# The IKE Scanner (ike-scan) is Copyright (C) 2003-2013 Roy Hills,
# NTA Monitor Ltd.
#
# This file is part of ike-scan.
#
# ike-scan is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
# the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
# (at your option) any later version.
#
# ike-scan is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
# GNU General Public License for more details.
#
# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
# along with ike-scan. If not, see .
#
# ike-vendor-ids -- File containing known Vendor IDs for ike-scan
#
# Author: Roy Hills
#
# Format:
# Implementation_NameVendor_ID_Pattern
#
# The Vendor_ID_Pattern should be specified as a Posix extended regular
# expression that will match the hex value of the Vendor ID. The Posix regular
# expression routines "regcomp" and "regexec" are used to compile and
# match the patterns.
#
# The hex value of the Vendor ID can only contain the characters [0-9a-f].
# The regular expression match is case insensitive so you can use either
# upper or lower case letters [A-F] in the pattern, although I recommend that
# you use only lower-case for consistency.
#
# The pattern is not anchored by default. If you want to match from the
# beginning of the vendor ID hex value (which is normally the case), you
# should start your pattern with "^" to anchor it at the beginning of the hex
# value. If you don't want to allow any extra trailing data, you should end
# the pattern with "$" to anchor it at the end of the hex value.
#
# Each entry must be on one line. A line can be up to 254 characters long.
# To allow for longer lines, adjust the MAXLINE macro in ike-scan.h
#
# Lines beginning with '#' and blank lines are ignored.
#
# The input format is quite strict. In particular, the separator between
# the implementation name and the VendorID pattern must be a single TAB and
# not a space.
#
# If you have problems adding entries, run ike-scan as:
# ike-scan -v -v -v
# Which will dump the VendorID pattern table.
#
# There are examples and analysis of vendor ids returned by various
# implementations on the ike-scan wiki at
# http://www.royhills.co.uk/wiki/index.php/Ike-scan_Documentation
#
# You are encouraged to submit comments, improvements or suggestions
# at the github repository https://github.com/royhills/ike-scan
#
# Microsoft/Cisco IPsec implementation for Win-2000 and above.
# The first 16 bytes are the MD5 hash of "MS NT5 ISAKMPOAKLEY"
# The next four bytes appear to be a version number in big endian format
# The observed version numbers are:
#
# 2 Windows 2000
# 3 Windows XP SP1
# 4 Windows 2003 and Windows XP SP2
# 5 Windows Vista (tested against Beta 2 build 5384) and 2008 server
# http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc233476.aspx
Windows-2000 ^1e2b516905991c7d7c96fcbfb587e46100000002
Windows-XP-SP1 ^1e2b516905991c7d7c96fcbfb587e46100000003
Windows-2003-or-XP-SP2 ^1e2b516905991c7d7c96fcbfb587e46100000004
Windows-Vista ^1e2b516905991c7d7c96fcbfb587e46100000005
Windows-2008 ^1e2b516905991c7d7c96fcbfb587e46100000006
Windows-7 ^1e2b516905991c7d7c96fcbfb587e46100000007
Windows-2008-R2 ^1e2b516905991c7d7c96fcbfb587e46100000008
Windows-8 ^1e2b516905991c7d7c96fcbfb587e46100000009
Windows-2012 ^1e2b516905991c7d7c96fcbfb587e46100000010
Windows ^1e2b516905991c7d7c96fcbfb587e46.........
# Checkpoint Firewall-1/VPN-1
#
# Firewall-1 v4.0 didn't use Vendor IDs. v3.0 and below didn't support IPsec.
#
# This is a 40-byte Vendor ID, which consists of the following fields:
#
# Bytes Description
# 1-20 Checkpoint VID (Probably an SHA1 hash of something)
# 21-24 Product (1=Firewall-1, 2=SecuRemote/SecureClient)
# 25-28 Encoded Version number
# 29-32 Timestamp (NGX only; always zero in 4.1 or NG)
# 33-36 Reserved
# 37-40 Features
#
# The Checkpoint VID is "f4ed19e0c114eb516faaac0ee37daf2807b4381f". I suspect
# that this is an SHA1 hash of something, but I don't know what the input text
# is.
#
# The Product is either 1 (0x00000001) for Firewall-1/VPN-1 or 2 (0x00000002)
# for SecuRemote/SecureClient (Checkpoint's VPN client).
#
# The encoded version number is described in the URL below.
#
# The timestamp field contains the Firewall's date and time encoded as seconds
# since 1st Jan 1970 (standard Unix epoch). Only NGX fills this in; it is
# always zero on 4.1 and NG.
#
# The first byte of the features field contains the number of bits used. This
# is normally 0x18 (24). The remaining three bytes (24 bits) are feature
# flags.
#
# Firewall-1 4.1 and NG only returns a Vendor ID if you send a Vendor ID
# payload starting with the Checkpoint VID. Firewall-1 NGX always returns
# a Vendor ID, regardless of whether the client sends the Checkpoint VID
# or not.
#
# See http://www.nta-monitor.com/news/checkpoint2004/index.htm for full details
#
Firewall-1 4.1 Base ^f4ed19e0c114eb516faaac0ee37daf2807b4381f00000001000000020000000000000000........
Firewall-1 4.1 SP1 ^f4ed19e0c114eb516faaac0ee37daf2807b4381f00000001000000030000000000000000........
Firewall-1 4.1 SP2-SP6 ^f4ed19e0c114eb516faaac0ee37daf2807b4381f0000000100000fa20000000000000000........
Firewall-1 NG Base ^f4ed19e0c114eb516faaac0ee37daf2807b4381f00000001000013880000000000000000........
Firewall-1 NG FP1 ^f4ed19e0c114eb516faaac0ee37daf2807b4381f00000001000013890000000000000000........
Firewall-1 NG FP2 ^f4ed19e0c114eb516faaac0ee37daf2807b4381f000000010000138a0000000000000000........
Firewall-1 NG FP3 ^f4ed19e0c114eb516faaac0ee37daf2807b4381f000000010000138b0000000000000000........
Firewall-1 NG AI R54 ^f4ed19e0c114eb516faaac0ee37daf2807b4381f000000010000138c0000000000000000........
Firewall-1 NG AI R55 ^f4ed19e0c114eb516faaac0ee37daf2807b4381f000000010000138d0000000000000000........
Firewall-1 NGX or later ^f4ed19e0c114eb516faaac0ee37daf2807b4381f000000010000138d........00000000........
Firewall-1 Unknown Vsn ^f4ed19e0c114eb516faaac0ee37daf2807b4381f
# Dead Peer Detection (DPD), detailed in RFC 3706.
# This is a truncated MD5 hash of "CISCO-DEAD-PEER-DETECTION"
# The last 2 bytes (4 hex chars) are major & minor version.
# The current version, and the only one that has been observed, is 1.0.
# Thanks to Hakan Olsson for clarifing this.
Dead Peer Detection v1.0 ^afcad71368a1f1c96b8696fc77570100
Dead Peer Detection ^afcad71368a1f1c96b8696fc7757....
# XAUTH
# This is a truncated MD5 hash of "draft-ietf-ipsra-isakmp-xauth-06.txt"
# IPSRA = "IP Security Remote Access"
# Also known as "draft-beaulieu-ike-xauth-02.txt"
XAUTH ^09002689dfd6b712
# SSH Communications Security IPSEC Express
# These VIDs are MD5 hashes of the text
# "SSH Communications Security IPSEC Express version x.y.z" or
# "Ssh Communications Security IPSEC Express version x.y.z"
# Where x.y.z is the version, e.g. 1.1.0
SSH IPSEC Express 1.1.0 ^fbf47614984031fa8e3bb6198089b223
SSH IPSEC Express 1.1.1 ^1952dc91ac20f646fb01cf42a33aee30
SSH IPSEC Express 1.1.2 ^e8bffa643e5c8f2cd10fda7370b6ebe5
SSH IPSEC Express 1.2.1 ^c1111b2dee8cbc3d620573ec57aab9cb
SSH IPSEC Express 1.2.2 ^09ec27bfbc09c75823cfecbffe565a2e
SSH IPSEC Express 2.0.0 ^7f21a596e4e318f0b2f4944c2384cb84
SSH IPSEC Express 2.1.0 ^2836d1fd2807bc9e5ae30786320451ec
SSH IPSEC Express 2.1.1 ^a68de756a9c5229bae66498040951ad5
SSH IPSEC Express 2.1.2 ^3f2372867e237c1cd8250a75559cae20
SSH IPSEC Express 3.0.0 ^0e58d5774df602007d0b02443660f7eb
SSH IPSEC Express 3.0.1 ^f5ce31ebc210f44350cf71265b57380f
SSH IPSEC Express 4.0.0 ^f64260af2e2742daddd56987068a99a0
SSH IPSEC Express 4.0.1 ^7a54d3bdb3b1e6d923892064be2d981c
SSH IPSEC Express 4.1.0 ^9aa1f3b43472a45d5f506aeb260cf214
SSH IPSEC Express 4.1.1 ^89f7b760d86b012acf263382394d962f
SSH IPSEC Express 4.2.0 ^6880c7d026099114e486c55430e7abee
SSH IPSEC Express 5.0 ^b037a21aceccb5570f602546f97bde8c
SSH IPSEC Express 5.0.0 ^2b2dad97c4d140930053287f996850b0
SSH IPSEC Express 5.1.0 ^45e17f3abe93944cb202910c59ef806b
SSH IPSEC Express 5.1.1 ^5925859f7377ed7816d2fb81c01fa551
# Cisco Unity compliant peer. VID is the MD5 hash of "CISCO-UNITY" with
# the last two bytes replaced with 0x0100.
Cisco Unity ^12f5f28c457168a9702d9fe274cc0100
# Cisco VPN 3000 Concentrator (formerly Altega Networks)
# There are several models: 3005, 3015, 3020, 3030, 3060 and 3080, which are
# equivalent to the old Altiga C5, C15 Etc.
#
# The VPN 3000 client VID is the MD5 hash of "ALTIGA NETWORKS"
# The VPN 3000 concentrator VID is a truncated MD5 hash of "ALTIGA GATEWAY"
#
# I've seen this pattern with trailing 500306 and 500400. I suspect that
# the last two bytes indicate the version number, e.g 0306 = 3.0.6. However,
# I need more examples before I'm confident that this is the case, so for
# now I'm just including the generic pattern.
Cisco VPN Concentrator (3.0.0) ^1f07f70eaa6514d3b0fa96542a500300
Cisco VPN Concentrator (3.0.1) ^1f07f70eaa6514d3b0fa96542a500301
Cisco VPN Concentrator (3.0.5) ^1f07f70eaa6514d3b0fa96542a500305
Cisco VPN Concentrator (4.0.7) ^1f07f70eaa6514d3b0fa96542a500407
VPN-3000-client ^f6f7efc7f5aeb8cb158cb9d094ba69e7
Cisco VPN Concentrator ^1f07f70eaa6514d3b0fa96542a
# IKE Fragmentation. VID is the MD5 hash of the text "FRAGMENTATION"
# I've seen extra bytes on the end of a fragmentation VID payload, e.g.
# c0000000 and 80000000. I don't know what these represent.
IKE Fragmentation ^4048b7d56ebce88525e7de7f00d6c2d3
# Various IKE Internet drafts. The VID payload is the MD5 hash of the
# implementation name given below.
draft-stenberg-ipsec-nat-traversal-01 ^27bab5dc01ea0760ea4e3190ac27c0d0
draft-stenberg-ipsec-nat-traversal-02 ^6105c422e76847e43f9684801292aecd
draft-huttunen-ipsec-esp-in-udp-00.txt ^6a7434c19d7e36348090a02334c9c805
# SafeNet SoftRemote VPN Client.
# Extra data has been observed at the end of this VID payload.
SafeNet SoftRemote 8.0.0 ^47bbe7c993f1fc13b4e6d0db565c68e5010201010201010310382e302e3020284275696c6420313029000000
SafeNet SoftRemote 9.0.1 ^47bbe7c993f1fc13b4e6d0db565c68e5010201010201010310392e302e3120284275696c6420313229000000
SafeNet SoftRemote ^47bbe7c993f1fc13b4e6d0db565c68e5
# HeartBeat Notify.
# VID is ASCII "HeartBeat_Notify"
# Extra data has been observed at the end of this VID payload. It is
# suspected that this may be a version number. E.g:
# 4865617274426561745f4e6f74696679386b0100
HeartBeat_Notify ^4865617274426561745f4e6f74696679
HeartBeat Notify ^486561727442656174204e6f74696679
# OpenPGP
OpenPGP ^4f70656e5047503130313731
# draft-huttunen-ipsec-esp-in-udp-01.txt
# VID is an MD5 hash of "ESPThruNAT"
ESPThruNAT ^50760f624c63e5c53eea386c685ca083
# SSH Sentinel.
# These VIDs are MD5 hashes of the implementation names given below.
SSH Sentinel ^054182a07c7ae206f9d2cf9d2432c482
SSH Sentinel 1.1 ^b91623e693ca18a54c6a2778552305e8
SSH Sentinel 1.2 ^5430888de01a31a6fa8f60224e449958
SSH Sentinel 1.3 ^7ee5cb85f71ce259c94a5c731ee4e752
SSH Sentinel 1.4 ^63d9a1a7009491b5a0a6fdeb2a8284f0
SSH Sentinel 1.4.1 ^eb4b0d96276b4e220ad16221a7b2a5e6
# Timestep VID is ASCII "TIMESTEP" (54494d4553544550) followed by further
# ASCII characters which seem to indicate a version number. e.g:
# 54494d455354455020312053475720313532302033313520322e303145303133
# which is "TIMESTEP 1 SGW 1520 315 2.01E013"
Timestep ^54494d4553544550
# VID is MD5 hash of "KAME/racoon"
KAME/racoon ^7003cbc1097dbe9c2600ba6983bc8b35
# Negotiation of NAT-Traversal in the IKE - previously IETF draft, now RFC.
# The VID is the MD5 hash of the implementation name given below.
# The trailing newline (\n) on one entry is explained in
# http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/ipsec/2002/04/msg00233.html
# Jan 2005: RFC released as RFC 3947 "Negotiation of NAT-Traversal in the IKE"
# VID is MD5 hash of "RFC 3947"
draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike ^4df37928e9fc4fd1b3262170d515c662
draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-00 ^4485152d18b6bbcd0be8a8469579ddcc
draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-01 ^16f6ca16e4a4066d83821a0f0aeaa862
draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02\n ^90cb80913ebb696e086381b5ec427b1f
draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02 ^cd60464335df21f87cfdb2fc68b6a448
draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03 ^7d9419a65310ca6f2c179d9215529d56
draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-04 ^9909b64eed937c6573de52ace952fa6b
draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-05 ^80d0bb3def54565ee84645d4c85ce3ee
draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-06 ^4d1e0e136deafa34c4f3ea9f02ec7285
draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-07 ^439b59f8ba676c4c7737ae22eab8f582
draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-08 ^8f8d83826d246b6fc7a8a6a428c11de8
draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-09 ^42ea5b6f898d9773a575df26e7dd19e1
Testing NAT-T RFC ^c40fee00d5d39ddb1fc762e09b7cfea7
RFC XXXX ^810fa565f8ab14369105d706fbd57279
RFC 3947 NAT-T ^4a131c81070358455c5728f20e95452f
# A GSS-API Authentication Method for IKE - draft-ietf-ipsec-isakmp-gss-auth
# This is used by Windows 2000 and later. Specific Windows VIDs are in a
# separate section.
# Note that the MD5 hash for "A GSS-API ..." in draft version 07 is given as
# the hash of the string with a newline appended. I think that this is an
# error, so I've added patterns both with and without the trailing newline.
MS NT5 ISAKMPOAKLEY ^1e2b516905991c7d7c96fcbfb587e461
A GSS-API Authentication Method for IKE ^ad2c0dd0b9c32083ccba25b8861ec455
A GSS-API Authentication Method for IKE\n ^b46d8914f3aaa3f2fedeb7c7db2943ca
GSSAPI ^621b04bb09882ac1e15935fefa24aeee
NLBS_PRESENT ^72872B95FCDA2EB708EFE322119B4971
MS-MamieExists ^214ca4faffa7f32d6748e5303395ae83
MS-Negotiation Discovery Capable ^fb1de3cdf341b7ea16b7e5be0855f120
IKE CGA version 1 ^e3a5966a76379fe707228231e5ce8652
# Nortel Contivity VPN Router (was Bay Networks Enterprise Switch)
# The first 4 bytes are ASCII "BNES" (Bay Networks Enterprise Switch)
# The second 4 bytes appear to be a version number in big endian format.
# I've seen values 00000004, 00000005, 00000007, 00000009 and 0000000a in
# this position.
Nortel Contivity ^424e4553000000..
# Observed to be sent from SonicWall Firewalls
SonicWall-1 ^5b362bc820f60001
SonicWall-2 ^5b362bc820f60002
SonicWall-3 ^5b362bc820f60003
SonicWall-5 ^5b362bc820f60005
SonicWall-6 ^5b362bc820f60006
SonicWall-7 ^5b362bc820f60007
SonicWall-8 ^5b362bc820f60008
SonicWall-a ^404bf439522ca3f6
SonicWall-b ^da8e937880010000
SonicWall-c ^5b362bc820f70001
# SSH QuickSec
# The VIDs are the MD5 hashes of "SSH Communications Security QuickSec x.y.z"
# Where x.y.z is the version number
SSH QuickSec 0.9.0 ^37eba0c4136184e7daf8562a77060b4a
SSH QuickSec 1.1.0 ^5d72925e55948a9661a7fc48fdec7ff9
SSH QuickSec 1.1.1 ^777fbf4c5af6d1cdd4b895a05bf82594
SSH QuickSec 1.1.2 ^2cdf08e712ede8a5978761267cd19b91
SSH QuickSec 1.1.3 ^59e454a8c2cf02a34959121f1890bc87
SSH QuickSec 2.1.0 ^8f9cc94e01248ecdf147594c284b213b
# Netgear
# The VID is the MD5 hash of "NETGEAR"
Netgear ^dbfb81eb5760b0788562067da102d755
# VIDs are MD5 hash of:
# "IKE Challenge/Response for Authenticated Cryptographic Keys"
# "IKE Challenge/Response for Authenticated Cryptographic Keys (Revised)"
# both without and with trailing newline.
IKE Challenge-Response ^ba290499c24e84e53a1d83a05e5f00c9
IKE Challenge-Response-2 ^0d33611a5d521b5e3c9c03d2fc107e12
IKE Challenge-Response Revised ^ad3251042cdc4652c9e0734ce5de4c7d
IKE Challenge-Response Revised-2 ^13f11823f966fa91900f024ba66a86ba
# draft-krywaniuk-ipsec-antireplay-00.txt - Using Isakmp Message Ids for
# Replay Protection
#
# "They may also be enabled in the short term by mutual exchange of the
# vendor id 0x325df29a2319f2dd"
draft-krywaniuk-ipsec-antireplay-00 ^325df29a2319f2dd
# draft-ietf-ipsec-heartbeats-00.txt - Using Isakmp Heartbeats for Dead Peer
# Detection
# The draft says that the VID is a truncated MD5 hash of
# "draft-ietf-krywaniuk-ipsec-heartbeats-00.txt"
# but it is not.
draft-ietf-ipsec-heartbeats-00 ^8db7a41811221660
# MacOS X
# Unconfirmed, from StrongSwan vendor.c
MacOS 10.x-1 ^4d6163204f53582031302e78
MacOS 10.x-2 ^4df37928e9fc4fd1b3262170d515c662
# strongSwan
# VID is MD5 hash of "strongSwan x.y.z" where x.y.z is version number
# Originally obtained from strongSwan 4.0.5 pluto/vendor.c
strongSwan ^882fe56d6fd20dbc2251613b2ebe5beb
strongSwan 5.1.1 ^9e10a0d4205edc6c90bd5381a53c2d2b
strongSwan 5.1.1rc1 ^a55a90de781611f70cbbae7045a225fc
strongSwan 5.1.1dr4 ^c90b020d043f1f050ba809e13dc8234e
strongSwan 5.1.1dr3 ^06f2f1b82256dce62c07cb4f71604035
strongSwan 5.1.1dr2 ^4f130d312ec92f50c02f2b0eb60d6ccc
strongSwan 5.1.1dr1 ^1a45d3bda55646016e998ac1c5590e59
strongSwan 5.1.0 ^b7d8e62184049fb21b088d4232d2549c
strongSwan 5.1.0rc1 ^02c49867060173c665ebce2b8110c7f7
strongSwan 5.1.0dr2 ^e069a583c5640257a8de2cf062461a4b
strongSwan 5.1.0dr1 ^22982eab040be7a4cb4177da312f2f1c
strongSwan 5.0.4 ^dc3afcdda0514da394b4b36f4cb1b9a7
strongSwan 5.0.3 ^d398476a43b9d6c56c4045ffcc9fffb9
strongSwan 5.0.3rc1 ^f2d4de999721c37fea51d4bcbc060120
strongSwan 5.0.3dr3 ^f4d68a2fb63e4390a959baa5c4bc7598
strongSwan 5.0.3dr2 ^7b3f3d21e4768e010fc7dd04ae369c61
strongSwan 5.0.3dr1 ^ca7d77d20794391df5a3cb90fbf5b72e
strongSwan 5.0.2 ^04d52cc5fd04aa971063b111917731d2
strongSwan 5.0.2rc1 ^80b8f4380b18f24f03ce5745fc3db56b
strongSwan 5.0.2dr4 ^a5f8ce0d6751c640e55bc41784f2e081
strongSwan 5.0.1 ^75aa8f69de2e44500dae842be21f5491
strongSwan 5.0.0 ^e154b11a96ee2b44d4954843cd3a40a3
strongSwan 4.6.4 ^a87680d00cbb939871eb680d18d052e2
strongSwan 4.6.3 ^984a7bfefb46489a5be74b64531c6753
strongSwan 4.6.2 ^9c73b19f5f4181aa4b269dd004608811
strongSwan 4.6.1 ^1d6cfa4d69d9d33c0b2244bf99de9b8b
strongSwan 4.6.0 ^41ef2e2f7ec8b923c98d9fa9bb7a04a5
strongSwan 4.5.3 ^75244ad8a5a0f48e7e3b7ad79dcab153
strongSwan 4.5.2 ^b149d6161fb4c7c3805beeff042d08c0
strongSwan 4.5.1 ^efe12e8533bbcf4e978ec874935e9972
strongSwan 4.5.0 ^eff89e6f406f55292807c3b8f925884a
strongSwan 4.4.1 ^aaa2e272c58de8f96e72c4c21ba7dd99
strongSwan 4.4.0 ^a5ad81e15e1c68a1be277abfeee80d94
strongSwan 4.3.7 ^02d7c3a0698ec33bb126b2baa70b9c2c
strongSwan 4.3.6 ^882fe56d6fd20dbc2251613b2ebe5beb
strongSwan 4.3.5rc1 ^117c406d20a29f56f0dfcb03d9fa835b
strongSwan 4.3.5 ^de5c703801952d85f6b3ed33b33784b4
strongSwan 4.3.4 ^e37e5d64a329a5cf1eeb8546c3b06018
strongSwan 4.3.3 ^f9f093629308b24388d09c3f026de0a8
strongSwan 4.3.2 ^d6263956ac790961a9c8409b393724bf
strongSwan 4.3.1 ^20b1f62b240a52a849309183960cbb64
strongSwan 4.3.0 ^9deb74e751f44c47905ed2fad93f9271
strongSwan 4.2.9 ^488c08f57afc382112f7cb396f2d4f6c
strongSwan 4.2.8 ^95569ee23ebb62eddedea353a575faf3
strongSwan 4.2.7 ^4ddc7e1f6d6cd1ae9d5dcac58fa1fe9a
strongSwan 4.2.6 ^a2782dd683b5edee3b777f897d2b867e
strongSwan 4.2.5 ^af0a05e0bd37b0aba0135a194abb5b89
strongSwan 4.2.4 ^cd5792d4b70f0299a6a1373de236d2ac
strongSwan 4.2.3 ^2d1f406118fbd5d28474791ffa00488a
strongSwan 4.2.2 ^2a517d0d23c37d08bce7c292a0217b39
strongSwan 4.2.1 ^bab253f4cb10a8108a7c927c56c87886
strongSwan 4.2.0 ^9f68901325a972894335302a9531ab9f
strongSwan 4.1.11 ^b7bd9f2f978e3259a7aa9f7a1396ad6c
strongSwan 4.1.10 ^bf3a89ae5bef8e72d44dac8bb88d7d5f
strongSwan 4.1.9 ^78fdd287def01a3f074b5369eab4fd1c
strongSwan 4.1.8 ^66a2045507c119da78a4666259cdea48
strongSwan 4.1.7 ^ea840aa4dfc9712d6c32b5a16eb329a3
strongSwan 4.1.6 ^d19683368af4b0edc21ccde982b1d1b0
strongSwan 4.1.5 ^bf0fbf7306ebb7827042d893539886e2
strongSwan 4.1.4 ^312f9cb1a6b90e19de7528c904ac3087
strongSwan 4.1.3 ^5849ab6d8beabd6e4d09e5a3b88c089a
strongSwan 4.1.2 ^15a1ace7ee52fddfef04f928db2dd134
strongSwan 4.1.1 ^d3f1c488c368175d5f40a8f5ca5f5e12
strongSwan 4.1.0 ^4794cef6843422980d1a3d06af41c5cd
strongSwan 4.0.7 ^ab0746221cc8fd0d5238f73a9b3da557
strongSwan 4.0.6 ^4c90136946577b51919d8d9a6b8e4a9f
strongSwan 4.0.5 ^dd180d21e5ce655a768ba32211dd8ad9
strongSwan 4.0.4 ^1ef283f83549b5ff9608b6d634f84d75
strongSwan 4.0.3 ^b181b18e114fc209b3c6e26c3a80718e
strongSwan 4.0.2 ^77e8eea6f556a499de3ffe7f7f95661c
strongSwan 4.0.1 ^9dbbafcf1db0dd595ae065294003ad3e
strongSwan 4.0.0 ^2ce9c946a4c879bf11b50b76cc5692cb
strongSwan 2.8.9 ^0e9e820524932da199a498953afa8a7e
strongSwan 2.8.8 ^8c4a3bcb729b11f703d22a5b39640ca8
strongSwan 2.8.7 ^3a0d4e7ca4e492ed4dfe476d1ac6018b
strongSwan 2.8.6 ^fe3f49706e26a9fb36a87bfce9ea36ce
strongSwan 2.8.5 ^4c7efa31b39e510432a317570d97bbb9
strongSwan 2.8.4 ^76c72bfd398424dd001b86d0012fe061
strongSwan 2.8.3 ^fb4641ad0eeb2a34491d15f4eff51063
strongSwan 2.8.2 ^299932277b7dfe382ce23465333a7d23
strongSwan 2.8.1 ^e37f2d5ba89a62cd202ee27dac06c8a8
strongSwan 2.8.0 ^32f0e9b9c06dfe8c9ad5599a636971a1
strongSwan 2.7.3 ^7f50cc4ebf04c2d9da73abfd69b77aa2
strongSwan 2.7.2 ^a194e2aaddd0bafb95253dd96dc733eb
strongSwan 2.7.1 ^8134878582121785ba65ea345d6ba724
strongSwan 2.7.0 ^07fa128e4754f9447b1dd46374eef360
strongSwan 2.6.4 ^b927f95219a0fe3600dba3c1182ae55f
strongSwan 2.6.3 ^b2860e7837f711bef3d0eeb106872ded
strongSwan 2.6.2 ^5b1cd6fe7d050eda6c93871c107db3d2
strongSwan 2.6.1 ^66afbc12bbfe6ce108b1f69f4bc917b7
strongSwan 2.6.0 ^3f3266499ffdbd85950e702298062844
strongSwan 2.5.7 ^1f4442296b83d7e33a8b45209ba0e590
strongSwan 2.5.6 ^3c5eba3d8564928e32ae43c3d9924dee
strongSwan 2.5.5 ^3f267ed621ada7ee6c7d8893ccb0b14b
strongSwan 2.5.4 ^7a6bf5b7df89642a75a78ef7d657c1c0
strongSwan 2.5.3 ^df5b1f0f1d5679d9f8512b16c55a6065
strongSwan 2.5.2 ^861ce5eb72164b190e9e629a31cf4901
strongSwan 2.5.1 ^9a4a4648f60f8eda7cfcbfe271ee5b7d
strongSwan 2.5.0 ^9eb3d907ed7ada4e3cbcacb917abc8e4
strongSwan 2.4.4 ^485a70361b4433b31dea1c6be0df243e
strongSwan 2.4.3 ^982b7a063a33c143a8eadc88249f6bcc
strongSwan 2.4.2 ^e7a3fd0c6d771a8f1b8a86a4169c9ea4
strongSwan 2.4.1 ^75b0653cb281eb26d31ede38c8e1e228
strongSwan 2.4.0 ^e829c88149bab3c0cee85da60e18ae9b
strongSwan 2.3.2 ^42a4834c92ab9a7777063afa254bcb69
strongSwan 2.3.1 ^f697c1afcc2ec8ddcdf99dc7af03a67f
strongSwan 2.3.0 ^b8f92b2fa2d3fe5fe158344bda1cc6ae
strongSwan 2.2.2 ^99dc7cc823376b3b33d04357896ae07b
strongSwan 2.2.1 ^d9118b1e9de5efced9cc9d883f2168ff
strongSwan 2.2.0 ^85b6cbec480d5c8cd9882c825ac2c244
# ZyXEL ZyWALL router
# Observed on several devices. HTTP interface shows that they are XyWALL
# I suspect that this VID is an SHA-1 hash of something because of the length
ZyXEL ZyWALL Router ^b858d1addd08c1e8adafea150608aa4497aa6cc8
ZyXEL ZyWALL USG 100 ^f758f22668750f03b08df6ebe1d0
ZyXEL ZyWALL ^625027749d5ab97f5616c1602765cf480a3b7d0b
# Microsoft Initial Contact
# VID is MD5 hash of "Vid-Initial-Contact"
Microsoft Initial-Contact ^26244d38eddb61b3172a36e3d0cfb819
# FreeS/WAN and Openswan
# VID is a 12-byte printable string. The first two bytes are "OE", which
# stands for "Opportunistic Encryption" (the FreeS/WAN designers were
# enthusiastic about opportunistic encryption); the remaining ten bytes are
# a truncated, "ASCIIfied" MD5 hash of the implementation name given below.
# The "ASCIIfication" process involves clearing bit 7 and setting bit 6 in
# each byte, thus constraining the range to 64-127 inclusive.
# I think that support for this VID was added in FreeS/WAN 2.00, and carried
# over into openswan 2.x.
Linux FreeS/WAN 0.5 ^4f454a734e486b4a4c656272
Linux FreeS/WAN 0.6 ^4f456c4f6b6251695c7c4674
Linux FreeS/WAN 0.7 ^4f4548604f7f426647775453
Linux FreeS/WAN 0.7.1 ^4f456462595d67595351445c
Linux FreeS/WAN 0.7.2 ^4f457c625363787f517e6544
Linux FreeS/WAN 0.8 ^4f4569517b587444694c4367
Linux FreeS/WAN 0.8.1 ^4f45776a7f6d5e7a415d6f7c
Linux FreeS/WAN 0.8.2 ^4f454f575c595a744a7d4f78
Linux FreeS/WAN 0.8.3 ^4f45676a5553715e794f4f48
Linux FreeS/WAN 0.8.4 ^4f45664250754b79577f5d55
Linux FreeS/WAN 0.8.5 ^4f45615f4d44507343785d7b
Linux FreeS/WAN 0.9 ^4f45494f5e4f746c57664157
Linux FreeS/WAN 0.9.1 ^4f45494654445c41425d6d7b
Linux FreeS/WAN 0.9.10 ^4f45497d4f7e6e5d60525170
Linux FreeS/WAN 0.9.11 ^4f454b486274755358555140
Linux FreeS/WAN 0.9.12 ^4f45694146645c4d4362727b
Linux FreeS/WAN 0.9.13 ^4f45556c7d7671444b474c59
Linux FreeS/WAN 0.9.14 ^4f456640625376587d626277
Linux FreeS/WAN 0.9.15 ^4f454b796672767d437d5d5a
Linux FreeS/WAN 0.9.16 ^4f454f62767d78797d7f6579
Linux FreeS/WAN 0.9.17 ^4f45565b597d556e596e5e60
Linux FreeS/WAN 0.9.18 ^4f45637e47544c77644a5b76
Linux FreeS/WAN 0.9.19 ^4f45614d4873425c42727b63
Linux FreeS/WAN 0.9.2 ^4f456171784e6b594a497058
Linux FreeS/WAN 0.9.20 ^4f455c6d6c497f764f44477b
Linux FreeS/WAN 0.9.21 ^4f4560624076527767787c56
Linux FreeS/WAN 0.9.22 ^4f4541687e4c507a405d5146
Linux FreeS/WAN 0.9.23 ^4f457841597142737f44787d
Linux FreeS/WAN 0.9.24 ^4f457145706b5560634e725f
Linux FreeS/WAN 0.9.25 ^4f454e5b60465a5a53656967
Linux FreeS/WAN 0.9.26 ^4f45677c575b4c7c6a4a7173
Linux FreeS/WAN 0.9.27 ^4f455f7f606c66424e616a60
Linux FreeS/WAN 0.9.28 ^4f454e6d545e534c4a626063
Linux FreeS/WAN 0.9.29 ^4f45765a4a6a51584653424e
Linux FreeS/WAN 0.9.3 ^4f45485e6175794375444950
Linux FreeS/WAN 0.9.30 ^4f45684e6772456542755d69
Linux FreeS/WAN 0.9.31 ^4f45764141405f577750567b
Linux FreeS/WAN 0.9.32 ^4f45546d5d704f49785e6467
Linux FreeS/WAN 0.9.33 ^4f45655d786b445b75484668
Linux FreeS/WAN 0.9.34 ^4f456547696d46657a4e5371
Linux FreeS/WAN 0.9.35 ^4f455b76646a646f79695451
Linux FreeS/WAN 0.9.36 ^4f454d596b6a6e5f56707e49
Linux FreeS/WAN 0.9.37 ^4f45757b6e79665a556c6546
Linux FreeS/WAN 0.9.38 ^4f455b6b636e606f5b42707b
Linux FreeS/WAN 0.9.39 ^4f45677e79657a56654f7145
Linux FreeS/WAN 0.9.4 ^4f4551604748445356727b74
Linux FreeS/WAN 0.9.40 ^4f456e504e735f4f67555d5f
Linux FreeS/WAN 0.9.5 ^4f4549557964647c42614440
Linux FreeS/WAN 0.9.6 ^4f4570695578777266796a56
Linux FreeS/WAN 0.9.7 ^4f457b4a767a6f716e48566c
Linux FreeS/WAN 0.9.8 ^4f455b71457d4f685c475d6c
Linux FreeS/WAN 0.9.9 ^4f455e4f4d58404f604d595c
Linux FreeS/WAN 1.0.0 ^4f457f685e7d4c5645785669
Linux FreeS/WAN 1.0.1 ^4f457176515f515f71526b56
Linux FreeS/WAN 1.0.2 ^4f45465d56636a5149725558
Linux FreeS/WAN 1.1.0 ^4f454644595a4f5c7a535445
Linux FreeS/WAN 1.1.1 ^4f456842537e5a5c71527547
Linux FreeS/WAN 1.1.2 ^4f457d5b4a707d736e7b5b6f
Linux FreeS/WAN 1.1.3 ^4f45646357714a755b4a5b72
Linux FreeS/WAN 1.1.4 ^4f454160444e745150604e47
Linux FreeS/WAN 1.1.5 ^4f4544547476647754795157
Linux FreeS/WAN 1.1.6 ^4f454b48657b616b494a4c77
Linux FreeS/WAN 1.2.0 ^4f45544e79737d4953437b43
Linux FreeS/WAN 1.2.1 ^4f454d524173695157515375
Linux FreeS/WAN 1.2.2 ^4f45465e5c62774e59774c4f
Linux FreeS/WAN 1.3.0 ^4f455a717b40607977577067
Linux FreeS/WAN 1.3.1 ^4f457d7c696569676a6f607c
Linux FreeS/WAN 1.3.2 ^4f457c6f70766b5a61546a51
Linux FreeS/WAN 1.3.3 ^4f457d5b527b6c54736d447d
Linux FreeS/WAN 1.3.4 ^4f454e746f4f53427579497d
Linux FreeS/WAN 1.3.5 ^4f45415262734d596d56516b
Linux FreeS/WAN 1.3.6 ^4f456248514f405942447c4e
Linux FreeS/WAN 1.4.0 ^4f45404063756a5d496a584f
Linux FreeS/WAN 1.4.1 ^4f455f526760425742497c65
Linux FreeS/WAN 1.4.2 ^4f456270434d5b6e6753776e
Linux FreeS/WAN 1.4.3 ^4f457a6d5b605b7d42405a67
Linux FreeS/WAN 1.4.4 ^4f457177674d6a63426e4d54
Linux FreeS/WAN 1.4.5 ^4f457d73435c6d5b6e777d59
Linux FreeS/WAN 1.4.6 ^4f45425261435763654e5269
Linux FreeS/WAN 1.4.7 ^4f457a6a547b434378757857
Linux FreeS/WAN 1.4.8 ^4f455476696c4e50675f6e70
Linux FreeS/WAN 1.5.0 ^4f455676404f5b55457d5479
Linux FreeS/WAN 1.5.1 ^4f45617072517b7d5c607344
Linux FreeS/WAN 1.5.2 ^4f456f407272744071414846
Linux FreeS/WAN 1.5.3 ^4f4547425f74447179614445
Linux FreeS/WAN 1.5.4 ^4f457d667c7069487e495448
Linux FreeS/WAN 1.5.5 ^4f45505f70774e73435e5b7a
Linux FreeS/WAN 1.6.0 ^4f45467c4d4760617f486547
Linux FreeS/WAN 1.6.1 ^4f454b534c5842715a656f49
Linux FreeS/WAN 1.6.2 ^4f4557464c67535540427a72
Linux FreeS/WAN 1.6.3 ^4f457d60727152596653686e
Linux FreeS/WAN 2.00 ^4f45486b7d44784d42676b5d
Linux FreeS/WAN 2.01 ^4f457c4f547e6e615b426e56
Linux FreeS/WAN 2.02 ^4f456c6b44696d7f6b4c4e60
Linux FreeS/WAN 2.03 ^4f45566671474962734e6264
Linux FreeS/WAN 2.04 ^4f45704f736579505c6e5f6d
Linux FreeS/WAN 2.05 ^4f457271785f4c7e496f4d54
Linux FreeS/WAN 2.06 ^4f457e4c466e5d427c5c6b52
# Generated using openswan-vid.pl logic
# - confirmed behavior on Openswan 2.6.28 on Ubuntu
Openswan 2.1.0 ^4f455d787a5b6948787a655b
Openswan 2.1.1 ^4f45466a786e57484d4d4361
Openswan 2.1.2 ^4f4555656771407e63636578
Openswan 2.2.0 ^4f4548724b6e5e68557c604f
Openswan 2.3.0 ^4f4572696f5c77557f746249
Openswan 2.3.1 ^4f45454355706e735d625c71
Openswan 2.3.1 X.509-1.5.4 LDAP_V3 PLUTO_SENDS_VENDORID PLUTO_USES_KEYRR ^4f45436f586c544d46766f54
Openswan 2.3.1 X.509-1.5.4 PLUTO_SENDS_VENDORID PLUTO_USES_KEYRR ^4f454578616c467b5f6f606d
Openswan 2.4.0 ^4f45785c567c6f61507e7864
Openswan 2.4.0 X.509-1.5.4 PLUTO_SENDS_VENDORID PLUTO_USES_KEYRR ^4f457240604e7f585d6d5869
Openswan 2.4.1 ^4f456e5e4c737d7d62796c51
Openswan 2.4.10 ^4f456971726d54726e464a71
Openswan 2.4.10 PLUTO_SENDS_VENDORID PLUTO_USES_KEYRR ^4f4574715e655577567a5f41
Openswan 2.4.11 ^4f4550484948576e64636f6b
Openswan 2.4.11 PLUTO_SENDS_VENDORID PLUTO_USES_KEYRR ^4f457b64445e664a6355766b
Openswan 2.4.12 ^4f456c7c5b79725e4a6a5658
Openswan 2.4.12 LDAP_V3 PLUTO_SENDS_VENDORID PLUTO_USES_KEYRR ^4f45606c50487c5662707575
Openswan 2.4.12 PLUTO_SENDS_VENDORID PLUTO_USES_KEYRR ^4f454b427a64597b774d5d40
Openswan 2.4.13 ^4f45445e597f60634770436c
Openswan 2.4.13 LDAP_V3 PLUTO_SENDS_VENDORID PLUTO_USES_KEYRR ^4f456b5a5d52605d7a7a6f4e
Openswan 2.4.13 PLUTO_SENDS_VENDORID PLUTO_USES_KEYRR ^4f456066696a417566514d44
Openswan 2.4.14 ^4f454c4e767d475b775e6f56
Openswan 2.4.14 PLUTO_SENDS_VENDORID PLUTO_USES_KEYRR ^4f455a526b5f4c686e534e63
Openswan 2.4.15 ^4f45675d5e5d7f664c604651
Openswan 2.4.15 LDAP_V3 PLUTO_SENDS_VENDORID PLUTO_USES_KEYRR ^4f4540784e47627163627858
Openswan 2.4.15 PLUTO_SENDS_VENDORID PLUTO_USES_KEYRR ^4f457d78546050757b707245
Openswan 2.4.2 ^4f45666a6343554b5f7a4062
Openswan 2.4.3 ^4f4547407c7673775449546e
Openswan 2.4.3 X.509-1.5.4 LDAP_V3 PLUTO_SENDS_VENDORID PLUTO_USES_KEYRR ^4f455b7075417d5959587e46
Openswan 2.4.4 ^4f45565e6441545f4a664642
Openswan 2.4.4 X.509-1.5.4 PLUTO_SENDS_VENDORID PLUTO_USES_KEYRR ^4f457a7d4646466667725f65
Openswan 2.4.5 ^4f45587d5d4b4b7c61487b7c
Openswan 2.4.5 X.509-1.5.4 LDAP_V3 PLUTO_SENDS_VENDORID PLUTO_USES_KEYRR ^4f454766754a5b59657b4168
Openswan 2.4.5 X.509-1.5.4 PLUTO_SENDS_VENDORID PLUTO_USES_KEYRR ^4f456e4d43757f784f704063
Openswan 2.4.5dr3 X.509-1.5.4 PLUTO_SENDS_VENDORID PLUTO_USES_KEYRR ^4f45725c5b754061666c425f
Openswan 2.4.6 ^4f45636e6542785f6f6b7257
Openswan 2.4.6 X.509-1.5.4 LDAP_V3 PLUTO_SENDS_VENDORID PLUTO_USES_KEYRR ^4f456c4c4f5d5264574e5244
Openswan 2.4.6 X.509-1.5.4 PLUTO_SENDS_VENDORID PLUTO_USES_KEYRR ^4f454e7c454d716b5f4d6c67
Openswan 2.4.6rc3 X.509-1.5.4 PLUTO_SENDS_VENDORID PLUTO_USES_KEYRR ^4f457a7d6d6c5e5441727070
Openswan 2.4.7 ^4f4552756a414d79434d4951
Openswan 2.4.7 PLUTO_SENDS_VENDORID PLUTO_USES_KEYRR ^4f455a7e4261425d725c705f
Openswan 2.4.8 ^4f457a6d734b6f476273616c
Openswan 2.4.8 LDAP_V3 PLUTO_SENDS_VENDORID PLUTO_USES_KEYRR ^4f455d62575860514272754c
Openswan 2.4.8 PLUTO_SENDS_VENDORID PLUTO_USES_KEYRR ^4f4574514070784e717f5760
Openswan 2.4.9 ^4f45414c5d6a75516450457a
Openswan 2.4.9 LDAP_V3 PLUTO_SENDS_VENDORID PLUTO_USES_KEYRR ^4f45534a496f60726b636462
Openswan 2.4.9 PLUTO_SENDS_VENDORID PLUTO_USES_KEYRR ^4f455f5d7b764b67436f4f49
Openswan 2.5.0 ^4f4546477e5e4b5440606859
Openswan 2.5.00 ^4f45495c767449495c5a7350
Openswan 2.5.01 ^4f457260466858434c7e6a45
Openswan 2.5.02 ^4f45717a7c715b657c5c5156
Openswan 2.5.03 ^4f456651517b4f475276654d
Openswan 2.5.04 ^4f455672606d794f697d7242
Openswan 2.5.05 ^4f454a4d5e5e674c604e4168
Openswan 2.5.06 ^4f454a6176624e5876754d64
Openswan 2.5.07 ^4f455c47464946434875464e
Openswan 2.5.08 ^4f455a6f776e666c49497b68
Openswan 2.5.09 ^4f454c4f577c5a7c4c665248
Openswan 2.5.10 ^4f45714250575765766a6c72
Openswan 2.5.11 ^4f457a795c6440407166776c
Openswan 2.5.12 ^4f4549796c524b7c515b5450
Openswan 2.5.13 ^4f45455740667a5f766d785d
Openswan 2.5.14 ^4f45736b7f50645f6c416341
Openswan 2.5.15 ^4f45675e407f696148444f7c
Openswan 2.5.16 ^4f4557575d58474e5d574e58
Openswan 2.5.17 ^4f457a74437b794a6148685b
Openswan 2.5.18 ^4f455e74654a504c7a614967
Openswan 2.6.01 ^4f45766b71776b6f48467a69
Openswan 2.6.02 ^4f455f525758674a61465b6b
Openswan 2.6.03 ^4f45775376797c60516a757b
Openswan 2.6.04 ^4f45736f4c6569475a7d7f4c
Openswan 2.6.05 ^4f457b654a44434170427663
Openswan 2.6.06 ^4f454a4376414f737d6e495f
Openswan 2.6.07 ^4f45466b5d7b4753765c686b
Openswan 2.6.08 ^4f457d456755615659534c7b
Openswan 2.6.09 ^4f455a447e4d547d6d416e6c
Openswan 2.6.10 ^4f45744a61537c7646486641
Openswan 2.6.11 ^4f455e7f4c79574b43455465
Openswan 2.6.12 ^4f45775b5b5e5b705443404e
Openswan 2.6.13 ^4f455a7f4b47466754526564
Openswan 2.6.14 ^4f456f534a55776561714158
Openswan 2.6.15 ^4f4563476e586e5f567a5457
Openswan 2.6.16 ^4f456a7d637357765a5c7b63
Openswan 2.6.17 ^4f4554704245584355764571
Openswan 2.6.18 ^4f457d5a765a404d5b4f5744
Openswan 2.6.19 ^4f456b71484c42504f664d44
Openswan 2.6.20 ^4f4543714271574c644b7a41
Openswan 2.6.20dr2 ^4f454970424c6d5f4e5b6f59
Openswan 2.6.20rc1 ^4f4550544259485a67464e66
Openswan 2.6.21 ^4f457e717f6b5a4e727d576b
Openswan 2.6.22 ^4f456c6a405d72544d42754d
Openswan 2.6.23 ^4f456d406b6753464548407f
Openswan 2.6.24 ^4f45557d6068416e77737478
Openswan 2.6.24rc3 ^4f45694b5146645d6863434c
Openswan 2.6.24rc5 ^4f45445743787f6f78467b4d
Openswan 2.6.25 ^4f4543606e547b776f5e5848
Openswan 2.6.26 ^4f45504b7e7a764d4e645f57
Openswan 2.6.27 ^4f456e544e77494c76567e5c
Openswan 2.6.28 ^4f45517b4f7f6e657a7b4351
Openswan 2.6.29 ^4f455e5a65725d6564727763
Openswan 2.6.30 ^4f457656736b546968656675
Openswan 2.6.31 ^4f457d476e447f5a4159655b
Openswan 2.6.32 ^4f4568794c64414365636661
Openswan 2.6.33 ^4f456768495f775c414c4679
Openswan 2.6.34 ^4f457f7e637f7679517f4a5a
Openswan 2.6.35 ^4f457e487a746b6f69705842
Openswan 2.6.36 ^4f45716c74725d4b5a6c5d5f
Openswan 2.6.37 ^4f45755c645c6a795c5c6170
Openswan 2.6.38 ^4f4576795c6b677a57715c73
Openswan 2.6.38dr2 ^4f454b705270417f765b6b59
Openswan 2.6.38rc2 ^4f45414f75405b4e6b554a50
Openswan 2.6.39 ^4f456d6470475f6c477d767d
Openswan 2.6.39dr3 ^4f456c4e75416271485b7970
# Openswan 2.6.40+ uses "OSW" instead of "OE" as prefix, and the same
# truncated, "ASCIIfied" MD5 hash (only 9 bytes, to keep the same
# total length)
Openswan 2.6.40 ^4f53577666617a6f6355505a
Openswan 2.6.41 ^4f535773786c6a4640545359
Openswan 2.6.42 ^4f535751624a50497c705f61
Openswan 2.6.43 ^4f53577b5547416f4c674b64
# Openswan 2.6.44+, keeps the prefix "OSW", but the hashed name
# changes from "Openswan" to "Linux Openswan"
Linux Openswan 2.6.44 ^4f53574745627352675b5a51
Linux Openswan 2.6.45 ^4f53577e7b6566787577466d
Linux Openswan 2.6.46 ^4f535771775064405e494145
Linux Openswan 2.6.47 ^4f5357584f7a6d66706e7052
Linux Openswan 2.6.47.1 ^4f53575353637b5979536b4c
Linux Openswan 2.6.48 ^4f53576d77657d7c497e6c7c
Linux Openswan 2.6.49 ^4f5357795f4472657a654753
Linux Openswan 2.6.50dev1 ^4f53575e5f45464d62615370
Openswan Unknown Vsn ^4f5357[[:xdigit:]]{18}$
# Libreswan was forked from Openswan 2.6.38, which was forked from
# FreeS/WAN 1.99. This signature was taken from Libreswan 3.3 running
# on Fedora Core 19 x86_64. It appears like the same scheme as
# openswan, using OEN as the prefix.
Libreswan 3.3 LDAP_V3 ^4f454e574547444b6865684a
Libreswan 3.5 ^4f454e5f52685050487b645e
Libreswan 3.5 LDAP_V3 ^4f454e756f6b706a71757d5c
# General pattern, must come after specific FreeS/WAN and OpenSwan patterns.
FreeS/WAN or OpenSWAN or Libreswan ^4f454e[[:xdigit:]]{18}$
FreeS/WAN or OpenSWAN ^4f45[[:xdigit:]]{20}$
# OpenPGP
# VID starts with ASCII "OpenPGP". This is generally followed by some extra
# data, e.g. "OpenPGP10171", but we don't match that.
OpenPGP ^4f70656e504750
# Observed on Fortinet ForteGate Firewalls.
# Probably an MD5 hash of something.
FortiGate ^1d6e178f6c2c0be284985465450fe9d4
# Juniper NetScreen running ScreenOS
#
# There are many different entries for this implementation, because the VID
# varies depending on the s/w version and h/w model, and maybe other things
# as well.
#
# The first 20 bytes are suspected to be an SHA1 hash of something.
# This suspected hash appears to include the s/w version and the h/w platform.
#
# This is followed by eight bytes, which we don't include in the pattern.
# This eight bytes consists of two four-byte values in big endian format,
# e.g. 0000000900000500, the last four bytes appear to indicate the ScreenOS
# version.
#
# Examples:
#
# For the examples below, we show the entire VID, the netscreen model, and
# the ScreenOS version number.
#
# 64405f46f03b7660a23be116a1975058e69e83870000000400000403 ns5xp 4.0.3r3.0
# 299ee8289f40a8973bc78687e2e7226b532c3b760000000900000500 ns5xp 5.0.0r1.0
# 299ee8289f40a8973bc78687e2e7226b532c3b760000000900000500 ns5xp 5.0.0r6.0
# 299ee8289f40a8973bc78687e2e7226b532c3b760000000900000500 ns5xp 5.0.0r9.0
# 4a4340b543e02b84c88a8b96a8af9ebe77d9accc0000000b00000500 ns5gt 5.0.0r7.1
# 2a2bcac19b8e91b426107807e02e7249569d6fd30000000b0000050a ns5gt 5.1.0r1.0
# 166f932d55eb64d8e4df4fd37e2313f0d0fd84510000000000000000 ns5gt 5.2.0r3b.0
# 166f932d55eb64d8e4df4fd37e2313f0d0fd84510000000000000000 ns5gt 5.3.0r4.0
# 166f932d55eb64d8e4df4fd37e2313f0d0fd84510000000000000000 ns5gt 5.4.0r1.0
# a35bfd05ca1ac0b3d2f24e9e82bfcbff9c9e52b50000000b00000514 unknown unknown
#
# The Netscreen hardware referenced above is:
#
# ns5xp model NS-5XP
# ns5gt model NS-5GT-103 serial no 0064062004015770
#
# Netscreens also return:
# 4865617274426561745f4e6f74696679386b0100 (Heartbeat Notify)
# In addition, ScreenOS Version 5.3 and 5.4 returns:
# afcad71368a1f1c96b8696fc77570100 (Dead Peer Detection)
#
Netscreen-01 ^299ee8289f40a8973bc78687e2e7226b532c3b76
Netscreen-02 ^3a15e1f3cf2a63582e3ac82d1c64cbe3b6d779e7
Netscreen-03 ^47d2b126bfcd83489760e2cf8c5d4d5a03497c15
Netscreen-04 ^4a4340b543e02b84c88a8b96a8af9ebe77d9accc
Netscreen-05 ^64405f46f03b7660a23be116a1975058e69e8387
Netscreen-06 ^699369228741c6d4ca094c93e242c9de19e7b7c6
Netscreen-07 ^8c0dc6cf62a0ef1b5c6eabd1b67ba69866adf16a
Netscreen-08 ^92d27a9ecb31d99246986d3453d0c3d57a222a61
Netscreen-09 ^9b096d9ac3275a7d6fe8b91c583111b09efed1a0
Netscreen-10 ^bf03746108d746c904f1f3547de24f78479fed12
Netscreen-11 ^c2e80500f4cc5fbf5daaeed3bb59abaeee56c652
Netscreen-12 ^c8660a62b03b1b6130bf781608d32a6a8d0fb89f
Netscreen-13 ^f885da40b1e7a9abd17655ec5bbec0f21f0ed52e
Netscreen-14 ^2a2bcac19b8e91b426107807e02e7249569d6fd3
Netscreen-15 ^166f932d55eb64d8e4df4fd37e2313f0d0fd8451
Netscreen-16 ^a35bfd05ca1ac0b3d2f24e9e82bfcbff9c9e52b5
Netscreen-16 ^9436e8d67174ef9aed068d5ad5213f187a3f8ba6
# Avaya
# Observed on Avaya VSU 100R
# Not sure if this is common to all Avaya equipment
avaya ^4485152d18b6bbcc0be8a8469579ddcc
# Stonegate
# Observed on Stonesoft StoneGate v2.2.1
StoneGate-01 ^c573b056d7faca36c2fba28374127cbf
StoneGate-02 ^baeb239037e17787d730eed9d95d48aa
# Symantec Raptor / Enterprise Firewall
# Observed on Symantec Enterprise Firewall 8.0 running on Windows 2000
# An example vendor ID returned by these systems is:
# 526170746f7220506f77657256706e20536572766572205b56382e315d
# which corresponds to the ASCII string: "Raptor PowerVpn Server [V8.1]"
#
Symantec-Raptor-v8.1 ^526170746f7220506f77657256706e20536572766572205b56382e315d
Symantec-Raptor ^526170746f7220506f77657256706e20536572766572
# First 9 bytes seem to be random, last six bytes are the string "Teldat"
Teldat ^..................54656c646174
# Other things I've seen but not fully classified yet.
# If anyone can confirm any of these, please let me know.
Maybe Cisco IOS ^bdb41038a7ec5e5534dd004d0f91f927
# Unknown 1 was classified as Cisco VPN Concentrator
# Unknown 2 was classified as Windows-2000
Unknown 3 ^edea53a3c15d45cafb11e59ea68db2aa99c1470e0000000400000303
Unknown 4 ^bedc86dabf0ab7973870b5e6c4b87d3ee824de310000001000000401
Unknown 5 ^ac5078c25cabb9523979978e76a3d0d2426bc9260000000400000401
# Unknown 6 was classified as SSH IPSEC Express 4.1.0
Unknown 7 ^69b761a173cc1471dc4547d2a5e94812
Unknown 8 ^4c5647362e303a627269636b3a362e302e353732
Unknown 9 ^3499691eb82f9eaefed378f5503671debd0663b4000000040000023c
# I've seen Unknown 10 sent from SonicWall Global VPN Client
Unknown 10 ^975b7816f69789600dda89040576e0db
# The "Safenet or Watchguard" Vendor ID has also been seen sent from SonicWall
# Global VPN client. It is normally followed by 80010000, which looks like a
# version number.
Safenet or Watchguard ^da8e9378
Unknown-cisco ^e23ae9f51a46876ff93d89ba725d649d
Maybe Sidewinder G2 ^8404adf9cda05760b2ca292e4bff537b
Maybe Sidewinder G2 ^e720cdd49d2ee7b83ce1970a6c69b528