 static void setup_ns_context(cpu_context_t *ctx, const struct entry_point_info *ep)
202 {
203 u_register_t scr_el3;
204 el3_state_t *state;
205
206 state = get_el3state_ctx(ctx);
207 scr_el3 = read_ctx_reg(state, CTX_SCR_EL3);
208
209 /* SCR_NS: Set the NS bit */
210 scr_el3 |= SCR_NS_BIT;
211
212 /* Allow access to Allocation Tags when FEAT_MTE2 is implemented and enabled. */
213 if (is_feat_mte2_supported()) {
214 scr_el3 |= SCR_ATA_BIT;
215 }
216
217 #if !CTX_INCLUDE_PAUTH_REGS
218 /*
219 * Pointer Authentication feature, if present, is always enabled by default
220 * for Non secure lower exception levels. We do not have an explicit
221 * flag to set it.
222 * CTX_INCLUDE_PAUTH_REGS flag, is explicitly used to enable for lower
223 * exception levels of secure and realm worlds.
224 *
225 * To prevent the leakage between the worlds during world switch,
226 * we enable it only for the non-secure world.
227 *
228 * If the Secure/realm world wants to use pointer authentication,
229 * CTX_INCLUDE_PAUTH_REGS must be explicitly set to 1, in which case
230 * it will be enabled globally for all the contexts.
231 *
232 * SCR_EL3.API: Set to one to not trap any PAuth instructions at ELs
233 * other than EL3
234 *
235 * SCR_EL3.APK: Set to one to not trap any PAuth key values at ELs other
236 * than EL3
237 */
238 scr_el3 |= SCR_API_BIT | SCR_APK_BIT;
239
240 #endif /* CTX_INCLUDE_PAUTH_REGS */
241
242 #if HANDLE_EA_EL3_FIRST_NS
243 /* SCR_EL3.EA: Route External Abort and SError Interrupt to EL3. */
244 scr_el3 |= SCR_EA_BIT;
245 #endif
246
247 #if RAS_TRAP_NS_ERR_REC_ACCESS
248 /*
249 * SCR_EL3.TERR: Trap Error record accesses. Accesses to the RAS ERR
250 * and RAS ERX registers from EL1 and EL2(from any security state)
251 * are trapped to EL3.
252 * Set here to trap only for NS EL1/EL2
253 *
254 */
255 scr_el3 |= SCR_TERR_BIT;
256 #endif
257
258 /* CSV2 version 2 and above */
259 if (is_feat_csv2_2_supported()) {
260 /* Enable access to the SCXTNUM_ELx registers. */
261 scr_el3 |= SCR_EnSCXT_BIT;
262 }
263
264 #ifdef IMAGE_BL31
265 /*
266 * SCR_EL3.IRQ, SCR_EL3.FIQ: Enable the physical FIQ and IRQ routing as
267 * indicated by the interrupt routing model for BL31.
268 */
269 scr_el3 |= get_scr_el3_from_routing_model(NON_SECURE);
270 #endif
271
272 if (is_feat_the_supported()) {
273 /* Set the RCWMASKEn bit in SCR_EL3 to enable access to
274 * RCWMASK_EL1 and RCWSMASK_EL1 registers.
275 */
276 scr_el3 |= SCR_RCWMASKEn_BIT;
277 }
278
279 if (is_feat_sctlr2_supported()) {
280 /* Set the SCTLR2En bit in SCR_EL3 to enable access to
281 * SCTLR2_ELx registers.
282 */
283 scr_el3 |= SCR_SCTLR2En_BIT;
284 }
285
286 if (is_feat_d128_supported()) {
287 /* Set the D128En bit in SCR_EL3 to enable access to 128-bit
288 * versions of TTBR0_EL1, TTBR1_EL1, RCWMASK_EL1, RCWSMASK_EL1,
289 * PAR_EL1 and TTBR1_EL2, TTBR0_EL2 and VTTBR_EL2 registers.
290 */
291 scr_el3 |= SCR_D128En_BIT;
292 }
293
294 write_ctx_reg(state, CTX_SCR_EL3, scr_el3);
295
296 /* Initialize EL2 context registers */
297 #if (CTX_INCLUDE_EL2_REGS && IMAGE_BL31)
298
299 /*
300 * Initialize SCTLR_EL2 context register with reset value.
301 */
302 write_el2_ctx_common(get_el2_sysregs_ctx(ctx), sctlr_el2, SCTLR_EL2_RES1);
303
304 if (is_feat_hcx_supported()) {
305 /*
306 * Initialize register HCRX_EL2 with its init value.
307 * As the value of HCRX_EL2 is UNKNOWN on reset, there is a
308 * chance that this can lead to unexpected behavior in lower
309 * ELs that have not been updated since the introduction of
310 * this feature if not properly initialized, especially when
311 * it comes to those bits that enable/disable traps.
312 */
313 write_el2_ctx_hcx(get_el2_sysregs_ctx(ctx), hcrx_el2,
314 HCRX_EL2_INIT_VAL);
315 }
316
317 if (is_feat_fgt_supported()) {
318 /*
319 * Initialize HFG*_EL2 registers with a default value so legacy
320 * systems unaware of FEAT_FGT do not get trapped due to their lack
321 * of initialization for this feature.
322 */
323 write_el2_ctx_fgt(get_el2_sysregs_ctx(ctx), hfgitr_el2,
324 HFGITR_EL2_INIT_VAL);
325 write_el2_ctx_fgt(get_el2_sysregs_ctx(ctx), hfgrtr_el2,
326 HFGRTR_EL2_INIT_VAL);
327 write_el2_ctx_fgt(get_el2_sysregs_ctx(ctx), hfgwtr_el2,
328 HFGWTR_EL2_INIT_VAL);
329 }
330 #else
331 /* Initialize EL1 context registers */
332 setup_el1_context(ctx, ep);
333 #endif /* (CTX_INCLUDE_EL2_REGS && IMAGE_BL31) */
334
335 manage_extensions_nonsecure(ctx);
336 }
337
338 /*******************************************************************************
339 * The following function performs initialization of the cpu_context 'ctx'
340 * for first use that is common to all security states, and sets the
341 * initial entrypoint state as specified by the entry_point_info structure.
342 *
343 * The EE and ST attributes are used to configure the endianness and secure
344 * timer availability for the new execution context.
345 ******************************************************************************/
346 static void setup_context_common(cpu_context_t *ctx, const entry_point_info_t *ep)
347 {
348 u_register_t scr_el3;
349 u_register_t mdcr_el3;
350 el3_state_t *state;
351 gp_regs_t *gp_regs;
352
353 state = get_el3state_ctx(ctx);
354
355 /* Clear any residual register values from the context */
356 zeromem(ctx, sizeof(*ctx));
357
358 /*
359 * The lower-EL context is zeroed so that no stale values leak to a world.
360 * It is assumed that an all-zero lower-EL context is good enough for it
361 * to boot correctly. However, there are very few registers where this
362 * is not true and some values need to be recreated.
363 */
364 #if (CTX_INCLUDE_EL2_REGS && IMAGE_BL31)
365 el2_sysregs_t *el2_ctx = get_el2_sysregs_ctx(ctx);
366
367 /*
368 * These bits are set in the gicv3 driver. Losing them (especially the
369 * SRE bit) is problematic for all worlds. Henceforth recreate them.
370 */
371 u_register_t icc_sre_el2_val = ICC_SRE_DIB_BIT | ICC_SRE_DFB_BIT |
372 ICC_SRE_EN_BIT | ICC_SRE_SRE_BIT;
373 write_el2_ctx_common(el2_ctx, icc_sre_el2, icc_sre_el2_val);
374
375 /*
376 * The actlr_el2 register can be initialized in platform's reset handler
377 * and it may contain access control bits (e.g. CLUSTERPMUEN bit).
378 */
379 write_el2_ctx_common(el2_ctx, actlr_el2, read_actlr_el2());
380 #endif /* (CTX_INCLUDE_EL2_REGS && IMAGE_BL31) */
381
382 /* Start with a clean SCR_EL3 copy as all relevant values are set */
383 scr_el3 = SCR_RESET_VAL;
384
385 /*
386 * SCR_EL3.TWE: Set to zero so that execution of WFE instructions at
387 * EL2, EL1 and EL0 are not trapped to EL3.
388 *
389 * SCR_EL3.TWI: Set to zero so that execution of WFI instructions at
390 * EL2, EL1 and EL0 are not trapped to EL3.
391 *
392 * SCR_EL3.SMD: Set to zero to enable SMC calls at EL1 and above, from
393 * both Security states and both Execution states.
394 *
395 * SCR_EL3.SIF: Set to one to disable secure instruction execution from
396 * Non-secure memory.
397 */
398 scr_el3 &= ~(SCR_TWE_BIT | SCR_TWI_BIT | SCR_SMD_BIT);
399
400 scr_el3 |= SCR_SIF_BIT;
401
402 /*
403 * SCR_EL3.RW: Set the execution state, AArch32 or AArch64, for next
404 * Exception level as specified by SPSR.
405 */
406 if (GET_RW(ep->spsr) == MODE_RW_64) {
407 scr_el3 |= SCR_RW_BIT;
408 }
409
410 /*
411 * SCR_EL3.ST: Traps Secure EL1 accesses to the Counter-timer Physical
412 * Secure timer registers to EL3, from AArch64 state only, if specified
413 * by the entrypoint attributes. If SEL2 is present and enabled, the ST
414 * bit always behaves as 1 (i.e. secure physical timer register access
415 * is not trapped)
416 */
417 if (EP_GET_ST(ep->h.attr) != 0U) {
418 scr_el3 |= SCR_ST_BIT;
419 }
420
421 /*
422 * If FEAT_HCX is enabled, enable access to HCRX_EL2 by setting
423 * SCR_EL3.HXEn.
424 */
425 if (is_feat_hcx_supported()) {
426 scr_el3 |= SCR_HXEn_BIT;
427 }
428
429 /*
430 * If FEAT_LS64_ACCDATA is enabled, enable access to ACCDATA_EL1 by
431 * setting SCR_EL3.ADEn and allow the ST64BV0 instruction by setting
432 * SCR_EL3.EnAS0.
433 */
434 if (is_feat_ls64_accdata_supported()) {
435 scr_el3 |= SCR_ADEn_BIT | SCR_EnAS0_BIT;
436 }
437
438 /*
439 * If FEAT_RNG_TRAP is enabled, all reads of the RNDR and RNDRRS
440 * registers are trapped to EL3.
441 */
442 #if ENABLE_FEAT_RNG_TRAP
443 scr_el3 |= SCR_TRNDR_BIT;
444 #endif
445
446 #if FAULT_INJECTION_SUPPORT
447 /* Enable fault injection from lower ELs */
448 scr_el3 |= SCR_FIEN_BIT;
449 #endif
450
451 #if CTX_INCLUDE_PAUTH_REGS
452 /*
453 * Enable Pointer Authentication globally for all the worlds.
454 *
455 * SCR_EL3.API: Set to one to not trap any PAuth instructions at ELs
456 * other than EL3
457 *
458 * SCR_EL3.APK: Set to one to not trap any PAuth key values at ELs other
459 * than EL3
460 */
461 scr_el3 |= SCR_API_BIT | SCR_APK_BIT;
462 #endif /* CTX_INCLUDE_PAUTH_REGS */
463
464 /*
465 * SCR_EL3.TCR2EN: Enable access to TCR2_ELx for AArch64 if present.
466 */
467 if (is_feat_tcr2_supported() && (GET_RW(ep->spsr) == MODE_RW_64)) {
468 scr_el3 |= SCR_TCR2EN_BIT;
469 }
470
471 /*
472 * SCR_EL3.PIEN: Enable permission indirection and overlay
473 * registers for AArch64 if present.
474 */
475 if (is_feat_sxpie_supported() || is_feat_sxpoe_supported()) {
476 scr_el3 |= SCR_PIEN_BIT;
477 }
478
479 /*
480 * SCR_EL3.GCSEn: Enable GCS registers for AArch64 if present.
481 */
482 if ((is_feat_gcs_supported()) && (GET_RW(ep->spsr) == MODE_RW_64)) {
483 scr_el3 |= SCR_GCSEn_BIT;
484 }
485
486 /*
487 * SCR_EL3.HCE: Enable HVC instructions if next execution state is
488 * AArch64 and next EL is EL2, or if next execution state is AArch32 and
489 * next mode is Hyp.
490 * SCR_EL3.FGTEn: Enable Fine Grained Virtualization Traps under the
491 * same conditions as HVC instructions and when the processor supports
492 * ARMv8.6-FGT.
493 * SCR_EL3.ECVEn: Enable Enhanced Counter Virtualization (ECV)
494 * CNTPOFF_EL2 register under the same conditions as HVC instructions
495 * and when the processor supports ECV.
496 */
497 if (((GET_RW(ep->spsr) == MODE_RW_64) && (GET_EL(ep->spsr) == MODE_EL2))
498 || ((GET_RW(ep->spsr) != MODE_RW_64)
499 && (GET_M32(ep->spsr) == MODE32_hyp))) {
500 scr_el3 |= SCR_HCE_BIT;
501
502 if (is_feat_fgt_supported()) {
503 scr_el3 |= SCR_FGTEN_BIT;
504 }
505
506 if (is_feat_ecv_supported()) {
507 scr_el3 |= SCR_ECVEN_BIT;
508 }
509 }
510
511 /* Enable WFE trap delay in SCR_EL3 if supported and configured */
512 if (is_feat_twed_supported()) {
513 /* Set delay in SCR_EL3 */
514 scr_el3 &= ~(SCR_TWEDEL_MASK << SCR_TWEDEL_SHIFT);
515 scr_el3 |= ((TWED_DELAY & SCR_TWEDEL_MASK)
516 << SCR_TWEDEL_SHIFT);
517
518 /* Enable WFE delay */
519 scr_el3 |= SCR_TWEDEn_BIT;
520 }
521
522 #if IMAGE_BL31 && defined(SPD_spmd) && SPMD_SPM_AT_SEL2
523 /* Enable S-EL2 if FEAT_SEL2 is implemented for all the contexts. */
524 if (is_feat_sel2_supported()) {
525 scr_el3 |= SCR_EEL2_BIT;
526 }
527 #endif /* (IMAGE_BL31 && defined(SPD_spmd) && SPMD_SPM_AT_SEL2) */
528
529 /*
530 * Populate EL3 state so that we've the right context
531 * before doing ERET
532 */
533 write_ctx_reg(state, CTX_SCR_EL3, scr_el3);
534 write_ctx_reg(state, CTX_ELR_EL3, ep->pc);
535 write_ctx_reg(state, CTX_SPSR_EL3, ep->spsr);
536
537 /* Start with a clean MDCR_EL3 copy as all relevant values are set */
538 mdcr_el3 = MDCR_EL3_RESET_VAL;
539
540 /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
541 * Initialise MDCR_EL3, setting all fields rather than relying on hw.
542 * Some fields are architecturally UNKNOWN on reset.
543 *
544 * MDCR_EL3.SDD: Set to one to disable AArch64 Secure self-hosted debug.
545 * Debug exceptions, other than Breakpoint Instruction exceptions, are
546 * disabled from all ELs in Secure state.
547 *
548 * MDCR_EL3.SPD32: Set to 0b10 to disable AArch32 Secure self-hosted
549 * privileged debug from S-EL1.
550 *
551 * MDCR_EL3.TDOSA: Set to zero so that EL2 and EL2 System register
552 * access to the powerdown debug registers do not trap to EL3.
553 *
554 * MDCR_EL3.TDA: Set to zero to allow EL0, EL1 and EL2 access to the
555 * debug registers, other than those registers that are controlled by
556 * MDCR_EL3.TDOSA.
557 */
558 mdcr_el3 |= ((MDCR_SDD_BIT | MDCR_SPD32(MDCR_SPD32_DISABLE))
559 & ~(MDCR_TDA_BIT | MDCR_TDOSA_BIT)) ;
560 write_ctx_reg(state, CTX_MDCR_EL3, mdcr_el3);
561
562 /*
563 * Configure MDCR_EL3 register as applicable for each world
564 * (NS/Secure/Realm) context.
565 */
566 manage_extensions_common(ctx);
567
568 /*
569 * Store the X0-X7 value from the entrypoint into the context
570 * Use memcpy as we are in control of the layout of the structures
571 */
572 gp_regs = get_gpregs_ctx(ctx);
573 memcpy(gp_regs, (void *)&ep->args, sizeof(aapcs64_params_t));
574 }
575
576 /*******************************************************************************
577 * Context management library initialization routine. This library is used by
578 * runtime services to share pointers to 'cpu_context' structures for secure
579 * non-secure and realm states. Management of the structures and their associated
580 * memory is not done by the context management library e.g. the PSCI service
581 * manages the cpu context used for entry from and exit to the non-secure state.
582 * The Secure payload dispatcher service manages the context(s) corresponding to
583 * the secure state. It also uses this library to get access to the non-secure
584 * state cpu context pointers.
585 * Lastly, this library provides the API to make SP_EL3 point to the cpu context
586 * which will be used for programming an entry into a lower EL. The same context
587 * will be used to save state upon exception entry from that EL.
588 ******************************************************************************/
589 void __init cm_init(void)
590 {
591 /*
592 * The context management library has only global data to initialize, but
593 * that will be done when the BSS is zeroed out.
594 */
595 }
596
597 /*******************************************************************************
598 * This is the high-level function used to initialize the cpu_context 'ctx' for
599 * first use. It performs initializations that are common to all security states
600 * and initializations specific to the security state specified in 'ep'
601 ******************************************************************************/
602 void cm_setup_context(cpu_context_t *ctx, const entry_point_info_t *ep)
603 {
604 unsigned int security_state;
605
606 assert(ctx != NULL);
607
608 /*
609 * Perform initializations that are common
610 * to all security states
611 */
612 setup_context_common(ctx, ep);
613
614 security_state = GET_SECURITY_STATE(ep->h.attr);
615
616 /* Perform security state specific initializations */
617 switch (security_state) {
618 case SECURE:
619 setup_secure_context(ctx, ep);
620 break;
621 #if ENABLE_RME
622 case REALM:
623 setup_realm_context(ctx, ep);
624 break;
625 #endif
626 case NON_SECURE:
627 setup_ns_context(ctx, ep);
628 break;
629 default:
630 ERROR("Invalid security state\n");
631 panic();
632 break;
633 }
634 }
635
636 /*******************************************************************************
637 * Enable architecture extensions for EL3 execution. This function only updates
638 * registers in-place which are expected to either never change or be
639 * overwritten by el3_exit.
640 ******************************************************************************/
641 #if IMAGE_BL31
642 void cm_manage_extensions_el3(void)
643 {
644 if (is_feat_amu_supported()) {
645 amu_init_el3();
646 }
647
648 if (is_feat_sme_supported()) {
649 sme_init_el3();
650 }
651
652 pmuv3_init_el3();
653 }
654 #endif /* IMAGE_BL31 */
655
656 /******************************************************************************
657 * Function to initialise the registers with the RESET values in the context
658 * memory, which are maintained per world.
659 ******************************************************************************/
660 #if IMAGE_BL31
661 void cm_el3_arch_init_per_world(per_world_context_t *per_world_ctx)
662 {
663 /*
664 * Initialise CPTR_EL3, setting all fields rather than relying on hw.
665 *
666 * CPTR_EL3.TFP: Set to zero so that accesses to the V- or Z- registers
667 * by Advanced SIMD, floating-point or SVE instructions (if
668 * implemented) do not trap to EL3.
669 *
670 * CPTR_EL3.TCPAC: Set to zero so that accesses to CPACR_EL1,
671 * CPTR_EL2,CPACR, or HCPTR do not trap to EL3.
672 */
673 uint64_t cptr_el3 = CPTR_EL3_RESET_VAL & ~(TCPAC_BIT | TFP_BIT);
674
675 per_world_ctx->ctx_cptr_el3 = cptr_el3;
676
677 /*
678 * Initialize MPAM3_EL3 to its default reset value
679 *
680 * MPAM3_EL3_RESET_VAL sets the MPAM3_EL3.TRAPLOWER bit that forces
681 * all lower ELn MPAM3_EL3 register access to, trap to EL3
682 */
683
684 per_world_ctx->ctx_mpam3_el3 = MPAM3_EL3_RESET_VAL;
685 }
686 #endif /* IMAGE_BL31 */
687
688 /*******************************************************************************
689 * Initialise per_world_context for Non-Secure world.
690 * This function enables the architecture extensions, which have same value
691 * across the cores for the non-secure world.
692 ******************************************************************************/
693 #if IMAGE_BL31
694 void manage_extensions_nonsecure_per_world(void)
695 {
696 cm_el3_arch_init_per_world(&per_world_context[CPU_CONTEXT_NS]);
697
698 if (is_feat_sme_supported()) {
699 sme_enable_per_world(&per_world_context[CPU_CONTEXT_NS]);
700 }
701
702 if (is_feat_sve_supported()) {
703 sve_enable_per_world(&per_world_context[CPU_CONTEXT_NS]);
704 }
705
706 if (is_feat_amu_supported()) {
707 amu_enable_per_world(&per_world_context[CPU_CONTEXT_NS]);
708 }
709
710 if (is_feat_sys_reg_trace_supported()) {
711 sys_reg_trace_enable_per_world(&per_world_context[CPU_CONTEXT_NS]);
712 }
713
714 if (is_feat_mpam_supported()) {
715 mpam_enable_per_world(&per_world_context[CPU_CONTEXT_NS]);
716 }
717 }
718 #endif /* IMAGE_BL31 */
719
720 /*******************************************************************************
721 * Initialise per_world_context for Secure world.
722 * This function enables the architecture extensions, which have same value
723 * across the cores for the secure world.
724 ******************************************************************************/
725 static void manage_extensions_secure_per_world(void)
726 {
727 #if IMAGE_BL31
728 cm_el3_arch_init_per_world(&per_world_context[CPU_CONTEXT_SECURE]);
729
730 if (is_feat_sme_supported()) {
731
732 if (ENABLE_SME_FOR_SWD) {
733 /*
734 * Enable SME, SVE, FPU/SIMD in secure context, SPM must ensure
735 * SME, SVE, and FPU/SIMD context properly managed.
736 */
737 sme_enable_per_world(&per_world_context[CPU_CONTEXT_SECURE]);
738 } else {
739 /*
740 * Disable SME, SVE, FPU/SIMD in secure context so non-secure
741 * world can safely use the associated registers.
742 */
743 sme_disable_per_world(&per_world_context[CPU_CONTEXT_SECURE]);
744 }
745 }
746 if (is_feat_sve_supported()) {
747 if (ENABLE_SVE_FOR_SWD) {
748 /*
749 * Enable SVE and FPU in secure context, SPM must ensure
750 * that the SVE and FPU register contexts are properly managed.
751 */
752 sve_enable_per_world(&per_world_context[CPU_CONTEXT_SECURE]);
753 } else {
754 /*
755 * Disable SVE and FPU in secure context so non-secure world
756 * can safely use them.
757 */
758 sve_disable_per_world(&per_world_context[CPU_CONTEXT_SECURE]);
759 }
760 }
761
762 /* NS can access this but Secure shouldn't */
763 if (is_feat_sys_reg_trace_supported()) {
764 sys_reg_trace_disable_per_world(&per_world_context[CPU_CONTEXT_SECURE]);
765 }
766
767 has_secure_perworld_init = true;
768 #endif /* IMAGE_BL31 */
769 }
770
771 /*******************************************************************************
772 * Enable architecture extensions on first entry to Non-secure world only
773 * and disable for secure world.
774 *
775 * NOTE: Arch features which have been provided with the capability of getting
776 * enabled only for non-secure world and being disabled for secure world are
777 * grouped here, as the MDCR_EL3 context value remains same across the worlds.
778 ******************************************************************************/
779 static void manage_extensions_common(cpu_context_t *ctx)
780 {
781 #if IMAGE_BL31
782 if (is_feat_spe_supported()) {
783 /*
784 * Enable FEAT_SPE for Non-Secure and prohibit for Secure state.
785 */
786 spe_enable(ctx);
787 }
788
789 if (is_feat_trbe_supported()) {
790 /*
791 * Enable FEAT_TRBE for Non-Secure and prohibit for Secure and
792 * Realm state.
793 */
794 trbe_enable(ctx);
795 }
796
797 if (is_feat_trf_supported()) {
798 /*
799 * Enable FEAT_TRF for Non-Secure and prohibit for Secure state.
800 */
801 trf_enable(ctx);
802 }
803 #endif /* IMAGE_BL31 */
804 }
805
806 /*******************************************************************************
807 * Enable architecture extensions on first entry to Non-secure world.
808 ******************************************************************************/
809 static void manage_extensions_nonsecure(cpu_context_t *ctx)
810 {
811 #if IMAGE_BL31
812 if (is_feat_amu_supported()) {
813 amu_enable(ctx);
814 }
815
816 if (is_feat_sme_supported()) {
817 sme_enable(ctx);
818 }
819
820 if (is_feat_fgt2_supported()) {
821 fgt2_enable(ctx);
822 }
823
824 if (is_feat_debugv8p9_supported()) {
825 debugv8p9_extended_bp_wp_enable(ctx);
826 }
827
828 if (is_feat_brbe_supported()) {
829 brbe_enable(ctx);
830 }
831
832 pmuv3_enable(ctx);
833 #endif /* IMAGE_BL31 */
834 }
835
836 /* TODO: move to lib/extensions/pauth when it has been ported to FEAT_STATE */
837 static __unused void enable_pauth_el2(void)
838 {
839 u_register_t hcr_el2 = read_hcr_el2();
840 /*
841 * For Armv8.3 pointer authentication feature, disable traps to EL2 when
842 * accessing key registers or using pointer authentication instructions
843 * from lower ELs.
844 */
845 hcr_el2 |= (HCR_API_BIT | HCR_APK_BIT);
846
847 write_hcr_el2(hcr_el2);
848 }
849
850 #if INIT_UNUSED_NS_EL2
851 /*******************************************************************************
852 * Enable architecture extensions in-place at EL2 on first entry to Non-secure
853 * world when EL2 is empty and unused.
854 ******************************************************************************/
855 static void manage_extensions_nonsecure_el2_unused(void)
856 {
857 #if IMAGE_BL31
858 if (is_feat_spe_supported()) {
859 spe_init_el2_unused();
860 }
861
862 if (is_feat_amu_supported()) {
863 amu_init_el2_unused();
864 }
865
866 if (is_feat_mpam_supported()) {
867 mpam_init_el2_unused();
868 }
869
870 if (is_feat_trbe_supported()) {
871 trbe_init_el2_unused();
872 }
873
874 if (is_feat_sys_reg_trace_supported()) {
875 sys_reg_trace_init_el2_unused();
876 }
877
878 if (is_feat_trf_supported()) {
879 trf_init_el2_unused();
880 }
881
882 pmuv3_init_el2_unused();
883
884 if (is_feat_sve_supported()) {
885 sve_init_el2_unused();
886 }
887
888 if (is_feat_sme_supported()) {
889 sme_init_el2_unused();
890 }
891
892 #if ENABLE_PAUTH
893 enable_pauth_el2();
894 #endif /* ENABLE_PAUTH */
895 #endif /* IMAGE_BL31 */
896 }
897 #endif /* INIT_UNUSED_NS_EL2 */
898
899 /*******************************************************************************
900 * Enable architecture extensions on first entry to Secure world.
901 ******************************************************************************/
902 static void manage_extensions_secure(cpu_context_t *ctx)
903 {
904 #if IMAGE_BL31
905 if (is_feat_sme_supported()) {
906 if (ENABLE_SME_FOR_SWD) {
907 /*
908 * Enable SME, SVE, FPU/SIMD in secure context, secure manager
909 * must ensure SME, SVE, and FPU/SIMD context properly managed.
910 */
911 sme_init_el3();
912 sme_enable(ctx);
913 } else {
914 /*
915 * Disable SME, SVE, FPU/SIMD in secure context so non-secure
916 * world can safely use the associated registers.
917 */
918 sme_disable(ctx);
919 }
920 }
921 #endif /* IMAGE_BL31 */
922 }
923
924 #if !IMAGE_BL1
925 /*******************************************************************************
926 * The following function initializes the cpu_context for a CPU specified by
927 * its `cpu_idx` for first use, and sets the initial entrypoint state as
928 * specified by the entry_point_info structure.
929 ******************************************************************************/
930 void cm_init_context_by_index(unsigned int cpu_idx,
931 const entry_point_info_t *ep)
932 {
933 cpu_context_t *ctx;
934 ctx = cm_get_context_by_index(cpu_idx, GET_SECURITY_STATE(ep->h.attr));
935 cm_setup_context(ctx, ep);
936 }
937 #endif /* !IMAGE_BL1 */
938
939 /*******************************************************************************
940 * The following function initializes the cpu_context for the current CPU
941 * for first use, and sets the initial entrypoint state as specified by the
942 * entry_point_info structure.
943 ******************************************************************************/
944 void cm_init_my_context(const entry_point_info_t *ep)
945 {
946 cpu_context_t *ctx;
947 ctx = cm_get_context(GET_SECURITY_STATE(ep->h.attr));
948 cm_setup_context(ctx, ep);
949 }
950
951 /* EL2 present but unused, need to disable safely. SCTLR_EL2 can be ignored */
952 static void init_nonsecure_el2_unused(cpu_context_t *ctx)
953 {
954 #if INIT_UNUSED_NS_EL2
955 u_register_t hcr_el2 = HCR_RESET_VAL;
956 u_register_t mdcr_el2;
957 u_register_t scr_el3;
958
959 scr_el3 = read_ctx_reg(get_el3state_ctx(ctx), CTX_SCR_EL3);
960
961 /* Set EL2 register width: Set HCR_EL2.RW to match SCR_EL3.RW */
962 if ((scr_el3 & SCR_RW_BIT) != 0U) {
963 hcr_el2 |= HCR_RW_BIT;
964 }
965
966 write_hcr_el2(hcr_el2);
967
968 /*
969 * Initialise CPTR_EL2 setting all fields rather than relying on the hw.
970 * All fields have architecturally UNKNOWN reset values.
971 */
972 write_cptr_el2(CPTR_EL2_RESET_VAL);
973
974 /*
975 * Initialise CNTHCTL_EL2. All fields are architecturally UNKNOWN on
976 * reset and are set to zero except for field(s) listed below.
977 *
978 * CNTHCTL_EL2.EL1PTEN: Set to one to disable traps to Hyp mode of
979 * Non-secure EL0 and EL1 accesses to the physical timer registers.
980 *
981 * CNTHCTL_EL2.EL1PCTEN: Set to one to disable traps to Hyp mode of
982 * Non-secure EL0 and EL1 accesses to the physical counter registers.
983 */
984 write_cnthctl_el2(CNTHCTL_RESET_VAL | EL1PCEN_BIT | EL1PCTEN_BIT);
985
986 /*
987 * Initialise CNTVOFF_EL2 to zero as it resets to an architecturally
988 * UNKNOWN value.
989 */
990 write_cntvoff_el2(0);
991
992 /*
993 * Set VPIDR_EL2 and VMPIDR_EL2 to match MIDR_EL1 and MPIDR_EL1
994 * respectively.
995 */
996 write_vpidr_el2(read_midr_el1());
997 write_vmpidr_el2(read_mpidr_el1());
998
999 /*
1000 * Initialise VTTBR_EL2. All fields are architecturally UNKNOWN on reset.
1001 *
1002 * VTTBR_EL2.VMID: Set to zero. Even though EL1&0 stage 2 address
1003 * translation is disabled, cache maintenance operations depend on the
1004 * VMID.
1005 *
1006 * VTTBR_EL2.BADDR: Set to zero as EL1&0 stage 2 address translation is
1007 * disabled.
1008 */
1009 write_vttbr_el2(VTTBR_RESET_VAL &
1010 ~((VTTBR_VMID_MASK << VTTBR_VMID_SHIFT) |
1011 (VTTBR_BADDR_MASK << VTTBR_BADDR_SHIFT)));
1012
1013 /*
1014 * Initialise MDCR_EL2, setting all fields rather than relying on hw.
1015 * Some fields are architecturally UNKNOWN on reset.
1016 *
1017 * MDCR_EL2.TDRA: Set to zero so that Non-secure EL0 and EL1 System
1018 * register accesses to the Debug ROM registers are not trapped to EL2.
1019 *
1020 * MDCR_EL2.TDOSA: Set to zero so that Non-secure EL1 System register
1021 * accesses to the powerdown debug registers are not trapped to EL2.
1022 *
1023 * MDCR_EL2.TDA: Set to zero so that System register accesses to the
1024 * debug registers do not trap to EL2.
1025 *
1026 * MDCR_EL2.TDE: Set to zero so that debug exceptions are not routed to
1027 * EL2.
1028 */
1029 mdcr_el2 = MDCR_EL2_RESET_VAL &
1030 ~(MDCR_EL2_TDRA_BIT | MDCR_EL2_TDOSA_BIT | MDCR_EL2_TDA_BIT |
1031 MDCR_EL2_TDE_BIT);
1032
1033 write_mdcr_el2(mdcr_el2);
1034
1035 /*
1036 * Initialise HSTR_EL2. All fields are architecturally UNKNOWN on reset.
1037 *
1038 * HSTR_EL2.T<n>: Set all these fields to zero so that Non-secure EL0 or
1039 * EL1 accesses to System registers do not trap to EL2.
1040 */
1041 write_hstr_el2(HSTR_EL2_RESET_VAL & ~(HSTR_EL2_T_MASK));
1042
1043 /*
1044 * Initialise CNTHP_CTL_EL2. All fields are architecturally UNKNOWN on
1045 * reset.
1046 *
1047 * CNTHP_CTL_EL2:ENABLE: Set to zero to disable the EL2 physical timer
1048 * and prevent timer interrupts.
1049 */
1050 write_cnthp_ctl_el2(CNTHP_CTL_RESET_VAL & ~(CNTHP_CTL_ENABLE_BIT));
1051
1052 manage_extensions_nonsecure_el2_unused();
1053 #endif /* INIT_UNUSED_NS_EL2 */
1054 }
1055
1056 /*******************************************************************************
1057 * Prepare the CPU system registers for first entry into realm, secure, or
1058 * normal world.
1059 *
1060 * If execution is requested to EL2 or hyp mode, SCTLR_EL2 is initialized
1061 * If execution is requested to non-secure EL1 or svc mode, and the CPU supports
1062 * EL2 then EL2 is disabled by configuring all necessary EL2 registers.
1063 * For all entries, the EL1 registers are initialized from the cpu_context
1064 ******************************************************************************/
1065 void cm_prepare_el3_exit(uint32_t security_state)
1066 {
1067 u_register_t sctlr_el2, scr_el3;
1068 cpu_context_t *ctx = cm_get_context(security_state);
1069
1070 assert(ctx != NULL);
1071
1072 if (security_state == NON_SECURE) {
1073 uint64_t el2_implemented = el_implemented(2);
1074
1075 scr_el3 = read_ctx_reg(get_el3state_ctx(ctx),
1076 CTX_SCR_EL3);
1077
1078 if (el2_implemented != EL_IMPL_NONE) {
1079
1080 /*
1081 * If context is not being used for EL2, initialize
1082 * HCRX_EL2 with its init value here.
1083 */
1084 if (is_feat_hcx_supported()) {
1085 write_hcrx_el2(HCRX_EL2_INIT_VAL);
1086 }
1087
1088 /*
1089 * Initialize Fine-grained trap registers introduced
1090 * by FEAT_FGT so all traps are initially disabled when
1091 * switching to EL2 or a lower EL, preventing undesired
1092 * behavior.
1093 */
1094 if (is_feat_fgt_supported()) {
1095 /*
1096 * Initialize HFG*_EL2 registers with a default
1097 * value so legacy systems unaware of FEAT_FGT
1098 * do not get trapped due to their lack of
1099 * initialization for this feature.
1100 */
1101 write_hfgitr_el2(HFGITR_EL2_INIT_VAL);
1102 write_hfgrtr_el2(HFGRTR_EL2_INIT_VAL);
1103 write_hfgwtr_el2(HFGWTR_EL2_INIT_VAL);
1104 }
1105
1106 /* Condition to ensure EL2 is being used. */
1107 if ((scr_el3 & SCR_HCE_BIT) != 0U) {
1108 /* Initialize SCTLR_EL2 register with reset value. */
1109 sctlr_el2 = SCTLR_EL2_RES1;
1110
1111 /*
1112 * If workaround of errata 764081 for Cortex-A75
1113 * is used then set SCTLR_EL2.IESB to enable
1114 * Implicit Error Synchronization Barrier.
1115 */
1116 if (errata_a75_764081_applies()) {
1117 sctlr_el2 |= SCTLR_IESB_BIT;
1118 }
1119
1120 write_sctlr_el2(sctlr_el2);
1121 } else {
1122 /*
1123 * (scr_el3 & SCR_HCE_BIT==0)
1124 * EL2 implemented but unused.
1125 */
1126 init_nonsecure_el2_unused(ctx);
1127 }
1128 }
1129 }
1130 #if (!CTX_INCLUDE_EL2_REGS)
1131 /* Restore EL1 system registers, only when CTX_INCLUDE_EL2_REGS=0 */
1132 cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(security_state);
1133 #endif
1134 cm_set_next_eret_context(security_state);
1135 }
1136
1137 #if (CTX_INCLUDE_EL2_REGS && IMAGE_BL31)
1138
1139 static void el2_sysregs_context_save_fgt(el2_sysregs_t *ctx)
1140 {
1141 write_el2_ctx_fgt(ctx, hdfgrtr_el2, read_hdfgrtr_el2());
1142 if (is_feat_amu_supported()) {
1143 write_el2_ctx_fgt(ctx, hafgrtr_el2, read_hafgrtr_el2());
1144 }
1145 write_el2_ctx_fgt(ctx, hdfgwtr_el2, read_hdfgwtr_el2());
1146 write_el2_ctx_fgt(ctx, hfgitr_el2, read_hfgitr_el2());
1147 write_el2_ctx_fgt(ctx, hfgrtr_el2, read_hfgrtr_el2());
1148 write_el2_ctx_fgt(ctx, hfgwtr_el2, read_hfgwtr_el2());
1149 }
1150
1151 static void el2_sysregs_context_restore_fgt(el2_sysregs_t *ctx)
1152 {
1153 write_hdfgrtr_el2(read_el2_ctx_fgt(ctx, hdfgrtr_el2));
1154 if (is_feat_amu_supported()) {
1155 write_hafgrtr_el2(read_el2_ctx_fgt(ctx, hafgrtr_el2));
1156 }
1157 write_hdfgwtr_el2(read_el2_ctx_fgt(ctx, hdfgwtr_el2));
1158 write_hfgitr_el2(read_el2_ctx_fgt(ctx, hfgitr_el2));
1159 write_hfgrtr_el2(read_el2_ctx_fgt(ctx, hfgrtr_el2));
1160 write_hfgwtr_el2(read_el2_ctx_fgt(ctx, hfgwtr_el2));
1161 }
1162
1163 static void el2_sysregs_context_save_fgt2(el2_sysregs_t *ctx)
1164 {
1165 write_el2_ctx_fgt2(ctx, hdfgrtr2_el2, read_hdfgrtr2_el2());
1166 write_el2_ctx_fgt2(ctx, hdfgwtr2_el2, read_hdfgwtr2_el2());
1167 write_el2_ctx_fgt2(ctx, hfgitr2_el2, read_hfgitr2_el2());
1168 write_el2_ctx_fgt2(ctx, hfgrtr2_el2, read_hfgrtr2_el2());
1169 write_el2_ctx_fgt2(ctx, hfgwtr2_el2, read_hfgwtr2_el2());
1170 }
1171
1172 static void el2_sysregs_context_restore_fgt2(el2_sysregs_t *ctx)
1173 {
1174 write_hdfgrtr2_el2(read_el2_ctx_fgt2(ctx, hdfgrtr2_el2));
1175 write_hdfgwtr2_el2(read_el2_ctx_fgt2(ctx, hdfgwtr2_el2));
1176 write_hfgitr2_el2(read_el2_ctx_fgt2(ctx, hfgitr2_el2));
1177 write_hfgrtr2_el2(read_el2_ctx_fgt2(ctx, hfgrtr2_el2));
1178 write_hfgwtr2_el2(read_el2_ctx_fgt2(ctx, hfgwtr2_el2));
1179 }
1180
1181 static void el2_sysregs_context_save_mpam(el2_sysregs_t *ctx)
1182 {
1183 u_register_t mpam_idr = read_mpamidr_el1();
1184
1185 write_el2_ctx_mpam(ctx, mpam2_el2, read_mpam2_el2());
1186
1187 /*
1188 * The context registers that we intend to save would be part of the
1189 * PE's system register frame only if MPAMIDR_EL1.HAS_HCR == 1.
1190 */
1191 if ((mpam_idr & MPAMIDR_HAS_HCR_BIT) == 0U) {
1192 return;
1193 }
1194
1195 /*
1196 * MPAMHCR_EL2, MPAMVPMV_EL2 and MPAMVPM0_EL2 are always present if
1197 * MPAMIDR_HAS_HCR_BIT == 1.
1198 */
1199 write_el2_ctx_mpam(ctx, mpamhcr_el2, read_mpamhcr_el2());
1200 write_el2_ctx_mpam(ctx, mpamvpm0_el2, read_mpamvpm0_el2());
1201 write_el2_ctx_mpam(ctx, mpamvpmv_el2, read_mpamvpmv_el2());
1202
1203 /*
1204 * The number of MPAMVPM registers is implementation defined, their
1205 * number is stored in the MPAMIDR_EL1 register.
1206 */
1207 switch ((mpam_idr >> MPAMIDR_EL1_VPMR_MAX_SHIFT) & MPAMIDR_EL1_VPMR_MAX_MASK) {
1208 case 7:
1209 write_el2_ctx_mpam(ctx, mpamvpm7_el2, read_mpamvpm7_el2());
1210 __fallthrough;
1211 case 6:
1212 write_el2_ctx_mpam(ctx, mpamvpm6_el2, read_mpamvpm6_el2());
1213 __fallthrough;
1214 case 5:
1215 write_el2_ctx_mpam(ctx, mpamvpm5_el2, read_mpamvpm5_el2());
1216 __fallthrough;
1217 case 4:
1218 write_el2_ctx_mpam(ctx, mpamvpm4_el2, read_mpamvpm4_el2());
1219 __fallthrough;
1220 case 3:
1221 write_el2_ctx_mpam(ctx, mpamvpm3_el2, read_mpamvpm3_el2());
1222 __fallthrough;
1223 case 2:
1224 write_el2_ctx_mpam(ctx, mpamvpm2_el2, read_mpamvpm2_el2());
1225 __fallthrough;
1226 case 1:
1227 write_el2_ctx_mpam(ctx, mpamvpm1_el2, read_mpamvpm1_el2());
1228 break;
1229 }
1230 }
1231
1232 static void el2_sysregs_context_restore_mpam(el2_sysregs_t *ctx)
1233 {
1234 u_register_t mpam_idr = read_mpamidr_el1();
1235
1236 write_mpam2_el2(read_el2_ctx_mpam(ctx, mpam2_el2));
1237
1238 if ((mpam_idr & MPAMIDR_HAS_HCR_BIT) == 0U) {
1239 return;
1240 }
1241
1242 write_mpamhcr_el2(read_el2_ctx_mpam(ctx, mpamhcr_el2));
1243 write_mpamvpm0_el2(read_el2_ctx_mpam(ctx, mpamvpm0_el2));
1244 write_mpamvpmv_el2(read_el2_ctx_mpam(ctx, mpamvpmv_el2));
1245
1246 switch ((mpam_idr >> MPAMIDR_EL1_VPMR_MAX_SHIFT) & MPAMIDR_EL1_VPMR_MAX_MASK) {
1247 case 7:
1248 write_mpamvpm7_el2(read_el2_ctx_mpam(ctx, mpamvpm7_el2));
1249 __fallthrough;
1250 case 6:
1251 write_mpamvpm6_el2(read_el2_ctx_mpam(ctx, mpamvpm6_el2));
1252 __fallthrough;
1253 case 5:
1254 write_mpamvpm5_el2(read_el2_ctx_mpam(ctx, mpamvpm5_el2));
1255 __fallthrough;
1256 case 4:
1257 write_mpamvpm4_el2(read_el2_ctx_mpam(ctx, mpamvpm4_el2));
1258 __fallthrough;
1259 case 3:
1260 write_mpamvpm3_el2(read_el2_ctx_mpam(ctx, mpamvpm3_el2));
1261 __fallthrough;
1262 case 2:
1263 write_mpamvpm2_el2(read_el2_ctx_mpam(ctx, mpamvpm2_el2));
1264 __fallthrough;
1265 case 1:
1266 write_mpamvpm1_el2(read_el2_ctx_mpam(ctx, mpamvpm1_el2));
1267 break;
1268 }
1269 }
1270
1271 /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1272 * The following registers are not added:
1273 * ICH_AP0R<n>_EL2
1274 * ICH_AP1R<n>_EL2
1275 * ICH_LR<n>_EL2
1276 *
1277 * NOTE: For a system with S-EL2 present but not enabled, accessing
1278 * ICC_SRE_EL2 is undefined from EL3. To workaround this change the
1279 * SCR_EL3.NS = 1 before accessing this register.
1280 * ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1281 */
1282 static void el2_sysregs_context_save_gic(el2_sysregs_t *ctx, uint32_t security_state)
1283 {
1284 u_register_t scr_el3 = read_scr_el3();
1285
1286 #if defined(SPD_spmd) && SPMD_SPM_AT_SEL2
1287 write_el2_ctx_common(ctx, icc_sre_el2, read_icc_sre_el2());
1288 #else
1289 write_scr_el3(scr_el3 | SCR_NS_BIT);
1290 isb();
1291
1292 write_el2_ctx_common(ctx, icc_sre_el2, read_icc_sre_el2());
1293
1294 write_scr_el3(scr_el3);
1295 isb();
1296 #endif
1297 write_el2_ctx_common(ctx, ich_hcr_el2, read_ich_hcr_el2());
1298
1299 if (errata_ich_vmcr_el2_applies()) {
1300 if (security_state == SECURE) {
1301 write_scr_el3(scr_el3 & ~SCR_NS_BIT);
1302 } else {
1303 write_scr_el3(scr_el3 | SCR_NS_BIT);
1304 }
1305 isb();
1306 }
1307
1308 write_el2_ctx_common(ctx, ich_vmcr_el2, read_ich_vmcr_el2());
1309
1310 if (errata_ich_vmcr_el2_applies()) {
1311 write_scr_el3(scr_el3);
1312 isb();
1313 }
1314 }
1315
1316 static void el2_sysregs_context_restore_gic(el2_sysregs_t *ctx, uint32_t security_state)
1317 {
1318 u_register_t scr_el3 = read_scr_el3();
1319
1320 #if defined(SPD_spmd) && SPMD_SPM_AT_SEL2
1321 write_icc_sre_el2(read_el2_ctx_common(ctx, icc_sre_el2));
1322 #else
1323 write_scr_el3(scr_el3 | SCR_NS_BIT);
1324 isb();
1325
1326 write_icc_sre_el2(read_el2_ctx_common(ctx, icc_sre_el2));
1327
1328 write_scr_el3(scr_el3);
1329 isb();
1330 #endif
1331 write_ich_hcr_el2(read_el2_ctx_common(ctx, ich_hcr_el2));
1332
1333 if (errata_ich_vmcr_el2_applies()) {
1334 if (security_state == SECURE) {
1335 write_scr_el3(scr_el3 & ~SCR_NS_BIT);
1336 } else {
1337 write_scr_el3(scr_el3 | SCR_NS_BIT);
1338 }
1339 isb();
1340 }
1341
1342 write_ich_vmcr_el2(read_el2_ctx_common(ctx, ich_vmcr_el2));
1343
1344 if (errata_ich_vmcr_el2_applies()) {
1345 write_scr_el3(scr_el3);
1346 isb();
1347 }
1348 }
1349
1350 /* -----------------------------------------------------
1351 * The following registers are not added:
1352 * AMEVCNTVOFF0<n>_EL2
1353 * AMEVCNTVOFF1<n>_EL2
1354 * -----------------------------------------------------
1355 */
1356 static void el2_sysregs_context_save_common(el2_sysregs_t *ctx)
1357 {
1358 write_el2_ctx_common(ctx, actlr_el2, read_actlr_el2());
1359 write_el2_ctx_common(ctx, afsr0_el2, read_afsr0_el2());
1360 write_el2_ctx_common(ctx, afsr1_el2, read_afsr1_el2());
1361 write_el2_ctx_common(ctx, amair_el2, read_amair_el2());
1362 write_el2_ctx_common(ctx, cnthctl_el2, read_cnthctl_el2());
1363 write_el2_ctx_common(ctx, cntvoff_el2, read_cntvoff_el2());
1364 write_el2_ctx_common(ctx, cptr_el2, read_cptr_el2());
1365 if (CTX_INCLUDE_AARCH32_REGS) {
1366 write_el2_ctx_common(ctx, dbgvcr32_el2, read_dbgvcr32_el2());
1367 }
1368 write_el2_ctx_common(ctx, elr_el2, read_elr_el2());
1369 write_el2_ctx_common(ctx, esr_el2, read_esr_el2());
1370 write_el2_ctx_common(ctx, far_el2, read_far_el2());
1371 write_el2_ctx_common(ctx, hacr_el2, read_hacr_el2());
1372 write_el2_ctx_common(ctx, hcr_el2, read_hcr_el2());
1373 write_el2_ctx_common(ctx, hpfar_el2, read_hpfar_el2());
1374 write_el2_ctx_common(ctx, hstr_el2, read_hstr_el2());
1375 write_el2_ctx_common(ctx, mair_el2, read_mair_el2());
1376 write_el2_ctx_common(ctx, mdcr_el2, read_mdcr_el2());
1377 write_el2_ctx_common(ctx, sctlr_el2, read_sctlr_el2());
1378 write_el2_ctx_common(ctx, spsr_el2, read_spsr_el2());
1379 write_el2_ctx_common(ctx, sp_el2, read_sp_el2());
1380 write_el2_ctx_common(ctx, tcr_el2, read_tcr_el2());
1381 write_el2_ctx_common(ctx, tpidr_el2, read_tpidr_el2());
1382 write_el2_ctx_common(ctx, vbar_el2, read_vbar_el2());
1383 write_el2_ctx_common(ctx, vmpidr_el2, read_vmpidr_el2());
1384 write_el2_ctx_common(ctx, vpidr_el2, read_vpidr_el2());
1385 write_el2_ctx_common(ctx, vtcr_el2, read_vtcr_el2());
1386
1387 write_el2_ctx_sysreg128(ctx, ttbr0_el2, read_ttbr0_el2());
1388 write_el2_ctx_sysreg128(ctx, vttbr_el2, read_vttbr_el2());
1389 }
1390
1391 static void el2_sysregs_context_restore_common(el2_sysregs_t *ctx)
1392 {
1393 write_actlr_el2(read_el2_ctx_common(ctx, actlr_el2));
1394 write_afsr0_el2(read_el2_ctx_common(ctx, afsr0_el2));
1395 write_afsr1_el2(read_el2_ctx_common(ctx, afsr1_el2));
1396 write_amair_el2(read_el2_ctx_common(ctx, amair_el2));
1397 write_cnthctl_el2(read_el2_ctx_common(ctx, cnthctl_el2));
1398 write_cntvoff_el2(read_el2_ctx_common(ctx, cntvoff_el2));
1399 write_cptr_el2(read_el2_ctx_common(ctx, cptr_el2));
1400 if (CTX_INCLUDE_AARCH32_REGS) {
1401 write_dbgvcr32_el2(read_el2_ctx_common(ctx, dbgvcr32_el2));
1402 }
1403 write_elr_el2(read_el2_ctx_common(ctx, elr_el2));
1404 write_esr_el2(read_el2_ctx_common(ctx, esr_el2));
1405 write_far_el2(read_el2_ctx_common(ctx, far_el2));
1406 write_hacr_el2(read_el2_ctx_common(ctx, hacr_el2));
1407 write_hcr_el2(read_el2_ctx_common(ctx, hcr_el2));
1408 write_hpfar_el2(read_el2_ctx_common(ctx, hpfar_el2));
1409 write_hstr_el2(read_el2_ctx_common(ctx, hstr_el2));
1410 write_mair_el2(read_el2_ctx_common(ctx, mair_el2));
1411 write_mdcr_el2(read_el2_ctx_common(ctx, mdcr_el2));
1412 write_sctlr_el2(read_el2_ctx_common(ctx, sctlr_el2));
1413 write_spsr_el2(read_el2_ctx_common(ctx, spsr_el2));
1414 write_sp_el2(read_el2_ctx_common(ctx, sp_el2));
1415 write_tcr_el2(read_el2_ctx_common(ctx, tcr_el2));
1416 write_tpidr_el2(read_el2_ctx_common(ctx, tpidr_el2));
1417 write_ttbr0_el2(read_el2_ctx_common(ctx, ttbr0_el2));
1418 write_vbar_el2(read_el2_ctx_common(ctx, vbar_el2));
1419 write_vmpidr_el2(read_el2_ctx_common(ctx, vmpidr_el2));
1420 write_vpidr_el2(read_el2_ctx_common(ctx, vpidr_el2));
1421 write_vtcr_el2(read_el2_ctx_common(ctx, vtcr_el2));
1422 write_vttbr_el2(read_el2_ctx_common(ctx, vttbr_el2));
1423 }
1424
1425 /*******************************************************************************
1426 * Save EL2 sysreg context
1427 ******************************************************************************/
1428 void cm_el2_sysregs_context_save(uint32_t security_state)
1429 {
1430 cpu_context_t *ctx;
1431 el2_sysregs_t *el2_sysregs_ctx;
1432
1433 ctx = cm_get_context(security_state);
1434 assert(ctx != NULL);
1435
1436 el2_sysregs_ctx = get_el2_sysregs_ctx(ctx);
1437
1438 el2_sysregs_context_save_common(el2_sysregs_ctx);
1439 el2_sysregs_context_save_gic(el2_sysregs_ctx, security_state);
1440
1441 if (is_feat_mte2_supported()) {
1442 write_el2_ctx_mte2(el2_sysregs_ctx, tfsr_el2, read_tfsr_el2());
1443 }
1444
1445 if (is_feat_mpam_supported()) {
1446 el2_sysregs_context_save_mpam(el2_sysregs_ctx);
1447 }
1448
1449 if (is_feat_fgt_supported()) {
1450 el2_sysregs_context_save_fgt(el2_sysregs_ctx);
1451 }
1452
1453 if (is_feat_fgt2_supported()) {
1454 el2_sysregs_context_save_fgt2(el2_sysregs_ctx);
1455 }
1456
1457 if (is_feat_ecv_v2_supported()) {
1458 write_el2_ctx_ecv(el2_sysregs_ctx, cntpoff_el2, read_cntpoff_el2());
1459 }
1460
1461 if (is_feat_vhe_supported()) {
1462 write_el2_ctx_vhe(el2_sysregs_ctx, contextidr_el2,
1463 read_contextidr_el2());
1464 write_el2_ctx_vhe_sysreg128(el2_sysregs_ctx, ttbr1_el2, read_ttbr1_el2());
1465 }
1466
1467 if (is_feat_ras_supported()) {
1468 write_el2_ctx_ras(el2_sysregs_ctx, vdisr_el2, read_vdisr_el2());
1469 write_el2_ctx_ras(el2_sysregs_ctx, vsesr_el2, read_vsesr_el2());
1470 }
1471
1472 if (is_feat_nv2_supported()) {
1473 write_el2_ctx_neve(el2_sysregs_ctx, vncr_el2, read_vncr_el2());
1474 }
1475
1476 if (is_feat_trf_supported()) {
1477 write_el2_ctx_trf(el2_sysregs_ctx, trfcr_el2, read_trfcr_el2());
1478 }
1479
1480 if (is_feat_csv2_2_supported()) {
1481 write_el2_ctx_csv2_2(el2_sysregs_ctx, scxtnum_el2,
1482 read_scxtnum_el2());
1483 }
1484
1485 if (is_feat_hcx_supported()) {
1486 write_el2_ctx_hcx(el2_sysregs_ctx, hcrx_el2, read_hcrx_el2());
1487 }
1488
1489 if (is_feat_tcr2_supported()) {
1490 write_el2_ctx_tcr2(el2_sysregs_ctx, tcr2_el2, read_tcr2_el2());
1491 }
1492
1493 if (is_feat_sxpie_supported()) {
1494 write_el2_ctx_sxpie(el2_sysregs_ctx, pire0_el2, read_pire0_el2());
1495 write_el2_ctx_sxpie(el2_sysregs_ctx, pir_el2, read_pir_el2());
1496 }
1497
1498 if (is_feat_sxpoe_supported()) {
1499 write_el2_ctx_sxpoe(el2_sysregs_ctx, por_el2, read_por_el2());
1500 }
1501
1502 if (is_feat_s2pie_supported()) {
1503 write_el2_ctx_s2pie(el2_sysregs_ctx, s2pir_el2, read_s2pir_el2());
1504 }
1505
1506 if (is_feat_gcs_supported()) {
1507 write_el2_ctx_gcs(el2_sysregs_ctx, gcscr_el2, read_gcscr_el2());
1508 write_el2_ctx_gcs(el2_sysregs_ctx, gcspr_el2, read_gcspr_el2());
1509 }
1510
1511 if (is_feat_sctlr2_supported()) {
1512 write_el2_ctx_sctlr2(el2_sysregs_ctx, sctlr2_el2, read_sctlr2_el2());
1513 }
1514 }
1515
1516 /*******************************************************************************
1517 * Restore EL2 sysreg context
1518 ******************************************************************************/
1519 void cm_el2_sysregs_context_restore(uint32_t security_state)
1520 {
1521 cpu_context_t *ctx;
1522 el2_sysregs_t *el2_sysregs_ctx;
1523
1524 ctx = cm_get_context(security_state);
1525 assert(ctx != NULL);
1526
1527 el2_sysregs_ctx = get_el2_sysregs_ctx(ctx);
1528
1529 el2_sysregs_context_restore_common(el2_sysregs_ctx);
1530 el2_sysregs_context_restore_gic(el2_sysregs_ctx, security_state);
1531
1532 if (is_feat_mte2_supported()) {
1533 write_tfsr_el2(read_el2_ctx_mte2(el2_sysregs_ctx, tfsr_el2));
1534 }
1535
1536 if (is_feat_mpam_supported()) {
1537 el2_sysregs_context_restore_mpam(el2_sysregs_ctx);
1538 }
1539
1540 if (is_feat_fgt_supported()) {
1541 el2_sysregs_context_restore_fgt(el2_sysregs_ctx);
1542 }
1543
1544 if (is_feat_fgt2_supported()) {
1545 el2_sysregs_context_restore_fgt2(el2_sysregs_ctx);
1546 }
1547
1548 if (is_feat_ecv_v2_supported()) {
1549 write_cntpoff_el2(read_el2_ctx_ecv(el2_sysregs_ctx, cntpoff_el2));
1550 }
1551
1552 if (is_feat_vhe_supported()) {
1553 write_contextidr_el2(read_el2_ctx_vhe(el2_sysregs_ctx,
1554 contextidr_el2));
1555 write_ttbr1_el2(read_el2_ctx_vhe(el2_sysregs_ctx, ttbr1_el2));
1556 }
1557
1558 if (is_feat_ras_supported()) {
1559 write_vdisr_el2(read_el2_ctx_ras(el2_sysregs_ctx, vdisr_el2));
1560 write_vsesr_el2(read_el2_ctx_ras(el2_sysregs_ctx, vsesr_el2));
1561 }
1562
1563 if (is_feat_nv2_supported()) {
1564 write_vncr_el2(read_el2_ctx_neve(el2_sysregs_ctx, vncr_el2));
1565 }
1566
1567 if (is_feat_trf_supported()) {
1568 write_trfcr_el2(read_el2_ctx_trf(el2_sysregs_ctx, trfcr_el2));
1569 }
1570
1571 if (is_feat_csv2_2_supported()) {
1572 write_scxtnum_el2(read_el2_ctx_csv2_2(el2_sysregs_ctx,
1573 scxtnum_el2));
1574 }
1575
1576 if (is_feat_hcx_supported()) {
1577 write_hcrx_el2(read_el2_ctx_hcx(el2_sysregs_ctx, hcrx_el2));
1578 }
1579
1580 if (is_feat_tcr2_supported()) {
1581 write_tcr2_el2(read_el2_ctx_tcr2(el2_sysregs_ctx, tcr2_el2));
1582 }
1583
1584 if (is_feat_sxpie_supported()) {
1585 write_pire0_el2(read_el2_ctx_sxpie(el2_sysregs_ctx, pire0_el2));
1586 write_pir_el2(read_el2_ctx_sxpie(el2_sysregs_ctx, pir_el2));
1587 }
1588
1589 if (is_feat_sxpoe_supported()) {
1590 write_por_el2(read_el2_ctx_sxpoe(el2_sysregs_ctx, por_el2));
1591 }
1592
1593 if (is_feat_s2pie_supported()) {
1594 write_s2pir_el2(read_el2_ctx_s2pie(el2_sysregs_ctx, s2pir_el2));
1595 }
1596
1597 if (is_feat_gcs_supported()) {
1598 write_gcscr_el2(read_el2_ctx_gcs(el2_sysregs_ctx, gcscr_el2));
1599 write_gcspr_el2(read_el2_ctx_gcs(el2_sysregs_ctx, gcspr_el2));
1600 }
1601
1602 if (is_feat_sctlr2_supported()) {
1603 write_sctlr2_el2(read_el2_ctx_sctlr2(el2_sysregs_ctx, sctlr2_el2));
1604 }
1605 }
1606 #endif /* (CTX_INCLUDE_EL2_REGS && IMAGE_BL31) */
1607
1608 #if IMAGE_BL31
1609 /*********************************************************************************
1610 * This function allows Architecture features asymmetry among cores.
1611 * TF-A assumes that all the cores in the platform has architecture feature parity
1612 * and hence the context is setup on different core (e.g. primary sets up the
1613 * context for secondary cores).This assumption may not be true for systems where
1614 * cores are not conforming to same Arch version or there is CPU Erratum which
1615 * requires certain feature to be be disabled only on a given core.
1616 *
1617 * This function is called on secondary cores to override any disparity in context
1618 * setup by primary, this would be called during warmboot path.
1619 *********************************************************************************/
1620 void cm_handle_asymmetric_features(void)
1621 {
1622 cpu_context_t *ctx __maybe_unused = cm_get_context(NON_SECURE);
1623
1624 assert(ctx != NULL);
1625
1626 #if ENABLE_SPE_FOR_NS == FEAT_STATE_CHECK_ASYMMETRIC
1627 if (is_feat_spe_supported()) {
1628 spe_enable(ctx);
1629 } else {
1630 spe_disable(ctx);
1631 }
1632 #endif
1633
1634 #if ERRATA_A520_2938996 || ERRATA_X4_2726228
1635 if (check_if_affected_core() == ERRATA_APPLIES) {
1636 if (is_feat_trbe_supported()) {
1637 trbe_disable(ctx);
1638 }
1639 }
1640 #endif
1641
1642 #if ENABLE_FEAT_TCR2 == FEAT_STATE_CHECK_ASYMMETRIC
1643 el3_state_t *el3_state = get_el3state_ctx(ctx);
1644 u_register_t spsr = read_ctx_reg(el3_state, CTX_SPSR_EL3);
1645
1646 if (is_feat_tcr2_supported() && (GET_RW(spsr) == MODE_RW_64)) {
1647 tcr2_enable(ctx);
1648 } else {
1649 tcr2_disable(ctx);
1650 }
1651 #endif
1652
1653 }
1654 #endif
1655
1656 /*******************************************************************************
1657 * This function is used to exit to Non-secure world. If CTX_INCLUDE_EL2_REGS
1658 * is enabled, it restores EL1 and EL2 sysreg contexts instead of directly
1659 * updating EL1 and EL2 registers. Otherwise, it calls the generic
1660 * cm_prepare_el3_exit function.
1661 ******************************************************************************/
1662 void cm_prepare_el3_exit_ns(void)
1663 {
1664 #if IMAGE_BL31
1665 /*
1666 * Check and handle Architecture feature asymmetry among cores.
1667 *
1668 * In warmboot path secondary cores context is initialized on core which
1669 * did CPU_ON SMC call, if there is feature asymmetry in these cores handle
1670 * it in this function call.
1671 * For Symmetric cores this is an empty function.
1672 */
1673 cm_handle_asymmetric_features();
1674 #endif
1675
1676 #if (CTX_INCLUDE_EL2_REGS && IMAGE_BL31)
1677 #if ENABLE_ASSERTIONS
1678 cpu_context_t *ctx = cm_get_context(NON_SECURE);
1679 assert(ctx != NULL);
1680
1681 /* Assert that EL2 is used. */
1682 u_register_t scr_el3 = read_ctx_reg(get_el3state_ctx(ctx), CTX_SCR_EL3);
1683 assert(((scr_el3 & SCR_HCE_BIT) != 0UL) &&
1684 (el_implemented(2U) != EL_IMPL_NONE));
1685 #endif /* ENABLE_ASSERTIONS */
1686
1687 /* Restore EL2 sysreg contexts */
1688 cm_el2_sysregs_context_restore(NON_SECURE);
1689 cm_set_next_eret_context(NON_SECURE);
1690 #else
1691 cm_prepare_el3_exit(NON_SECURE);
1692 #endif /* (CTX_INCLUDE_EL2_REGS && IMAGE_BL31) */
1693 }
1694
1695 #if ((IMAGE_BL1) || (IMAGE_BL31 && (!CTX_INCLUDE_EL2_REGS)))
1696 /*******************************************************************************
1697 * The next set of six functions are used by runtime services to save and restore
1698 * EL1 context on the 'cpu_context' structure for the specified security state.
1699 ******************************************************************************/
1700 static void el1_sysregs_context_save(el1_sysregs_t *ctx)
1701 {
1702 write_el1_ctx_common(ctx, spsr_el1, read_spsr_el1());
1703 write_el1_ctx_common(ctx, elr_el1, read_elr_el1());
1704
1705 #if (!ERRATA_SPECULATIVE_AT)
1706 write_el1_ctx_common(ctx, sctlr_el1, read_sctlr_el1());
1707 write_el1_ctx_common(ctx, tcr_el1, read_tcr_el1());
1708 #endif /* (!ERRATA_SPECULATIVE_AT) */
1709
1710 write_el1_ctx_common(ctx, cpacr_el1, read_cpacr_el1());
1711 write_el1_ctx_common(ctx, csselr_el1, read_csselr_el1());
1712 write_el1_ctx_common(ctx, sp_el1, read_sp_el1());
1713 write_el1_ctx_common(ctx, esr_el1, read_esr_el1());
1714 write_el1_ctx_common(ctx, ttbr0_el1, read_ttbr0_el1());
1715 write_el1_ctx_common(ctx, ttbr1_el1, read_ttbr1_el1());
1716 write_el1_ctx_common(ctx, mair_el1, read_mair_el1());
1717 write_el1_ctx_common(ctx, amair_el1, read_amair_el1());
1718 write_el1_ctx_common(ctx, actlr_el1, read_actlr_el1());
1719 write_el1_ctx_common(ctx, tpidr_el1, read_tpidr_el1());
1720 write_el1_ctx_common(ctx, tpidr_el0, read_tpidr_el0());
1721 write_el1_ctx_common(ctx, tpidrro_el0, read_tpidrro_el0());
1722 write_el1_ctx_common(ctx, par_el1, read_par_el1());
1723 write_el1_ctx_common(ctx, far_el1, read_far_el1());
1724 write_el1_ctx_common(ctx, afsr0_el1, read_afsr0_el1());
1725 write_el1_ctx_common(ctx, afsr1_el1, read_afsr1_el1());
1726 write_el1_ctx_common(ctx, contextidr_el1, read_contextidr_el1());
1727 write_el1_ctx_common(ctx, vbar_el1, read_vbar_el1());
1728 write_el1_ctx_common(ctx, mdccint_el1, read_mdccint_el1());
1729 write_el1_ctx_common(ctx, mdscr_el1, read_mdscr_el1());
1730
1731 if (CTX_INCLUDE_AARCH32_REGS) {
1732 /* Save Aarch32 registers */
1733 write_el1_ctx_aarch32(ctx, spsr_abt, read_spsr_abt());
1734 write_el1_ctx_aarch32(ctx, spsr_und, read_spsr_und());
1735 write_el1_ctx_aarch32(ctx, spsr_irq, read_spsr_irq());
1736 write_el1_ctx_aarch32(ctx, spsr_fiq, read_spsr_fiq());
1737 write_el1_ctx_aarch32(ctx, dacr32_el2, read_dacr32_el2());
1738 write_el1_ctx_aarch32(ctx, ifsr32_el2, read_ifsr32_el2());
1739 }
1740
1741 if (NS_TIMER_SWITCH) {
1742 /* Save NS Timer registers */
1743 write_el1_ctx_arch_timer(ctx, cntp_ctl_el0, read_cntp_ctl_el0());
1744 write_el1_ctx_arch_timer(ctx, cntp_cval_el0, read_cntp_cval_el0());
1745 write_el1_ctx_arch_timer(ctx, cntv_ctl_el0, read_cntv_ctl_el0());
1746 write_el1_ctx_arch_timer(ctx, cntv_cval_el0, read_cntv_cval_el0());
1747 write_el1_ctx_arch_timer(ctx, cntkctl_el1, read_cntkctl_el1());
1748 }
1749
1750 if (is_feat_mte2_supported()) {
1751 write_el1_ctx_mte2(ctx, tfsre0_el1, read_tfsre0_el1());
1752 write_el1_ctx_mte2(ctx, tfsr_el1, read_tfsr_el1());
1753 write_el1_ctx_mte2(ctx, rgsr_el1, read_rgsr_el1());
1754 write_el1_ctx_mte2(ctx, gcr_el1, read_gcr_el1());
1755 }
1756
1757 if (is_feat_ras_supported()) {
1758 write_el1_ctx_ras(ctx, disr_el1, read_disr_el1());
1759 }
1760
1761 if (is_feat_s1pie_supported()) {
1762 write_el1_ctx_s1pie(ctx, pire0_el1, read_pire0_el1());
1763 write_el1_ctx_s1pie(ctx, pir_el1, read_pir_el1());
1764 }
1765
1766 if (is_feat_s1poe_supported()) {
1767 write_el1_ctx_s1poe(ctx, por_el1, read_por_el1());
1768 }
1769
1770 if (is_feat_s2poe_supported()) {
1771 write_el1_ctx_s2poe(ctx, s2por_el1, read_s2por_el1());
1772 }
1773
1774 if (is_feat_tcr2_supported()) {
1775 write_el1_ctx_tcr2(ctx, tcr2_el1, read_tcr2_el1());
1776 }
1777
1778 if (is_feat_trf_supported()) {
1779 write_el1_ctx_trf(ctx, trfcr_el1, read_trfcr_el1());
1780 }
1781
1782 if (is_feat_csv2_2_supported()) {
1783 write_el1_ctx_csv2_2(ctx, scxtnum_el0, read_scxtnum_el0());
1784 write_el1_ctx_csv2_2(ctx, scxtnum_el1, read_scxtnum_el1());
1785 }
1786
1787 if (is_feat_gcs_supported()) {
1788 write_el1_ctx_gcs(ctx, gcscr_el1, read_gcscr_el1());
1789 write_el1_ctx_gcs(ctx, gcscre0_el1, read_gcscre0_el1());
1790 write_el1_ctx_gcs(ctx, gcspr_el1, read_gcspr_el1());
1791 write_el1_ctx_gcs(ctx, gcspr_el0, read_gcspr_el0());
1792 }
1793
1794 if (is_feat_the_supported()) {
1795 write_el1_ctx_the(ctx, rcwmask_el1, read_rcwmask_el1());
1796 write_el1_ctx_the(ctx, rcwsmask_el1, read_rcwsmask_el1());
1797 }
1798
1799 if (is_feat_sctlr2_supported()) {
1800 write_el1_ctx_sctlr2(ctx, sctlr2_el1, read_sctlr2_el1());
1801 }
1802
1803 if (is_feat_ls64_accdata_supported()) {
1804 write_el1_ctx_ls64(ctx, accdata_el1, read_accdata_el1());
1805 }
1806 }
1807
1808 static void el1_sysregs_context_restore(el1_sysregs_t *ctx)
1809 {
1810 write_spsr_el1(read_el1_ctx_common(ctx, spsr_el1));
1811 write_elr_el1(read_el1_ctx_common(ctx, elr_el1));
1812
1813 #if (!ERRATA_SPECULATIVE_AT)
1814 write_sctlr_el1(read_el1_ctx_common(ctx, sctlr_el1));
1815 write_tcr_el1(read_el1_ctx_common(ctx, tcr_el1));
1816 #endif /* (!ERRATA_SPECULATIVE_AT) */
1817
1818 write_cpacr_el1(read_el1_ctx_common(ctx, cpacr_el1));
1819 write_csselr_el1(read_el1_ctx_common(ctx, csselr_el1));
1820 write_sp_el1(read_el1_ctx_common(ctx, sp_el1));
1821 write_esr_el1(read_el1_ctx_common(ctx, esr_el1));
1822 write_ttbr0_el1(read_el1_ctx_common(ctx, ttbr0_el1));
1823 write_ttbr1_el1(read_el1_ctx_common(ctx, ttbr1_el1));
1824 write_mair_el1(read_el1_ctx_common(ctx, mair_el1));
1825 write_amair_el1(read_el1_ctx_common(ctx, amair_el1));
1826 write_actlr_el1(read_el1_ctx_common(ctx, actlr_el1));
1827 write_tpidr_el1(read_el1_ctx_common(ctx, tpidr_el1));
1828 write_tpidr_el0(read_el1_ctx_common(ctx, tpidr_el0));
1829 write_tpidrro_el0(read_el1_ctx_common(ctx, tpidrro_el0));
1830 write_par_el1(read_el1_ctx_common(ctx, par_el1));
1831 write_far_el1(read_el1_ctx_common(ctx, far_el1));
1832 write_afsr0_el1(read_el1_ctx_common(ctx, afsr0_el1));
1833 write_afsr1_el1(read_el1_ctx_common(ctx, afsr1_el1));
1834 write_contextidr_el1(read_el1_ctx_common(ctx, contextidr_el1));
1835 write_vbar_el1(read_el1_ctx_common(ctx, vbar_el1));
1836 write_mdccint_el1(read_el1_ctx_common(ctx, mdccint_el1));
1837 write_mdscr_el1(read_el1_ctx_common(ctx, mdscr_el1));
1838
1839 if (CTX_INCLUDE_AARCH32_REGS) {
1840 /* Restore Aarch32 registers */
1841 write_spsr_abt(read_el1_ctx_aarch32(ctx, spsr_abt));
1842 write_spsr_und(read_el1_ctx_aarch32(ctx, spsr_und));
1843 write_spsr_irq(read_el1_ctx_aarch32(ctx, spsr_irq));
1844 write_spsr_fiq(read_el1_ctx_aarch32(ctx, spsr_fiq));
1845 write_dacr32_el2(read_el1_ctx_aarch32(ctx, dacr32_el2));
1846 write_ifsr32_el2(read_el1_ctx_aarch32(ctx, ifsr32_el2));
1847 }
1848
1849 if (NS_TIMER_SWITCH) {
1850 /* Restore NS Timer registers */
1851 write_cntp_ctl_el0(read_el1_ctx_arch_timer(ctx, cntp_ctl_el0));
1852 write_cntp_cval_el0(read_el1_ctx_arch_timer(ctx, cntp_cval_el0));
1853 write_cntv_ctl_el0(read_el1_ctx_arch_timer(ctx, cntv_ctl_el0));
1854 write_cntv_cval_el0(read_el1_ctx_arch_timer(ctx, cntv_cval_el0));
1855 write_cntkctl_el1(read_el1_ctx_arch_timer(ctx, cntkctl_el1));
1856 }
1857
1858 if (is_feat_mte2_supported()) {
1859 write_tfsre0_el1(read_el1_ctx_mte2(ctx, tfsre0_el1));
1860 write_tfsr_el1(read_el1_ctx_mte2(ctx, tfsr_el1));
1861 write_rgsr_el1(read_el1_ctx_mte2(ctx, rgsr_el1));
1862 write_gcr_el1(read_el1_ctx_mte2(ctx, gcr_el1));
1863 }
1864
1865 if (is_feat_ras_supported()) {
1866 write_disr_el1(read_el1_ctx_ras(ctx, disr_el1));
1867 }
1868
1869 if (is_feat_s1pie_supported()) {
1870 write_pire0_el1(read_el1_ctx_s1pie(ctx, pire0_el1));
1871 write_pir_el1(read_el1_ctx_s1pie(ctx, pir_el1));
1872 }
1873
1874 if (is_feat_s1poe_supported()) {
1875 write_por_el1(read_el1_ctx_s1poe(ctx, por_el1));
1876 }
1877
1878 if (is_feat_s2poe_supported()) {
1879 write_s2por_el1(read_el1_ctx_s2poe(ctx, s2por_el1));
1880 }
1881
1882 if (is_feat_tcr2_supported()) {
1883 write_tcr2_el1(read_el1_ctx_tcr2(ctx, tcr2_el1));
1884 }
1885
1886 if (is_feat_trf_supported()) {
1887 write_trfcr_el1(read_el1_ctx_trf(ctx, trfcr_el1));
1888 }
1889
1890 if (is_feat_csv2_2_supported()) {
1891 write_scxtnum_el0(read_el1_ctx_csv2_2(ctx, scxtnum_el0));
1892 write_scxtnum_el1(read_el1_ctx_csv2_2(ctx, scxtnum_el1));
1893 }
1894
1895 if (is_feat_gcs_supported()) {
1896 write_gcscr_el1(read_el1_ctx_gcs(ctx, gcscr_el1));
1897 write_gcscre0_el1(read_el1_ctx_gcs(ctx, gcscre0_el1));
1898 write_gcspr_el1(read_el1_ctx_gcs(ctx, gcspr_el1));
1899 write_gcspr_el0(read_el1_ctx_gcs(ctx, gcspr_el0));
1900 }
1901
1902 if (is_feat_the_supported()) {
1903 write_rcwmask_el1(read_el1_ctx_the(ctx, rcwmask_el1));
1904 write_rcwsmask_el1(read_el1_ctx_the(ctx, rcwsmask_el1));
1905 }
1906
1907 if (is_feat_sctlr2_supported()) {
1908 write_sctlr2_el1(read_el1_ctx_sctlr2(ctx, sctlr2_el1));
1909 }
1910
1911 if (is_feat_ls64_accdata_supported()) {
1912 write_accdata_el1(read_el1_ctx_ls64(ctx, accdata_el1));
1913 }
1914 }
1915
1916 /*******************************************************************************
1917 * The next couple of functions are used by runtime services to save and restore
1918 * EL1 context on the 'cpu_context' structure for the specified security state.
1919 ******************************************************************************/
1920 void cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(uint32_t security_state)
1921 {
1922 cpu_context_t *ctx;
1923
1924 ctx = cm_get_context(security_state);
1925 assert(ctx != NULL);
1926
1927 el1_sysregs_context_save(get_el1_sysregs_ctx(ctx));
1928
1929 #if IMAGE_BL31
1930 if (security_state == SECURE)
1931 PUBLISH_EVENT(cm_exited_secure_world);
1932 else
1933 PUBLISH_EVENT(cm_exited_normal_world);
1934 #endif
1935 }
1936
1937 void cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(uint32_t security_state)
1938 {
1939 cpu_context_t *ctx;
1940
1941 ctx = cm_get_context(security_state);
1942 assert(ctx != NULL);
1943
1944 el1_sysregs_context_restore(get_el1_sysregs_ctx(ctx));
1945
1946 #if IMAGE_BL31
1947 if (security_state == SECURE)
1948 PUBLISH_EVENT(cm_entering_secure_world);
1949 else
1950 PUBLISH_EVENT(cm_entering_normal_world);
1951 #endif
1952 }
1953
1954 #endif /* ((IMAGE_BL1) || (IMAGE_BL31 && (!CTX_INCLUDE_EL2_REGS))) */
1955
1956 /*******************************************************************************
1957 * This function populates ELR_EL3 member of 'cpu_context' pertaining to the
1958 * given security state with the given entrypoint
1959 ******************************************************************************/
1960 void cm_set_elr_el3(uint32_t security_state, uintptr_t entrypoint)
1961 {
1962 cpu_context_t *ctx;
1963 el3_state_t *state;
1964
1965 ctx = cm_get_context(security_state);
1966 assert(ctx != NULL);
1967
1968 /* Populate EL3 state so that ERET jumps to the correct entry */
1969 state = get_el3state_ctx(ctx);
1970 write_ctx_reg(state, CTX_ELR_EL3, entrypoint);
1971 }
1972
1973 /*******************************************************************************
1974 * This function populates ELR_EL3 and SPSR_EL3 members of 'cpu_context'
1975 * pertaining to the given security state
1976 ******************************************************************************/
1977 void cm_set_elr_spsr_el3(uint32_t security_state,
1978 uintptr_t entrypoint, uint32_t spsr)
1979 {
1980 cpu_context_t *ctx;
1981 el3_state_t *state;
1982
1983 ctx = cm_get_context(security_state);
1984 assert(ctx != NULL);
1985
1986 /* Populate EL3 state so that ERET jumps to the correct entry */
1987 state = get_el3state_ctx(ctx);
1988 write_ctx_reg(state, CTX_ELR_EL3, entrypoint);
1989 write_ctx_reg(state, CTX_SPSR_EL3, spsr);
1990 }
1991
1992 /*******************************************************************************
1993 * This function updates a single bit in the SCR_EL3 member of the 'cpu_context'
1994 * pertaining to the given security state using the value and bit position
1995 * specified in the parameters. It preserves all other bits.
1996 ******************************************************************************/
1997 void cm_write_scr_el3_bit(uint32_t security_state,
1998 uint32_t bit_pos,
1999 uint32_t value)
2000 {
2001 cpu_context_t *ctx;
2002 el3_state_t *state;
2003 u_register_t scr_el3;
2004
2005 ctx = cm_get_context(security_state);
2006 assert(ctx != NULL);
2007
2008 /* Ensure that the bit position is a valid one */
2009 assert(((1UL << bit_pos) & SCR_VALID_BIT_MASK) != 0U);
2010
2011 /* Ensure that the 'value' is only a bit wide */
2012 assert(value <= 1U);
2013
2014 /*
2015 * Get the SCR_EL3 value from the cpu context, clear the desired bit
2016 * and set it to its new value.
2017 */
2018 state = get_el3state_ctx(ctx);
2019 scr_el3 = read_ctx_reg(state, CTX_SCR_EL3);
2020 scr_el3 &= ~(1UL << bit_pos);
2021 scr_el3 |= (u_register_t)value << bit_pos;
2022 write_ctx_reg(state, CTX_SCR_EL3, scr_el3);
2023 }
2024
2025 /*******************************************************************************
2026 * This function retrieves SCR_EL3 member of 'cpu_context' pertaining to the
2027 * given security state.
2028 ******************************************************************************/
2029 u_register_t cm_get_scr_el3(uint32_t security_state)
2030 {
2031 cpu_context_t *ctx;
2032 el3_state_t *state;
2033
2034 ctx = cm_get_context(security_state);
2035 assert(ctx != NULL);
2036
2037 /* Populate EL3 state so that ERET jumps to the correct entry */
2038 state = get_el3state_ctx(ctx);
2039 return read_ctx_reg(state, CTX_SCR_EL3);
2040 }
2041
2042 /*******************************************************************************
2043 * This function is used to program the context that's used for exception
2044 * return. This initializes the SP_EL3 to a pointer to a 'cpu_context' set for
2045 * the required security state
2046 ******************************************************************************/
2047 void cm_set_next_eret_context(uint32_t security_state)
2048 {
2049 cpu_context_t *ctx;
2050
2051 ctx = cm_get_context(security_state);
2052 assert(ctx != NULL);
2053
2054 cm_set_next_context(ctx);
2055 }