/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */ #include "sd-device.h" #include "sd-id128.h" #include "sd-json.h" #include "sd-varlink.h" #include "alloc-util.h" #include "blkid-util.h" #include "blockdev-util.h" #include "chase.h" #include "errno-util.h" #include "escape.h" #include "fd-util.h" #include "hexdecoct.h" #include "id128-util.h" #include "iovec-util.h" #include "log.h" #include "mountpoint-util.h" #include "pcrextend-util.h" #include "pkcs7-util.h" #include "sha256.h" #include "string-util.h" #include "strv.h" #include "tpm2-pcr.h" #include "user-record.h" static int device_get_file_system_word( sd_device *d, const char *prefix, char **ret) { #if HAVE_BLKID int r; #endif assert(d); assert(prefix); assert(ret); #if HAVE_BLKID r = dlopen_libblkid(LOG_DEBUG); if (r < 0) return r; _cleanup_close_ int block_fd = sd_device_open(d, O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC|O_NONBLOCK); if (block_fd < 0) return block_fd; _cleanup_(blkid_free_probep) blkid_probe b = sym_blkid_new_probe(); if (!b) return -ENOMEM; errno = 0; r = sym_blkid_probe_set_device(b, block_fd, 0, 0); if (r != 0) return errno_or_else(ENOMEM); (void) sym_blkid_probe_enable_superblocks(b, 1); (void) sym_blkid_probe_set_superblocks_flags(b, BLKID_SUBLKS_TYPE|BLKID_SUBLKS_UUID|BLKID_SUBLKS_LABEL); (void) sym_blkid_probe_enable_partitions(b, 1); (void) sym_blkid_probe_set_partitions_flags(b, BLKID_PARTS_ENTRY_DETAILS); errno = 0; r = sym_blkid_do_safeprobe(b); if (r == _BLKID_SAFEPROBE_ERROR) return errno_or_else(EIO); if (IN_SET(r, _BLKID_SAFEPROBE_AMBIGUOUS, _BLKID_SAFEPROBE_NOT_FOUND)) return -ENOPKG; assert(r == _BLKID_SAFEPROBE_FOUND); _cleanup_strv_free_ char **l = strv_new(prefix); if (!l) return -ENOMEM; FOREACH_STRING(field, "TYPE", "UUID", "LABEL", "PART_ENTRY_UUID", "PART_ENTRY_TYPE", "PART_ENTRY_NAME") { const char *v = NULL; (void) sym_blkid_probe_lookup_value(b, field, &v, NULL); _cleanup_free_ char *escaped = xescape(strempty(v), ":"); /* Avoid ambiguity around ":" */ if (!escaped) return -ENOMEM; r = strv_consume(&l, TAKE_PTR(escaped)); if (r < 0) return r; } assert(strv_length(l) == 7); /* We always want 7 components, to avoid ambiguous strings */ _cleanup_free_ char *word = strv_join(l, ":"); if (!word) return -ENOMEM; *ret = TAKE_PTR(word); return 0; #else return -EOPNOTSUPP; #endif } int pcrextend_file_system_word(const char *path, char **ret_word, char **ret_normalized_path) { _cleanup_free_ char *normalized_path = NULL, *normalized_escaped = NULL, *prefix = NULL, *word = NULL; _cleanup_(sd_device_unrefp) sd_device *d = NULL; _cleanup_close_ int dfd = -EBADF; int r; assert(path); assert(ret_word); dfd = chase_and_open(path, NULL, 0, O_DIRECTORY|O_CLOEXEC, &normalized_path); if (dfd < 0) return log_error_errno(dfd, "Failed to open path '%s': %m", path); r = is_mount_point_at(dfd, NULL, 0); if (r < 0) return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to determine if path '%s' is mount point: %m", normalized_path); if (r == 0) return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENOTDIR), "Specified path '%s' is not a mount point, refusing.", normalized_path); normalized_escaped = xescape(normalized_path, ":"); /* Avoid ambiguity around ":" */ if (!normalized_escaped) return log_oom(); prefix = strjoin("file-system:", normalized_escaped); if (!prefix) return log_oom(); r = block_device_new_from_fd(dfd, BLOCK_DEVICE_LOOKUP_BACKING, &d); if (r < 0) { log_notice_errno(r, "Unable to determine backing block device of '%s', using generic fallback file system identity string: %m", path); word = strjoin(prefix, "::::::"); if (!word) return log_oom(); } else { r = device_get_file_system_word(d, prefix, &word); if (r < 0) return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to get file system identifier string for '%s': %m", path); } *ret_word = TAKE_PTR(word); if (ret_normalized_path) *ret_normalized_path = TAKE_PTR(normalized_path); return 0; } int pcrextend_machine_id_word(char **ret) { _cleanup_free_ char *word = NULL; sd_id128_t mid; int r; assert(ret); r = sd_id128_get_machine(&mid); if (r < 0) return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to acquire machine ID: %m"); word = strjoin("machine-id:", SD_ID128_TO_STRING(mid)); if (!word) return log_oom(); *ret = TAKE_PTR(word); return 0; } int pcrextend_product_id_word(char **ret) { _cleanup_free_ char *word = NULL; sd_id128_t pid; int r; assert(ret); r = id128_get_product(&pid); if (IN_SET(r, -ENOENT, -EADDRNOTAVAIL)) /* No product UUID field, or an all-zero or all-0xFF UUID */ word = strdup("product-id:missing"); else if (r < 0) return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to acquire product ID: %m"); else word = strjoin("product-id:", SD_ID128_TO_STRING(pid)); if (!word) return log_oom(); *ret = TAKE_PTR(word); return 0; } int pcrextend_login_word(UserRecord *ur, char **ret) { int r; assert(ur); assert(ret); /* Reduce the user record to the sections that make up its stable, host-specific identity, and turn * that into a word to measure into the 'login' NvPCR. We deliberately keep the 'regular', * 'perMachine' and 'binding' sections (the portable identity plus how it is realized on *this* * host), but drop 'privileged' (so password hash churn doesn't perturb the NvPCR), 'secret' and * 'status' (transient) and 'signature' (so the scheme is identical for signed and unsigned records). * Only 'regular' is required, the others are merely allowed, so plain NSS users reduce cleanly. */ UserRecordLoadFlags mask = USER_RECORD_REQUIRE_REGULAR | USER_RECORD_ALLOW_PER_MACHINE | USER_RECORD_ALLOW_BINDING | USER_RECORD_STRIP_PRIVILEGED | USER_RECORD_STRIP_SECRET | USER_RECORD_STRIP_STATUS | USER_RECORD_STRIP_SIGNATURE | USER_RECORD_PERMISSIVE; _cleanup_(sd_json_variant_unrefp) sd_json_variant *v = NULL; r = user_group_record_mangle(ur->json, mask, &v, /* ret_mask= */ NULL); if (r < 0) return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to reduce user record of '%s': %m", ur->user_name); /* Normalize so the serialization is canonical (stable key order) regardless of how the record was * assembled by the various userdb backends. */ r = sd_json_variant_normalize(&v); if (r < 0) return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to normalize user record of '%s': %m", ur->user_name); /* Format to compact, single-line JSON (no SD_JSON_FORMAT_NEWLINE), so the measured word stays on one * line and the colon-separated word structure is unambiguous. */ _cleanup_free_ char *text = NULL; r = sd_json_variant_format(v, /* flags= */ 0, &text); if (r < 0) return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to format user record of '%s': %m", ur->user_name); _cleanup_free_ char *name_escaped = xescape(ur->user_name, ":"); /* Avoid ambiguity around ":" */ if (!name_escaped) return log_oom(); _cleanup_free_ char *word = strjoin("login:", name_escaped, ":", text); if (!word) return log_oom(); *ret = TAKE_PTR(word); return 0; } int pcrextend_verity_word( const char *name, const struct iovec *root_hash, const struct iovec *root_hash_sig, char **ret) { int r; assert(name); assert(iovec_is_set(root_hash)); assert(ret); _cleanup_free_ char *name_escaped = xescape(name, ":"); /* Avoid ambiguity around ":" */ if (!name_escaped) return log_oom(); _cleanup_free_ char *h = hexmem(root_hash->iov_base, root_hash->iov_len); if (!h) return log_oom(); _cleanup_free_ char *sigs = NULL; if (iovec_is_set(root_hash_sig)) { size_t n_signers = 0; Signer *signers = NULL; /* Let's extract the X.509 issuer + serial number from the PKCS#7 signature and include that * in the measurement record. This is useful since it allows us to have different signing * keys for confext + sysext + other types of DDIs, and by means of this information we can * discern which kind it was. Ideally, we'd measure the fingerprint of the X.509 certificate, * but typically that's not available in a PKCS#7 signature. */ CLEANUP_ARRAY(signers, n_signers, signer_free_many); r = pkcs7_extract_signers(root_hash_sig, &signers, &n_signers); if (r < 0) return r; FOREACH_ARRAY(i, signers, n_signers) { _cleanup_free_ char *serial = hexmem(i->serial.iov_base, i->serial.iov_len); if (!serial) return log_oom(); _cleanup_free_ char *issuer = NULL; if (base64mem(i->issuer.iov_base, i->issuer.iov_len, &issuer) < 0) return log_oom(); if (strextendf_with_separator(&sigs, ",", "%s/%s", serial, issuer) < 0) return log_oom(); } } _cleanup_free_ char *word = strjoin("verity:", name_escaped, ":", h, ":", strempty(sigs)); if (!word) return log_oom(); *ret = TAKE_PTR(word); return 0; } int pcrextend_verity_now( const char *name, const struct iovec *root_hash, const struct iovec *root_hash_sig) { #if HAVE_TPM2 int r; _cleanup_free_ char *word = NULL; r = pcrextend_verity_word( name, root_hash, root_hash_sig, &word); if (r < 0) return r; _cleanup_(sd_varlink_unrefp) sd_varlink *vl = NULL; r = sd_varlink_connect_address(&vl, "/run/systemd/io.systemd.PCRExtend"); if (r < 0) return r; _cleanup_(sd_json_variant_unrefp) sd_json_variant *reply = NULL; const char *error_id = NULL; r = sd_varlink_callbo( vl, "io.systemd.PCRExtend.Extend", /* ret_reply= */ NULL, &error_id, SD_JSON_BUILD_PAIR_STRING("nvpcr", "verity"), SD_JSON_BUILD_PAIR_STRING("text", word), SD_JSON_BUILD_PAIR_STRING("eventType", "dm_verity")); if (r < 0) return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to issue io.systemd.PCRExtend.Extend() varlink call: %m"); if (error_id) { r = sd_varlink_error_to_errno(error_id, reply); if (r != -EBADR) return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to issue io.systemd.PCRExtend.Extend() varlink call: %m"); return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to issue io.systemd.PCRExtend.Extend() varlink call: %s", error_id); } log_debug("Measurement of '%s' into 'verity' NvPCR completed.", word); return 1; #else return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), "TPM2 support disabled, not measuring Verity root hashes and signatures."); #endif } #define IMDS_USERDATA_TRUNCATED_MAX 256U int pcrextend_imds_userdata_word(const struct iovec *data, char **ret) { assert(iovec_is_set(data)); assert(ret); /* We include both a hash of the complete user data, and a truncated version of the data in the word * we measure. The former protects the actual data, the latter is useful for debugging. */ _cleanup_free_ char *hash = hexmem(SHA256_DIRECT(data->iov_base, data->iov_len), SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); if (!hash) return log_oom(); _cleanup_free_ char *data_encoded = NULL; if (base64mem_full(data->iov_base, MIN(data->iov_len, IMDS_USERDATA_TRUNCATED_MAX), /* line_break= */ SIZE_MAX, &data_encoded) < 0) return log_oom(); _cleanup_free_ char *word = strjoin("imds-userdata:", hash, ":", data_encoded); if (!word) return log_oom(); *ret = TAKE_PTR(word); return 0; } int pcrextend_imds_userdata_now(const struct iovec *data) { #if HAVE_TPM2 int r; _cleanup_free_ char *word = NULL; r = pcrextend_imds_userdata_word(data, &word); if (r < 0) return r; _cleanup_(sd_varlink_unrefp) sd_varlink *vl = NULL; r = sd_varlink_connect_address(&vl, "/run/systemd/io.systemd.PCRExtend"); if (r < 0) return r; _cleanup_(sd_json_variant_unrefp) sd_json_variant *reply = NULL; const char *error_id = NULL; r = sd_varlink_callbo( vl, "io.systemd.PCRExtend.Extend", /* ret_reply= */ NULL, &error_id, SD_JSON_BUILD_PAIR_INTEGER("pcr", TPM2_PCR_KERNEL_CONFIG), SD_JSON_BUILD_PAIR_STRING("text", word), SD_JSON_BUILD_PAIR_STRING("eventType", "imds_userdata")); if (r < 0) return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to issue io.systemd.PCRExtend.Extend() varlink call: %m"); if (error_id) { r = sd_varlink_error_to_errno(error_id, reply); if (r != -EBADR) return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to issue io.systemd.PCRExtend.Extend() varlink call: %m"); return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to issue io.systemd.PCRExtend.Extend() varlink call: %s", error_id); } log_debug("Measurement of '%s' into PCR 12 completed.", word); return 1; #else return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), "TPM2 support disabled, not measuring IMDS userdata."); #endif }