const t = require('tap') const isScriptAllowed = require('../lib/script-allowed.js') const { trustedDisplay } = isScriptAllowed // Test nodes default to a consistent registry-tarball shape: the resolved // URL's name+version match the supplied name+version. Tests that need to // simulate manifest confusion (mismatched URL) can override `resolved` // independently. const node = (overrides = {}) => { const name = overrides.name ?? overrides.packageName ?? 'pkg' const packageName = overrides.packageName ?? name const version = overrides.version ?? '1.0.0' // For real aliased installs, the URL is the TARGET package's URL, so // build the default URL from packageName, not name. const urlPkg = packageName return { name, packageName, version, resolved: overrides.resolved ?? `https://registry.npmjs.org/${urlPkg}/-/${urlPkg}-${version}.tgz`, location: overrides.location ?? `node_modules/${name}`, ...overrides, } } t.test('returns null when no policy is set', t => { t.equal(isScriptAllowed(node(), null), null) t.equal(isScriptAllowed(node(), undefined), null) t.equal(isScriptAllowed(node(), {}), null) t.end() }) t.test('registry — name-only allow', t => { t.equal(isScriptAllowed(node({ name: 'canvas', version: '2.11.0' }), { canvas: true }), true) t.equal(isScriptAllowed(node({ name: 'other', version: '1.0.0' }), { canvas: true }), null) t.end() }) t.test('registry — exact version match', t => { const policy = { 'canvas@2.11.0': true } t.equal(isScriptAllowed(node({ name: 'canvas', version: '2.11.0' }), policy), true) t.equal(isScriptAllowed(node({ name: 'canvas', version: '2.11.1' }), policy), null) t.end() }) t.test('registry — semver range', t => { const policy = { 'sharp@0.33.2 || 0.34.0': true } t.equal(isScriptAllowed(node({ name: 'sharp', version: '0.33.2' }), policy), true) t.equal(isScriptAllowed(node({ name: 'sharp', version: '0.34.0' }), policy), true) t.equal(isScriptAllowed(node({ name: 'sharp', version: '0.33.3' }), policy), null) t.end() }) t.test('registry — version mismatch returns null', t => { const policy = { 'canvas@2.11.0': true } t.equal(isScriptAllowed(node({ name: 'canvas', version: '3.0.0' }), policy), null) t.end() }) t.test('alias must not match the alias name', t => { // install: `trusted@npm:naughty@1.0.0` // node.name === 'trusted', node.packageName === 'naughty' const aliased = node({ name: 'trusted', packageName: 'naughty', version: '1.0.0' }) // Key matching the alias name must NOT match. t.equal(isScriptAllowed(aliased, { trusted: true }), null) // Key matching the real package name DOES match. t.equal(isScriptAllowed(aliased, { naughty: true }), true) t.equal(isScriptAllowed(aliased, { 'naughty@1.0.0': true }), true) t.end() }) t.test('registry-style key does not match a tarball or git node', t => { const gitNode = node({ name: 'pkg', version: '1.0.0', resolved: 'git+ssh://git@github.com/foo/bar.git#deadbeefcafebabe1234567890abcdef12345678', }) t.equal(isScriptAllowed(gitNode, { pkg: true }), null) t.end() }) t.test('git — repo-only match by canonical ssh URL', t => { const gitNode = node({ name: 'bar', packageName: 'bar', version: '1.0.0', resolved: 'git+ssh://git@github.com/foo/bar.git#deadbeefcafebabe1234567890abcdef12345678', }) // Key by repo only — name-only allow for the git source. t.equal(isScriptAllowed(gitNode, { 'github:foo/bar': true }), true) t.equal(isScriptAllowed(gitNode, { 'github:foo/other': true }), null) t.end() }) t.test('git — short SHA prefix matches full SHA', t => { const gitNode = node({ name: 'bar', packageName: 'bar', version: '1.0.0', resolved: 'git+ssh://git@github.com/foo/bar.git#deadbeefcafebabe1234567890abcdef12345678', }) t.equal(isScriptAllowed(gitNode, { 'github:foo/bar#deadbeef': true }), true) t.equal(isScriptAllowed(gitNode, { 'github:foo/bar#deadbee': true }), true) t.equal(isScriptAllowed(gitNode, { 'github:foo/bar#abcdef0': true }), null) t.end() }) t.test('file path — exact resolved match', t => { const fileNode = node({ name: 'local-pkg', packageName: 'local-pkg', version: '1.0.0', resolved: 'file:../local-pkg', }) t.equal(isScriptAllowed(fileNode, { 'file:../local-pkg': true }), true) t.equal(isScriptAllowed(fileNode, { 'file:../other': true }), null) t.end() }) t.test('directory key — npa parses absolute paths as type=directory', t => { // npa treats absolute paths as { type: 'directory' }, which the // matcher shares with the 'file' case. path.resolve produces a // platform-correct absolute path so this works on Windows. const absDir = require('node:path').resolve('local-pkg') const dirNode = node({ name: 'local-pkg', packageName: 'local-pkg', version: '1.0.0', resolved: absDir, }) t.equal(isScriptAllowed(dirNode, { [absDir]: true }), true) t.end() }) t.test('local tarball key — npa parses *.tgz paths as type=file', t => { // npa treats `*.tgz` paths as { type: 'file' }, separate from // 'directory'. Both share the matchFileOrDir body. const tgzNode = node({ name: 'local-pkg', packageName: 'local-pkg', version: '1.0.0', resolved: 'file:../local-pkg.tgz', }) t.equal(isScriptAllowed(tgzNode, { 'file:../local-pkg.tgz': true }), true) t.end() }) t.test('remote tarball — exact resolved match', t => { const remoteNode = node({ name: 'pkg', packageName: 'pkg', version: '1.0.0', resolved: 'https://example.com/pkg.tgz', }) t.equal(isScriptAllowed(remoteNode, { 'https://example.com/pkg.tgz': true }), true) t.equal(isScriptAllowed(remoteNode, { 'https://example.com/other.tgz': true }), null) t.end() }) t.test('omitLockfileRegistryResolved: name-only match via edges; version-pinned does not', t => { // Without a resolved URL, the trusted name comes from an incoming // dependency edge (consumer-written), not from node.location (which // for aliases would expose the alias name and let a malicious publisher // bypass the policy). Version isn't trustable in this case, so // version-pinned policy entries cannot match. const omitted = { name: 'canvas', packageName: 'canvas', version: '2.11.0', resolved: undefined, location: 'node_modules/canvas', edgesIn: new Set([{ name: 'canvas', spec: '^2.0.0' }]), } t.equal(isScriptAllowed(omitted, { canvas: true }), true) t.equal(isScriptAllowed(omitted, { 'canvas@2.11.0': true }), null, 'version-pinned match requires the trusted URL-derived version') t.equal(isScriptAllowed(omitted, { 'canvas@3': true }), null) t.end() }) t.test('omitLockfileRegistryResolved + alias: location is ignored; underlying name wins', t => { // Consumer's package.json has `"trusted": "npm:naughty@1.0.0"`. With // omitLockfileRegistryResolved, the resolved URL is absent. The install // location is `node_modules/trusted` (alias path). The matcher MUST // derive the underlying name from the edge's alias subSpec, not from // the location. const aliasOmitted = { name: 'trusted', packageName: 'naughty', version: '1.0.0', resolved: undefined, location: 'node_modules/trusted', edgesIn: new Set([{ name: 'trusted', spec: 'npm:naughty@1.0.0' }]), } // Alias name MUST NOT match. t.equal(isScriptAllowed(aliasOmitted, { trusted: true }), null, 'alias name does not authorize the underlying package') // Underlying name DOES match. t.equal(isScriptAllowed(aliasOmitted, { naughty: true }), true, 'underlying package name authorizes scripts') t.end() }) t.test('omit-lockfile with no edges returns null (no trusted identity)', t => { const orphan = { name: 'canvas', packageName: 'canvas', version: '1.0.0', resolved: undefined, location: 'node_modules/canvas', // No edgesIn at all. } t.equal(isScriptAllowed(orphan, { canvas: true }), null, 'cannot match without a trusted name source') t.end() }) t.test('deny wins on conflict', t => { const n = node({ name: 'pkg', version: '2.0.0' }) t.equal(isScriptAllowed(n, { 'pkg@1.0.0 || 2.0.0': true, 'pkg@2.0.0 || 3.0.0': false }), false) t.equal(isScriptAllowed(n, { pkg: true, 'pkg@2.0.0': false }), false) t.end() }) t.test('name-only deny without overlap returns false', t => { t.equal(isScriptAllowed(node({ name: 'core-js', version: '3.0.0' }), { 'core-js': false }), false) t.end() }) t.test('skips unparseable policy keys', t => { t.equal( isScriptAllowed(node({ name: 'pkg', version: '1.0.0' }), { '@@@invalid': true, pkg: true }), true ) t.end() }) t.test('registry — forbidden semver ranges are rejected', async t => { const n = node({ name: 'sharp', version: '0.33.5' }) // Caret range that DOES match version, but RFC forbids — must return null t.equal(isScriptAllowed(n, { 'sharp@^0.33.0': true }), null) t.equal(isScriptAllowed(n, { 'sharp@~0.33.0': true }), null) t.equal(isScriptAllowed(n, { 'sharp@>=0.33.0': true }), null) t.equal(isScriptAllowed(n, { 'sharp@<1.0.0': true }), null) // Partial versions like `0.33` are ranges in semver — also rejected t.equal(isScriptAllowed(n, { 'sharp@0.33': true }), null) t.equal(isScriptAllowed(n, { 'sharp@0': true }), null) }) t.test('registry — wildcard versions are allowed (treated as name-only)', async t => { const n = node({ name: 'sharp', version: '0.33.5' }) t.equal(isScriptAllowed(n, { 'sharp@*': true }), true) }) t.test('registry — exact disjunction with full semver is allowed', async t => { const n = node({ name: 'sharp', version: '0.33.2' }) t.equal(isScriptAllowed(n, { 'sharp@0.33.2 || 0.34.0': true }), true) }) t.test('registry — exact disjunction where version is not listed returns null', async t => { const n = node({ name: 'sharp', version: '0.33.5' }) t.equal(isScriptAllowed(n, { 'sharp@0.33.2 || 0.34.0': true }), null) }) t.test('forbidden range deny does NOT win (would silently allow new versions otherwise)', async t => { // A user wrote `sharp@^0.33.0: false` thinking they're denying all 0.33.x. // The matcher rejects the range, so the entry is effectively absent — // deny does not match the node, returns null (unreviewed). const n = node({ name: 'sharp', version: '0.33.5' }) t.equal(isScriptAllowed(n, { 'sharp@^0.33.0': false }), null) }) t.test('isRegistryNode — spoofed tarball URL is NOT treated as registry', async t => { // An attacker-controlled URL that happens to contain /-/- // must not match a registry-style allow entry. const spoofed = node({ name: 'trusted', version: '1.0.0', resolved: 'https://evil.com/-/trusted-1.0.0.tgz', }) // Without a path segment before /-/, the URL is not a registry tarball // pattern. The 'trusted@1.0.0' allow must not match. t.equal(isScriptAllowed(spoofed, { 'trusted@1.0.0': true }), null) t.equal(isScriptAllowed(spoofed, { trusted: true }), null) // The user can still allow this specific URL via an exact resolved match. t.equal( isScriptAllowed(spoofed, { 'https://evil.com/-/trusted-1.0.0.tgz': true }), true ) }) t.test('isRegistryNode — arborist isRegistryDependency overrides URL guessing', async t => { // A real arborist Node has isRegistryDependency. When false, the URL // pattern is ignored entirely. const arboristNode = { name: 'trusted', packageName: 'trusted', version: '1.0.0', resolved: 'https://registry.npmjs.org/trusted/-/trusted-1.0.0.tgz', isRegistryDependency: false, // edges say it came from a non-registry source } t.equal(isScriptAllowed(arboristNode, { 'trusted@1.0.0': true }), null) }) t.test('isRegistryNode — arborist isRegistryDependency true accepts even unusual URLs', async t => { const arboristNode = { name: 'trusted', packageName: 'trusted', version: '1.0.0', resolved: 'https://internal.corp/private-registry/trusted/-/trusted-1.0.0.tgz', isRegistryDependency: true, // edges say it came from a configured registry } t.equal(isScriptAllowed(arboristNode, { 'trusted@1.0.0': true }), true) }) t.test('bundled deps cannot be allowlisted (Phase 1 blocks outright)', async t => { // Bundled dependencies have inBundle=true and no independent resolved // URL. The RFC explicitly forbids allowlisting them in Phase 1 because // matching by name@version from the bundled tarball would reintroduce // manifest confusion. They must always return null (unreviewed). const bundled = { name: 'bundled-pkg', packageName: 'bundled-pkg', version: '1.0.0', resolved: undefined, inBundle: true, } // Name-only allow: must NOT match a bundled dep. t.equal(isScriptAllowed(bundled, { 'bundled-pkg': true }), null) // Versioned allow: must NOT match a bundled dep. t.equal(isScriptAllowed(bundled, { 'bundled-pkg@1.0.0': true }), null) // Disjunction allow: must NOT match a bundled dep. t.equal(isScriptAllowed(bundled, { 'bundled-pkg@1.0.0 || 2.0.0': true }), null) // No policy: still null (no policy = nothing to evaluate against). t.equal(isScriptAllowed(bundled, {}), null) t.equal(isScriptAllowed(bundled, null), null) }) t.test('bundled deps: deny entry does not match either (returns null, not false)', async t => { // A deny entry doesn't apply to bundled deps because they're outside // the policy scope entirely. Phase 1 blocks them via the walker, not // via the policy. const bundled = { name: 'bundled-pkg', packageName: 'bundled-pkg', version: '1.0.0', resolved: undefined, inBundle: true, } t.equal(isScriptAllowed(bundled, { 'bundled-pkg': false }), null) }) t.test('bundled dep with resolved field is still rejected', async t => { // Defensive: even if a bundled dep somehow has a resolved URL, the // inBundle flag wins over identity matching. const bundledWithResolved = { name: 'pkg', packageName: 'pkg', version: '1.0.0', resolved: 'https://registry.npmjs.org/pkg/-/pkg-1.0.0.tgz', inBundle: true, } t.equal(isScriptAllowed(bundledWithResolved, { 'pkg@1.0.0': true }), null) }) t.test('inBundle: false does not affect normal matching', async t => { // Sanity check: explicit inBundle: false behaves identically to absent. const normal = { name: 'pkg', packageName: 'pkg', version: '1.0.0', resolved: 'https://registry.npmjs.org/pkg/-/pkg-1.0.0.tgz', inBundle: false, } t.equal(isScriptAllowed(normal, { 'pkg@1.0.0': true }), true) }) t.test('manifest confusion: malicious tarball self-name cannot bypass allow entry', async t => { // A package author publishes 'naughty' to the registry but inside the // tarball claims `package.json#name = "trusted"` and the matching // version. The lockfile records the registry URL for 'naughty'. // node.packageName / node.version return the tarball's claims; the // matcher MUST ignore both and consult only the URL. const malicious = { name: 'naughty', // dependency edge name (consumer's deps) packageName: 'trusted', // tarball's self-claimed name (LIE) version: '1.0.0', // tarball's self-claimed version resolved: 'https://registry.npmjs.org/naughty/-/naughty-1.0.0.tgz', location: 'node_modules/naughty', isRegistryDependency: true, } // The 'trusted' allowlist entry must NOT match this node. t.equal(isScriptAllowed(malicious, { trusted: true }), null) t.equal(isScriptAllowed(malicious, { 'trusted@1.0.0': true }), null) // A 'naughty' entry (the URL-derived name) DOES match. t.equal(isScriptAllowed(malicious, { naughty: true }), true) t.equal(isScriptAllowed(malicious, { 'naughty@1.0.0': true }), true) }) t.test('manifest confusion: malicious version claim cannot satisfy version pin', async t => { // The tarball claims version 1.0.0 but the URL records 2.0.0. The // matcher must trust the URL. const malicious = { name: 'pkg', packageName: 'pkg', version: '1.0.0', // tarball lie resolved: 'https://registry.npmjs.org/pkg/-/pkg-2.0.0.tgz', location: 'node_modules/pkg', isRegistryDependency: true, } // Pin for the URL version matches. t.equal(isScriptAllowed(malicious, { 'pkg@2.0.0': true }), true) // Pin for the tarball's lie does NOT match. t.equal(isScriptAllowed(malicious, { 'pkg@1.0.0': true }), null) }) t.test('manifest confusion: scoped registry tarball', async t => { const node = { name: 'pkg', packageName: 'totally-different', version: '9.9.9', resolved: 'https://registry.npmjs.org/@scope/real/-/real-1.0.0.tgz', location: 'node_modules/@scope/real', isRegistryDependency: true, } t.equal(isScriptAllowed(node, { '@scope/real': true }), true) t.equal(isScriptAllowed(node, { '@scope/real@1.0.0': true }), true) t.equal(isScriptAllowed(node, { 'totally-different': true }), null) }) t.test('git committish: matching is one-directional (key is prefix of resolved SHA)', async t => { // The lockfile records a 40-char SHA; the policy key has a (typically // shorter) SHA. The trusted check is `nodeFullSha.startsWith(keyShortSha)`. // The reverse direction must NOT match — a malformed lockfile that // happens to record only a short committish must not let a longer key // authorize it. const shortNode = node({ name: 'bar', packageName: 'bar', version: '1.0.0', // Node committish is 8 chars; key committish below is longer. resolved: 'git+ssh://git@github.com/foo/bar.git#deadbeef', }) // Key SHA strictly longer than the node committish: must not match. t.equal( isScriptAllowed(shortNode, { 'github:foo/bar#deadbeefcafebabe1234567890abcdef12345678': true }), null ) // Node fully starts with key — matches normally. const fullNode = node({ name: 'bar', packageName: 'bar', version: '1.0.0', resolved: 'git+ssh://git@github.com/foo/bar.git#deadbeefcafebabe1234567890abcdef12345678', }) t.equal(isScriptAllowed(fullNode, { 'github:foo/bar#deadbeef': true }), true) }) t.test('git policy key against a non-git node does not match', t => { // matchGit fast-exits when the node has no resolved or its resolved // does not begin with `git`. const registryNode = node({ name: 'bar', packageName: 'bar', version: '1.0.0', resolved: 'https://registry.npmjs.org/bar/-/bar-1.0.0.tgz', }) t.equal(isScriptAllowed(registryNode, { 'github:foo/bar': true }), null) const noResolved = { name: 'bar', packageName: 'bar', version: '1.0.0', resolved: undefined, edgesIn: new Set([{ name: 'bar', spec: 'github:foo/bar' }]), } t.equal(isScriptAllowed(noResolved, { 'github:foo/bar': true }), null) t.end() }) t.test('git — non-hosted git URL matches via fetchSpec', t => { // Self-hosted git server: not on GitHub/GitLab/etc, so `hosted` is // undefined and the matcher falls back to comparing fetchSpec. const gitNode = node({ name: 'bar', packageName: 'bar', version: '1.0.0', resolved: 'git+ssh://git.example.com/foo/bar.git#deadbeefcafebabe1234567890abcdef12345678', }) t.equal( isScriptAllowed(gitNode, { 'git+ssh://git.example.com/foo/bar.git': true }), true ) t.equal( isScriptAllowed(gitNode, { 'git+ssh://git.example.com/foo/other.git': true }), null ) t.end() }) t.test('git — hosted key against non-hosted node falls through', t => { // A GitHub-style key cannot match a self-hosted git node: one side // produces a hosted.ssh URL, the other does not, so neither the // hosted branch nor the fetchSpec branch applies. const gitNode = node({ name: 'bar', packageName: 'bar', version: '1.0.0', resolved: 'git+ssh://git.example.com/foo/bar.git#deadbeefcafebabe1234567890abcdef12345678', }) t.equal(isScriptAllowed(gitNode, { 'github:foo/bar': true }), null) t.end() }) t.test('git — resolved URL without a committish does not match keys with one', t => { // The lockfile somehow recorded the git URL without a #SHA suffix. // Any policy key that pins a specific committish must NOT match. const gitNode = node({ name: 'bar', packageName: 'bar', version: '1.0.0', resolved: 'git+ssh://git@github.com/foo/bar.git', }) t.equal(isScriptAllowed(gitNode, { 'github:foo/bar#deadbeef': true }), null) // Repo-only key still matches. t.equal(isScriptAllowed(gitNode, { 'github:foo/bar': true }), true) t.end() }) t.test('file/directory key against a node with no resolved does not match', t => { const noResolved = { name: 'local-pkg', packageName: 'local-pkg', version: '1.0.0', resolved: undefined, edgesIn: new Set([{ name: 'local-pkg', spec: 'file:../local-pkg' }]), } t.equal(isScriptAllowed(noResolved, { 'file:../local-pkg': true }), null) t.end() }) t.test('remote key against a node with no resolved does not match', t => { const noResolved = { name: 'pkg', packageName: 'pkg', version: '1.0.0', resolved: undefined, edgesIn: new Set([{ name: 'pkg', spec: 'https://example.com/pkg.tgz' }]), } t.equal(isScriptAllowed(noResolved, { 'https://example.com/pkg.tgz': true }), null) t.end() }) t.test('alias-typed policy key never matches anything', t => { // Policy key parsed as type 'alias' (e.g. `foo@npm:bar@1.0.0`) is // explicitly disallowed. The user must address the real package name. const aliased = node({ name: 'foo', packageName: 'bar', version: '1.0.0' }) t.equal(isScriptAllowed(aliased, { 'foo@npm:bar@1.0.0': true }), null) t.end() }) t.test('registry — `pkg@latest` tag spec does not match (rejected up front)', t => { // npa parses `canvas@latest` as { type: 'tag' }. Validated out by // resolve-allow-scripts.js#validatePolicy; defense-in-depth here. const n = node({ name: 'canvas', version: '2.11.0' }) t.equal(isScriptAllowed(n, { 'canvas@latest': true }), null) t.equal(isScriptAllowed(n, { 'other@latest': true }), null) t.end() }) t.test('omit-lockfile: unparseable edge specs are skipped', t => { // An edge whose spec npa.resolve cannot parse is ignored; the matcher // continues to the next edge to find a trusted name. const omitted = { name: 'canvas', packageName: 'canvas', version: '2.11.0', resolved: undefined, location: 'node_modules/canvas', edgesIn: new Set([ { name: 'canvas', spec: '\u0000not a real spec' }, { name: 'canvas', spec: '^2.0.0' }, ]), } t.equal(isScriptAllowed(omitted, { canvas: true }), true) t.end() }) t.test('omit-lockfile: edges with only non-registry specs yield no trusted name', t => { // Every incoming edge is a git/file/remote spec, so nameFromEdges // walks them all and returns null at the end. const omitted = { name: 'canvas', packageName: 'canvas', version: '2.11.0', resolved: undefined, location: 'node_modules/canvas', edgesIn: new Set([ { name: 'canvas', spec: 'github:foo/canvas' }, { name: 'canvas', spec: 'file:../canvas' }, ]), } t.equal(isScriptAllowed(omitted, { canvas: true }), null) t.end() }) t.test('trustedDisplay returns URL-derived identity when available', t => { // Registry tarball URL carries name and version — those are trusted and // must override the tarball-self-claimed package fields. const n = node({ name: 'pkg', packageName: 'lying-name', version: '9.9.9', resolved: 'https://registry.npmjs.org/canvas/-/canvas-2.11.0.tgz', }) t.strictSame(trustedDisplay(n), { name: 'canvas', version: '2.11.0' }) t.end() }) t.test('trustedDisplay falls back to node.name/version when URL has no identity', t => { // Git source: matchGit handles it for matching, but trustedDisplay // accepts the node's self-reported name/version for human-facing output. const n = node({ name: 'bar', packageName: 'bar', version: '1.2.3', resolved: 'git+ssh://git@github.com/foo/bar.git#deadbeefcafebabe1234567890abcdef12345678', }) t.strictSame(trustedDisplay(n), { name: 'bar', version: '1.2.3' }) t.end() })